





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
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THE
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
OF THE
MONARCHY OF GREECE,

FROM THE YEAR 1830,

SHOWING THE TRANSFER TO RUSSIA OF THE MORTGAGE HELD BY
BRITISH CAPITALISTS OVER ITS PROPERTY AND REVENUES.

BY
HENRY HEADLEY PARISH, ESQ.,

LATE SECRETARY OF LEGATION TO GREECE.

"Contempts against the Prerogative may also be, by preferring the interests of a Foreign Potentate to those of our own, or doing or receiving any thing that may create an undue influence, in favour of such extrinsic power."—*Blackstone*, Book iv. Chap. 9.

LONDON :

J. HATCHARD AND SON, 187, PICCADILLY.

1838.

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LONDON:

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INTRODUCTION.

THE persevering warfare of Russia in the remote, and next to unknown, territory of Circassia, renders less extraordinary the deep intentness of her policy in Greece. But the one and the other should separately suffice to impress upon England the necessity of attaching greater importance than has unfortunately for some years been given to foreign relations.

The extraordinary efforts which Russia has to make to secure her ends in countries apparently so insignificant, must suffice to show that a slight degree of attention granted to our foreign interests would be attended with the desired results; and that a policy of conservation and peace has but to be in reality acted upon by England, to combine those divided, but resisting, elements of the separate nationalities which Russia is subduing in detail, and to confer on any and on all of them

a real strength, which she would be unable to overthrow, by giving to each the moral support of a power superior to their antagonist.

The unparalleled exposures that have recently taken place, leave no further ground for discussion respecting the views of Russia, her purposes of appropriation, and her hostility to all and every power disposed to thwart and capable of thwarting her.

The means by which she has advanced, step by step, to the positions which she now occupies, by which she has assumed the threatening posture which she now displays, have also been traced with equal felicity and effect. These disquisitions have claimed an interest paralleled by none which foreign events have for many years called for; and it is now admitted as an axiom "that from the earliest times in which Russia has had a share in the policy of Europe, her views in the East have been promoted by the ignorance which made other powers her dupes and the instruments of her aggrandizement."*

Her policy has yet to be elucidated in Greece.

* Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East.

To that subject the following pages are devoted. From the hour the Greeks became a nation, all sympathy ceased between them and Russia; all influence on the part of Russia over them was at an end; the commanding position she has regained in that country, has been achieved through England and France, who, by their ignorance, have been made, and continue to be, the dupes of her policy and the instruments of her aggrandizement. The means by which she has advanced, stand by

Having been, during ten years, confidentially connected with the negotiations which have been carried on at St. Petersburg, at Constantinople, and in Greece, I find it incumbent upon me to anticipate any suspicion of betrayal of confidence on my part, by stating, that no document has been made use of in this volume, which is not published and accessible, to any person anxious to inquire into these matters: I will further add that I have admitted into these papers no statement—that I have expressed no opinion, derived from sources to which my official position gave me exclusive access. Her policy has yet to be elucidated in Greece.

My object in publishing this work might have

been attained without affixing to it my name: but, as the statements which I make involve charges of the most serious nature against individuals, I think it incumbent on me not to make those statements anonymously.

Only two works have appeared on Greece during the period of which I treat. The first of these is

“*L'état actuel de La Grèce et des moyens d'arriver à sa restauration*, par Frederic Thiersch, en 2 vols. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1833.”

M. Thiersch, originally the preceptor of Prince Otho, and distinguished by his great classical attainments, went to Greece in 1831 to study on the spot the country and its inhabitants. Such was the confidence which M. Thiersch's character inspired in Greece, that he was selected by the residents and the admirals of the three powers, to act as a mediator between the two parties contending in arms, when neither of them would listen to the representatives of the alliance.

The work of M. Thiersch is one of the most remarkable of the times. It preserves a record, which would otherwise have been lost, of that most interesting and dramatic period from the

conclusion of the rule of Capodistrias to the arrival of King Otho, and which every diplomatic and official means were employed to disguise and to falsify. His concise, but effective sketches of character, his details respecting the habits of administration of the Greek people, the extent of his information, the exactness of his observation, so completely throw into the shade every thing else that has appeared relating to that country, that his work may be said to be the only one on Greece. Professor Thiersch had at that time seen but Greece, and he could not have observed the connexion of sympathies, feelings, or institutions, which in reality identified Greece with the other portions of that Eastern world, with which, to his eyes, it appeared only connected by hatred and hostility.

A man who had thus rendered himself the object of the affections of the Greek people, and who had exposed the misrepresentations of foreign diplomacy, naturally became an object of animosity to some of the foreign agents, and representations from England to the King of Bavaria caused his exclusion from any post in the royal government, and pre-

vented him from accompanying his pupil to Greece. Hereupon, M. Thiersch published his views as a protest against the sacrifice of Greece by European diplomacy or German legislation.

The next work which appeared was that of M. von Maurer, under the title of

“Das Griechische Volk, in öffentlicher, kirchlicher, und privatrechtlicher Beziehung vor und nach dem Freiheitskampfe bis zum 31. Juli, 1834. Von Georg Ludwig von Maurer. Heidelberg, 1835.”*

This is a most valuable work from its details of the customs and the popular and traditional legislation of Greece. It shows an amount of honest labour in the author which does great credit to the sentiments with which he viewed the responsibility imposed upon him. The opinions contained in the work are neither striking nor important, but they confirm while they reflect the views of M. Thiersch.

* The Greek People, in their Political, Ecclesiastical, and Civil Relations, before and after the war of Independence, down to the 31st of July, 1834; by George Louis von Maurer, Councillor of State of the King of Bavaria, Member of the Royal Regency of Greece, &c. &c., &c., in 4 vols.

But M. de Maurer's work is of importance in another point of view. It is a manifesto of the majority of the royal Regency of Greece published to their native land, to Germany, and to the world, in which they detail the circumstances of their administration, assert the principles of their policy, and protest against the breaking up of the Regency in Greece through the influence of his Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, under the impression that the measures of policy and the dispositions of the individuals thus protesting were—Russian!

Singular to say, these works, not the production of insignificant and anonymous writers, but proceeding from men called by the powers of Europe to situations of the highest trust and honour — involving charges of the gravest nature against individuals, not limited to a single transaction, but continued through a series of years, have hitherto remained unanswered. No single effort has been made to meet the accusations which they convey, and no step has been taken to disavow the acts which they record.

These are the only works that have appeared

within the period to which I have alluded. In France not a single line has been written; and in England, which has taken the lead in the political affairs of Greece within the whole of this interesting interval, no writer has undertaken the task of elucidating its history.

But in England the subject of Greece has been treated in the various political reviews, and in all of them in a sense more or less coinciding with the views of M. Thiersch and M. von Maurer. The works treating on the foreign policy of England are—

The Quarterly Review, Edinburgh Review, British and Foreign Quarterly Review, Foreign Quarterly Review, Blackwood's Magazine, The Portfolio.

Is it not singular that the whole of these periodicals, belonging to different parties, holding opposite opinions, and advocating rival interests, should all of them agree on the point that Greece was entirely Russian,* and that in the face of this

* *Quarterly Review*, February, 1836.—“Greece—almost Russian, and altogether bankrupt—distracted by internal factions, and disgusted with its European rulers and protectors.”

Edinburgh Review. CXXXI. April, 1837.—“What is the actual position of Russia? The boundaries of that power may

mass of opinion, expressed during the last three years, the government, adopting a different view, and acting energetically upon that view, should never have refuted such opinions, demonstrated the hollowness of such assertions, and shown the grounds of its policy?

I have still to advert to the documentary history of Greece, the public acts of its successive governments, and the state papers by which those acts were detailed and defended.

works treating on the foreign policy of England now be considered as advanced to the Dardanelles, and even to Cape Matapan; for the kingdom of Greece, if suffered to exist, will always act in obedience to the dictates of the Court of St. Petersburg.

British and Foreign Quarterly Review, No. III., January, 1836.
—“It was not till European institutions, and European civilization, which our author is so anxious to inflict on all the Eastern populations, was sought to be introduced into that now distracted country—that society was convulsed almost to its very lowest foundations; for this convulsion an able power has long and successfully laboured; yet, all these causes would have been insufficient, without £5,000,000, (four-fifths of it English) applied for the consolidation there of Russian power.”

Foreign Quarterly Review, No. XXXII., January, 1836.—“The fact is that Russia has arrived at all her ends. She has arrived at the exclusion of Foreign Influence in Greece. Her object now is to render the national party her party. The point had been gained when struggle and contention ceased, when the timid became harassed, and the bold desponding. It remained for her,

It is a most remarkable circumstance that, amidst the complicated history of Greece during the last seven years, during the conflict of parties under no less than ten provisional governments, every measure of state, every act of each separate administration, has been preserved; and thus, although no native historian has yet appeared, there exists an unbroken chain of history in state papers and public records. Amongst these, the most distinguished are the reports of the National Assemblies. They contain expositions of principles of government, having a striking analogy with the ancient institutions of England and Germany. The character of the Primates is placed in a most interesting light, by the sagacity, the financial knowledge, and the powers of mind which those papers display.

Having witnessed the action of various forms of representative government in the Western Hemisphere and in Europe, I cannot refrain from ex-

But the Protocols of the Conference of London then, in profiting by the results, by the arts which had pushed them to despair, to step in with consolations which were not expected, and cast on others the obloquy which their supineness admitted, but which their intentions had not merited."

pressing the admiration with which the study of these documents has inspired me; and I shrink not from asserting my conviction that they may bear to be compared with the parliamentary records of this or of any other age or country.*

The foreign policy of England must be founded on the reports of its representatives abroad, whose views are principally formed on the official acts of the governments to which they are accredited, and which they transmit to their own, as the grounds of their conviction. They contain expositions of principle.

The diplomatic history of Greece, which has served as the basis and justification of the policy of England, is comprised in the papers which have been presented to Parliament by His Majesty's command, in the years 1832 and 1836, detailing the progress of the negotiations of England, France, and Russia, and indicating the measures and the individuals those powers had supported in Greece.

But the Protocols of the Conferences of London do not coincide in their representation of the

I allude to the acts of the assemblies of Epidaurus, Astros, Trezene, and Pronia.

events in Greece, and of the acts recording those events, with the historical records which Greece preserves. The groundwork of the policy of England in Greece, from the year 1830, has thus been — misrepresentation; not on the part of any of the conflicting parties, but on the part of the diplomatic agents. At the Conference of London, under a veil of mystery, impenetrable to any of the interested parties, the plenipotentiaries of England, France, and Russia, met to receive and to communicate their separate reports and opinions, and to take, in common, measures which became binding on all; thus placing at the disposal of any one of the three powers which was abler than the rest the direction of the policy under the influence of which future reports should be presented to them from the country itself. And here is the extraordinary predicament in which the British government has suffered itself to be placed, that the representations of its own minister were regularly communicated to the plenipotentiary of the power whose views were as clearly hostile to England as they were hostile to Greece. Nay, more, that the English representative was instructed by his government

to conform himself, *in his reports*, to the views of the other representatives, and therefore to that of Russia. Causes must be without effects, when such a system could fail to produce the mass of misrepresentation, which the British Secretary of State has, on two occasions, presented to the Parliament of Great Britain. One of the most lamentable effects of this state of things is, that the first step involves a continuation in the same line. Once engaged in this untoward career, the public functionaries have had all their feelings of self-love, and their character for sagacity and discrimination, staked on the continuation of the same policy, and employed in resisting every evidence of the truth; and Russia, having alone the consciousness of their errors, acquired over them that power which the circumstances of Europe reveal, which has never been exercised before by one free state over another, and the existence of which can alone explain such circumstances as those which have occurred respecting Cracow, or the capture of the "Vixen." Our constitutional changes of government and of principles, so lamentable in other respects,

might still afford the means of correction in such a case as this; but, in consequence of the absence of information respecting Greece, independent of government sources, a new ministry can only judge by the records which the Foreign Office contains, and it must employ the agents already committed.

Thus the statute history of Greece is in diametrical opposition to the diplomatic history drawn up in Downing Street. The surprise of the reader that such a system of deception should never have been unmasked, either in Greece or in Europe, will be dissipated on reflecting that no deception of such a character could have been carried on without a purpose, and that, in the complete accomplishment and success of that purpose, the truth was suppressed.

This singular process of extinguishing in the eyes of public men in England the past history of Greece is not without a parallel in the diplomatic relations of the last ten years. The success of Russia in this respect has not been confined to Greece, and without parallel cases it would be incredible. A war of seven continuous years in Cir-

cassia was veiled from the world. The Ottoman empire, with whom we have maintained diplomatic relations of the most important character, was, by her agency, so completely misrepresented in the eyes of mankind, that it was universally considered as on the point of dissolution, at a period when Russia was putting in motion nearly 250,000 men, in consequence of the alarm which had been awakened in her mind, by the new energies that empire was in reality putting forth, and by the career of internal and peaceful progress on which it had happily entered.

The negotiations respecting the affairs of Greece commenced at Verona; they were reduced to positive stipulation at St. Petersburg, and to a formal and obligatory treaty on the 6th of July, 1827, in London. They were directed, not to the exclusive interests of Greece, but to the various relations in which the Ottoman Empire was placed towards Europe; and that conviction was emphatically recorded in the denomination which those negotiations at first received—*“For the Pacification of the East.”* Europe felt that peace was endangered by the

preponderating influence of Russia, and by the menacing position which she assumed in the East—where no substantive power in the individual states—where no concert of purpose between themselves, or with Europe—and no positive diplomatic stipulations, afforded a prospect of resisting her encroachments, or even of ascertaining the amount of her progress, or the proximity of her success. Under the impulse of this indistinct apprehension, England, in ignorance of her own strength and of Russia's weakness, allied herself with Russia to retard, under the idea of forcing Russia to co-operate with herself, that aggrandizement to which she contributed by co-operating with Russia.

France was then induced to join this ill-omened alliance, increasing its power and extending the sphere of its influence as operating on the mind and policy of Europe, and as exasperating still more the Mussulman world against Christendom; while this new ally gave Russia further means of acting on England, and of making France and England reciprocally act on each other.

The alliance being thus constituted, Russia, with her wonted ability, gradually narrowed the large

view with which the design had originally been conceived. The pacification of the East dwindled down into the pacification of Greece, whilst, from the second stage of the negotiations, (the Protocol of April the 4th,) Russia secured the insertion of a clause frustrating the very object for which the alliance was formed—the joint co-operation of the allies—which clause,* within a very few months, she made use of as a menace to force the English minister into adhesion to her views, by the threatened exposure of this sacrifice of his own principles. From that period the alliance has placed its Eastern policy and its Eastern diplomacy at the disposal of Russia; and thus have the general feelings of Europe, which a dozen years ago prompted the cabinets to adopt measures to control the ambition of Russia, when in arms against Turkey, ended in

* ART. III.—“Whatever may be the nature of the relations between his Imperial Majesty and the Turkish government, his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty will still consider the terms of the arrangements specified in Art. I. of this Protocol as the basis of any reconciliation to be effected by their intervention, whether in concert or *separately*, between the Porte and the Greeks.”

diverting their interest from every other portion of the East to absorb them exclusively in the affairs of Greece;* and, even in that country, placed at a distance from her frontiers, not menaced by her armies, and no longer accessible to her diplomacy, she has secured, through England, that preponderating influence, position, and power, which she had avowed her inability to obtain through any unassisted efforts of her own.

The right assumed by Russia to interfere, by force of arms, in the internal concerns of the Ottoman Empire, for the purpose of extinguishing the Greek insurrection, was so entirely opposed to British principles, that all diplomatic intercourse between England and Russia on the Eastern Question was suspended, in 1825, for upwards of a twelvemonth; during which period the Greeks fixed their entire hopes on this country, and placed, by a national act, their political existence and independence unconditionally under the protection

* Between Turkey and Russia there was no intervention, no negotiation on the part of England and France.

of Great Britain. They at the same time solicited the nomination of a Prince connected with England to rule over them, and entrusted His Majesty's ambassador to the Porte with full powers to negotiate their reconciliation with the Sultan.

England was, therefore, in the possession of that position which Russia coveted, and, by England's possession of it was Russia doubly excluded; nor—such were the feelings of the Greek people—could she expect to supplant England except through England herself, and that was to be effected by identifying England with herself, and by obtaining the support of England to measures conducive to the proposed end. The proposal of the Greeks to acknowledge the supremacy of England thus strangely became the source of a combination through which the objects of England have been frustrated, and her influence excluded.

The first stipulation we find laid down as the condition of the concert between England and Russia, to effect the pacification of the East, is, that—

“ His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty will not

seek, in this arrangement, any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence, nor advantage in commerce for their subjects, which shall not be equally attainable by all other nations."—*Art. V. of the Protocol of St. Petersburg, April 4, 1826.*

Now, the boundaries of the Russian empire in 1826, as settled by the treaty of Bucharest, between Russia and Turkey, on the 16th of May, 1812, were defined as follows:—

ART. VI.—“Independently of the frontier of the Pruth, those on the coast of Asia and other places are re-established entirely as they were formerly before the war, according as it is stipulated by Art. III. of the preliminaries. Consequently, the imperial court of Russia surrenders and restores to the sublime Ottoman Porte, in the state in which they are at present, the fortresses and castles situated in the interior of this frontier, and conquered by her arms, as well as the towns, burghs, villages, habitations, and everything that the country contains.”

Thus the southern limit of Russia and of Europe on the side of Asia remained the same at the treaty of Vienna, and at the signature of the Protocol of St. Petersburg, as it was settled by the peace of Yassy; viz., the *Kuban River*.

Mr. Canning, in his letter to Prince Lieven of the 20th of November, 1826, “proposes,” after communicating conjointly to the courts of Paris,

Berlin, and Vienna, his letter of the 4th of September, "to add the expression of the well-founded hope entertained by our two sovereigns of finding the said courts disposed to co-operate with the parties who signed the Protocol *in the pacification of the East of Europe.*"

In the note presented by Lord Granville to the Baron de Damas, his lordship states,

"The Undersigned is charged to express the firm hope that the court of France will be disposed to co-operate with the parties who signed the Protocol, *in the pacification of the East of Europe.*"

Baron de Damas, in his reply to Lord Granville of the 8th of December, 1826, states,

"Under the conviction which he (the king of France) feels, that a complete accordance on all points between the five allied courts can alone triumph over the difficulties which attach to the *pacification of the East*, he proposes that the Protocol of the 4th of April should be converted into a treaty between these courts."

Count Nesselrode, in his despatch to the Russian chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, dated St. Petersburg, 12th December, 1826, states,

"Frank representations have taken place, first between

the cabinet of his Imperial majesty and that of St. James's, afterwards between these two united cabinets and the courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin. They have brought about the adherence of the latter to the *principles consecrated by the Protocol of the 4th of April.*"

The subsequent conversion of the Protocol of St. Petersburg into the treaty of July the 6th, 1827, by which France acceded to the alliance, still further consecrated the spirit of disinterestedness which animated the mediating powers. The 5th article of the treaty states,

"The contracting powers will not seek in these arrangements *any augmentation of territory, any exclusive influence, or any commercial advantage* for their subjects, which those of every other nation may not equally obtain."

But Russia, in her diplomatic communications annexed to the Protocols of the Conferences of London, has herself defined the spirit of her engagements towards her allies. In the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven, dated St. Petersburg, January 6th, 1828, annexed to Protocol No. 7, his Excellency states,

"Nevertheless, Mon Prince, the more anxious the Emperor is for the prompt execution of the treaty of London, the more will he himself *respect its stipulations*. Without doubt,

the conduct of the Porte, its strange proceedings with regard to the commerce and subjects of his majesty, the refusal to allow, henceforth, in their favour, a protection which has ever existed under similar circumstances, would fully justify the employment of the means which our august master has at his disposal: but it is sufficient for the Emperor to have signed an agreement with his allies, *to ensure his adherence to the principles which it establishes.*

“The first, and the most essential of all, is that which prohibits to the powers who signed the treaty of London, conquests and exclusive advantages. His majesty has already announced that *in any supposable case* he will never deviate from it. He charges me to *repeat in this place the expression of that firm resolution.* It is with true pleasure that the Emperor has seen, by your highness’s despatch, dated the 29th of November, (11th of December) that, upon the receipt of the first intelligence from Constantinople which portended to what extent the Porte would carry its blind obstinacy, the Conference of London was employed on a declaration, which should prove anew, in the face of Europe, the unchangeable disinterestedness of the three monarchs, whatever might be the measures to which the policy of the divan might compel them to resort. In signing this declaration, Mon Prince, you will have anticipated the wishes of his majesty, and there is no form in which such an engagement can be renewed which the Emperor does not approve beforehand. If a special treaty should be necessary for this purpose, you may conclude it, without waiting for further instructions. We will add, frankly, that it is not an abstract maxim of generosity, or a vain desire of glory, which dictates this policy to the Emperor; *it is the interest of Russia well understood.* She has a powerful interest in beholding in

Greece the formation of a new state, which may freely trade with the Black Sea; but that interest is identified with that of other commercial powers. She has no less direct an interest, and of which we have already made mention, in exercising in the East an influence which of right belongs to her; but this influence does not exclude that of the other courts of Europe, and cannot, even on that account, excite either well founded alarms or reasonable jealousy. Russia, on the other hand, has *no interest in aggrandizing herself, or in overthrowing the Ottoman empire.*"

Again, in the same despatch, Count Nesselrode adds—

"We are arrived at a point at which it is no longer in our power to hesitate upon the measures which the determinations of the Turkish government call for; *but we repeat it, even to satiety*, that neither the fall of that government, nor conquests, enter into our contemplation, because they would be more prejudicial than useful to us. Besides, even if, notwithstanding our intentions and our efforts, the decrees of divine Providence should have predestined us to be witnesses of the last day of the Ottoman Empire, the sentiments of his majesty *with regard to the aggrandizement of Russia* would be still the same. *The Emperor would not enlarge the limits of his territory, and he would only ask of his allies the same absence of ambition and of exclusive designs, of which he would give the first example.* Resting upon such principles, the arrangements to be made in such a case (the probability of which, however, we are far from admitting) could not experience any serious difficulties. Such is, and such will invariably be, our single answer to the de-

clamations which fill the public prints of all parties upon the gigantic projects of Russian policy, upon the acquisitions which it meditates, or upon our desire to produce the fall of the empire of the crescent, and to appropriate Constantinople to ourselves. For our allies, the pledges of our moderation are, *our true interests and our solemn promises*. Do there exist between states any safer guarantees?"

In reply to the notification, that Russia had declared war against Turkey, Lord Dudley thus addresses Prince Lieven. (See Annex A to Protocol of June 15, 1828.)—

"In two papers, one addressed to your highness, and the other to the French government, your highness has been made fully acquainted with the reasons for which his majesty deprecates an invasion of the Ottoman empire. His majesty can never be induced to look at such an event, merely in the partial and imperfect view of its possible bearing upon the state of Greece.

Even were its effects in that direction to be more salutary than any that he may venture to anticipate, he would still regard that benefit as far more than counterbalanced by the danger to which it would expose the tranquillity of Europe.

To sanction this measure—still more to be a party to it—would be to act in direct contradiction to the whole tenour of the conduct pursued, and to the language held, by his majesty's command, ever since the affairs of Greece first engaged the consideration of the great powers of Europe."

It appears, therefore, that England, wholly disapproved of the war with Turkey; and, in the following passage, the opinions of the British government are unequivocally expressed:—

“The peculiar situation of the Emperor of Russia, the language employed towards Russia by the Turkish government, which, in the judgment of his imperial majesty, affords just cause of resentment, and the grievances of which his subjects have to complain, have induced him to engage in a war. But his majesty relies too confidently upon the wisdom and justice of his imperial majesty, to imagine that he will consider himself warranted to aim by it at any other objects in Greece than those pointed out in the treaty of July. Separated from his allies by circumstances over which they had no controul; that separation having taken place without previous concert or consultation with them, and for which they are therefore not responsible, he may pursue that object by means to which they are not at liberty to resort; but the object must remain the same; nor could his imperial majesty propose to himself one differing from it, either in kind or *in degree*, without departing from the spirit of his engagements.

“In the conduct of the war, as it arises out of separate differences of Russia with the Porte, is his imperial majesty bound by any positive stipulations? He is in the situation of an independent power, engaged in a contest with another state, upon grounds of which his imperial majesty himself is the most competent judge. His majesty relies, however, with confidence upon the wisdom and magnanimity of the

Emperor, for concluding it at the earliest possible period, and upon equitable terms.

“That confidence is strengthened by those declarations which have been recently made, on the part of his imperial majesty, in Count Nesselrode’s despatches of the 6th of January, and of the 26th of February, addressed to your highness, and communicated to his majesty’s government.

“In the first of these, Count Nesselrode, speaking in the name of his imperial master, declares: ‘Il suffit à l’empereur d’avoir signé une transaction avec ses alliés, pour ne jamais s’écarter des principes qu’elle consacre. Le premier et le plus essentiel de tous, est celui qui interdit aux Puissances signataires du traité de Londres, les conquêtes et les avantages exclusifs. Sa majesté a déjà annoncé qu’elle n’en dévierait dans aucune hypothèse.’

“In another place, Count Nesselrode says: ‘La Russie, en revanche, n’a aucun intérêt à s’agrandir ou à renverser l’empire Ottoman.’ And again: ‘Ni la chute de ce gouvernement, ni des conquêtes, n’entrent dans nos vues, parcequ’elles nous seraient plus nuisibles qu’utiles. Au reste, quand même, malgré nos intentions et nos efforts, les décrets de la divine Providence nous auraient prédestinés à être témoins du dernier jour de l’empire Ottoman, les idées de sa majesté, quant aux agrandissemens de la Russie, seraient encore les mêmes. L’empereur ne reculerait pas les bornes de son territoire, et ne demanderait à ses alliés que cette absence d’ambition et de pensées exclusives, dont il donnerait le premier exemple.’

“And in that of the 26th of February, his imperial majesty, after claiming for himself complete liberty as to the mode of carrying on the war, in case his allies should withhold their co-operation, goes on to say: ‘La Russie ne se

proposera ni des conquêtes, ni la chute de l'empire Ottoman.

“But your highness is aware, that no war between two great powers can be so far confined to themselves, as not to give to the rest of Europe a right to watch over its progress, and examine its result. Russia, believing herself injured or insulted, may demand satisfaction and redress; but, at the final settlement of such differences, *the interests of the other parties*, besides those actually engaged in the struggle, *have a claim to attention*.

“The most complete success, in the justest cause, would not entitle the stronger party to require from the weaker such sacrifices, under the name of indemnity, as would affect its political existence, or *would infringe upon that state of territorial possession upon which the general peace has rested*, and which has been acquiesced in, during one of the longest, and by far the most prosperous intervals of tranquillity, that Europe has ever known.

“I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) “DUDLEY.”

In replying to the observations of Lord Dudley, Count Nesselrode, in his letter to Prince Lieven, dated St. Petersburg, the 29th of April, 1828, (see Annexe D. to Protocol of the 15th of June, 1828) states:

“Neither does it enter into the ideas of the Emperor *to change the state of territorial possession*, whereupon that peace rests, of which the British Cabinet speaks, and of

which we desire, as strongly as it does, the long maintenance. But we will observe, without any secret design, and to place facts on their exact footing, that that same peace, and the state of the territorial possession of the different Christian Powers, result from negotiations and Treaties, in which there has never been any mention, either directly or indirectly, of Turkey. Those Treaties, and the reciprocal guarantees contained therein, cannot therefore apply to it of right; a consideration, which, however, *makes no change in the intentions, always equally moderate, of our August Sovereign.*"

In her Declaration of War, addressed to the European Courts, Russia publicly defines the spirit of all her pre-existing engagements with Turkey, thus showing that those stipulations were a part of the International Law of Europe.

Russia states :

"The Porte has nevertheless constantly misunderstood the advantages of its stipulations with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and of the fundamental treaties of Kainardjhe, Jassy, and *Bucharest*, which, by placing the existence of the Porte, and the integrity of its frontiers, under the protection of the law of nations, could not fail to contribute to the duration of its Empire."

Russia adds in the same declaration her definition of her engagements with England :

"The sending of a permanent mission to Constantinople soon followed this reconciliation, at which the Porte expressed

its satisfaction in the strongest terms:—soon afterwards the Treaty of the 6th of July, 1827, *confirmed in the face of the world the disinterested principles proclaimed by the Protocol of the 4th of April.*"

And the declaration terminates with the following protestation:

"*Russia is far from cherishing ambitious projects.* Sufficient people and countries acknowledge her sway; already sufficient anxieties are connected with the extent of her dominion.

"Finally, Russia, notwithstanding her being at war with the Porte for motives independent of the Treaty of July the 6th, has not departed, *and will not depart, from the stipulations of that act.*" "Her allies will always find her ready to concert with them her measures relative to the execution of the Treaty of London, always anxious to co-operate in a work which is recommended to its lively solicitude by religion, and all the feelings which do honour to humanity; always inclined to make use of its present situation, *only for the more speedy fulfilment of the stipulations of the 6th of July, and not to make any change in their nature or their effects.*"
—*St. Petersburg, April the 26th, 1828.*

On a subsequent occasion, in a letter from Lord Aberdeen to Prince Lieven, dated June the 6th, 1828, his lordship reminds the Prince that the condition of England's continuing to take part in the Conferences, is the declaration made

by Russia, that "even under the altered circumstances of his present position, the stipulations of the Treaty will ever be sacred in His Imperial Majesty's eyes." His lordship states:

"There is still another point in the despatch of Count Nesselrode, to which the Undersigned feels himself compelled to advert; more especially as it is put forward in the declaration of war by Russia, and in the circular note of Count Nesselrode of the 14th (26th) April. But, in doing so, he thinks it necessary explicitly to declare, that the sentiments of moderation and disinterestedness by which His Imperial Majesty is animated, are such as to remove any just ground of uneasiness on this head, and even to obviate any misconception to which the statement might otherwise give rise. It seems, however, to be assumed by Count Nesselrode, that, because the general Treaties of Paris and Vienna, in 1814-15, were concluded without the participation of the Porte, and even without any reference to the interests of that Power, the invasion of the Turkish Empire is, therefore, a subject of less interest to those European States, under whose auspices those Treaties were negotiated and ratified. It is true that the preservation of the Turkish Empire is enjoined neither by the stipulations of any Treaty, nor by the obligations of reciprocal guarantee. But the Russian Government is too enlightened not to see, and too just not to admit, *not only that no change in the state of possession, as established by the Treaties in question, could take place without proving deeply interesting to the several Powers of Europe, but that no material alteration could be effected in the condition, strength, and character of a great Power,*

without altering the relative position of the neighbouring States towards each other, and towards the rest of Europe.

“Whatever tends to derange that balance, the re-adjustment of which, after years of blood and toil, the great Powers of Europe happily succeeded in effecting, will of necessity mar the perfection of their work; and, by giving rise to jealousies and apprehensions, may too probably lead to fresh complications and disasters.

“The Undersigned requests His Highness Prince Lieven to accept the assurances, &c.

(Signed) ABERDEEN.”

Three months later, on England's being led into adherence to the exercise of belligerent rights on the part of Russia in the Mediterranean, the English Minister, recalling the solemn pledges of the Emperor to the contrary, releases at least his own conscience by the following remonstrance against the acts to which he yielded :

“No reasoning can be necessary to enforce the sacred character of the Royal word, or the paramount obligations of honour and good faith; and the Undersigned feels convinced that the sense of justice and the magnanimity of His Imperial Majesty are too conspicuous, to render it possible for His Imperial Majesty to follow any other course.

“Great and irresistible as the impulses of truth and honour must at all times be in generous minds, the peculiarity of the present state of the relations of the Allied Powers with the Ottoman Porte renders a scrupulous re-

gard to the rectitude of their conduct more than ever indispensable. Almost at the very commencement of the measures adopted in execution of the Treaty of London, an unforeseen and unexpected collision occasioned the destruction of the Turkish fleet; subsequently the ports of the Morea have been strictly blockaded, and still more recently, that province has been occupied by a French force. All this has been done with the assurance of neutrality, and in the execution of the Treaty having for its object the pacification of Greece. These measures have been accompanied by repeated professions of friendship towards the Porte: and, although it may not be easy for the Turkish Government to appreciate justly the conduct of the Allies, which, it must be confessed, however necessary, carried with it the appearance of hostility, *there can be no hope, under such circumstances, of meeting with any degree of credit, if other promises and declarations, made and repeated, be not religiously observed!*—*Lord Aberdeen to Prince Lieven, September the 30th, 1828.*

The object of the Protocol of the 4th of April and of the Treaty of July was attained by the declaration of the Sublime Porte of September the 9th, 1829:

The Sublime Porte declares that, having already adhered to the Treaty of London, it now further promises and pledges itself to the Representatives of the Powers who signed the said Treaty, to subscribe entirely to all the decisions which the Conference of London shall adopt with respect to its execution.

It must be remarked that, at the period of this declaration, Turkey was still at war with Russia, and, consequently, no treaties whatever existed between them. The Greeks had already long since acceded to the Treaty of London. Consequently, the sole object for which England had allied herself with Russia, and for which she had bound herself towards France, Austria, and Prussia, was secured.

Turkey, Greece, England, France, Austria, and Prussia, were all now acting on the same line.

But five days afterwards Russia forced upon Turkey the Treaty of Adrianople of the 15th of September, by which, in violation of the principles laid down in the Protocol and the Treaty of July, and of her pledged faith to all the world, she claimed "*an augmentation of territory, an exclusive influence, and commercial advantages*" for her subjects from which she excludes England and every other nation.

Her territorial aggrandizement is the acquisition of the Coast of Circassia and the mouths of the Danube.

The former point has still to be decided by the British Legislature, and the explanation which her Majesty's Government will be called upon to make regarding the seizure by the Russian government of an English vessel on that coast, must bring this most important question to an issue.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

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Municipal System of Greece under the Turks. Appreciated by Russia, unknown to England. Fundamental Laws of Independent Greece drawn up at Epidaurus. Greece devoted to England, stigmatised by Russia. Sir Stratford Canning supports the Municipal, Representative, and Financial Rights of Greece. Russia denounces them. Enlists the support of England in favour of Capodistrias.

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years, and in order to understand a no less important question, viz.—the real character of the institutions implanted by Turkey in her European possessions.

The following sketch of the organization of Greece, under the Turkish administration, is extracted from a Greek journal, called the "Sauveur," published at Nauplia, in 1834, under the eyes of the Royal Regency. The reader, on perusing these regulations, will cease to marvel at the extraordinary prosperity, wealth, and cultivation, to which the Greeks had attained, and at the strength of national character which they displayed in their struggle for independence.

"Communal Rights of Greece under the Turkish Rule."

The municipal rights of Greece have existed from the remotest period. The patrimony of the citizens who lived under the Roman yoke, transmitted from age to age, modified by each successive conquest, was acknowledged and respected by the Turks. The fact is, the municipal system was not repugnant to their customs, and the laws which governed their ancient tribes and united them to the body of the nation.

Greece enjoyed the benefits of the municipal system, but it was infinitely diversified. It had no free and uniform march, it was somewhat disordered and irregular, like the strange divisions of its territory. The Peloponnesus, the islands, and continental

Greece, lived under different municipal systems. The principle was every where the same, the forms varied infinitely.

“The Municipal System of the Peloponnesus.”

“Each town, burgh, or village, named, by the majority of votes, the Demogerontes (or Mayors), who, by order of the Voyvode, repaired to the residence of the Cadi. Each province had a particular judge, before whom were brought all the civil or commercial causes, but he could not take cognizance of criminal causes until he had been expressly authorised to do so by the Pasha.

The Deputies, united in the capital of the province where the Cadi resided, proceeded, in presence of the judge, of the Voyvode, &c., to the nomination of a Codja Bachi (Greek Primate), of an Ayan (Turkish Primate), and of a treasurer. On the termination of the election, the judge notified in writing their nomination to the deputies who had been elected, and exhorted them as representatives of the people to defend their interests on every occasion, and to fill with honour the trust which had been confided to them.

“The newly-elected officers immediately commenced their functions, which lasted a year, and opened the provincial council. The members of that council were all of them, as we have just seen, elected in a popular assembly, and formed the administration of the province. The Voyvode alone was directly named by the Pasha.

“Attributes of the Provincial Council.”

“The Codja Bachi and the treasurer resided always near the Voyvode. They deliberated with him on the measures to be taken in order to execute the orders of the Pasha, to secure the public tranquillity, the levying of the taxes, &c., in a word, they discussed in council all the affairs concerning the administration of the province.

When grave questions produced a difference of opinion between the Voyvode and the Codja Bachi, the latter had the power of summoning to a general assembly the Demogerontes of the towns, the burghs, and the villages. He laid before them the differences which had arisen between the Voyvode and himself. If the assembly did not succeed in convincing the Voyvode, it appealed to the Pasha through the channel of the Cadi. If well-founded complaints arose against the exactions committed by the Voyvode, (Turkish Governor), the Codja Bachi, (Greek Primate), in concert with the Cadi, (Mussulman Judge), suspended him from his functions, and appealed to the competent authority.

Each province had a Buluc Bachi, or chief of the gendarmerie, under the orders of the Voyvode and the provincial council. The council might displace him whenever it thought proper, without referring to the Turkish authority.

No tax, of any kind, which was called for by the wants of the government, or of the country, could be levied without the express consent of the provincial council, as well as that of the mayors of the towns, burghs, and villages. The mayors assessed this tax proportionally amongst the families.

At the end of each year, the treasurer-general presented his accounts to the provincial council. A commission was named in order to verify them, and, when the verification was finished, these accounts were submitted to the examination of the mayors of the province, convoked in a general assembly. If the treasurer was convicted of malversation, the Assembly addressed a petition to the Cadi, and, on the report of the latter, the Pasha punished the guilty. Every criminal process instituted against a Greek was drawn up before the Cadi and the Primate. If the process was grave, the Primate, the Voyvode, and the Ayan, were bound to be present.

The bishop took no part in civil matters; but all religious affairs, without exception, were subjected to his control. He had even the right to know the differences which arose amongst

the Greeks, and to conciliate them, but without being able to judge them definitively. He thus partly filled the functions of a justice of the peace. He persuaded the parties to become reconciled, and his advice, supported by religious authority, had so much weight with the people that it was rare to see any differences which had first been submitted to the examination of the bishop become matters of trial before the tribunal of the Cadi. The bishop was the intermediary authority between the people and the provincial council, between the people and the Voyvode. If the people complained against the provincial council, the bishop made the Voyvode acquainted with the wrongs of the people against the council; if the people had to complain of the Voyvode, the bishop addressed himself directly to the Pasha.

At the end of each year, the members of the provincial council gave an account of their acts to their constituents; if their conduct was approved of, the Pasha might confirm them in their employment for another year.

Administration of the Pasha.

The Pasha had associated with him a Greek assessor named by the Turkish government, on the proposal of the first Dragoman of the Sublime Porte. This assessor was bound to be the natural protector of his countrymen. It was he who presented all the business to the Pasha.

Each province sent to the residence of the Pasha, as deputies, one or two primates, who, with the Turkish Ayans, formed his council. These primates, united in assembly with the assessor, examined all affairs, deliberated on the measures to be taken, and on the proportional assessment of the taxes demanded by the Pasha.

The Peloponnesus sent to Constantinople two or three primates to represent there the general interests of the Peninsula; the connexions formed by these deputies with the important personages of the Court gave them a great influence in all the affairs relating to the administration of their country. Their residence in the

capital set limits to the oppression and cupidity of the Pashas, many of whom had been recalled on the representations of the Moreote plenipotentiaries.

Maina was governed by a communal system peculiar to itself. It was self-governed, having never allowed the Turks to establish their authority in its mountains. The villages and the burghs named the mayors, who took the title of Capitani, and formed the communal council, presided over by a captain, chosen amongst them and elected by a majority of votes. This president of the council was called chief of the Capitani.

In 1770, the administrative system of the Mainotes underwent important changes. The Morea had risen against the Turks, at the instigation of the Empress Catherine of Russia. Maina, after being subdued, was detached from the Pashalick of the Morea, and given by the Sultan to the Capitan Pasha. It lost a part of its communal franchises; the tribute of four thousand piastres, which it paid to the Sultan, was raised to fifteen thousand. In the room of its communal council, which administered the country under the presidency of the chief of the Capitani, the Sublime Porte named a Prince or Bey of Maina, who was under the control of the Capitan Pasha, who paid him the tribute of fifteen thousand piastres, assessed the taxes of the province, administered its revenues, and maintained order and tranquillity. Until the year 1821, Maina was, as it were, a fief, not hereditary, but elective.

Communal System of Continental Greece.

The communal system in force in Continental Greece resembled, in many respects, that which governed the Peloponnesus. The towns, burghs, and villages, elected representatives, who named the provincial primates by a majority of votes.

These primates composed the assembly, or provincial council, and their functions were either for life, or hereditary, or temporary, according to the provinces.

No administrative or judicial authority, either Turkish or Greek, could interfere in the election of these primates. The provincial council could alone authorize the levying of the taxes.

Ali Pasha deprived Continental Greece of all these prerogatives, which she enjoyed before his time. He violently interfered in the election of the primates, caused his own partizans to be named in the provincial council, gave his own creatures to the country as their representatives, which, under his iron despotism, was overwhelmed with *corvées* and taxes, without being able to convey its complaints to the Sultan's ears. Ali Pasha stifled the murmurs of the Roumeliotes by new violences. Continental Greece had not, like the Morea, its representatives at Constantinople to support its interests.

"The Communal System of the Islands."

The islands enjoyed still more extensive privileges perhaps than the Peloponnesus. Dependent on the Capitan Pasha, they were not in general subjected to permanent Pashas, whose avidity was always a curse to the country.

At the commencement of each year, the primates of the islands assembled at a fixed spot, and named, by a majority of votes, their Demogerontes, who bore the title of Archontes; their functions were annual.

As soon as the new Archons commenced their functions, they were obliged, before all things, to demand of their predecessors the account of the expences of the preceding year, and to make a budget of the sums necessary for the service of the current year. At the conclusion of this work, they sent to Constantinople commissioners to convey the regular tribute to the Sultan. On their return, the budget of the year was settled, and the taxes assessed by the Archons proportionally amongst the families. If the ordinary taxes were insufficient, the Archons fixed extraordinary taxes to make up the deficit. The revenues of the islands were the tenths and the customs' duties, which the communes

raised on their own account. The country, therefore, was not administered by the Turks and for their own profit; the islands paid a regular tribute to the Porte: in time of war they furnished the Capitan Pasha with sailors and transports; but their internal administration was entirely in the hands of their Archons. The Turks never sent a governor to them excepting at their express request. This governor, nominally designated by the islands, named by the Capitan Pasha, shared his judicial authority with the Archons, and conformed in every thing to the usages and customs of the country.

In the islands where there was no Turkish governor, the Archons were the civil and criminal judges. Still an appeal might be made against their sentence before the interpreter of the islands attached to the Capitan Pasha."

Such was the simple and beautiful system of administration which the Greeks had enjoyed until the year 1820, and under the shade of these institutions they had advanced in population,* commerce, administrative knowledge, and mental cultivation, beyond any conquered or tributary people of ancient or modern times. In 1820, their merchant vessels covered the Mediterranean.† The cities of Hydra, Spezia, Ipsara, Scio, and others, were rapidly rising to the fame of the Hanseatic, Venetian, and Genoese

* Under the Venetian rule, the population of the Morea was 190,653; under the Turks, in 1820, it was 458,000.

† When the revolution broke out, the merchant navy of Greece consisted of 600 vessels, mounting, in all, 6000 guns.

republics, when it suited the purpose of the cabinet of St. Petersburg for the third time to revolutionize Greece.

The ignorance of Europe respecting Turkish institutions may be traced to many causes, amongst which I may cite the extreme difficulty of the Turkish language, the barrier between the customs, manners, and creeds of the East and West, which has existed from all times, the fact of no resident embassies having been accredited by the Grand Signor to the European Courts, and the impediments to communication and interchange of thought arising from the plague and the quarantine regulations. But, independently of these difficulties, there was no real connexion between the Porte and other countries. We appear to possess diplomatic and other relations with it, whereas, in reality, we have none. What would be thought of the position of an English ambassador at Paris, who did not speak French, while none of the French authorities spoke English? It is clear that no useful intercourse could take place, no personal intimacies could be formed, and none of the objects of diplomatic intercourse could be

carried into effect. But in the absence of those means through which diplomacy acts, a system of the most fatal character sprang up in the employment of the inhabitants of Pera as dragomans, who gradually became the sole interpreters of the Turks to the Europeans, and of the Europeans to the Turks. A system of the basest and most contemptible intrigue has consequently followed. These men have, on various occasions, been discovered to be traitors to the Courts they have served, and such is their character and reputation that the employment of such men might be considered as the most efficient means for placing any government in a state of hostility with the Porte.*

All things, therefore, combined to blind the opinion of Europe respecting the real nature of Mussulman institutions, and to foster the uni-

* It may be a matter of surprise to the reader that Russia herself makes use of dragomans. But by doing so she patronizes the institution, and makes use of the whole body. The most serious blow that could be struck against the supremacy of Russia in Asia, and perhaps in Europe, would be the destruction of that body at Constantinople; while they are the channel of intercourse, she must succeed, though hitherto the governments of Europe have been of themselves so subservient that the rottenness of the system has been comparatively insignificant.

versally cherished fallacy that the struggle of Greece to shake off the suzeraineté of the Porte, was a struggle of freedom against despotism, of the Cross against the Crescent, of civilization against barbarism. Indeed, the encouragement by Russia of that revolution, far from directing attention to her objects therein furthered—the destruction of prosperity in Turkey—the introduction of civil war, was looked upon by the exulting sympathies of the liberals of Europe as a claim of Russia to their esteem and their regard, and as disproving her assumed hostility to national independence, or to liberal institutions.

The picture which I have given of the state of Greece previous to the Greek revolution was published in Greece after the triumph of the revolution, and under circumstances the most likely to predispose men to underrate the advantages and to misrepresent the benefits of their previous system.

But Greece had been the subject of much inquiry in England, and not merely as regarded its political state. Enlightened travellers had visited every spot of its soil, resided in its

cities, wandered over its mountains, and lingered by its ruins; they had studied the manners, customs, and character of the people; and yet not only before, but during, the revolution, when the interest excited by the struggle had drawn so many English visitors to that country, not one of them had even suspected the existence of institutions such as those which Greece enjoyed. It was only a year after the battle of Navarin, when the ambassadors were ordered to inquire into the state of the country, that Sir Stratford Canning first spoke of *municipal institutions* as connected with Greece, and — was marked to the Conference of London as a visionary and a revolutionist!

How completely, therefore, must England have been at the mercy of Russia during the preceding negotiations, and in every estimate which she formed of the character of the people, or of the measures which had reference to them!*

* The Empress Catherine had called Greece and Egypt the two horns of the Turkish crescent. In the year 1820, those horns seemed rising, growing, and extending; and she has found the means, through her allies, and more especially through England, in Greece, and France in Egypt, to bring those horns into col-

The whole struggle of Russia for power, internal and external, has been against the municipal system; from the first overthrow of the commercial municipality of Novogorod to the annihilation of the military municipalities of the Don. Throughout the whole of her empire still exists the mould of that ancient system, which it was the great conquest of Peter to overthrow, and the destruction of which has laid the foundation of the centralizing despotism of Russia, the conquests of her arms, the splendour of her power, and the degradation of her people. There can be no question that Russia, by her minute acquaintance with every circumstance, with the character of every man connected with Greece, must have fully understood, and have been at the mercy of Russia during the collision for the destruction of their mutual prosperity and the downfall of the Crescent itself.

The first ground alleged for the interference of England in the Greek struggle was the intention of Ibrahim Pasha to convert Greece into a Barbary state, and to transport the Christian population of the Morea as slaves into Egypt.

The Russian ambassador in London communicated the plan of Ibrahim to England, and thus succeeded in incensing England against Turkey. It is singular that the devastation of the olive-trees of the Morea, so favourable to the tallow-trade of Russia, should have been carried on by the Egyptian forces alone.

duly appreciated, the system of government pre-existing in Greece, if even it had not been one with which she had been familiarized, as an ally or an enemy, in every field of her action at home and abroad, in every step of her conquests, and in every phasis of her history,* one which she had examined with the calculating eye of hatred

* "Being questioned by Prince C —, ex-minister of Russia, as to the causes to which I attributed the failure of Capodistrias in Greece, I was proceeding to detail some of the reasons given in the text, placing in the first rank of errors the destruction of the existing municipalities. 'That was precisely,' observed the Prince, 'the policy he ought to have pursued; and I recollect perfectly a conversation I had with him on this very subject, one or two years before his nomination as President. I remarked to him that the municipalities of Turkey afforded the ready, the cheap, the easy, and efficient means of organizing Greece. Capodistrias made me one of the long answers in which he was so expert, with the view of effacing this conviction from my mind.'

"Does not this throw light on the diplomacy of Russia? My informant could not know any thing of the municipalities of Turkey, or of the means of organizing Greece, except through the information possessed by the foreign bureau at St. Petersburg. Nothing, indeed, save the high intellectuality of her diplomacy, could preserve the connexion and combine the functions of so inert and heterogeneous a mass. Had her object been to organize Greece, how straightly would she have marched towards it! If the contrary, how efficacious is her opposition, and how easily could she detect Capodistrias, had he aimed at consolidating there his own power."—Urquhart's "Turkey and its Resources."

and aversion, as the sole internal enemy of her military and despotic sway, as the principal basis of the nationality of the Eastern nations with which she was in contact.

Such was the difference of the intellectual position of Russia and her allies, when they commenced a common interference in the affairs of the East; and whoever perceives the full bearing of these questions, and the state of information of the various parties, must be fully prepared for the events which have followed.

The means which she had prepared during a long series of years were of a character which rendered the Greek contest inevitable, and reconciliation next to impossible. Scarcely had the French war ceased, and the pacific labours of the Congress of Vienna commenced, when she hastened to open her new campaign of conquest in peace, by the formation of the secret society of the Hæteria, for the purpose of instigating the Greeks to shake off their Turkish rulers. Several crowned heads, whose ambition she inflamed by the hope of being allied with a new dynasty, entered into the association. The Greek merchants and literati, and all those

Greeks who, having been incited to acts of treason against the Sultan, either at Constantinople, in the principalities, or in the Morea, had fled to different parts of Europe, became members of it; and, when the fitting hour had arrived, the explosion took place simultaneously at both extremities of the Turkish empire. Count Capodistrias had fanned the revolutionary flame amongst the Ionian Greeks under the protection of England, in an address drawn up at Corfu in 1819; and in 1820, Ypsilanti invaded Moldavia from the Russian frontier.

The spiritual chief of the Greeks, the Patriarch of Constantinople, who was answerable for the good conduct of his flock, was compromised by the Russian embassy at Constantinople in the treason of his countrymen, betrayed by them to the Divan, and executed. Thus were the Greeks exasperated against the Sultan for the apparent persecution of their faith, and taught to look to the Emperor not only as their temporal protector, but as the head of their religion.

The revolution breaks out. The Emperor de-

nounces it to Europe, and offers to the Sultan to suppress it.

The manner in which the Greek revolution was discountenanced by England, under the administration of Lord Londonderry, and the hostility of the government of the Ionian Islands to the insurgents, are matters of general history; yet, even while the Greeks were abandoned by the sympathy of the British, and every other government in the world, their general distrust of Russia was so great, that, in their first national assembly, they drew up principles of government with the view of excluding Russian interference.

"The commencement," says Mr. Gordon, "of the year 1822, the second of the war, was marked in Greece by the acts of the national assembly of Piada, which promulgated a declaration of independence, and sanctioned the outlines of a constitution, entitled the Organic Law of Epidaurus. Anxious to overthrow Ypsilanti and the Russian party, the Peloponnesian primates lent all their weight to Mavrocordato, elected him president of the congress, and readily accepted the new constitution presented under his auspices. Every Greek, without distinction of birth or fortune, was declared eligible to all employments, slavery abolished, and its existence proscribed on the Hellenic soil; and it was moreover decreed, that no citizen should remain in prison above twenty-four

hours without being informed of the causes of his arrest, nor more than three days without being brought to trial. While the Byzantine form of worship was pronounced the national established church, the constitution held forth full toleration to every sect.

"Some preliminary dispositions were laid down for instituting courts of justice, and drawing up a new code of laws; for the present, those of the Emperor Basil were declared to be in force, except in commercial disputes, which were to be decided according to the French code. Another measure, indifferent in itself, manifested, however, on the part of the assembly, an inclination to depreciate the Heterists, and seems to have been aimed at Ypsilanti and his adherents; instead of black, which they had introduced, light blue and white were fixed upon as national colours, and the emblem of the *phoenix* replaced by the *Athenian owl**."

This manifestation of the feelings of Greece induced Russia to draw up a memoir, exciting the alarms of the cabinets of Europe, and animating her allies to aid her in crushing the national representatives of Greece as revolutionists and anarchists.

The memoir of May 1824, drawn up by Count Nesselrode, states—

"According to the declaration of the Emperor, and of the
* The phoenix was the Russian emblem, now made current in Greece by the very designation of the coin.

Protocols of Verona, the affairs of Greece concern all the members of the alliance, and it has been agreed that they should collectively interfere in them. Their ministers, and that of his Imperial Majesty, would, therefore, find themselves in the same position. All the powers regard it as a sacred duty to concur in preserving the general peace; now, as long as the misunderstanding between the Porte and the Morea, and the islands of the Archipelago, exists, so long as *revolution and anarchy* prevail there, that peace, the object of so just an anxiety, is neither real nor complete: it is not so *materially*, for the struggle of which we speak seems far from being terminated. It is not so *morally*, for this same struggle keeps up, in the minds of all Europe, a restlessness, the existence of which creates a real danger. We have seen the allied courts surmount obstacles insuperable by any other force than that of their union; we have seen them dethrone usurpation and the disastrous genius of conquests, arrest the scourge of military revolutions, and, with a firm hand, consolidate social order on its ancient foundations. Shall we see them to-day reject one of the natural consequences of their system, and not crown successes which have gained for them so many titles to the gratitude of the present and the past? The well-intentioned would be struck with this change, and reproach the allies with want of perseverance and courage. On the other hand, the *revolutionists*, driven from the countries where they have only known how to unite weakness to treason, would bring back, more than ever, into the heart of Greece, all their fatal activity. They would fortify the ties which they may have already formed in those countries; they would make their *subversive doctrines* tri-

umph there; they might even succeed in misleading the world, by accusing the alliance of only seeking to replace Greece under an *anarchical and barbarous power*, and of ranging on the same line Mahometanism and the Christian religion.

The indignation excited amongst the Greeks on obtaining a knowledge of this memoir, led to their approximation to England. The Greek government addressed a letter to Mr. Canning, protesting against the Russian plan, declaring that death was preferable to its adoption, and imploring England to aid them in their struggle.

In the reply of Mr. Canning "to the Secretary of the Provisional Government of Greece," dated the 1st of December, 1824, England recognised the *de facto* government, and the belligerent rights of that country.

In the following February the Greek nation formed a contract with British capitalists, for a loan of £2,800,000, as a security for which they pledged the whole of the national property of Greece; thus binding their country to England by the strongest of all ties.

In the mean time, the continental allies of Russia, incited by her vindictive influence against

the liberal institutions of Greece, lent their clandestine support to Turkey; and the Greeks, finding themselves thwarted by the continental powers, placed their country under British protection by the following act.

“The clergy, the representatives, and the naval and military chiefs of the Greek nation, considering, That the Greeks have taken up arms in defence of mankind’s natural and imprescriptible right to freedom of property, religion, and liberty, and have for four years resisted the colossal forces of Egypt, Asia, and Africa, thereby acquiring a title to political existence: That the agents of certain continental and Christian powers have persisted in a line of conduct opposed to the principles which those powers profess, and that several of the said agents endeavour through their emissaries to draw the Greeks into improper engagements: That the Greek marine is hampered and persecuted by some admirals, who pay no attention to the neutrality which their courts proclaimed at Laybach and Verona: That Christians, armed in favour of the Koran against the disciples of the gospel, instruct and lead on the barbarous hordes which devastate the land of Cymon, Leonidas, and Bozzaris: That the free government of Great Britain is the only one that has observed a strict neutrality, but that its neutrality no longer suffices to guard the Greeks from unjust and increasing persecution: That (thanks to Divine Providence) the forces of his Britannic Majesty are close at hand, and that, in this desperate struggle, we ought to have recourse to the philanthropy of his government. We therefore prescribe, determine, and enact the following law.

"Article I. In virtue of the present act, the Greek nation places the sacred deposit of its liberty, independence, and political existence, under the absolute protection of Great Britain.

"II. This act shall be accompanied with two copies of a memorial addressed to the revered government of his Britannic Majesty.

"III. The president of the councils shall immediately execute the present law.

(Dated) *Nauplia*, *August 1st,* (1825.)
July 20th,

At the same time, Greece solicited the nomination of a prince connected with the royal family of England. The Greeks thus exhibited their desire and anxiety to obtain a monarchical form of government. Every fact is in the same sense. Nowhere can a shadow be found to justify the stigma of "revolution" and "republicanism," so artfully, incessantly, and solemnly fixed upon them by Russia.

During the whole of this period, the diplomatic relations of the court of St. Petersburg with the Sublime Porte had been broken off, and the attitude of Russia threatened every moment the invasion of Turkey; yet the Greeks, so far from addressing themselves to the Emperor for aid, countenance, or protection, leant solely on Eng-

land, and to the King of England alone did they apply for his good offices, in order to obtain their reconciliation with the Porte.

In fact, their appeal to England was the origin of the mediation in their favour: first, of England alone; then of England and Russia; thirdly, of England, France, and Russia; and, fourthly, of those three powers, supported by Austria and Prussia*.

The official acts of the Greek government, to which I have already referred, sufficiently evince, towards Russia, suspicion, jealousy, and aversion: confidence, affection, and devotion towards England. But official acts can but faintly represent the enthusiasm with which the British name was cherished in Greece. The liberal policy of England, in interposing between the Holy Alliance and the infant republics of South America, in upholding civil and religious liberty throughout the world, and the absence of aggressive views in any portion of it, had made

*In the preamble to the Treaty of July, 1827, England and France are stated as having been invited by the Greeks to offer their mediation to the Porte, but Russia is omitted in this invitation.

the Greeks almost forget the name of Hellenes in their attachment to England.

After struggling for more than six years singlehanded, against the legions of Albania, Asia Minor, and Egypt, and against the squadrons of the Sultan, Mahomet Ali, and the Barbary States, their hopes were raised by the arrival of Sir Richard Church and Lord Cochrane. During the whole of this period, their internal administration had been carried on according to strictly constitutional forms. The national assemblies of Astros and Troezen had given a further development to the principles laid down at the congress of Epidaurus, and, when the executive government deposed its authority in April, 1827, it became necessary to elect a new president.

It was on this occasion that Count John Capodistrias was proposed by the Russian party, composed of the Capitani, who had just conferred the highest military command on Sir Richard Church, viz., Colocotroni, Niketas, Coliopulo, and the Metaxas. The mention of Capodistrias' name was received by the Moreote primates with dismay, and many of the island

primates even left the assembly, when one of the most extraordinary events of this unparalleled drama took place—*Lord Cochrane and Sir Richard Church insisted on the nomination of Capodistrias*, declaring that to be the sole condition on which they would connect themselves with the cause or the destinies of Greece!

In this manner the Greeks were induced to resign their better judgment, and to look to Capodistrias as possessing claims on the admiration of distinguished citizens of England, in whom their hopes were centred, and to whom their whole confidence had been given!

Notwithstanding the support of Capodistrias by the English Philhellenes, the representatives of Greece did not assent to his election without stipulating that he should be required to swear to maintain the constitution. The oath drawn up by the assembly of Trœzene was to the following effect:—

“I swear, in the name of the Most High, to preserve inviolate the fundamental laws of the Greek government, and not to abrogate them, or to permit them to be abrogated, in any case, or under any pretext.

“I furthermore swear to defend and preserve with all my efforts the independence of the Greek nation and the general and individual freedom, to respect the rights of all and each, to preserve and increase the general and individual happiness, and to neglect none of the means with which the laws have entrusted me.”

During the eight months which elapsed between the nomination of Capodistrias and his arrival in Greece, he enjoyed every opportunity of enlisting European opinion, and of organising the European press in his favour.

From his retirement in Switzerland, where he had become favourably known to the liberals as the associate and friend of Eynard, the enthusiastic advocate of Greece, he proceeded to St. Petersburg, where, in order to remove the mistrust of France and England, he was formally absolved from the service of the Czar. He thence repaired to London and Paris, and finally embarked in an English line-of-battle ship, at Ancona, for the shores of Greece.

The fate of that country had been decided by the battle of Navarin. The three strongest powers of Europe had stepped in to rescue it from destruction, to acknowledge its political

existence and its national flag, and had committed their honour to the accomplishment of its independence.

In the midst of this sudden revulsion of the national mind, occasioned by the most extraordinary change that has ever happened in the destinies of a people, Capodistrias arrived, under the ægis of the alliance, to form the new bond of union between Greece and the European powers, and to settle, by diplomatic arrangement, their admission into the community of independent states. The devotional gratitude which they felt to the allied powers, to whom they owed their salvation, led them to receive, with confidence and respect, the man who, though elected by themselves, appeared amongst them as the representative, the organ, and the gift, of their protectors. Notwithstanding the misery into which the nation had fallen at the time when the navies of the three powers had undertaken its defence from external aggression, a simple proclamation of the president, addressed to the good feelings of the Greeks, instantaneously put an end to the license by land and the piracies by

sea. The whole nation hastened to respond to the wishes of the new government; and peace, order, and tranquillity, were immediately restored. Europe, astonished at the spectacle, regarded as the work of the superior genius of Capodistrias that which was the spontaneous action of a docile and confiding people, the process of whose self-government had been disturbed, but neither degraded nor impaired, and which, suddenly reviving with her cheering hopes of tranquillity and peace, presented the picture of a complete system of government starting suddenly to life.

In the mean time, the obstinacy of the Sultan, in rejecting all offers of accommodation, led to the departure of the ambassadors from Constantinople, and brought about a new phasis in the affairs of Greece.

Russia now appeared before the Conference of London as the champion of what she was pleased to term "conservative" principles, and urged their application to the internal affairs of Greece. At the Conference held at the Foreign Office, on the 12th of March, 1828, Prince Lieven annexes to the Protocol a despatch of Count

Nesselrode, of which the following is an extract—

“These observations lead us naturally to the measures which the present situation of affairs requires, with regard to Greece. *Here it is that we shall find our adversaries, both secret and open.* Here it will be important for the allies to prove that the treaty is a benefit. *Here it is that they have both shameful excesses to restrain and legal order to establish.* Here also, perhaps, will their task be the most delicate.

“Without doubt, *the choice of Count Capodistrias* to preside over the executive government in that country offers to the allies reasonable expectations. But Count Capodistrias will not be able to fulfil, *without them*, the great task to which he submits with noble devotion. Now that the rupture of all relation between the three courts and the Porte dissipates the scruples arising from the neutrality which they persisted in observing between the belligerent parties, *the first necessity*, and we will say *almost the first duty*, of the triple alliance, is *the foundation of a regular order of things in Greece.*

“That order of things will not be organized without pecuniary assistance: it is therefore urgent,

“1. That the allies should consider of the means, either of furnishing subsidies to the Greek government, or of favouring and hastening the conclusion of the loan of two millions sterling, which *Count Capodistrias* proposed in his memorandum of the month of September. We are prepared to guarantee the third part of it; *and with respect to immediate subsidies, we have already placed them in the hands of Count Heyden.*”

I must entreat the reader's attention to the extreme importance of this extract. Russia herein avows that she had in Greece "adversaries both secret and open."

But she insinuates that her adversaries were also the adversaries of England; whereas, the person the least acquainted with Greece must have known that those who were particularly friendly to England, were precisely those who dreaded Russia; and that a power that at that time only appeared with promises and smiles, that distributed largesses and decorations, could have no enemies but the public-spirited and the honest; those who, on the one hand, penetrated her objects, and on the other, were attached to their country's weal.

The national assembly at Epidaurus had appreciated Russia in 1822. The congress of Verona, in 1824, stigmatizes the Greeks as revolutionists and anarchists. Who instructed the representatives of Europe at Verona in the character of the Greeks? Who pointed them out as disturbers of the general repose, threatening the security of thrones? In 1825, Greece applied to England. How could

Russia ever suppose that protestant and heretic England would become the object of the sympathy and affection of the Greeks? The Protocol of January, 1828, denounces them as the enemies of England. Who instructed, on this head, the Conference of London? This instructress was kind and affectionate, communicative and confidential, when listened to and applauded, but, when doubts arose, or when opposition was offered, however slight and from whatever quarter, she haughtily turned away, and, confident in the absolute inaction of those whom she addressed, declared that alone she would settle the affairs of Greece, "*selon ses intérêts et ses convenances.*"*

We now come to the most important consideration relative to the motive for which money has been advanced to Greece, and the objects which, by means of that money, have been realised in Greece.

For what purpose was money required in the character of the Greeks? Who pointed

* On one occasion, negotiations between England and Russia were broken off in consequence of the above-quoted expression falling from the lips of the Russian plenipotentiary, in reply to a very timid remonstrance. (See despatch of Lord Dudley.)

Greece?—The war was at an end. From whom does the proposal come?—During the contest, Russia had looked coldly on, and even denounced the Greeks to destruction. Was not the source of the proposal enough to awaken suspicion, if not to set it instantaneously aside, based as it was on no necessity of the state, on no precedent in the history of diplomacy?—That money was to be advanced not merely, not in opposition to her views, but by her suggestion, by her urgent importunities. She had even commenced on this line, and had given subsidies before obtaining the consent of her allies. The advancement of money was, therefore, in strict accordance with her views; it was an essential portion of her policy; for what end we shall subsequently see.

We find, in the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven, of the 29th of April, the following passage:—

“Amongst the measures which will lead with the greatest celerity and certainty to the execution of the treaty of July, appear to us the subsidies to be granted to the Greeks.

Already the presence of Count Capodistrias has produced salutary effects in those unhappy countries. Already order begins to revive, and a regular government is being organ-

ized. It is not less urgent to support it. *Besides*, subsidies are not acts of open hostility. They cannot give a violent shock to the Ottoman empire, and they come within the limits of the means which the cabinet of St. James's regards as most conformable to the spirit of the transactions of London, because it is stipulated in them, that the Greeks shall be treated as friends by the contracting powers, when they shall have acceded to their wishes."

In the despatch of Count de la Ferronaye, the French Secretary of State, attached to the same Protocol, we find the following passage:—

"France thinks then that it is a matter of most urgent necessity to furnish the provisional government of Greece, on the one hand, with pecuniary succour, and on the other, with the moral support which would contribute to give it the power which it wants, and to this effect she proposes:

I. To place at the disposal of that government, during several months, and through the channel of the admirals, a sum equivalent to that which Count Capodistrias wished to borrow under the guarantee of the three courts, namely, a million sterling. His majesty is determined to give, for his part, five hundred thousand francs a month, until he has supplied one-third of the loan, that is to say, eight millions of francs. If the British government consented to the same sacrifice, *Russia, doubtless, would imitate that example!* *— the common action of the three courts would be maintained; and

* The curious reader may find elsewhere some singular passages connected with the intimacy at that time subsisting between M. de la Ferronaye and Count Pozzo di Borgo.

we do not think that, having such an object in view, England would scruple to admit it."

Thus Russia makes France propose a loan on the score of the treaty of July, to subsidize the enemy of the state with which she was at war, *in imitation of her allies*—allies "for the pacification of the East."

But Count Nesselrode adds,

"Finally, *that order of things will not be organized, unless the Greek government be surrounded by the three powers with agents who represent them, under whatever denomination, whose personal consideration, talents, and accordancy among themselves, may assure to it useful assistance.* It is therefore important.

"3. That the allies should accredit in Greece the consuls mentioned in the acts annexed to the treaty. But the most efficacious measure might perhaps be to send immediately into the Archipelago the three plenipotentiaries who carried on the negotiations with the Turks, and to remove thither the conference of Constantinople."

Thus consular agents were to be sent by England and France, not for the purpose of protecting the commercial interests and rights of their respective countrymen, which is the object of consular appointments in every country, but for the purpose of uniting with a Russian consul in assisting Capodistrias to administer the

country; and, in addition to this array of a new order of diplomacy, the immediate representatives of the Sovereigns of England, France, and Russia, to the ancient ally of England, were to be, as it were, accredited to Greece.

It is too contemptible to follow out the gross imposition upon common sense conveyed in these propositions. There is one, and one only, remark to make,—all this to govern a Turkish pashalick, with a population not much greater than the parish of Marylebone!

The instruction of Count Nesselrode to Admiral Heyden, dated Odessa, 26th of August, exposes the profound artifice with which Russia made England and France appear as supporting her through Greece in her war against Turkey.

“You are authorized to continue to give to the Greeks all the succour which may depend upon you. France, acting according to the same principle, not having hesitated to furnish them with munitions, arms, and subsidies, even before the arrival of her present expedition, and the intention of the emperor being to maintain in Greece the same attitude as that of his allies!” *

During this year, the Turco-Egyptian forces

had been compelled to evacuate the Morea, and the conferences of London placed that province under the provisional guarantee of the alliance.

In the mean time, the ambassadors of the three powers, in their conferences at Poros, had drawn up a report on the institutions which appeared to them suited to the Greeks; and this report reached England in the beginning of 1829.

They stated their opinion that, "IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN HEREDITARY GOVERNMENT IN GREECE, IT WOULD BE BOTH UNJUST AND DANGEROUS TO DEPRIVE THE GREEKS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE, FOR EVEN UNDER THE TURKISH RULE THEY ELECTED THEIR MUNICIPAL MAGISTRATES, AND THEIR 'NOTABLES' WERE GENERALLY INVESTED WITH THE RIGHT OF APPORTIONING THE TAXES IMPOSED BY THE PORTE."

With regard to any financial arrangement which might be entered into respecting them, it was stated to be obligatory on the alliance, "TO REGARD AS A PRIMARY CONSIDERATION THE IMPRESCRIPTIBLE RIGHTS OF THE CAPITALISTS WHO HAD TAKEN PART IN THE LOANS MADE IN ENGLAND BY THE GREEKS."

Whatever advantage, therefore, the Cabinet

* England had not subsidized Greece at all.

of St. Petersburg had expected to derive from the assistance of the Consular agents in Greece, was to a certain degree neutralized by the fact that a British and French ambassador had been joined by a Russian envoy in sanctioning the very principles which the primates of Greece had maintained in their national assemblies, and furthermore in the fact of a French ambassador subscribing to the opinions of Sir Stratford Canning, that the real interests of Greece were identified with the acknowledgment of its debt to England.

Foiled in the Conference of London by this very important triumph of British interests and of sound principle, Capodistrias and the Russian Resident in Greece immediately despatched a Memoir to St. Petersburg, which was forthwith sent to London, and appended to a new Protocol.

After stating "that the internal organization of Greece was a *vital question for the Emperor*," Count Nesselrode continues:

"With respect to this last point, the Emperor has himself expressed without reserve his wishes and opinions to Lord Heytesbury. He conceives himself imperatively bound

not to give to Greece a Government too feeble to destroy the secret societies which have been there formed, and the seeds of revolution which are there to be found at every step. The three Courts will not only be far from accomplishing the object of the Treaty of the 6th of July, if they leave Greece under the yoke of a ruinous anarchy; but they would fail in their duty towards themselves and towards Europe; for they would sanction the triumph of the most fatal and the most contagious doctrines. A result so inadmissible in the opinion of the Emperor is not less so, we are persuaded, in those of his Allies. According to our opinion, the only way of securing Greece from the dangers of misfortunes, the reaction of which would undoubtedly be felt even beyond its limits, is to adopt one of the plans which Austria has pointed out in her Mémoire of March: that is, to place that State under the government of a Chief, *invested with a power which would be more beneficial in the same degree in which it should be more extended, and should more nearly approach to monarchical power.* With respect to the person of the future Chief, His Majesty leaves his nomination and title to his Allies, with the sole reservation that their choice shall not fall on a Russian Prince. This system, the Emperor is aware, is not supported by the literal stipulations of the Treaty of the 6th of July, but it rests upon considerations of a higher order; upon the impossibility of adopting any other without causing disturbance in a country where we wish to re-establish peace. As it is moreover derived from a principle, the advantages of which have been proved by Austria in her above cited Mémoire, it might serve to bring about a complete understanding respecting the position of Greece, between all the Great Courts of Europe."

In the following extract from the memoir of Count Boulgari the reader will perceive that Russia had never for one moment deviated from her original aim, viz. the extinction of the Primates devoted to England, and the establishment of the Capodistrian faction on their overthrow, through the instrumentality of her Allies :

"Greece, such as three ages of slavery and a bloody revolution have left her, does not contain, in general, among the most influential class, either the virtues or the knowledge upon which well organized political societies generally depend. This situation is easily explained by that which has preceded it. It was such, that one has not a right to expect of the Greeks virtues which, far from having been necessary, were fatal to them under the yoke of the Mussulmans.

"The Primates, who were in habitual contact with the latter; the men, above all, who, in arrogating to themselves the right of oppression and of exaction, served as willing instruments to the most savage tyranny; those, in short, who armed themselves for the purpose of blindly following the views and the passions of the Satraps who desolated Greece, form a list, a caste, of men, whom no advice, or benevolent effort, will be able to recal into the paths of order, and to whom every regular Government becomes a motive for exciting trouble and anarchy.

"Accustomed, under the rule of the Mussulmans, to change Pashas as often as the pecuniary sacrifices offered by the provinces to the Porte were large enough to procure this

result; *the Primates of Greece* only see at present a principle of oppression in the wisdom of a Government, which becomes to them the more odious, as it forbids rapine, punishes the guilty, and protects the oppressed.

“Such are in general, with a few honourable exceptions, the character and tendency of the higher classes of Greece.

“A circumstance worthy of remark has associated them for seven years with the real or pretended theorists who are to be found in these countries, and who have by turns manifested their incapacity or their bad faith by the three democratical Constitutions which have weighed down this country, and had rendered the organization of it impossible, until the arrival of the President in Greece.

“As these three Constitutional Charters limited and confined the action of the Executive Power so far as to render it ridiculous, and as this circumstance, which took away on the one hand all conservative power from the Government, favoured on the other the power and rapacity of the Primates; the result has been, that the latter, *looking at liberal principles as a means of perpetuating their influence, have thrown themselves into the constitutional ranks*, and have offered their support to the national theorists, as to the agents of confusion, who are come from all parts of Europe for the purpose of fomenting and turning to their profit the revolution in Greece.

“If, from this singular alliance, the cause and end of which are plainly hostile to the repose of this unhappy country, we proceed to consider the most prominent features, and the general tendency of the great bodies who have endured the Greek revolution without being engaged in bringing it about, one cannot help being struck with the mildness, the subordination, the spirit of order and justice,

which have characterized them for the last six months, and which deserve to fix the attention of the three Allied Courts.

"It is a very remarkable phenomenon, to see an entire people, after seven years of war and anarchy, resume, at the voice of one man, the peaceable habits of industry, reject with indignation the advice of the numerous agents who endeavour to excite them to revolt, and submit themselves to the laws, without being compelled to do so by any force whatever."

In this extraordinary memoir, Russia involuntarily does some justice to Turkey, by acknowledging that the "most savage tyranny" of the Turkish Pashas could be at once restrained by purchasing their dismissal.

But she involuntarily affords still higher testimony to the character of the Primates, by stating that, no sooner had they overthrown the Turkish rule, than they admitted their inferiors to equal privileges with themselves, and thus acknowledged the empire of the law to be equally applicable to the rich and to the poor. The memoir continues:

"If we now consider the difficulties *inherent in every elective Government*,* and the disorders which are almost always

* Did not Russia compel adhesion to the *elective* principle in Poland?

the result of it, as long as liberal institutions are neither consecrated by the moral habits of the people nor by time, it must be confessed that the three Allied Courts would destroy with one hand the work which they would have founded with the other, if they should consent to establish in Greece an order of things, the danger and absurdity of which are sufficiently demonstrated *by seven years of anarchy*, by the immorality and ignorance of the most influential class and the higher orders in the country. It would be a strange delusion to believe in the possibility of organizing any government whatever in Greece, *on purely constitutional principles*, which, in the present situation of political societies, require a general tendency in the people toward constituent forms of government, as well as elements of civilization, which in Greece exist only among a few individuals.

“If, notwithstanding the facts which prove this deplorable state of things, the three Allied Courts should *not think themselves authorized to interfere in the organization of this country*, or should think it their duty *to establish it upon purely constitutional principles* and forms, it would be easy to point out from the present time the new disasters with which Greece would be visited.

“The sacrifices which the Powers have already made, and those which they continue to make, for Greece, give them incontestably the right *to interfere in an active manner in the form of its Government*, and to exclude from it all the principles which should be thought incompatible at the same time with the real social tendency of the Greek people, and with the repose of Europe.

“*The President*, whose opinion is of a preponderating weight in this important affair, *goes even further*: for he recognizes in the three Allied Powers the right, not only to

require from Greece guarantees of order and stability, but also that of founding a monarchical Government, the only one which, in his opinion, can conciliate every thing which is due to the well-understood interests of this country, with those, not less legitimate, which the three Courts propose to attain in pacifying Greece.

“It is from this arrangement, and from the attitude which would result from it, that the latter would receive, in her turn, from the Allied Powers a guarantee that they would not interfere in any way in the affairs of Greece, as soon as she should be placed under the monarchical rule, of which the form and essence would agree better with the customs, manners, and character of the Greeks, than the abstract principles and the dogmas of the pretended sovereignty of the People, *which have latterly cost Greece a debt of seventy millions of francs, civil war, misery, and anarchy.*

“It behoves the three Allied Powers *to come to an understanding as to the form of Government, and to the mode of organizing it which they may think fit to establish in that country.*

“*All the other questions, without excepting those respecting the delimitation of Greece, the tribute, the relation of Suzeraineté, or other relations to be established between her and the Ottoman Porte, can only be considered as merely of secondary importance, and essentially subordinate to that question which relates to the form of Government which it may be possible and fit to establish in Greece.*

“It is for the wisdom of the Allied Sovereigns to decide whether this double condition can best be fulfilled by establishing in Greece a monarchical Government, or by fixing by common agreement upon the basis of a constitutional order of things, from which they should reject all the ele-

ments which might disturb society, and place the Powers in contradiction with themselves.

“In the one, as in the other, of these cases, the three Allied Courts, by giving a settled posture to Greece, would not fail to render the transaction resulting from the Treaty of the 6th of July ; the proper sequel of the Acts which, in 1814, 1815, and 1818, secured the repose of Europe.

“It is in this manner that the Powers would strike at the heart of the demagogues of all countries, in proving to them that there is no revolution which is not necessarily put an end to by the union of the Allied Sovereigns ; and that, even when revolts are encouraged and feasible, they find in the combined action of the Crowns an insurmountable barrier, and an inclination always ready to destroy them, or to turn them to the advantage of social order.”

This memoir was intended to confound the cause of Greece with that of Spain and Italy ; to entangle it, in the minds of Europeans, and especially of Austria, with the conflicting opinions respecting despotism and civil liberty ; and to enlist the hatred of England and France against the leading men in Greece, as Republicans and demagogues. They were neither the one nor the other. They had announced themselves as favourable to a monarchical system in asking for Prince Leopold. So far from desiring to exercise arbitrary power over the peasants, they

had, at the assembly of Epidaurus, shown that they wished to elevate the peasantry, by admitting all classes to an equality before the law, and by establishing independent tribunals.

I assert in the most unqualified manner that there is no sympathy in Greece amongst any class of the population for revolutionary sentiments, movements, or parties elsewhere. Among no people living under the Eastern or Patriarchal form of government, has ever a revolution (in our sense) taken place, or has a "party" existed. The Greeks did not comprehend the term--they have no such word. The movement in Greece, which we designate a revolution, was a movement not against internal principles, but against foreign authority. The people had to complain of the haughty and proud bearing of the Turks as opposed to the Greeks, of the Mahomedan as opposed to the Christian. They had to complain, because they suffered from the anarchy resulting at once from the external difficulties of the Turkish Empire, and from the internal abuses of the Janissary system. Against these causes of discontent they re-

volted. So have the Turkish Empire, and Sultan Mahmoud.

It is not true, as M. Boulgari states, that the primates of Greece were destitute of virtue and talent. The very fact of their being elected by the heads of families implied the possession of both talent and respectability ; otherwise they never would have been chosen to administer the affairs of the community, as any one acquainted with the municipal organization will at once perceive. They participated with the clergy in the administration of justice, and, whatever abuses may have crept into the system under licentious pashas, were removed with the departure of the Turks.

There is a wide difference between the primates and the Capitanis. The latter were the chiefs of a local militia, not of the Peloponnesus, but of continental Greece, which were spread from Upper Macedonia down to the Isthmus of Corinth ; they were termed Armatolis. The Capitani commanding these Armatolis, or Palikars, had a seat in the municipal council, and appear formerly to have been of a very pacific disposition ; but the revolts of Greece, from 1770,

had struck at the root of the system, rendered the Armatolis objects of suspicion, and their character must necessarily have sunk with the anarchy of the times.

Under circumstances so unfavourable, the Capitani often took to the mountains, maintained an armed neutrality, or levied black mail from the surrounding country. Thus they were alternately the preservers of order and the patrons of anarchy; and Russia, from this singular contradiction in their character, found the means of deluding Europe by representing them as the friends of good government, whilst she made use of them to trample on the peaceful primates, men who had no prerogative of caste, and no authority save of a representative character.

The memoir of Count Boulgari was annexed to a new Protocol of the 22nd of March, 1829, in which it was determined that the ambassadors of England and France to the Ottoman Porte should return to Constantinople, to reopen negotiations on the basis that Greece should enjoy, under the Suzeraineté of the Sultan, "an administration as much as possible

approaching to monarchical forms, and should be confided to a Christian chief or prince, whose authority should be hereditary, by order of primogeniture."

The whole of the exertions of Capodistrias were now directed to the destruction of the municipal, representative, financial, and judicial independence of Greece; and the manner in which he accomplished his purpose does honour to the school of Venice and St. Petersburg, in which his principles had been formed. To have attempted such a scheme by arbitrary means, would have drawn down upon him the execration of the liberals throughout the world, and have been met by instantaneous and determined resistance from the Greeks.

His comprehensive design was to exhibit himself to England and France as governing on representative principles; to show to the sovereigns of the Holy Alliance, that, under this mask, he was, in reality, acting on the purest principles of despotism; to obtain from the Greeks the surrender of their national rights, and simultaneously to destroy for ever their esteem for the representative system, by placing

it before them under characters which, by divesting it of usefulness, would deprive it of respect.

On arriving in Greece, one of his first acts had been to abolish the legislative body, and to institute a consultative council, under the scholastic epithet of the *Panhellenium*, consisting of twenty-seven members, who were to share with himself the labours and responsibility of the government, until the meeting of a national assembly, which he promised to convoke within two months.

During more than a year, he contrived under various pretexts to postpone this measure, and in the interval he appointed his own partizans as prefects and extraordinary commissioners over the provinces.

The municipal organization which the Greeks enjoyed under the Mussulman administration had undergone only a slight modification since the expulsion of the Turks. In 1821, the assembly of Epidaurus had removed by Art. xii. the distinctions which had been introduced between the primates and the other members of the commune. Every citizen of thirty-five

years of age might be elected. The law was silent relative to the duration of the functions of the Demogerontes, because they were previously accustomed to retain those officers only so long as they gave general satisfaction. They were invested with the character and the duties of a justice of the peace: they kept the registers of the receipts and expenses of the communes, and every month they gave an account of their administration to the Epistates. They were personally responsible for the management of the funds which they received. Besides the Demogerontes, the inhabitants named, by a majority of votes, two Epistates, to levy the public taxes, one of whom bore the title of Epistates of the expenses, the other, that of Epistates of the receipts.

This law was confirmed by the assembly of Astros in 1823. By its provisions, the state was divided into departments; the departments into provinces; the provinces into communes. Each province had a central or provincial demogerontie, composed of three or five members.

Besides this central Demogerontie, the towns, burghs, and villages, had also their particular

Demogeronties, the number of which was in proportion to the population;—one demogeron to one hundred families.

Capodistrias had preserved this organization, and the elections as they had been regulated by the law, No. xii.; but, by a decree of the 16th of April, 1828, he ordered that the electoral colleges should be presided over by the Extraordinary Commissioners or Prefects, or by *persons designated for that purpose by the government.*

A few days afterwards, he issued general instructions to the Demogeronties, intimating that they *could only administer the affairs of their communes according to the decisions of the authority.*

The action of these bodies being thus paralyzed, he proceeded to modify their constitution. A list was now to be drawn up of the electors, and another of those who were eligible. If objections were made, the Extraordinary Commissioner judged of their validity. *His decisions were without appeal.* Thus the executive interfered, for the first time, in those village—I may almost say, domestic—rights and duties, from all antiquity held inviolable in every por-

tion of the East ; and thus Capodistrias having been rendered by foreign subsidies independent of the financial controul which the people formerly exercised over their rulers, wholly vitiated the constitution of the municipalities—the basis of the institutions of Greece.

Accurately informed of what was passing in the Conferences of London, Capodistrias received early intimation of the approaching Protocol of the 22nd of March, placing Greece under the government of a Christian prince. To parry this blow, he had recourse finally to the long-promised National Assembly. In the beginning of January, 1829, he communicated with the Panhellenium, respecting the elections. The Panhellenium drew up a detailed memoir, the spirit of which may be inferred from the following propositions, equally unpalatable to the President :—that those who had quitted the Greek state since the commencement of the war should be ineligible : and that the electoral colleges should choose their own president and secretary.

Capodistrias, whose appeal to the Panhellenium had been a mere matter of form, took

umbrage at the freedom of their opinions, and a breach ensued. The Panhellenium met no more.

The primates no sooner heard of the Protocol, than they freely expressed their joy at the prospect held out to them of a Christian prince, and a more National form of government; and a letter of a Greek patriot of the name of Pharmakides, expressive of these sentiments, fell into the hands of the President. The writer was thrown into prison, and the whole private correspondence of Greece was placed under the surveillance of a newly-created police. Letters were opened in all parts of the country, and especially those which arrived from England and France. The country now swarmed with spies, to whom were open the suspicious ears of the strangers, to whose hands all power was confided;* and to such an extent was this system carried, that the conversation and views of every European traveller passing through the Morea were noted down and transmitted to the secret police. After

* It was said at that time that ninety-five per cent. of the government agents were Ionians, and adventurers from the various parts of the Levant.

thus becoming acquainted with the opinions of the leading citizens, Capodistrias undertook a journey into the Morea, whilst his brother, Count Augustin, traversed continental Greece. The inhabitants, who for centuries had been accustomed to view the supreme power only when attended by the symbols of despotism and extortion, and who were now exulting in the enjoyment of tranquillity, and in the prosecution of peaceful industry, after having suffered during so many years the calamities of war, were charmed by the caresses, promises, and largesses of the President. Having thus predisposed the public mind in his favour, and being also, in all probability, much deceived in the estimate both of his power and his popularity, he conceived his game secure, and the elections commenced. As the conditions of the qualification for elector had been left undefined, all those became electors to whom the governors and their agents thought proper to grant the permission of voting, and the consequence was, that, in several of the provinces, the electors named as their representative the President himself.

For some days, Capodistrias hoped that such

would be the general result, which would, of course, have enabled him to combat the article in the Protocol relating to the Christian prince. He might then have addressed the Allied Powers in terms such as these:

“Do you really think of expelling me from Greece, after the nation has called me to be its governor, when, by their unanimous votes, they have just renounced in my favour the rights which I wished to attribute to them. Whatever be the title you may desire to give to the chief of this new state, you cannot so far betray the wishes of the people as to deprive them of the only man in whom they have placed their entire confidence.”

But the returns of the elections were by no means unanimous; and Capodistrias, the moment he ascertained this fact, was obliged generously to refuse the power conferred upon him by some of the provinces. This he did by the circular of the 28th of May, in which, after having alluded to his journey through the Morea, he expressed himself in these terms: “Our efforts have been fruitless in the provinces, which have just conferred upon us their full powers;”

assuming that he had himself contended against the unconstitutional confidence which was manifested towards him. Unfortunately, this declaration lost its value by arriving a month after the event, and when the elections of the other provinces had dissipated the dream which, had it been realised, would have been one of the most extraordinary and dexterous combinations that ever was brought about.

The proof of the President's intention to regulate his conduct by the event, and not on the constitutional principles which he afterwards put forward, is furnished by the following circular, addressed by him from Nauplia, on the 3rd of May, to the Prefects of Arcadia, Argolis, and Lower Messenia.

CIRCULAR.
 "We have received, with sentiments which it is difficult for us to express, the new proof of confidence which the provinces of your department have just given us, in conferring on us full powers for the fourth national congress.

"We authorize you to make known to the signers of this act, that we shall not delay answering it as soon as, by the deliberations of the other provinces of the state, we shall be enabled to form a resolution by means of which we may be

able to fulfil our duties, and at the same time to justify the confidence with which they honour us."

Thus it is proved, as much as a matter of this kind can be, that, if the suffrages of the other provinces had responded to the wish of the President, he would have received from the electors some months sooner what he received from the deputies some months afterwards.

The situation of things at home would have been the same, minus the parody of a national assembly, of which Greece would have been spared the representation and the cost.

The following document exposes the influence exercised by the government over the elections.

Declaration of the Electors.

"We, the undersigned electors of the province of Carytena, invited by the other electors of the capital, and having met in the church of Nôtre Dame, to proceed there together, with the fear of God and a pure conscience, to the election of four amongst us as representatives at the future National Congress—

"Having before us what we have sworn to establish, conformably to the instructions we have received, we conceive it to be first of all our duty to render to Heaven our humble thanks for the blessings it has showered upon us by sending

us our august President, who is the source of all our present and future happiness, after a barbarous and insupportable yoke of four centuries, and after all the intestine discord we have endured.

“ Acting on the part of the people of this capital and of all the villages, we desire that the four deputies elected to-day by the majority of votes religiously observe what follows :

“ 1. They will confine themselves strictly to all things that may contribute essentially to the advantage of the country, conformably to the wishes of his Excellency Count John Capodistrias, our august President, in every thing and always.

“ 2. They are prohibited from ever taking part, directly or indirectly, in factions or enmities, and from shocking or thwarting in the least thing the sentiments and the sacred and salutary intentions of his Excellency.

“ 3. If our said representatives should happen to deviate in any degree whatsoever from the conditions above set forth, without any exception, from that moment the mission which we entrust to them for the fourth National Congress would be null and void.

“ Such is our will and our decision, unanimously manifested and signed with our seal.

“ Given at Corinth the 2nd of June, 1829.”

(Follow the signatures.)

As soon as this document received the signature of the electors, the government gazette published it, and seemed to offer it as a model to the other provinces ; but it suppressed an

article, forming Art. III. in the original, which was circulated amongst the diplomatic body at Ægina, and excited no small astonishment.

It was as follows:—

“They must never entertain the idea of displacing his Excellency from the post assigned to him by the confidence of the nation, by lending themselves to plots and manœuvres which have but too long existed in Greece.”

The government, on reading, in the General Gazette, the mandate of the electors of Corinth, the insertion of which it had ordered, is struck with amazement—pens, upon the spur of the moment, a four thousand and nine hundredth circular, and despatches it forthwith throughout the provinces.

(No. 4900. Circular.)

The General Chancellerie to all the ordinary agents and provincial governors of the State.

“It has happened that in certain provinces the citizens, after having elected their deputies, have furnished them with written regulations as to the manner in which they ought to fulfil the duties of the sacred mission which is entrusted to them. The government could not foresee this wish of the electors on the convocation of the fourth National Assembly; now that it knows it, it is absolutely necessary that it should be at the same time informed of the results.

"Consequently, according to the decree of his Excellency our august President, you are invited, gentlemen, whether such rules may have already been given either directly by the population, or indirectly in its name by the electors, to the deputies of the provinces of your department, or whether they are to be subsequently imposed upon them — you are invited, I say, to send without the least delay and directly to his Excellency an authentic copy of these same rules, in order that the government may take timely measures for what it may think just and expedient.

"Egyna, 9--21 June 1829.

"The Chancellor of State, M. Spiliades."

Thus all the regulations which restricted the functions of the deputies, which issued from the cabinet of the President himself, were now presented to the electors as the production of their own free will, to a knowledge of which the government could not, however, remain, a stranger. By this circular it is suggested to the communities to imitate the example of Coriath, while the agents of government are furnished with an opportunity of interfering in the resolutions of the electors.

With the exception of some few places, where the principal Residents, whom it was impossible for the authority to refuse as electors, determined to exercise freely the right of voting, all

the individuals indicated by the government were returned. The latter designated them to the people under the title of "*good Christians*," and the people, who, upon the whole, took but little part in the affair, responded by that of "*serviles*," a name which stuck to them.

At Missolonghi, the government agents, unable to prevent the return of independent members, obtained the following mandate from the electors.

"The deputies are not allowed to require, from his Excellency, our august President, any account either of that which he has taken, or that which he has spent.

"They are expressly forbidden to make the slightest proposal without the advice and consent of his Excellency the President, the saviour of our country.

"The deputies will never accept, in any case whatsoever, any other chief for Greece than its well beloved President John Capodistrias.

"The deputies will swear to oppose every thing that might lead them to change their religion."

This last article is very remarkable. On every part of the continent of Greece, the agents of the government represented to the people that a change in the person of the chief of the




state would lead to a change of the national religion. At Egina, the seat of the government, the Ipsariote electors, assembled in that island, because their own was at that day uninhabited, were obliged to enter into a public compact with the provisional governor, M. Yanissi. After several sittings, in which he was unable to lead them, he succeeded in dividing them, and in inducing them to associate with two independent deputies two others agreeable to the government. This compromise effected, instructions were resorted to. They were proposed first by the governor, in his name, and rejected; then in the name of Count Viaro, and again rejected; and, finally, in the name of the President, and as being the result of his formal wishes.

All these means proving insufficient to obtain an assembly devoted to the President, an extraordinary expedient was then resorted to; nearly fifty deputies were added to the assembly as representing provinces belonging to Turkey, including Scio, Candia, Thessaly, Epirus, &c.

Nor was this sufficient. The assembly, chosen

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with so much care, had to undergo a new purification. A commission of three members was named to examine the return of each deputy, and to decide, without appeal, on its validity. Those who were recognised as "*good Christians*" received the best quarters. The following day, they were presented to the President, and announced under the title of "*The Loyal Deputies*." Those, on the contrary, who had refused to accept the instructions which restricted their duties, had the greatest difficulty in finding a lodging, and were denounced as revolutionists and disturbers of the existing harmony.

All these means proving insufficient to obtain an assembly devoted to the President, an extraordinary expedient was then resorted to; nearly fifty deputies were added to the assembly as representing provinces belonging to Turkey, including Scio, Candia, Thessaly, Epirus, &c. Nor was this sufficient. The assembly, chosen

the sum of 240,000 piastres, destined, as it was announced by M. Curado, the Governor of Argolis, to supply the first wants of the assembly.

The sacramental words, incessantly repeated by the President to all the deputies who were admitted to his presence, were the following:—

Proceedings of the Assembly of Argos.

DURING this time, the inhabitants of Argos were treated in a style very different from that which was to be expected in a country which chose its national representatives, or the place which was to become the scene of meeting of a constitutional parliament. Families were driven from their homes, and their goods and chattels thrown into the street. Thus the deputies named to defend the rights of the citizens commenced their representative career by profiting by a measure which violated home and hearth. While the assembly lasted, the unfortunate inhabitants slept in the streets, without receiving the smallest compensation; and yet Capodistrias had forwarded to Argos

the sum of 240,000 piastres, destined, as it was announced by M. Curado, the Governor of Argolis, to supply the *first wants* of the assembly.

The sacramental words, incessantly repeated by the President to all the deputies who were admitted to his presence, were the following:—

“That which I recommend to you, above all things, is to distrust the insinuations of certain persons who are too deeply interested in the execution of the Protocol of the 22nd of March. Greece, governed by any other person sent out by the powers, would fall under a yoke worse than that of the Turks. The happiness of the Greeks is entrusted to you. They think it can only be secured by your supporting me.”

All the deputies were now assembled at Argos. The President had received them both collectively and individually, and each of them had heard from the lips of his Excellency those subtle and captivating speeches in which he excelled, and which were so well adapted to the people with whom he had to deal. Nothing had been neglected to inculcate on the deputies one only thought—blind obedience to the will of

the government. The positions were sketched and the parts distributed, as if under histrionic superintendence, and this grand political comedy was actually represented in the ancient theatre of Argos.

The President guided the threads of the puppets which alternately appeared upon the stage. Count Viaro, charged with the secret police, was accurately informed, from hour to hour, of every thing that was said in the private houses and at the different meetings. Colocotroni and the comrades, whom his own influence and the government money had collected around him, were charged to support by cheers, and, if necessary, by force, the resolutions to be proposed, and to quell the opposition that might be made. In this manner, about twenty members, whose opinions were independent, were reduced to silence, without being able to obtain a hearing at all.

It had been agreed upon that Colocotroni, in order to merit the 50,000 piastres which the treasury had paid him, should move the resolutions, and that they should be supported principally by Perouca, Civeri, Rigagno, Tazzi,

Maughina, Legli, Enian, Spiliades, Poniropoulo, Crisogelos, Constantine Metaxa, all of them more or less powerful by a number of clients, and comprising together almost the whole of the assembly. As it was feared that the liberty of discussion might cause a divergence of opinion, even amongst the most devoted, these champions determined on passing all the resolutions by acclamation, and of not allowing them to be put to the vote. They had succeeded in carrying matters so entirely without order, that when they discussed the contents of an address to be presented to his Excellency, they put an end to all observation and debate by exclaiming, "Those who are favourable to the President will rise; those who are against him will remain seated."

Every thing being thus prepared, the opening of the session was fixed for the 11th (23rd) of July.

The following journal of the proceedings of the assembly I insert as a curious document, affording valuable insight both into the state of the public mind at that period, and of the means used by Capodistrias.

Opening of the Assembly.

11—23 July.—Count Capodistrias, in full costume, decorated with all his Russian orders, accompanied by Colocotroni, Miaulis, and all the deputies, escorted by a squadron of cavalry and two battalions of infantry, repaired to the church of the Virgin at Argos. After mass they took the oath *to occupy themselves only with the welfare of Greece—the wellbeing and liberty of each citizen.* Cries of *Long live the President* were heard repeatedly on all sides. The procession then advanced towards the theatre, which had been prepared for holding the sittings. The secretary of state, Spiliades, opened the assembly by a speech, in which the praises of the President were reproduced under different forms, and repeated to satiety in a manner to weary even the man who was the object of them, if certain men could be wearied with flattery. He ended by addressing thanks to the President in the name of the nation. The latter then began, and said, with downcast eyes, and giving to his voice a tone of emotion, *that his age and other motives obliged him to request permission to resign, and that he should be contented to return to the simple condition of a citizen of Ypsara!* At these words the party cried out, *We will have Count Capodistrias; Long live the President!* His Excellency bowed down his head, seeming to indicate that he immolated his repose to the desire of the assembly. Immediately afterwards, followed by the same escort, he repaired to the house which had been prepared for him by a certain Civeri, a deputy of Argolis, a man whose cruelty has become as proverbial as the justice of Aristides.

“ 12—24 July. — This was the day on which they were

to proceed to the nomination of the president of the assembly. Colocotroni had taken care to circulate among the deputies, that, if the choice fell on Zaimi or Condouioti, the President would resign, a step which could only bring on a civil war, the first misfortune of which would doubtless be the massacre of all the members of the assembly. It was added in whispers that the President had caused a considerable quantity of arms to be brought from Nauplia, and that he would oppose by force any decision which should openly infringe on his power; that thus there would be no less ingratitude than danger in not conforming to his wishes on this point.

“After these preliminaries, the deputies having met to name the president and the two secretaries, Colocotroni proposed Sessini for the former, Crisogheles and Jacovaki Rizo for the latter office. A deputy having asked who should be elected vice-president, Colocotroni hastily replied, without reflecting, ‘Oh, with regard to him, I received no instructions. Take, therefore, any one you please.’ Mavromati was named.

The deputy Niketas, charged with the police of the assembly, and under whose orders had been placed the armed force, which was considerable, rose from his place, and conducted Sessini to the seat he was to occupy. He did the same to the vice-president and the two secretaries.

“Although the assembly had not yet occupied itself with the slightest inquiry, Regagno observed that it could not better commence its labours than by thanking Count Capodistrias for his administration up to that day; he proposed to approve, without restriction, all that the President had done, supplicating him not to deprive the deputies of his paternal counsels.

“The deputies, Griva, Mikailo, and Crispi, the first of the armies of Roumelia, and the second of Poros, observed that a message of such great importance ought to be discussed, and that the examination of it ought to be deferred till the next day; that, in every case, they could not dispense with submitting it to the vote. ‘No! no!’ cried at the same time Colocotroni and all the champions, ‘we have no need of doing here as they do in Europe; we must economize our time, and simplify matters: those who are for the proposed address will rise, and then we shall see,’ he added, brandishing his arms in a menacing attitude. The whole of his comrades having immediately risen, a portion of the assembly did the same, and the remainder were carried along with them. The address was signed by the deputies, and sent to Capodistrias.

“They then proposed the nomination of three commissions, one to be composed of five members, charged to receive the petitions which should be addressed to the assembly; the other of seven members, charged to correspond with his Excellency; and the third of twenty-two members, having the power to sign, in the name of all the deputies, the addresses which should be drawn up in the sequel, and the acts to be recorded in the register. They proposed to name, for the two former, some of the deputies of the three islands of Hydra, Ipsara, and Spezia; but, as they refused, the decision was deferred to the following days.

“13—25 July.—The captain of the French frigate, ‘*La Fleur de Lys*,’ M. Lalande, having manifested a wish to be present at this sitting, was admitted amongst the deputies.

“The president Sessini made a speech to the deputies, recommending to them moderation in their proceedings,

inviting them to respect the presence of the stranger. The proposal of choosing among the deputies of the three islands some members for the two commissions was renewed. The same refusal on their side, although they gave no motives; which motives, however, were easily perceived in their resolution not to be the accomplices of the government, and to preserve the independence of their opinion. The election was again deferred to another sitting. Although the first duty of the assembly ought to have been to examine the legality of the return of each deputy, still, during the first three days, the question was never mooted. It is easy to assign the real cause of this, which was that the President desired that the addresses which had just been decreed in his favour should contain the greatest possible number of signatures. It was proposed, in fine, to examine the title of each deputy: the general opinion was in favour of deferring this examination to another sitting. This terminated with the reading of the answer of the President to the address of the 12—24 July.

“14—26 July.—It was decided, contrary to what had been previously adopted, that on Sunday there should be no meeting. This circumstance is sufficiently remarkable, because it shows that they had calculated beforehand with mathematical precision that the assembly would end on the day of the Greek festival of St. Saviour. In fact, all the labours of the assembly had been traced out beforehand, and the order of the day of each sitting came from the closet of the President.

“15—27 July.—The assembly demand, by a message, all the documents relating to the ministry of foreign affairs. The three commissions, whose nomination had been proposed in the sitting of the 12—24th, were at length formed.

It is useless to remark that they were only composed of deputies whose devotion to the President might be depended upon.

A petition of the upper town of Syra, demanding the exclusion of the two deputies of the lower town, was discussed. The petitioners maintained that, as the lower town of Syra was only inhabited by persons who were strangers to the island, where they had taken up their residence so lately as not to have obtained the right of electors, and as, furthermore, these individuals belonged to fractions of the population which were all represented in the assembly, because the Chiotes, the Tchesmeliotes, the Ipsariotes, had specially elected their own deputies, the real representatives of Syra could only be those who were named by the natives, and that the two others had no legal qualification.

In fact, they said, 'take from the lower town all those who belong to other portions of the population already represented, and who cannot be represented twice, and there will remain no one to name those same deputies whose exclusion we demand.' The illegality which had accompanied their election was also the subject of a serious examination.

The reasons discussed in the petition obtained the approbation of a portion of the Moreote and Roumeliote deputies; the champions alone were inexorable. In the midst of the agitation which ensued, the two deputies who were attacked cried out that they preferred retiring, and, after having loudly protested, they quitted the assembly. Zaïmi then rose, and showed that this was an illegal proceeding, and on his demand they decreed that, at a later period, the law should be adopted, by which no stranger could be named a deputy of a town without having first

obtained the right of a citizen. The exclusion of the two deputies of the lower town of Syra was not pronounced, and the sitting closed.

“16—28 July.—The two deputies of Syra, after long conferences, and after having allowed themselves to be entreated to forget the attack of the day before, returned to the hall. The proceedings began with the examination of the return of the members of the assembly.

“A certain Lyeurgus Castaniti, a deputy of Pyrgos, is accused by the champions of several acts which had been for a long time imputed to him, whether justly or not. Clonares and Monarchidi defended him, and pronounced these remarkable words: ‘If we are to investigate the private conduct of each of us, it would be exceedingly difficult to find a single man who is free from reproach.’ The minister Perouca, too well known for his acts at Ancona, and for the wealth he acquired during his stay at Cerigo, by furnishing supplies to the Turkish fortresses of Coron, Modon, and Navarin, during the period when they were blockaded by the Greeks—this same Perouca was one of the most violent declaimers against Lyeurgus.

“Monarchidi and Clonares perceiving that the champions would gain the day by clamour and violence, thought to parry the blow by proposing to open a list, in which every man should sign for or against the accused deputy. Crisoghelos began by writing the names of five or six deputies, among whom were remarked that of Petro Bey. All were favourable. A certain Bernardo, the deputy of Candia and president of the tribunal of first instance at Naxos, rose, and said to Crisoghelos, ‘Put me down *against*.’ Petro Bey having asked him what he had to allege against Lyeurgus, his reply was, ‘Well put me down *for him*.’ A

murmur arose in the assembly, and, by an involuntary movement, it manifested how much the fate of those was to be pitied whose fortunes and existence depended on the decisions of such an assembly.

“Perouca profited adroitly of this interval to make the assembly sensible that such a mode of collecting the votes was inadmissible, and that they must proceed as they had done before. On this N—, another deputy of Pyrgos

and the colleague of Lycurgus, cried with a loud voice:—

“Is it not inconceivable that people should pretend here to drag before the assembly the conduct of Lycurgus, whilst the government, which is the supreme regulator of what passes here, is far from having these scruples.

Amongst so many examples which I could quote, I shall content myself with that of Count Andrea Metaxa, honoured with the confidence of the President, but of whose conduct no one in Greece can be ignorant.”

“This sally appeared to have produced an effect on the assembly. The champions, who had nothing to reply, and who found themselves forced in their entrenchments, began to be at a loss how to triumph in this deliberation, when happily for them, the President, who was informed from one moment to another of all that passed, relieved them from their embarrassment. The Secretary of State, Tricoupi, arrived

with the documents which had been asked for the day before, and read the Treaty of July the 6th, the Protocol of March 22nd, and the correspondence which had taken place with regard to these important acts. He then retired. The discussion respecting the deputy Lycurgus was resumed. The

assembly was becoming excited, when Chrisogelos, in order to create a diversion, read a petition of the inhabitants of Aivali, who had fled to Syra, and who claimed the privilege

of sending a deputy. After an appeal in favour of the rights which the natives of the island alone had of being represented in the assembly, they put off till the next sitting the decision on these two propositions.

“17—29 July. During the interval since the last sitting, the government had exerted itself to the utmost to obtain a sentence of exclusion against the deputy Lycurgus; meetings had taken place between Metaxa, Perouca, and Colocotroni, and each of them had secured on his side a sufficient number of votes. Thus, on the opening of this sitting, the deputy Lycurgus was declared unworthy of a seat, and his name was erased from the list of members. The motive for this measure was not assigned, but it is certain that it referred to facts which had occurred before the arrival of Capodistrias. Thus the government, far from closing the wounds of the revolution by an oblivion of all the past acts, far from rallying the minds of all in the same sentiment, namely, that of the future happiness of Greece, laboured, on the contrary, to rekindle former feuds, and threw into the midst of the nation new germs of discord. Unskilful or ill-intentioned governors have almost always acted thus; it is easier to rule over men abandoned to all the ardour of individual passions, and exhausting in them their energy and their resources, than over men who, united by the ties of benevolence and affection, can devote a portion of their thoughts to the public interest.

“M. Scoufos, a deputy of Napoli, after a short discussion, was equally declared inadmissible, under the pretext that he was a stranger to the department which named him. At a former sitting, the same reason had not been deemed sufficient to prevent the admission of the two deputies of the lower town of Syra, so that within a few days the assembly

came to two exactly opposite decisions. But M. Scoufos had been for a long time marked at Napoli as the friend of the French. He had welcomed and fêted all the officers of the army who had visited that town, and this intercourse alone sufficed to render him an object of suspicion to the government. Moreover, M. Scoufos has travelled and acquired during his travels a certain degree of instruction; nothing more was necessary to make the President despair of counting him among the number of the *serviles*, and he was to be got rid of at any cost.

"Amongst the 200 deputies, and more than that number, who composed the assembly, scarcely twenty possessed the first notions necessary for understanding even a part of the questions submitted for discussion. The rest of the assembly was composed of fishermen, mechanics, and shepherds, such as the President had desired them to be, to do his work more speedily and certainly. Yet such was the assembly which Count Capodistrias dared to present to Europe as that of elected men, deciding with a knowledge of the subject on the future fate of Greece. As regards the composition of this assembly, it could scarcely be compared to one of those clubs in 1789, which, in the suburbs of Paris, undertook to investigate and decide on the profoundest problems of social existence.

"One of the members of the opposition demanded that they should decide, whether the oath of the President which he took on his arrival in Greece, to govern according to the basis of the principles laid down by the three assemblies of Epidaurus, Astros, and Trezene, remained in all its force for the next administration, or whether it was necessary to renew it under another form. A deputy stationed near Colotroni, from whom he received his orders, immediately

rose, and imposed silence on this unseasonable orator; telling him that these were matters beyond his competence, and with which he was not allowed to trouble himself.

"The Secretary of State read a project of His Excellency, in which he proposed a mode of establishing a provisional government in Greece.

"The champions all cried out together that it belonged to the Commission of Seven to make a report on this subject to the assembly.

"All the decrees, all the reports of the commissions, all the acts of the assembly, were drawn up beforehand in the closet, and by the hand, even, of the President. His Excellency, who could not write a word of Greek, prepared the documents in French, and Jacovaki Rizo, the Secretary of the Congress, translated them into Greek. There can be no mistake on this point; the style of the original and that of the translation do not admit of the slightest doubt of the manner in which the work proceeded. All the documents emanating from the assembly, which the President officially published in the *Courrier d'Orient*, and which have equally appeared in the *Smyrna Gazette*, with this difference, that, having received only a part of them before the session was closed, the latter was obliged to translate them from the Greek, these documents were evidently the first manufacture, whilst the stamp of a laboured and imperfect translation is impressed on each of the sentences of the Greek documents. The President cannot escape from the strength of this last proof; and, if he were to deny the innumerable mass of intrigues and illegal acts put into practice in order to procure for himself deputies resigned beforehand to all that would be exacted of them, still would the servility of the assembly, the burlesque ridiculousness of

this constitutional parody remain sufficiently attested by the French and Greek documents which are the monuments of it. We must now resume the thread of the proceedings.

“Count Capodistrias, in a letter which he addressed to the Congress, proposed to the nation *to get rid of the English debt by means of a loan of sixty-two millions of roubles, to be raised in Russia.* He endeavoured to prove, at the same time, that in forty-two years Greece, with its revenues, would be delivered from all its debts.

“18—30 July. The Secretary of the Finances read documents relating to his department. Constantine Metaxa was admitted into the assembly as a deputy of the armies of the Peloponnesus. For, under the necessity of finding creatures, they had considered the armed force, even the irregular bandits, as bodies which ought to be represented at the Congress.

“19—31 July. M. Andrea Metaxa submitted to the Congress documents relating to the administration of the interior. He was also the bearer of those of the commissariat of the navy, M. Mavrocordato, detained, as was said, at Poros by indisposition, having been unable to bring them himself. The absence of this distinguished functionary explained his opinion of the character of the assembly. He would have blushed to appear there, especially as the agent of the government, and thus to have become the accomplice in a fraud destined so grossly to deceive Europe and to prepare the subjugation of Greece.

“Count Capodistrias addressed to the assembly a letter informing it of the disorders which had occurred before his arrival in Greece, and the enormous deficit presented in the English loan, caused by the malversation of the persons who were then at the head of affairs. After reading this letter,

thrown designedly into the assembly as a new torch of discord, the champions sought to excite the indignation of the deputies against those whom public opinion accused of speculation, and some of whom were seated amongst them. This stroke was ably calculated by the President, who, in order to paralyze a portion of the opposition, thus made use of a circumstance foreign to his administration, and which ought to have been classed amongst the disorders inseparable from the first period of the insurrection.

“Will it be said that parliamentary tactics, and the necessity of crushing an opposition already three parts overcome, authorized the President to make use of such arms? If even he had on his side the rigour of justice, how did he not recoil from the idea of awakening amongst the Greeks the remembrance of a period of disorder and of scandal, over which he ought, on the contrary, to have thrown a veil? How could he lay aside the most noble of all the duties which he had to perform, that of a pacificator in the midst of a disunited family, and in which the avidity of gain tended to perpetuate sentiments of hatred and discord? Notwithstanding the absolute devotedness of almost the whole of the assembly, these reflections seemed to be gaining on their minds, and it was easy to perceive that this attack of his Excellency had sensibly wounded that opinion which it had wished to caress. After this sitting, at which M M. Orlando and Condouriotti were present, both of them deputies of Hydra, one did not appear again in the assembly, and the other showed himself but seldom.

“They then passed to the examination of the accounts of Colonel Heydeck. It is necessary here to make known two anterior facts.

“Colonel Heydeck having, some time before, sent in his accounts to his Excellency, they were forwarded to the commission charged to examine them; it was perceived that the Colonel had passed in the accounts the Sundays as paid to the daily labourers who had worked at the Arsenal. The members of the commission referred the matter to the President, who answered drily that the accounts of the Colonel were right, and that it only remained with the commission to approve of them.

“The second circumstance referred to the President himself. After having despatched some pirates against neutral vessels, he was compelled to pay a considerable sum to Admiral Dandolo, as an indemnity for the captured cargoes, and for the losses sustained by the merchant owners. This sum was raised at the time from sums which the President had on board a Russian frigate, the source of which is unknown; but it fell definitively on the public treasury. There was no one in Greece who did not agree respecting the enormous fault committed by the President, not only with regard to an illegal measure, as regarded neutrals, but also with regard to the very sensible loss which it occasioned to the finances. The President now persuaded each deputy privately that this proceeding, even considered in a financial point of view, had been very advantageous to Greece, and all of them assured His Excellency that they were convinced of it.

“These two facts had sufficiently proved to the deputies that all serious examination of the accounts of a public functionary was interdicted. They respectfully approved of those of Colonel Heydeck, in spite of the irreligious article of the Sunday salaries.

"20th and 22nd July—1st and 2nd August. These two days were holydays, as it was necessary to leave the secretaries time to put in order the reports of the past sittings.

"22nd July—3rd August. The reports of the former sittings were hastily read. The deputies signed them.

"It was resolved that a letter of thanks should be addressed to Colonel Heydeck for the services which he had rendered to Greece.

"M. Jacovaki Rizo, who had up to this day remained mute, read the project of an address to his Excellency, by which all the deputies, in the name of the nation, thanked Count Capodistrias for all the benefits which she had received from him, acknowledged him as the Saviour of Greece, and gave him full powers to treat with the sovereigns respecting the fate of the country, and to contract the new loans in the mode which he might think the most advisable. Thanks were to be equally addressed to the three admirals and to the French army.

"Coletti, a deputy of Roumelia, on whom the letter of the President relative to the malversation of English guineas had made an impression, hastened to give his approval to this project of address, and thought it ought to be immediately signed. Poniropulo and Calamogdarty were of the same opinion. Psylla and Crispy, deputies, the former of Athens, the latter of Paros, opposed this resolution, saying, that a project of such great importance, and by which the powers and the interests of the nation might be irretrievably compromised, demanded a profound attention before being adopted: they demanded an adjournment; the champions exclaimed loudly against this motion, and insisted that the address should immediately be sent. The two

deputies replied, and demanded, that, at all events, they should modify, on the one hand, the force of the expressions in favour of the President; whilst they should add, on the other, to the energy of those destined to make known to the Sovereigns of the Allied Powers the sentiments of gratitude with which the nation was penetrated towards them. Chrysogelos maintained, that all that concerned the three Sovereigns was enough, and that it would not be consistent with the dignity of the nation to add more.

Perouca, Colocotroni, and some others, who, in all the discussions, were the army of reserve to carry the grand measures, exclaimed loudly, that it was a shame that this address should give rise to the slightest objection; that it ought already to have been signed by the President and the secretaries of the assembly, and to have been sent to Count Capodistrias.

Rigagno thought that this document was too interesting not to be signed by all the representatives, and if possible, by the whole nation; and Poniropoulos cried out with enthusiasm, ‘This is very well said, for we ought to have confidence in our saviour, in the envoy of God, in the person whom we ought to consider as descended from Heaven, and to have received his mission from divine Providence.’

It was thus that Poniropoulos expressed himself every time that he spoke of Count Capodistrias; presuming, doubtless, that all those epithets might liberate him from the obligation of refunding the sums which he had been accused of purloining.

The numerous flock of the *serviles* rose and asked to sign the address; all imitated this example, and it was soon signed by them all. Psylla, seeing that, according to this mode of proceeding, there remained no further means of

being useful to his country, retired, and, under the pretence of ill health, appeared no more.

“The deputies of Hydra, seeing the confusion which reigned in the assembly, and easily comprehending that no measures could be discussed in it, and still less accepted without the approbation and the consent of the President, determined on taking a step, in order to obtain some little independence in the discussions, and at least to save, in the eyes of the nation and of Europe, the appearances of servility to which they were condemned by the composition of the assembly. They consequently went to the President, and communicated to him their intention *of proposing, as a basis, for the establishment of the government, the principles of the constitution, which had been approved of by the three preceding assemblies.*

“Although this declaration was made with the most minute precautions, for fear of offending the President, he received it with ill-disguised discontent and impatience; his answer was conveyed in a tone of extreme excitement.

“‘Do you imagine, gentlemen,’ said he, ‘that I am a Turk, and that I am the enemy of constitutions? I desire as strongly as you do to see Greece governed by a constitution. You have, in several of my proclamations, numberless proofs of my wishes and of my efforts to liberate you from despotic authority: but is it in our power at this moment to establish a constitution? The political existence of Greece depends entirely on its foreign policy; what can we do of ourselves? Suppose I were to give you this constitution, that it should be conformable to your wishes and to mine, and that a foreign prince came to govern Greece; if the Protocol of the 22nd of March were put in execution; do you think that this prince, *a stranger to your religion*

and your Wants, would not overthrow our work and all our institutions with less difficulty than I did myself the moment I arrived? You well know that I employed neither force nor violence for that purpose; but I acted according to my conviction that the circumstances required, for the moment, another form of government, such a one as we have wisely established by the grace of God.

“I ask of you, gentlemen, are the circumstances changed, or can you prove to me that the fate of Greece does not entirely depend on the foreign policy of the other cabinets? Tell me frankly?”

“It is precisely for this very reason, which your Excellency so well puts forward,” replied the deputies of Hydra, “that we must not allow ourselves to be taken off our guard, and *that we must oppose the strength of fundamental institutions to the unforeseen events which may threaten the future fate of Greece.*”

“No, no,” replied the President, with warmth; “be tranquil; I shall know how to provide for these events; I give you the fullest assurances on this point, and we have still time before us. Affairs are not such as you suppose; they are at this moment more complicated than ever, and we are not prepared yet for what may happen: meantime, believe in my foresight, in my zeal, my experience, in the diplomatic career, to which I have been devoted for more than thirty years.”

“Thus the President maintained, with the same strength and in the same breath, two contrary opinions; the one, that the destinies of Greece were entirely involved in the march of its foreign policy, and that neither he nor the Greeks could do anything of themselves; the other, that he boasted of guiding the course of that policy, and of pre-

venting it from being hostile to the country. He would have done better by explaining himself clearly, in agreeing that Russia was not yet sufficiently mistress of events to allow him to guarantee any thing, but that, the success of that cabinet being undoubted, he thought he might also take his share of the certainty of the future. The Deputies appeared to be unable to understand him; they attempted again some observations on the acts of the administration, which, like the former, were evaded by equivocal arguments. Reduced to silence, but not convinced, they took leave of His Excellency, persuaded of the uselessness of any discussion with a chief decided on making his will prevail, and to overpower, with a brilliant flow of words, men but little accustomed to a contest of that character.

“23 July—4 August.—The sitting commenced with the reading of the petition of General Church; but scarcely had the champions heard a few words of it, than they cried out it was scandalous; declared that they would not allow a letter to be read in the Assembly which contained blasphemy, and sent it back to the Commission for them to report upon it. This petition referred to the resignation of the General, and expressed the motives of that measure.

“It was proposed to authorize the Commission of twenty-two to sign, in the sequel, for the whole Assembly.

“They read the answer of the President to the address of the preceding day.

“25 July—6 August.—The Commission of Seven ordered the reading of its correspondence with the President on the basis of the government which it would be proper to establish in Greece. The communication of all these documents took place with such rapidity, and in such a manner,

that it was almost impossible to remember any of it, and to analyze its meaning.

“The Assembly was informed of the Protocol of the 22d March, of some diplomatic papers emanating from the Ministers of the three powers, and particularly of a letter written by the British Resident in sending the Protocol to His Excellency. They ended by the replies of the President to the Ministers, who became the object of a boisterous applause, expressed by the habitual members.

“26 July—7 August. — *The Commission of Seven submitted to the Assembly the proposal of a provisional Government of Greece, composed of the President and of a Council of twenty-seven Members, which should take the name of GERUSIA — (Senate).* In order to form this body, the Assembly will present to the President the names of sixty-one individuals, amongst whom His Excellency will choose twenty-one; the nomination of the six others will be entirely at his disposal. The attributes of the Senate will be in a few words, to decide on nothing without the permission of the President.

“Idomeneus, the deputy of Candia, after having heard this project read, cried out with marked vivacity: ‘So this, then, is the sole power which our unhappy nation can confer on a body composed of the chief men of Greece, whilst all the others have been, without distinction and without any safeguard, placed in the hands of Count Capodistrias!’ This exclamation was followed by the most violent outcries. A great part of the Assembly rose from the benches, and threatened Idomeneus, who, abandoned by his own courage, and by those who ought to have supported him, seemed crushed under the weight of what

he had just uttered, and dared not add a word. Tranquillity was re-established, and the decision was adjourned to the following sitting.

“27 July—8 August. —The project presented the day before was hastily adopted, and was immediately transcribed on the register.

“The proposal was made to exclude all strangers from employments in Greece, and not to admit counsel in the tribunals. These two questions remained undecided.

“29 July—10 August.—The deputies were more numerous than usual. They had been informed, by order of the President, that the Russian and French admirals, and the agents of the three powers, had expressed their desire to be present at this sitting.

“The government dexterously turned this circumstance to account. In the short interval which remained before the arrival of the foreign authorities, Chrysoghelos made a speech to announce that, as the book which contained the acts of the Assembly up to that day had only a few more blank leaves, it could not suffice for the remainder of the session; that, besides, the leaves had become soiled, and that therefore the acts ought to be transcribed on another register. ‘Here it is,’ he said; ‘every thing is ready; the acts are already transcribed, and I shall now read them to you.’ Rigagno and Colocotroni, then performing the part agreed upon, cried out in a decided tone: ‘The reading of these acts is useless; we are all of us men of honour, and we have the greatest confidence in our secretary; we have only therefore to sign.’ The champions set the example, one by one: all the others followed; and the new register was signed without the old one being destroyed, so

that at present there exist two, and the President may make use of whichever suits him best.

The admirals and the diplomatic agents of the powers were introduced. Chrysoghelos addressed them in a speech, and the deputies made the theatre resound with cries of 'Long live the three powers!' Some of the champions proposed to create an order, destined to be conferred as a reward to valour. Some of them (for on that day the parts were distributed) replied emphatically: 'We desire no decoration; we renounce, in favour of the President, all the rights which we might have to it. Count Capodistrias alone shall be decorated with it; we are sufficiently rewarded in seeing our country placed under so good an administration; and, with regard to the merit of our exploits, history will speak of them.'

A general *bravo* followed these words, when Griva Mikailo rising, demanded the arrears of the soldiers, deprived of the necessaries of life. Spiliades replied that this claim was well founded, but that the finances of the state did not allow it to act as it ought to do. 'The brightest reward,' said he, 'which these brave Hellenes ought to hope for, is that which history will reserve for them.' 'But history,' replied Griva, with a severe tone, 'does not support them against cold, sickness, and death, which daily sweeps away lives dear to their country. You, Spiliades, you may well speak of history, who live in your closet, surrounded by all the luxuries of life. Would it not be better that half the emoluments of the civil functionaries, so generously paid, should be assigned to the payment of so many impoverished soldiers, who are dying of hunger?' Colocotroni, beside himself, transported with a fury of which he

had not hitherto given an example in the Assembly, apostrophized, with threatening gestures, the man who had just reasoned so loyally. 'And who are you,' said he, 'to dare to speak thus?' 'I,' replied Griva, 'I am the representative of men who will know how to make themselves feared, if they are reduced to despair.'

"The foreign admirals and residents, seeing that the quarrel waxed warm, and that it might possibly end in bloodshed, thought it time to retire. Their departure calmed the irritation which began to prevail in the Assembly, and the sitting was closed.

"30 July—12 August.—At the opening of the sitting, they again proceeded to discuss the project of establishing a decoration, as a military reward. Here the scene changed entirely. To the great astonishment of the whole Assembly, Colocotroni and Niketas passed over into the ranks of the opposition, and claimed, not for the President, but for the army and its chiefs, the institution of the order. The discussion was animated; both of them persevered in supporting it; but at length the proposal, such as it was brought forward two days before, was adopted by the Assembly. Colocotroni murmured loudly against this decision, and suddenly rushed out of the hall. Rado, Poniropoulo, and others, followed him, and tried to calm him; they succeeded in persuading him, and brought him back to the Assembly. He seated himself tranquilly, and resumed his habitual task; that which he had just filled, and which he had played with success in order to deceive some of his friends, had lasted long enough.

"A petition was presented in the name of the Ionians, praying to be allowed the right of Greek citizens. Coletti

pronounced a glowing eulogium on the petitioners, saying, that it is to them that Greece almost owed her delivery, and recalled the efforts made in favour of liberty from the commencement of the revolution. Spiliades supported this opinion, and concluded in favour of the demand. But Sessini, the President of the Assembly, forgetting that his position imposed upon him the obligation of confining himself to gathering the opinion of the others, could not refrain from making known his real sentiments on this question. Combating the eulogium lavished on the Ionians, he only attributed to the love of gain the services which they had been able to render during the years of the Greek struggle; he affirmed that, in thus expressing himself, he was acquainted with the subject, and that he advanced nothing which he could not prove. All the other deputies, although remaining silent, seemed to share the opinion of the President of the Assembly, and the sitting was raised without having come to any decision.

“1—13 August.—Several petitions were presented, accompanied by a private letter from His Excellency to the Assembly. They were addressed by the inhabitants of Candia, Samos, Scio, Constantinople, Smyrna, Hydra, Spezia, and Ipsara. The petitioners of these three last islands demanded to be indemnified; the others begged the President and the Assembly to intercede in their favour with the powers, preferring, they said, death to the Ottoman rule. The presentation of these petitions may give rise to an error which it is important to correct. They were not signed by the Greek inhabitants who really resided in the places designated as forming a part of the Ottoman Empire, but by some fugitives who were in Greece, and who, for the

most part, had no resources there. They were sent to the Commission of Five, to be then submitted to the decision of His Excellency.

“2—14 August.—The Commission of Five presented a report on a certain number of the petitions, among which figured that of the Ionians, with which they were occupied the day before. All of them were referred to the decision of the President. Amongst these petitions, there was one which the Assembly demanded to hear read aloud. It was from a woman of Sparta, who had served as a soldier during the whole period of the war of Insurrection. She was brought into the middle of the Assembly, questioned with extreme interest, and her petition was sent to His Excellency, recommending the woman to his generosity for the recompense she solicited.

“A proposal was made to regulate the convents, and the property dependent upon them. The decision was referred to the President.

“3—15 August.—Luca Ralli, a deputy of Scio, proposed an amnesty in favour of all those, who, during the whole of the insurrection, should have been false coiners, pirates, receivers of stolen goods, or guilty of other crimes and misdemeanors. The majority of the Assembly exclaimed against this proposal, and strongly opposed its being mentioned in the journals. *A member proposed to allow pay to the demogerontes, or municipal councillors, of the different districts. It was left to His Excellency to decide on this point.*

“5—17 August.—The Assembly decided, after a short discussion, that strangers should not be excluded from foreign employments in Greece, and that counsel should be

allowed in the tribunals; but it urged that a regulation on these two subjects should be made by the President.

"After some unimportant conversation, they separated, and this sitting closed the session, or, to express the matter more clearly, as Count Capodistrias did, it was adjourned to the period when the negotiations with the powers should require a new meeting of the representatives of the people.

"M. Le Marquis de Valmy, who, during a certain period, filled the functions of French agent, and M. Panin, provisionally charged with the Russian mission, were regularly present at all the sittings.

"6—18 August.—Festival of St. Saviour. All the deputies having met in the theatre, the president, Sessini, sent to his Excellency a deputation of eleven members, who repaired to his house. They escorted him thence to the hall of the sittings, where, on his arrival, he was conducted to the President's chair. The latter addressed him in terms analogous to the occasion. Chrysogelos and Spiliades did the same. His Excellency replied.

"When the mutual congratulations had ceased, his Excellency, accompanied by the same escort which had attended him the day of the opening of the Assembly, repaired to the church, where the celebration of grand mass was followed by a Te Deum of thanks. The religious ceremony was hardly finished, when Count Capodistrias, anxious to free himself at last from the annoyance which the Assembly had for so many days imposed upon him, abruptly quitted his escort, and unexpectedly returned, alone and precipitately, to his house, leaving every one free to go whithersoever he pleased.

"From that time forward, the deputies, at least the in-

significant deputies composing the servile flock whose nomination the President had obtained at the elections by bribery, held no further communication with him. The others remained about him to put the last seal on the work of slavery, of which they had just laid the foundations."

The above reports were drawn up by an agent sent to Greece by M. Blacque, the editor of the Smyrna Gazette, and subsequently of the Moniteur Ottoman, with the concurrence of several gentlemen, English, French, and others, who followed with deep interest the proceedings of the assembly; and also of some of the principal deputies who could not understand the whirlpool of events in which they were involved, and, in their anxiety to communicate just and correct details of what passed, were forced to look to the free press of Turkey for the means of recording the truth, and protesting in the face of Europe against the misrepresentation of their own acts and opinions, under a government designated Constitutional.

The following are amongst the most important acts of this self-styled National Assembly.

Capodistrias, in a letter addressed to the assembly, proposed to get rid of the English debt

by means of a loan of sixty-two millions of roubles, to be raised in Russia. He endeavoured to prove at the same time *that in forty-two years Greece with its resources would be delivered from all its debts.* The reader is particularly requested to bear this fact in mind, the importance of which will appear in the sequel.

The Panhellenium was replaced by a Senate composed of twenty-seven members, twenty-one of which were to be chosen by the President from a list of sixty-three candidates, to be proposed by the assembly. The choice of the other six was left entirely to the President, who thus paid his adherents out of the public purse, and exhibited to Europe a kind of national representation.

The assembly entrusted the President with full powers to negotiate with the Allied Courts; *on the condition, however, of subsequent ratification by the assembly.*

The judicial system provisionally established in Greece, was to be maintained, *with the reserve of the modifications which the President might desire to introduce.*

All the other branches of the administration

were to remain as before ; *but such modifications might be made as experience* (the President) *shall require.*

The assembly sanctioned the institution of a bank, the fixing of the national domains, and their being mortgaged to the bank. This is another point to which I beg the reader's particular attention.

The nation was made responsible for the debts of the municipalities. This measure bore on its face, to the eyes of Europeans at least, an appearance of solicitude and generous protection. It was, however, one of the severest blows struck at those habits and principles, and feelings, which in reality constitute national institutions. Here was one of those insidious processes of disorganization effected through financial means, of which Greece exhibits such remarkable examples, which will be immediately appreciated by those familiar with Eastern habits of administration, but which I despair of rendering intelligible to those accustomed only to our centralized habits of finance, where it is impossible to perceive the connexion between the financial system and political independence

on the one hand, and individual morality on the other.

The Municipal compact was the last bulwark of the citizens against a Government which, in the absence of legal institutions, had made itself the arbiter of the fortunes, the lives, and the opinions of all; it was a sort of intermediary power which the administration was obliged to break down before reaching the private individual who formed a part of the communal barrier. By transferring to the Government the debts of the Communes, that is to say, by making the Government the debtor of the creditors, and itself the creditor of the Communes, the Municipal compact was broken. Its honour was wiped away—its credit vanished. Having been also deprived of the basis of their rights, the initiative, as regarded their own concerns, and having been forced to submit to this act of outrage, the municipalities were worse than annihilated. They were converted into the passive agents of power. The President, supported by foreign money, accomplished that which no Pacha had ever dreamt of attempting; because the Pacha, being obliged to remit a

tribute, was under the necessity of conciliating popular support.

Capodistrias secured, through this packed assembly, a no less absolute power over the tribunals than that which he obtained over the municipalities.

By the 12th decree, the National Assembly ordained that all causes between natives, relative to acts qualified as crimes or misdemeanors committed between 1821 and 1828, should be judged without appeal by a board of commissioners composed of three members.

According to Art. 2, each of the parties was to name one judge, and the third member was to be named directly by the government.

Art. 3. If the plaintiff does not present his arbitrator, the government will have the right to name him.

Art. 5. The ordinary process will be followed in all the above-mentioned affairs, *with the reserve of the modifications which the Government may adopt* for all in general, or for each separate case.

Art. 6. This tribunal will have the power of pronouncing definitively on all the cases with regard to damages and the interest to which the

injured party may have proved his claim ; but all that relates to the application of the punishment is referred to the government.

In this manner, Capodistrias gained a power of investigating all the crimes, dissensions, wrongs, claims, and disputes, which had arisen during the revolution, and acquired the means of persecuting by judicial chicane any single citizen ; while he threw the responsibility of his acts on legal form ; associated many with himself in the perpetration of injustice ; screened both his acts and the character of his administration from the little penetrating eyes of Europe ; and gaining the applause of the liberals, while conciliating the favour of the lovers of despotic rule, and thus uniting all parties in branding opposition to him with the character of revolution and of anarchy.

Another measure of importance was the sanction given by the assembly to Capodistrias to continue his negotiations with the Allied Courts to obtain their guarantee to a loan of sixty millions of francs, by which all these usurpations were to be consolidated, and the Government maintained, in defiance of public opinion and on the ruins of national institutions.

CHAPTER III.

Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg defrauded by Capodistrias of the Crown of Greece. Triumph of Russia against England and the Greek nation. Capodistrias directs the indignation of the Sovereign Prince against the friends of England. The Conference again misled into supporting Capodistrias. He persecutes the whole of the Notables. Passports, Quarantines, Custom-Houses. Byzantine Code. Spies. Revolt of Roumelia, Maina, and the Islands. Death of Capodistrias.

HAVING in the last chapter explained the manner in which Russia obtained "*exclusive influence*" in Greece, I must not omit to show how she employed that influence to acquire an "increase of territory," and "*exclusive influence*" over Turkey.

The campaign of the Emperor against the Turks, in 1828, had been unsuccessful; but the prolonged continuance in the Morea of a French army of 17,000 men, after they had expelled the Turco-Egyptian garrisons, enabled Capodistrias, in the following spring, to deploy along the whole northern frontier a force of 15,000 Greeks

who, attacking the Turkish garrisons in Acarnania, emancipated Western Greece. The army was commanded by Sir Richard Church, and the campaign necessarily paralyzed Albania, the most warlike province of Turkey. The result was, that the Albanian army, amounting to 25,000 men, could not repair to the Danube until the month of June. Had the Pasha of Scodra been able to occupy with his mountaineers the defiles of the Balkan, it is fair to presume that General Diebitsch would never have gained the title of Sa Balkanski, or assumed the laurels won for him on the gulf of Lepanto.

In the mean time, the adherence of the Sultan to the Treaty of London enabled the British government to act an independent part. Accordingly, no sooner had the Porte intimated its readiness to abide by the determinations which the Conference might ultimately decide upon, relative to Greece, than the sovereignty of that country was offered to Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg.

The knowledge of this decision reached Greece towards the end of December, and the manner

in which the views of England and Greece were frustrated, during the year 1830, displays no less extraordinary ability on the part of Capodistrias, than his usurpation of supreme power the year before.

Sir Frederick Adam, the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, had no sooner received intelligence of the nomination of the prince, than he wrote to an English gentleman at Patrass, to ascertain the opinions of the Greeks, and to encourage the primates, if favourable, to declare their wishes in addresses. This gentleman having written to several of his friends, visited in person six-and-twenty villages and towns of the Morea, where addresses were immediately signed. Sir Richard Church having reason to believe that he was acting in accordance with the views of the government in England, encouraged the primates to come forward in a similar manner, and procured within a week addresses from almost all the chief men in the country expressive of their enthusiastic devotion to the prince, which he presented to Mr. Dawkins, who had already assented to the judiciousness of the steps he was taking; but,

when Sir Richard Church urged their being immediately forwarded, Mr. Dawkins refused to afford an opportunity for their transmission to England. Not one of them reached their destination until months after the resignation of His Highness, who, on subsequently learning the fact, expressed his astonishment and regret in a letter, which to this day exists in the hands of Sir Richard Church at Athens*.

Count Capodistrias, immediately on learning the intelligence, took the most decided measures to suppress any manifestation of national feeling. Colocotroni and several of the "good christians" were despatched into all parts to prevent public meetings. In the town of Vostizza, two English travellers, Mr. Urquhart and Mr. Ross of Bladensberg, who had spread the intelligence, were denounced as impostors †.

* It was at a subsequent period told me by an English Resident at Patrass, that some of those addresses had been forwarded as far as Corfu, but that Mr. Dawkins sent a courier to overtake his despatches, and recalled the packet. I do not hesitate to mention this, as I could not at the time have any official knowledge of the circumstance.

† This fact I had from Riga Palamede, to whom the order of Capodistrias was sent.

and the prefect was ordered to proclaim, by beat of drum, the untruth of the news.

I have shown how completely Capodistrias had overthrown the representative system; but there still remained a vestige of freedom in the municipal institutions, which he resolved to eradicate entirely.

On receiving from the Residents of the three powers in Greece the official communication of the choice of Prince Leopold, the President pretended to consider it necessary to submit the decisions of the alliance to the consideration and approval of the Senate, and thus brought forward that body, consisting of his own servile nominees, as representing the *national will*. Tutored by the Count, they drew up a memoir, presenting such difficulties in the execution of the Protocol as were calculated to deter any prince from assuming the government. The restriction of the boundary to the Aspropotamos gave rise to universal discontent; and Sir Richard Church was induced to write a pamphlet, which, arriving at an opportune moment, contributed to increase the embarrassment of the Prince. During the interval, the

national party expressed, in addresses, their enthusiastic devotion to His Highness, calling his nomination a gift from Heaven, and conjuring His Highness to hasten his arrival in the country.

These addresses were stigmatized by Count Capodistrias as illegal, and a Circular was issued by him to the governors of the provinces, denouncing the signers of them as having acted by secret, unlawful, and dishonourable means.

To describe the whole tissue of fraud by which Capodistrias misled Prince Leopold, with regard to the entire state of Greece, and the feelings of the nation, would transcend the limits of this work. It is sufficient to state, that not only were his intrigues successful in the particular object which he desired, viz., the renunciation of His Highness, but that he contrived to derive, from the mere fact of the nomination of a Sovereign Prince, and the difficulties now put forward respecting the boundary, new arms for persecuting the independent Primates, and crushing them under the weight of European hostility.

In his letter to His Royal Highness Prince

Leopold, dated Nauplia, 12th June, 1830, he states—

“*There are malignant spirits and intriguers in Greece, as every where else ; but here there is more than this. Foreigners, who for a long time have not ceased to scatter the seeds of dissension, continue their culpable practices with more than ordinary activity at the present moment.*

“*The revenues of the state would offer us resources, but they are uncertain, on account of the efforts which the intriguers are unceasingly making to paralyze the government. These unhappy men are encouraged, and they now shew themselves with an effrontery which would be formidable if the people did not know them beforehand. Nevertheless, the means of corruption of which they make use, may in the end be attended with success, especially if the government is not enabled regularly to pay the army and its civil officers.*

“*The band of plotters is composed of some foreigners who, from want of judgment and good conduct, have failed in every thing which they imagined they could undertake in this country. It is also composed of a handful of Greeks, on whom an evil conscience imposes the necessity of seeking, out of their own country, the influence and credit which they have lost in the opinion of the great mass of their fellow citizens.*

“*So long as their means of action were confined to the diatribes of the Journal of Smyrna, the consequences could not be in the least mischievous to this country ; and I did not therefore think it consistent with the dignity of the government to descend into such an arena, for the purpose of contending with them. But, since the Acts of London*

have been communicated to us, and since your Royal Highness has deigned to write to me your letter of the (16) 28 February, they have not only multiplied their attacks in the Journal of Smyrna, but they have begun to act in a direct manner upon all classes of citizens. They preach to them doctrines which would take effect, if the people had less good sense and sagacity."

In thus instigating the British government against the unhappy primates, Capodistrias receives the support of the Residents, who, in a letter to the Conference, express themselves as follows. Alluding to the reply of the President to their communication of the Protocol, they state—

"According to this document, the Provisional Government of Greece adheres freely to all the propositions which have been made to it; and engages to fulfil the obligations imposed upon it.

"But, at the same time, the President requested the Agents of the three Allied Courts, in the most pressing manner, to represent to their governments with how many difficulties this operation would be surrounded in a country in which the scheme of social order is scarcely traced out, *and in which anarchy finds a perpetual refuge in the recesses of the mountains.* The Provisional Government of Greece therefore solicits the immediate mission of the Boundary-Commissioners, and *will probably apply to the Admirals of the Allied Powers, in order to obtain the presence of a force to prevent or repress disturbances, a*

force which might be supported, in case of need, by the French troops under the command of General Schneider. The President, moreover, earnestly implores the transmission of the funds specially destined to the aid of the families which shall expatriate themselves from Acarnania, for the purpose of establishing themselves in the provinces again united to continental Greece, but almost entirely uncultivated.

“In concluding the present report, the Residents of the Allied Courts consider themselves fortunate in being able to add, that the fermentation which for a moment agitated the public mind, has given place to sentiments more conformable to those which the Allied Courts had a right to expect from the nation which they have saved and loaded with benefits.”

Thus the Conference is entreated to lend the aid of foreign arms to the President, to punish the signers of the addresses, who, on hearing of the perfidy of the Senate and the Court, in opposing insurmountable difficulties to the acceptance of the crown by Prince Leopold, were only prevented, by the support given to Capodistrias by the Alliance, from breaking out into open revolt, whilst Russia persuaded her two allies in the Conference of London, not that their troops were to be employed in overthrowing the decisions of the Conference, as was really the case, but in supporting Capodistrias in giving

them effect; and without waiting for these effects, the Conference is led to applaud itself by the information that the public fermentation of Greece had yielded to sentiments more in conformity with the wishes of the alliance, the fermentation having been an explosion of enthusiasm in favour of their decision resisted by Capodistrias, repressed by the moral and other means of the alliance, misrepresented by the Residents, and accepted by the Conference as a proof of the anarchical spirit of Greece, of the loyal support given by Capodistrias to their views, and of the necessity of maintaining him in his arduous position and in his straightforward acts.

It is only when one has followed out the effects of secret machinations of this description that an idea can be formed of the character of that most remarkable of all tribunals, the secret tribunal of Venice. When a veil of mystery is drawn over proceedings of this description, they of course become perfectly inscrutable. No one can venture to condemn, no one is prepared to resist, no one ventures to advocate, truth, because he does not know on what data the secret

tribunal acts. Men await in doubt and suspense, and when overtaken by decisions which a ray of light thrown at the proper period might have wholly prevented, they are forced to submit through ignorance of the motives of the framers, as if to decrees of destiny which they can neither comprehend or resist. But in this mysterious *chamber of three** it was not the affairs of one state managed by the Representatives of that state; it was not a citizen, a Proveditore, or a Doge, that was denounced as republican and anarchist; but it was the Representatives of the three first Empires of the world assembled in conclave to weigh the merits and scrutinize the opinions of a Foreign population, and to dispose of fleets and armies, and of millions of treasure, for the purpose of preserving animation in one of the colonies of Venice which she governed by a single Proveditore; and in this burlesque of national representation and of foreign policy, the three members of the secret tribunal are representing opposed interests, and yet their action is always in common.

* The secret tribunal of three at Venice was composed of two black and one red.

In endeavouring to grasp the ramifications and to trace out the effects of this system of Conference and of Protocol on Greece, on the policy of the Alliance, on the relative position of the nations of Europe, on the minds and opinions of the people of Europe, in discovering at each point the objects which Russia has gained, the chances of opposition which she has frustrated, the mind is quite overwhelmed, and it becomes as it were a relief to grasp at the conclusion that the power which has conceived and carried into effect such a scheme is worthy of, and will attain, universal dominion. The effect produced on Greece by the continuation of this system is beyond the power of language to describe.

No words can paint the wretchedness, the agony, the despair of the Greeks. Having seen man in almost every stage of life, under the most varied forms of government, in the wilds of America, in the snows of Russia, in Poland, Germany, Italy, Turkey, never have I witnessed so heart-rending a scene. The indignation of the English in Greece, the distraction of Church, the astonishment of the naval officers of England, altogether formed a scene which can

never be effaced from remembrance. Existence was misery itself.

The Conference, fatally misled into the belief that the opposition to the execution of their decisions arose from the disaffection of the Greeks, and not from the disloyalty of their President, instructed their admirals and the French commander to aid the Count, "to prevent or repress disturbances;" and they recorded in the Protocol of the 26th of July, their resolution to "*baffle these culpable intrigues.*"

Capodistrias, after the Residents had thus committed their governments to lend him military and naval aid, engages them to manifest towards the Greeks their confidence in his own system.

The following correspondence shows the entire concurrence of the Residents in the system of the President.

"*Annex A to the Protocol of the Conference (No. 35) of the 17th November, 1830.*

"*Extract of a Note addressed by the President of Greece to the Residents of France, Great Britain, and Russia, at the seat of the Greek Government, dated Napoli, July (14) 26, 1830.*

"The Provisional Government of Greece hastens to trans-

mit to you, herewith, the letter which it has just received from His Royal Highness the Prince of Cobourg, as well as the answer which it has addressed to him, and the message by which it conveys these documents to the knowledge of the Senate and of the nation.

“ We beg you to lay the present communication before your august Sovereign. His Majesty will perceive therein the expression of the deep regrets which the abdication of His Royal Highness the Prince of Cobourg causes to Greece and her government. His Majesty will also perceive therein the expression of the anxious desire which the nation entertains, that this unexpected event may not further prolong a state of uncertainty and danger which may compromise its dearest interests. *We also indulge in the hope, sir, that, witnessing, as you do, all that passes in this country, you will do it justice.*

“ You will have observed with satisfaction, *that order and tranquillity have not been disturbed, in spite of the efforts of a handful of men*, who seem to have united themselves for the purpose of diverting the citizens, wherever it might be possible, from the right course which they are following. *These men intend to make an opposition*, and perhaps to contrive the means of exercising it openly against the government.

“ *At last, they have even dared to send to His Royal Highness the Prince of Cobourg, addresses signed under an engagement of secrecy.*

“ *By these addresses they have presumed to characterise the opinion and the wishes of the government and of the senate*, upon the weighty questions of the fate of Greece, as an opinion, and as wishes, which would not obtain the *national assent*. Under circumstances of such importance,

the government has been compelled to appeal to the loyalty of the provinces. On receiving the circular, of which we subjoin a copy, they answered our expectations.

“ In taking into consideration the observations and facts which we have just recapitulated, *you will think with us*, that it is of great importance to preserve Greece, which gives constant proof of the most honourable sentiments, from the fresh misfortunes with which she would be threatened *by the continuance of these plots*, and by the continuance of external circumstances, which, in the long run, might favour them.”

In reply to this letter the Residents state :

“ *Annex E to the Protocol (No. 35) of the Conference of the 17th November, 1830.*

“ *Extract of a Note addressed by the Residents of France, Great Britain, and Russia, in Greece, to His Excellency Count Capodistrias, dated Napoli, July 28, 1830.*

“ Monsieur le Président,

“ I have received, as well as my colleagues, the note which your Excellency did us the honour to address to us on the (14) 26th of this month, together with the three papers which were annexed to it; namely, the letter of His Royal Highness Prince Leopold, the answer of your Excellency, and the message from the Provisional Government of Greece to the Senate.

“ In transmitting these important documents forthwith to our respective Courts, *it will be our duty to inform them that one unanimous feeling of regret and general accordance of wishes burst forth amongst the Greeks*, when the

country was again plunged, by the abdication of Prince Leopold, into the distress and uncertainty which the last Protocol seemed to have removed.

“ At the same time, our governments will no doubt learn *with lively satisfaction*, that all the provinces of Greece have *unanimously* manifested the confidence which they repose in the august protectors of this country, *and in the system by which it is destined to be governed*. The profound gratitude which the Greeks express on this occasion, will doubtless be appreciated as it ought to be. *In the unanimity of the sentiments which they have manifested*, we are *willing to find a pledge also of their future union*; and we think we shall be able safely to offer this pledge to our august sovereigns, *seeing, as we do* with so much satisfaction, that order and tranquillity have not been disturbed; and *witnessing the tendency of the efforts of the provisional government of Greece to preserve the country free from all commotion*, until the happy moment shall arrive when the fresh choice of a Sovereign Prince, known and promulgated, shall fulfil all hopes and calm all uneasiness.

“ It is with this object, *promoted by the whole tenour of our representations to our respective governments*, that we hasten to support your application for the continuance of the succours which the friendly care of the allied Courts has up to this time afforded to Greece.

“ We request your Excellency to add to the communications which you propose to make to the Senate the answer which we have now the honour to address to you, and *to allow it to be included amongst the documents which you may make public on this occasion*.”

So that in addition to the unanimous support of the nation, and the general tranquillity which had not been disturbed, the whole naval force of the Alliance, and the additional 10,000 French troops, were to be required to support the government; and it was necessary, in addition to all these vast means, aided by the moral weight of England, France, and Russia, that their Representatives should publish this array of force, in order to support Capodistrias.

Can any thing more completely reveal the hollowness and the antinational character of the government which the Residents thus upheld?

Yet in this manner were the Primates of Greece taught to feel that unless they were subservient to the views of Capodistrias, they would be represented in England, throughout Europe, and to their future Sovereign, as the friends of anarchy.

The author of these pages happened at that period to pass a few weeks in Greece, and to witness the effects of Count Capodistrias's administration. The whole of the Primates, who had so long shown their devotion to England, were suffering under the most galling persecu-

tion. Sir Richard Church had just received a letter, exiling him from the Greek territory. Mavrocordato and Tricoupi dwelt in retirement and poverty, declining to hold any office under the President. Admiral Miaulis, and the island Primates, anxious to pay their respects to Sir Pulteney Malcolm, refused to come to a town which held the President within its walls. Capodistrias surrounded by his faction, the Senate, composed of men sullied by all the vices of the revolution — pirates, forgers, outlaws from Corfu, the most rapacious of the Klephts, and by the three Representatives, contrived to paralyze the agriculture, commerce, and navigation, of the whole country. In Messenia the shepherds refused to pay the taxes, the military had no less than three times broken out into insurrection, and the spirit of disorder and insubordination had obtained a dangerous triumph from the government being obliged to comply with their demands. The tariff weighed heavily on internal and foreign trade, whilst vexations entirely unknown to Greece in the time of the Turks irritated the whole population. Thus the Count refused to allow the

Greeks to travel from one village to another, or from the country to the capital, without being provided with a passport — a custom wholly foreign to oriental habits. At the same time, the institution of arbitrary quarantine regulations, the insecurity of private correspondence, the swarms of government spies, and the distraction and distrust produced in social life by their conduct, afforded the most painful contrast to the state of Greece, even in the most calamitous periods of the war with Turkey. But an event at this moment occurred which gave a sudden and an entire new turn to the affairs of Greece. The revolution of July came like a thunderclap to awaken Capodistrias from his slumber of security. Hitherto, the policy of France had been the strongest support of Russian aggrandizement in the East, and the arbitrary principles of the Polignac ministry had wonderfully supported Capodistrias in extinguishing the liberties of Greece.*

France, from the Treaty of Vienna, had been the tool of Russia in every question of foreign policy; but it was reserved for the Polignac ministry, a ministry represented throughout Europe as favourable to England, to accomplish the deed which henceforward made her a co-partitioning power, and linked her to the

But the revolution of July indicated a change of system which threatened to place that nation in collision with Russia; and it was immediately expected that France would be liberated from the subserviency under which, since the retirement of Prince Talleyrand, it had followed the counsels of the Russian cabinet. The French army of occupation in the Morea, and the French military and civil officers in the employment of Capodistrias, now came to sympathize with the constitutional Primates, devoted to England; and, what was still more irritating to Capodistrias, they assisted in unmasking his past acts. The accession to power of the Reform Ministry in England further contributed to excite the hopes of Greece; whilst the expulsion of the Russian faction from Poland, and the successes of the Polish nation, all came to awaken indignation against the Russian faction, and to weaken the authority of the Pre-
enemy of Turkey in bonds, perhaps at the moment not perceptible to herself, but which have been more and more tightened and strengthened as her possessions have extended in Africa, and as the French people have become indifferent to public justice, and degraded by exulting in the triumph of unrighteous arms in a struggle without glory.

sident. In the first moments of his dismay, Capodistrias expressed publicly his alarm for his own downfall; and on first recovering from his apprehensions, he had recourse to the most violent measures against the individuals to whom the nation were most likely to look for support.

Petro Bey, the aged Prince of Maina, was detained at Nauplia on the plea of his travelling about the country without a passport, although he was a guest on board an English yacht. A law was issued against the liberty of the press; whilst the institution of tribunals of exception, the appointment of judges revocable at pleasure, and acts rendering the property of every individual amenable to their capricious decisions, roused the people to phrenzy. A newspaper was at length set on foot by the Primates; and the editor having been imprisoned, the press was transported to Hydra, where the patriotic party established a journal, called the "Apollo," which at once enlightened the whole nation on the abyss into which they were plunged. The whole country now demanded the convocation of a National

Assembly. The warlike province of Maina, incensed at the indignities offered to its prince, flew to arms. Caratasso, a Roumeliote chief, placed himself at the head of the movement in Roumelia, and the islanders prepared to elect their representatives. Capodistrias, finding it impossible to stem the current of national opinion, convoked the Assembly for the 15th of October. During the interval, supported by the representations of the Residents to the Conference of London, he urged every argument which ingenuity could suggest to obtain pecuniary succour from the three powers, and, counting upon their energetic aid, he prepared to attack the islands by force of arms. For this purpose he gave orders for the equipment of the national marine at Poros. No sooner had this intelligence reached Hydra than the municipality, determined to anticipate the step of the President, and a party of the Hydriote sailors, under Miaulis, the High Admiral of Greece, suddenly crossed the peninsula opposite to their island, and took possession of the "Hellas" frigate and the rest of the fleet, as well as of the town of Poros. The patriot party

had been led to believe by the English minister and the naval commander on the station, that the Russians would not be allowed to interfere separately against them; and accordingly, when the Russian admiral sailed from Nauplia to restore order at Poros, he was accompanied by the English and French commanders on the station, whose appearance seemed a sufficient guarantee to the national party that they would not be molested by the Russian admiral. But Capodistrias boasted of having been informed by the English minister that the principles of Lord Grey's government being *non-intervention*, the British navy would in no supposable case interfere in the affairs of Greece. Accordingly, the three frigates had hardly reached Poros, when the Russian admiral, concerting his operations by overland communication with the President, persuaded his colleagues, the English and French commanders, to return to Nauplia for instructions, and scarcely were they out of sight when he proceeded to attack the Greeks with cannon shot. The municipality of Hydra having learnt that the President had secretly sold the "Hellas" frigate to

Russia, had ordered Miaulus to blow her up in the event of the Russians attempting to seize her. Miaulis, protesting at the interference of the Russian admiral, set fire to her on the approach of his boats. A murderous conflict ensued, which ended with the destruction, by Admiral Ricord, of the remainder of the Greek marine, and the pillage of the town of Poros.

The Residents of England and Russia were immediately appealed to by Capodistrias, and their "*non-intervention*" principle was displayed in the following letter:—

“ Napoli, Aug. 1, 1831.

“ Sir,

“ We hasten, conformably to the application of your Excellency, to declare that our respective governments attach the highest importance to the preservation of order and tranquillity in Greece, and to the maintenance of the provisional state of affairs that is introduced there.

“ We lament and highly disapprove the insurrectionary movements at Poros*, and hope that, in the absence of the

* The encouragement which Mr. Dawkins had given to the opposition against the President was notorious to all Greece. He even urged several English travellers to write to their parliamentary friends to excite public indignation in England against the acts of Capodistrias. M. Thiersch states—“ The opposition had not been viewed with displeasure by two of the Residents.” Yet no sooner were they engaged in a contest, than Mr. Dawkins

French Resident, and of the Commanders of the French and English Squadrons, this declaration will suffice to recall to their duty the chiefs who have taken part in the revolt. We have taken this opportunity to offer your Excellency the tribute of our profound respect.

“BARON VON RUCKMAN.

“To His Excellency

“DAWKINS.”

“Count Capodistrias.”

How easy would it have been for Mr. Dawkins, in the absence of the French Resident, to decline acting with his Russian colleague alone.

Capodistrias, armed with this support, drew up an act of attainder against the island Primates, of which the following is an extract:—

“In this state of things, the authors and contrivers of the revolt have assumed the double responsibility before the laws.

“1. Of receiving judgment as attainted of the crime of high treason against the internal safety of the state.

“2. Of being constituted, *collectively* and *individually*, responsible towards the nation for the losses which it has sustained by the destruction of the vessels, as well as by

hastened to sanction their execution! Capodistrias addressed a letter to Lord Palmerston, complaining of Mr. Dawkins; and perhaps there may have been something in Mr. Dawkins's conduct, on this occasion, which rendered it a *bonâ fide* transaction. At all events, it was the most effective means by which the subsequent collusion was veiled.

the damage which it has suffered, and may further suffer, through the continuance of the revolt."

Amongst the first class of names were the following:—

"Lazarus Condourioti, John Orlando, Demetrius Boulgaris, John Criesi, George Condourioti, Alexander Mavrocordato, Andrew Miaulis."

The second class included most of the inferior Primates.

In the mean time, the measure of the wrongs of Greece had exceeded human endurance. Capodistrias, by destroying, in violation of his oath, every fundamental institution in that country, and by constituting himself the sole arbiter of the fortunes, lives, and characters of each individual, had concentrated national and individual despair against himself. He had deprived the Greeks of the means of meeting to communicate their wrongs, and of the freedom of declaring them; he had cut off their means of communication with Europe, misrepresented their condition and his acts; had defrauded them of their liberties, and the Prince of their choice; ruined their character in the estimation of the world; perverted an alliance

formed to save, into being the instrument of destroying, the independence of Greece; and had finally directed foreign arms against his fellow citizens. However deeply, therefore, the Greeks might regret the mode in which their emancipation was effected, they could not but feel that Capodistrias was the sole obstacle to national redress. The filial piety of George Mavromichæli, whose aged father had been driven, with blows and insult, from the palace of the President, after enduring, with several other members of his family, the most tyrannical treatment for months, prompted him to the act which rid his country of an oppressor.

On the 27th of September, Capodistrias fell by the daggers of the Mavromichælis, in the midst of his guards, and immediately expired. Had this deed been concerted with others, a government would have been formed, in which the Residents could not have interfered.

CHAPTER IV.

The Residents invest the Russian Faction with a constituent and illegal Authority. Meeting of the National Assembly. Conflict at Argos. Civil War. Bases of Conciliation proposed by Sir Stratford Canning. The Residents misrepresent the Acts of the Conference to the Greeks, and the Acts of Greece to the Alliance. Formation of a mixed Government. Rebellion against it fomented by the Residents. Bavaria encourages the Russian Party. National Assembly proclaim their Intention to pay the Greek Debt to England. Opposed by the Residents, and dispersed. Arrival of King Otho.

If England had had no Representative in Greece, that unfortunate country would have been entirely emancipated by the death of Capodistrias from foreign control and domestic tyranny. According to the constitution, the National Assembly had only been prorogued; and, as no provision had been made for a successor to the President, in the event of his death, a National Assembly could alone appoint a new

provisional government. The only constituted body which existed before the President's death was the Senate, composed of his own nominees and partizans; but such had been Capodistrias's jealousy of parting with any portion of that authority which he desired to exercise uncontrolled, that the very constitution of the Senate prevented its deliberation on any matters which regarded the administration*. It had been decided by Art. 13 of the 2d decree of the Assembly of Argos, that, in the event of the President's death, a National Assembly should be immediately convoked. Consequently, the functions of the Senate expired with the President.

Nevertheless, the Residents of the Three Powers, in conjunction with the Russian admiral, took upon themselves to recognize in the Senate not only a permanent existence, but an usurpation of the functions of a constituent authority. Thus the power of Russia, annihilated in the person of Capodistrias, was revived and

* Art. 5 of the 12th Decree of the Congress of Argos. "The Senate will pronounce its opinion on all the decrees which shall not be purely administrative."

perpetuated by the elevation of the Russian party on the ruins of the institutions and laws of Greece, even as constituted by Count Capodistrias himself. Greece received thirty tyrants in exchange for one;* and the whole patronage of the country, the command of its revenues, the disposal of its national lands, the farming of the revenues, the carrying into execution of the laws of attainder, which ruined the Primates in life, fortune, and character, were conferred exclusively upon the Capodistrian faction, by the Representatives of England, France, and Russia.

But the conduct of the English minister in this transaction is the more remarkable, when we consider that his previous representations to the Conference had been framed with a view to procure for Count Capodistrias the whole support of the alliance, in order to enable him, for a second time, to enact the farce of a mock National Assembly. In anticipation, therefore, of that support arriving from England, he had in the interval invested the revolutionary

*Twenty-seven members of the Senate, and a Provisional Government of three.

faction with power. The National Assembly had been convened by Capodistrias for the 15th of October; and on the 26th of September, viz., three weeks previously, being the exact interval required for its arrival in Greece on the 15th of October, a Protocol was drawn up at the Foreign Office to the following effect:

“With respect to the pecuniary advance solicited by the Greek government, on account of a loan, the Conference is of opinion that *each of the three courts should reserve to itself the power of weighing, separately, the reasons which the Greek government puts forward in support of its application, and of acting upon them so far as it shall itself think necessary or expedient.*”

This of course enabled Russia to subsidize her own party.

“At the moment when the Conference was adopting the resolutions which have been herein set forth, it was informed of the events of Poros, which it has learnt with the deepest concern.

“The principle of the Conference will continue to be *to support the provisional government established in Greece, until such time as the election of a sovereign, which will take place at a very early period, shall render it possible to establish a settled government in that country; and this principle cannot fail to lead the Residents of the three courts, the commanders of their naval forces in the Archipelago, and the commander of the French troops in the*

Morea, to employ all their influence to discourage attempts at disturbance and revolt.

"It is accordingly indispensable,—1st. That the Residents of the three courts in Greece, and the commanders of their naval forces, should concert with the Greek government as to the best means of employing their influence, in order to put an end to the state of insurrection of the island of Hydra; and to prevent the disturbances from extending to other islands in the *Ægean Sea*.

"2d. That in the execution of this task, they should avail themselves of every means of conciliation, and exert, to the utmost, the moral influence of their united authority.

"3d. That they should consider of the measures necessary for preventing the renewal of piracy; and that, for this purpose, Greek vessels must be provided, as heretofore, with commissions or patents from the government of Greece.

"4th. That they should, in like manner, contribute, as far as may depend upon them, to the observance of the regulations of the quarantine service, for preventing the introduction into Greece of the contagious diseases which prevail in the Levant.

"But that which the Conference of London cannot sufficiently recommend to the Residents of the three courts, and to their naval and military officers, is the invariable maintenance of a perfect unity in their language and in their decisions.

"No separation from the Alliance can be allowable in affairs which interest all the parties. There is no case in which it ought either to be announced, or to take place.

"This fundamental principle is deduced from the very

union which exists between the three courts. The observance of it is therefore essential; and the Conference of London cannot avoid pointing out once more to the Residents of France, Great Britain, and Russia, in Greece, as well as to the commanders of their naval and military forces, *the absolute necessity of abstaining from acting separately, and of causing a perfect unanimity to govern all their decisions and all their measures.*

“Accept, &c.

(Signed)

“TALLEYRAND.

“PALMERSTON.

“LIEVEN. MATUSZEWIC.”

Now, the whole of the above-mentioned measures, whatever may have been the ostensible grounds of their being asked for, had been solicited by Capodistrias and the Residents, for the purpose of enabling him to prevent the meeting of independent representatives from the different parts of Greece.

Thus, Hydra and the islands were to be blockaded by the allied navies, and quarantine regulations were to be enforced, in order to cut off communication between the islands and Argos; whilst the owners of the Greek merchant vessels who could not apply for commissions or patents to a government which they did not recognize, and which would not have given them,

were constituted pirates, and amenable to capital punishment, not for any acts of their own, but by the acts of the Conference of London.

Immediately after the death of Capodistrias, the Senate named a Provisional Government, consisting of three members—Count Augustin Capodistrias, the brother of the late President; Colocotroni; and Coletti. The latter was selected partly in homage to the feelings of the nation, and partly in order that, by assenting to the measures of his colleague, he might be compromised with the constitutionalists. The principles which induced Coletti to form a part of this administration, were, a knowledge that the power of Russia was entirely overthrown by the fall of Capodistrias, and that, in the excitement which prevailed, the nation might rush to arms before they were prepared for the entire change which such an event would necessarily introduce.

On the arrival of the Protocol of September 26th in Greece, Augustin Capodistrias, supported by the whole influence of the Alliance, proceeded to carry into execution the anti-national system, which had brought about the

death of its founder. The islanders were prevented from joining the assembly; a Greek squadron was sent into the Archipelago to interfere in the elections, and to convey to the Morea only such members as were favourable to the Russian party.

Nevertheless, as the naval forces of the allies could not interfere by land, the representatives of continental Greece crossed the isthmus of Corinth. On the meeting of the deputies at Argos, the Senate usurped the right, which naturally belonged to the National Assembly alone, of scrutinizing the qualifications of the members, and of rejecting all those who would not previously sign a document, electing Count Augustin Capodistrias sole head of the executive. The measures adopted at the last Assembly were imitated on the present occasion. Colocotroni, and the champions under the denomination of peaceful citizens and "good Christians," surrounded the town with their Palikars; whilst Augustin Capodistrias came to Argos, escorted from Nauplia by infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The Roumeliote deputies, joined by those

amongst the island and Moreote primates, who could break through the *cordon sanitaire* of the provisional government, had been accompanied by their armed retainers. None of them chose to recognize the pretensions of the Senate ; and, during the schism, Augustin Capodistrias and Colocotroni formally laid down their power, upon which the Russian faction elected the former president. After this, Colocotroni and Andrea Metaxa recommended a *coup d'état*, and Count Augustin attacked the Roumeliotes with the regular troops of the late government. During three days the conflict was maintained from house to house. The constitutionalists, apprehending an attack, had applied to the Residents for their counsel ; and they were told that they had only to remain on the defensive, and that, if they should be attacked, the forces of the allies would interfere to protect them. After the conflict, the Residents excused themselves by stating, that any interference would infringe upon the independence of Greece. The constitutional deputies retired to the isthmus of Corinth, commanded by Coletti, who, having never resigned his functions, remained the

elected and sole constitutional head of the government.

At the moment to which I allude, Sir Stratford Canning arrived in Greece. I have already explained that, at the Conferences of Poros, that diplomatist had maintained that it would be both unjust and dangerous to deprive the Greeks of the municipal and representative rights which they had enjoyed under the Turks; and that Capodistrias and Count Boulgari had immediately opposed a counterpoise to these opinions, by annexing to a Protocol a memoir, stigmatizing the Primates elected under that system as anarchists, and the adversaries of England no less than of Russia.

Perceiving the fatal results which had accrued to Greece from "the exclusive influence" of the Russian faction, Sir Stratford Canning drew up a confidential memorandum, which was communicated to Count Augustin Capodistrias, indicating the best mode of healing the wounds of Greece. The following extract will serve to show the state of Greece at the time. It was dated the 28th of December, 1830:—

"The present state of Greece is very far from realizing the just expectations of the Alliance. Anarchy re-appears in the very bosom of peace. Adverse parties, with arms in their hands, dispute the authority of the state; Greek blood has just been shed by Greeks before the eyes of the Representatives of the Allied Powers; and war, in its most frightful form, civil war, succeeds to that which the horror of an insupportable yoke could scarcely justify.

"It is well known that, after the battles fought in the streets of Argos, while the deputies of the nation were assembled in that city, the Roumeliote chiefs withdrew themselves. But it would seem that the war so unfortunately excited does but change its scene, and it is impossible not to be convinced that, to put an end to the disorders of the country, and to preserve its tranquillity till the arrival of a prince, it will be imperatively necessary to have recourse to arrangements, which, without excluding what now exists, would nevertheless be founded upon a principle of a more comprehensive and conciliatory character.

"The mere prolongation of a provisional state of things is a misfortune for Greece. The Conference of London itself acknowledges that it is so; and is endeavouring to apply a remedy, by removing the difficulties which have for so long a time beset the country. But it is not the less true, that the interest of the Greeks and the honour of the allies require, in the mean time, a system of provisional administration calculated to conciliate the public mind, and to preserve the country from the anarchy with which she is at present threatened.

"The most influential island of the Archipelago, and the most warlike province of the Morea, are separated from the rest of Greece: the deep importance of the question would

seem to require, that the means of reuniting them should again be taken into consideration.

"Several of the Roumeliote chiefs, powerful by their reputation and by a numerous following, have established themselves in an armed body near Corinth: it must be the interest of their adversaries not to drive them to despair.

"The arbitrary acts of the police have induced some individuals of note, against whom the government has not thought fit to bring any direct accusation, to take refuge in Hydra: let them be permitted to return to their homes.

"The state prisons are crowded with persons arrested on suspicion. It is revolting to the principles of justice to keep any one whatever imprisoned for an indefinite period, without bringing him to trial according to legal forms.

"In short, the Assembly of Deputies does not appear to be constituted in such a manner as to answer the wishes of the nation: it is of the utmost importance that that body should not persist in remaining in a position so equivocal as to encourage the malecontents to form themselves into a distinct Assembly. The sight of two national Assemblies, painful as it would be to the friends of Greece and of public order, would not be the less embarrassing to the authorities assembled in this place.

"In order to effect these different objects in the most suitable manner, it is to be desired that the government should name some persons in its confidence to confer with the Residents. Local experience is the only sure guide in a case of this kind; and there will be no want of intelligence among men capable of feeling how essential it is to their country to exhibit to the Porte and to Europe, espe-

cially at the present moment, some appearance of good order and harmony.

“With respect to the Assembly, let one of two courses be pursued: either let there be new elections, or let the excluded deputies be invited to join the Assembly. In the latter case, Hydra and Maina must be enabled to take part in the arrangement; and, in any event, it would be a most conciliatory measure to put again to the vote the return of any deputy whose election may have been accompanied by circumstances calculated to throw doubts upon its legality.

—“The only circumstance which forms a real obstacle to the deputies of Hydra repairing at once to the General Assembly, is the absence in that island of all authority emanating from the President. The difficulty of remedying this deficiency would not be insurmountable, if an agreement could be made that the government should appoint its functionary from a list of individuals previously presented to it by the inhabitants of Hydra. Maina would not be disposed to persevere alone in a separation which could lead to no useful end.

“The object of these propositions being to reunite all the parties in Greece around the central authority, it is evident that, in order to restore confidence, without which it would be in vain to look to the attainment of the object in view, some change of the individuals composing the nucleus of that authority becomes indispensably necessary.”*

*The memoir of Count Boulgari stated, that “the plenipotentiary who should think it his duty to propose the establishment of a federative government in Greece, would infallibly deprive his court of the salutary influence which present events call him to exercise there, and would furnish a pretext to malevolence to doubt his good faith, and perhaps even impute to him *arrière*

Now, the Residents in Greece were forced to confess, during the stay of Sir Stratford Canning at Nauplia, that the bases thus laid down "offered the best means of effecting a conciliation;" and, previous to the 20th of January, they wrote to the Conference of London to say, "that they had opened negotiations on the said bases with a fair prospect of success."—Negotiations with a fair prospect of success!—the Residents of the three Powers negotiating with the Greek government—negotiating with a phantom of a government, to which they alone gave any substance or force—with a phantom which they themselves had evoked, *pensées* incompatible with the avowed object of the triple alliance." This referred to the defence, by Sir Stratford Canning, in the Conferences at Poros, of the municipal and representative rights of the Greeks. The word federative, as here employed, is a conversion of terms, and a perversion of the sense, as appears from the preceding passages in Count Boulgari's note, in which he says, "Three forms of government appear possible or suitable in Greece—the federative, the elective, and the monarchical. In either of the two former cases, the dissolution of the government which we should have to establish in Greece would be inevitable." The vindictive spirit of Russia was subsequently evinced in depriving England of the services of Sir Stratford Canning, as ambassador at St. Petersburg, an event which came to my knowledge in Greece before that gentleman was himself acquainted with it.

and armed only with the terrors of their canons and their Protocols. But, at all events, it is satisfactory to find that they have a fair prospect of success in this negociation, and that, if mistaken in their position towards the government of Greece, they were at least capable of estimating fairly the dispositions of that government to accede to the proposals which they made. Now let us see the result of this negociation, which offered such cheering prospects.

Supported by the Residents, Augustin Capodistrias issued, on the 22d of January, viz. two days afterwards, the following enactment:—

Decree of the National Assembly (which had never met).

“ Art. 1. The Senators, deprived of their rank by the above-mentioned acts of the Senate, John Coletti, Tatzi Maughina, Zanolaki Grigoraki, are guilty of high treason, as the authors and contrivers of the atrocities which took place at Argos, and as chiefs of the innovations proclaimed at Perachora and at Megara.

“ 2. Panoutzo Notaras, signing himself president of a national congress in the acts of certain individuals who arrogate to themselves the sovereignty of the nation, is included in this list.

“ 3. In case the above-mentioned John Coletti, &c. &c.,

should present themselves before the government within the interval of twelve days from the date of the publication of the present decree, the government is invested with the power of commuting the punishment inflicted by the law; in every other case, they are judged unworthy of equity, deprived of the name and rights of Greek citizens, and proclaimed outlaws.

“22d January, 1832.”

Thus, by the act of attainder of Capodistrias against the island Primates in August, and by this act of Augustin Capodistrias against the Roumeliote Primates, and by accusations against the remainder of the principal Greeks, as having been accomplices in the assassination of the President, the whole of the men of distinction, not included in the Russian faction, were under sentence of death as rebels, pirates, assassins, and outlaws.

The Residents informed the Conference, that, acting upon the views of Sir Stratford Canning, they were urging upon the Greek government measures of conciliation, the oblivion of injuries, the abandonment of arbitrary imprisonment. They informed the Conference, moreover, that the Greek Government entered into those views; as, of course, the strongest govern-

ment in Greece, existing only by the means and support of the alliance, must immediately have done; and, forty-eight hours after this declaration was made, instead of acts of amnesty and oblivion, a sentence of death and a warrant of execution were issued against the remainder of the men of distinction and the notables of Greece, not already included in those proceedings, the annulment of which Sir Stratford Canning had proposed; and, as if to increase the perfidiousness of an act which rouses the inmost indignation of the soul, the representation tending to impress the Conference of London with the most false estimate of the state of affairs was carried down in date till within a few hours of the promulgation of this monstrous act; and the Resident, or the framer of the communication, in which, by previous instructions, all the Residents were bound to coincide, at once fully exposes his consciousness of what was to follow, in using a term implying distinctly — “negociation” — a word employed on no other occasion with Greece, and qualifies, by doubts “of success,” the communication which would, of course, be received by the

unsuspecting majority of the Conference in perfect confidence.*

In this state of things there arrived at Naulia, on the 27th of January, the following Protocol.

“PROTOCOL 38.

“London, January 7, 1832.

“1. By the time when they [the Residents] will receive the present instruction, the *National Assembly of Argos* will no doubt have terminated its deliberations, and have acknowledged or confirmed a provisional government. The government *thus constituted with all legal forms* must be recognised as the *National Provisional Government of Greece*, as well by the Residents of the three Courts as by the commanders of their naval and military forces.”

Now it is evident that, during the interval which elapsed between the day originally fixed for the convocation of the Assembly, viz., the

* I must here observe, that the communications of the Residents to the Conference were by the monthly packet to and from England; and it is remarkable, that all the acts subversive of the national party in Greece emanated from the Provisional Government directly after the departure of the packet from Greece, whereby the instructions of the Conference, which were anticipated by the Residents, were made to apply to the events which the Residents, during the intervening two months, could bring about, so that in reality the Conference became the tool of the Residents, acting in concert with Count Matuscheyitz and Prince Lieven.

15th of October and the 7th of January, the Conference must have imagined that sufficient time had elapsed, after the death of Capodistrias, for the formation of an Independent Assembly, according to the legal process of election; at all events, it was to a government constituted *with legal forms alone* that the Residents were to lend the support of their governments. But, in subscribing to the truth of Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum, they had acknowledged that the "Deputies of Hydra and of Maina were separated from the rest of Greece, that the Roumeliote chiefs had been obliged to retire from Argos, that the Assembly of Deputies was not constituted in a manner to meet the wishes of the nation, that it was necessary either to proceed to new elections, or to let the excluded Deputies join the Assembly." Yet, what is their first act? They apply the Protocol to Augustin Capodistrias and the Senate, both of whom, according to the confession of the Residents themselves, had violated all the laws of Greece in usurping supreme power.

The Protocol proceeds thus:—

"2. The Residents of the three Courts, and the com-

manders of their naval and military forces, will set the example of the respect and consideration which are due *to such government*.

"3. As, on the one hand, the three Courts have the right to require that this government should rule the country *according to the laws*, with mildness and impartiality, and that they should aim at effecting the extinction and oblivion of the dissensions which have latterly agitated Greece; it is, on the other hand, requisite that the Residents of the three Courts, and their naval and military officers, should contribute by their general conduct, by their language, and by the influence which they derive from their functions, and from the character with which they are invested, to the maintenance of tranquillity and public order throughout the whole extent of the Greek State; that they should divest themselves of all personal feelings; and that they should, so far as may depend upon them, endeavour to secure *to the provisional government that respect which it is necessary that it should enjoy*."

I have already stated what were the "laws," in the execution of which, provided they were enforced "with mildness and humanity," the provisional government were now to be supported by the Residents and the naval and military officers of the Alliance. They were sentences of death against the Greeks, who were the chiefs of the nation and the Representatives of its feelings.

The Protocol continues—

“ 4. They, the Residents, must constantly bear in mind, that, in order to preserve peace in Greece, and to prevent the return of that anarchy which, previously to the intervention of the three Courts, had nearly caused its ruin, it is indispensable that a perfect union should prevail among them; and that, in moments of danger and difficulty, such union alone can enable them to execute the services which the three Courts expect from their zeal and abilities.

“ 5. One of the first objects which the three Courts proposed to attain by the Treaty of London of the 6th of July, 1827, was the extinction of piracy in the seas of Greece.

“ It must be repressed with all possible energy, if it should show itself there again.

“ The commanders of the naval forces of the three Courts will not allow any *Greek vessel whatsoever to navigate, which shall not be furnished with the proper register and papers from the competent authorities, which authorities must, of course, furnish the said papers conformably to the laws and regulations of Greece relating thereto.*

“ 6. The Conference has had under consideration the application for a subsidy, which has been addressed to it in the name of the provisional government of Greece, such subsidy to be furnished on account of the loan which the three Courts have reserved to themselves to guarantee to Greece.

“ It has been decided, that this application should be submitted direct to the three Courts; and it has been agreed, *that each of the three Courts should be left at full liberty to make such advances, if it should think proper to do so, either making an arrangement to this effect with its*

two Allies, through the medium of the Conference of London, or simply announcing to the Conference the fact of *its having sent such a subsidy as it may have deemed expedient to grant to the government of Greece.*"

This last paragraph enabled the Russian Admiral and Resident again to subsidize the Russian faction.

The Residents, after manifesting the respect and consideration of the Alliance to Augustin's faction, concerted with them the following proclamation:—

"PROCLAMATION OF COUNT A. CAPODISTRIAS.

"Nauplia, January 25, 1832.

"The Allied Powers recognize the National Assembly, and the government which it has established, and they call upon the citizens to *respect its acts* and to fulfil their duties.

"We decree as follows :

"1. Full and entire amnesty is granted to every citizen, civil or military, of all ranks and degrees, who has taken a share in revolutionary meetings. Nobody shall be responsible for any actions or sentiments he has manifested during the revolt, if, in ten days from the publication of the present decree, he lays down his arms and adopts a peaceful life.

"From this amnesty are *only excluded the accomplices in the assassination of the late President, of eternal memory ; those who are accused of being such, and proofs of whose culpability are deposited in the office of the minister of jus-*

tice, as well as all persons already accused before the tribunals, or definitively condemned."

The Residents supported this measure by the following public act.

"Nauplia, Feb. 26, 1832.

"A Protocol, signed on the 7th of January, 1832, by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers, was communicated to us on the 27th of the same month.

"The Alliance, by this act, orders us to recognize and support *the government actually established at Nauplia as the National Provisional Government of Greece.*

"It recommends to *this* government a march *conformable to the laws*, and calculated to bring about the *extinction and oblivion* of the discord which has for a long time agitated the country, and it announces the speedy nomination of a Prince Sovereign.

"On the receipt of the above-mentioned Protocol, the Greek government has suspended all judicial proceedings, and has granted an amnesty for political crimes, only excepting the accomplices in the assassination of the late President of Greece, against whom the acts of accusation exist with the Minister of Justice, or who are already pursued by the tribunals, or definitively condemned. *It is to the Primates of Hydra and to the Chiefs united in continental Greece* to give an example, on their side, of respect and submission.

"The government offers them the example of deference to the wishes of the Allied Powers, and of a desire to re-establish harmony and concord; and they cannot fail to respond to it without incurring the gravest responsibility

towards their country, their Prince, and the Allied Powers, who desire, above all things, to see order and tranquillity reign in this country.

"We invite them, *in the name of the Allied Powers, in their own interest, and in that of Greece*, to which many among them have formerly rendered important services, to lay down their arms, and to return peaceably to obedience. This example will not fail to be immediately followed by those who surround them."

The Residents did not publish the Protocol, they made no extract from it, they did not state that they were ordered to support a government constituted by legal forms; but they stated, that they were ordered to support the Russian faction, which had seized the reins of government, and which they, in concurrence with Sir Stratford Canning, had just before denounced, or pretended to denounce; leading, on the one hand, the Conference into the fallacy that the government in Greece was constituted by legal forms, since they had so proclaimed; and the Greek nation, on the other, into a belief of the perfect subserviency of the Alliance to the exclusive views of Russia, encouraging her partizans by such tremendous support, and breaking down the courage and expectations of the

national Representatives, who, persecuted, denounced, and sentenced by this antinational faction, could only be supported by the expectation that England, when she came to know the circumstances, would cease to persecute her own friends, and cease to support the enemies of their country.*

Exasperated by the bitter irony of this proclamation, the whole of the legal Representatives

* "The Residents knew very well, that by not admitting the claim of the opposition to a National Assembly freely elected, and a government constituted according to legal forms, they might expect that the opposition would refuse to conform to their invitation; but the French Resident, M. Rouen, was the only one who saw this in its clear light. Mr. Dawkins had changed his policy, by joining Baron Ruckman. It was then that the recognition of Count Augustin, and the summons to the Roumeliotes, were resolved upon. What might have been expected took place; they received thanks from the party they had recognized, and protests from the other. No one thought of submitting or of laying down his arms; and instead of pacifying Greece, the Residents had compromised the authority of the Alliance. In order to be recognized, they made Count Augustin sign a decree of amnesty. Nevertheless, not a single prisoner was released, and it may be remembered that it was reserved for me to open the prison of the Mavromichaelis, whose detention had, from the first, excited the compassion of all Greece. There appeared even protestations against the accomplishment of this act *on the part of Mr. Dawkins*, who, although he consented to the termination of the confinement of the two old men, wished to commute

of Greece, accompanied by numerous armed retainers, prepared to march into the Morea to overthrow the despicable faction. Mavrocordato protested in the following words: *—

“ I think that the most appropriate means of pacifying Greece was not to apply the Protocol to the power established at Nauplia, and I hope that the Viceroy of the Sovereign may arrive as soon as possible. In every other case, I foresee great calamities. I will not enter into an examination of *the acts of violence which have been committed in the elections, nor occupy myself with showing that legal forms have been equally violated in the establishment of the government at Nauplia.* You were present in the country, and you are fully informed on all that has passed, consequently it is superfluous to speak to you on that point; but it is necessary here to bring forward a matter which deserves the greatest attention, and which, by what accident I know not, has escaped the attention of the Residents. Blood has been shed at Argos. The number of those who quitted it to retire to Corinth amounted to 1200 armed men. United with their countrymen, and with other allies in Western Greece, they at present form a body of more than 5000 men. The greater part of them look upon Count Augustin Capodistrias as the author of the bloodshed at Argos and elsewhere. Is it then such an easy matter to persuade them to acknowledge this person it into a temporary banishment. He demanded that these unhappy men, instead of being sent back to their homes, should be kept away, either at Argos or in some island.”—*Thiersch*, vol. i., p. 104.

* Letter to M. Thiersch, 25th March.—See Appendix.

for a single instant as the chief of the nation, and to submit to his authority? The Residents, in their communications, speak to us of the responsibility that will weigh on each of those who will not conform to the interpretation which they have given to the Protocol. This may make an impression on some of the military chiefs; but, suppose the latter were to retire, and that 5000 or 6000 armed men remain without control, and without any other impulse than the desire of vengeance, who then will assume the responsibility of the events which such a state of things must necessarily bring about?"

M. Thiersch's protest on the part of the constitutional representatives is no less energetic.

In his letter to the Residents, dated April 8, 1832, he states,—

"Must I then indicate to you the causes of the invasion of the Morea? Well, then. It was the national indignation roused to phrenzy by the detestable system of the government which you had recognized and supported. You have followed the path traced by your instructions. I do not contest your having done your duty, and I sincerely regret that men for whom I have the greatest esteem should have imputed to me opinions unworthy of their character; but I, on my side, had some right to demand that some confidence should be placed in me relatively to what I advanced *as facts, and their causes.*"

Extract of a Letter from M. Thiersch to the Residents.

"March 27, 1832.

"M. Coletti entered frankly on the state of affairs. He did not conceal the grave difficulties raised by the recog-

dition of the government established at Argos, nor the dangers which might be incurred in opposing diplomatic decisions already taken. At the same time, he declared to me, that *none of those who acknowledged his authority found in the government of Count Augustin Capodistrias the character demanded by the Protocol*; that every one, down to the lowest soldier, was intimately convinced that *this government was neither national nor established according to the legal forms required by the Powers*; that, on the contrary, *it was the government of a faction which had raised itself by fraud*, and the first act of which had been the *premeditated assassination of the deputies of the nation*. He added, that, after the death of the President, the *sole* recognized authority was the Administrative Commission, of which he was a member; that, Count Augustin and Colocotroni having laid aside the power which they enjoyed as members of this commission, the Greek government was concentrated in his sole person, because he had neither been able nor allowed to lay down his authority before a mass of deputies, against whose illegality he had solemnly protested. Consequently, as on the arrival of the Protocol, the *hypothesis on which it rested did not exist, and there was no government yet established according to all legal forms*; it was necessary, before all, to endeavour to make one for the purpose of recognizing one, by reuniting all the deputies chosen for the Assembly of Argos in a free spot, and in insisting on the departure of all armed force, thus bringing about a legal and tranquil result. After having arrived at such a result, so certain and so easy to be obtained, they might have finished where they began, because they were to proclaim a government legally constituted, and conformably to the bases laid down

by common consent by the Powers who benevolently protected Greece. M. Coletti concluded that, this being the state of the question, they were strictly *within the terms of the Protocol in seeking to give it a legal solution.*"

Whilst these events were happening in Greece, the Russian plenipotentiaries, at the Conference in London, accomplished a master-stroke by enlisting a fourth monarch in support of their party in Greece, and thus further consolidating the supremacy of Russia in that country, whilst they established it in the heart of Germany, at the court of Munich.

A new Protocol was signed on the 13th of February, offering the crown of Greece to Prince Otho, the second son of the King of Bavaria; and the principles which the Conference determined to pursue in Greece, until the arrival of its sovereign, were to maintain, on every spot, in every municipality of Greece, "throughout the whole extent of its territory," the authorities planted there by Capodistrias, and to make their acts against the national Representatives "respected and obeyed." These were the conditions on which the King of Bavaria was invited to accept the sovereignty for his

son, Prince Otho ; these the stipulations by which that unfortunate prince was admitted " within the pale of that insurmountable barrier of crowns, whose combined action was to destroy the *revolutionary* spirit of Greece, and to turn it to the advantage of social order." (!)

"The minister of the King of Bavaria was introduced to the Conference in London, and expressed the satisfaction with which his Royal Master would receive the testimony of friendship and of confidence given to him by the three courts." *

Mean time, the national army of Greece advanced, in the first week of April, to within view of the capital. The squadrons of England, France, and Russia, prepared to cannonade them from the bay, whilst the forces of the faction, inspired by the Residents, and paid and organised by Admiral Ricord, whose headquarters were in the town, prepared to oppose them.

At this critical period, an English frigate sailed up the bay, with the copy of a new protocol, sent from Constantinople by the British

* Protocol, No. 41.

Ambassador, who imagined that it might haply reach Greece before the original, and thus arrest the calamity of a civil war.

This Protocol, dated March the 7th, commanded the formation of a government on the bases of the memorandum drawn up by Sir Stratford Canning, on the supposition that the negotiations of the Residents with Augustin Capodistrias had met with the "success" of which they had communicated to the Conference "such fair prospects," in the month of December. The Protocol stated—

"It is of course understood that the Residents of the three courts, and the commanders of their forces by sea and land, will offer the most effective support to the Provisional Government of Greece, such as it shall be established by the negotiations mentioned in the present Protocol, *until the sovereign to be named shall make known his decisions on the administration of the state.*"

The Residents now enjoyed a fifth opportunity of founding the happiness of Greece on the durable basis of its own national institutions.

The whole of continental Greece, the islands, and a part of the Peloponnesus, had shaken off the Russian faction; and if the English and

French ministers had countenanced the formation of a Provisional Government, in which the national party had predominated, the Russian Resident must have united with them in upholding it, or, by his secession, have betrayed the insincerity of his court.

But, to the astonishment of the Greeks, the Residents patronized a Provisional Government of five members, four of whom were of the Russian Party; they still acknowledged the usurpation of the Senate; and to this government they invited Coletti to adhere, as the fifth.*

Already the distraction produced by their conduct amongst the leaders of the national party

* M. Thiersch's account of the conduct of the English minister on this occasion is as follows:—"The complete dispersion of the army of Count Augustin Capodistrias at the isthmus, and the arrival of the Roumeliotes at Argos, threw the Residents into a painful embarrassment at Nauplia. To acknowledge them, after having been disobeyed, and even despised by them? Impossible! To attack them and drive them back to the Isthmus? Equally impossible! They could not compromise the troops of the Alliance, in the midst of the combatants, to serve one party. In this embarrassment, a miracle only could save the honour of the Residents, and this miracle took place. A new Protocol, that of the 7th of March, arrived on the very day. It was the complete condemnation of their conduct; since, instead of approving of the recognition of Count Augustin, and of his usurped power, the

had led to one lamentable result, viz., the desertion from their ranks of Tricoupi and Zaimi. The secession of these two conspicuous Primates led to their being considered from that time as deserters from the national cause, and thenceforth they lost the confidence of the constitutionalists.

The attempt of the Residents, to impose upon the triumphant majority of the nation the yoke of a defeated faction, was of course spurned by the constitutionalists.

The Residents then agreed to an administrative commission of seven, viz., Condourioti, D. Ypsilanti, Coletti, Zaimi, Metaxa, D. Plaponta, and S. Tricoupi; and it was decided that, in the event of the resignation of one member, the Senate should supply his place. Thus the majority would have still remained with the faction.

On M. Tricoupi's resignation, they substituted M. Lidoriki, another Russian. But as the Conference of London charged them to compose a mixed government out of the two parties. 'That will save us!' exclaimed Mr. Dawkins, and he set to work accordingly. We shall now see how he acted, and whether, if, in trying to save himself, he has not ruined Greece. — *Thiersch*, vol. i. p. 106.

constitutionalists could not consent to degrade themselves in the eyes of the nation, it was finally arranged, by the appointment of C. Botzaris, that the majority of four votes in the council should belong to them; but now the Senate introduced a clause to the effect that no decree should be valid without a majority of five votes, so that, as the three members devoted to Russia acted in concert, it was impossible for the constitutionalists to carry on the government with any prospect of success. But the Residents had denounced, in a public letter, M. Coletti as having *opposed force to the rights of the only constituted body in Greece, viz. the Senate*; and thus they calumniated his character in the eyes of England, in a manner which led to fatal effects at a subsequent period of the annals of Greece, and which still rankles in the breast of Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary. On M. Tricoupi's resignation, they

A most detailed and interesting account of the state of Greece at this period will be found in the correspondence of Professor Thiersch with the Residents, and in his memoir to Sir Stratford Canning.—(See Appendix.)

Immediately on hearing of the Protocol of March, the whole of the Primates of Greece repaired to Nauplia, from which the greater part of them had been driven by the tyranny of the faction. The dungeons were opened; the Prince of Maina came forth to welcome the deputies of his native province; the refugees at Hydra, the Hydriote Capitani, the Roumeliote chiefs, the primates of the Morea, met together hand in hand; and the National Assembly immediately existed in the same simple form in which it had met at Epidaurus, Astros, and Trezene. But Colocotroni, the moment he heard of the provisions of the Protocol, fled into the province of Arcadia, vowing that he would shortly return with 4000 men, and re-establish the triumph of his party. The Klephtic chiefs, who were the strength of the faction, immediately attempted to seize the fortresses in the Morea, and Zavellas marched to the attack of Patrass. The faction received under these circumstances the warmest support from the Residents. The Provisional Government appealed to them for the aid of the French brigade "to prevent disturbances," by holding the forts of

Patrass, Corinth, and Nauplia, until the arrival of the Prince. Accordingly, at the solicitation of the Residents, the French commander marched to occupy Patrass, when, to his astonishment, he found a letter to the following effect from the Residents to the Consuls at Patrass:—

“You will declare to General Zavellas, that, in case he should persist in his refusal to surrender the citadel to the French troops, he must be convinced that we shall exert *all our efforts to divert the government from employing coercive measures against him*, which would be contrary to the pacific and conciliatory directions that we have received from the Conference of London; but, at the same time, we shall hold him responsible for his resistance, and the consequences that it may bring about.”

Such was the mode in which the Residents supported a really national government in Greece, viz., by encouraging military revolt against it! * Accordingly, Zavellas plundered

* The opinions prevailing in Greece respecting this measure may be conceived from the following remarks of M. Thiersch:—

The reader will be struck by the tenor of this letter, of which the unexpected declaration is neither modified nor softened by the end, since it is self-evident that every man is responsible for his acts. The declaration, therefore, remains in all its force; that is to say, that if this chieftain persists in his rebellion, the Residents will prevent the government from reducing him by arms.

the town, and destroyed all the property of the British and Ionian merchants.

Peace must be maintained. Such is the will of the Powers. But here the peace is broken, civil war has recommenced. The Capitani are invited to follow the example given at Patrass. A general explosion, fomented on all sides, will be the consequence. It is necessary, therefore, either to prevent it by the overthrow of the insurgent chief, or to suffer the consequences, and it is in such an alternative that the Residents declare that they will hinder the government from combating the insurrection. In order to give more solemnity to such an infraction of the law of nations, they order their declaration to be communicated to the rebel chief by the Consuls of the three Powers, and in order to sanction it they appeal to the benevolent intentions of the Courts who protect Greece. It may be said, perhaps, that the acts of Zavellas were isolated facts, which it was necessary to tolerate, in order to avoid still graver complications. But every body knew that the conspiracy to upset the government just recognized had spread over all Greece, that new revolts might every moment be expected, from the activity and audacity of the overthrown faction. It is impossible, therefore, to misunderstand the measure executed by the Residents. They were told with truth, 'That which you do for Zavellas you cannot refuse to do for others who will follow his example. You offer, in the name of the Alliance, an impunity to chiefs ready to revolt, and you will be understood. In the name of peace you preach civil war, and you will be obeyed.' Such is the march of these diplomatists, pushed to the extreme limits of the perfidy which had directed it. So long as Count Augustin was in power, they had nothing but contempt and threats for his adversaries. Scarcely are the latter on the point of overthrowing a power which had become disastrous to the country, and dangerous to its Prince, than they intervene to make the victorious party submit to the destiny of the defeated;

In the mean time there arrived a new Protocol, dated April 26, containing affirmations

and, because certain modifications had been successfully introduced in their work, they begin by refusing to the government the means of existence, and end by exciting armed resistance against it. One may doubt what their intentions were. One cannot doubt their acts. They prevented the pacification of Greece, and they contributed to replunge it into the anarchy from which it was on the point of escaping.

I have often done justice to the honourable sentiments of Baron de Rouen, and I owe him this tribute of justice on the present occasion. When I communicated to him pretty nearly the same observations which I have just made on the fatal letter which he had signed with his two colleagues, he replied, 'What would you have me do? You know our instructions, and that I must follow the advice of my two colleagues in every case when they are united. When such matters are laid before us, I always expect some sinister decision to be taken, and I have all the trouble in the world to obtain at least some modifications.' That Baron Ruckman, as the Resident of Russia, should have acted in an opposite sense to that of M. de Rouen, I can easily understand. M. Ruckman has never concealed the interest which he took in the government of Capodistrias, and he did not change his conduct, in refusing his good offices to the opposite party; but that Mr. Dawkins, the Minister of England, influenced by his aversion for what he regards, although most erroneously, as a French party, and by resentments but little worthy of his public character, should have allowed himself to be drawn into supporting measures calculated to rally the Capodistrian party, and to plunge Greece again into a path opposed to the true interests and the policy of his cabinet. *Voilà une chose qu'on peut bien expliquer, mais qu'on ne peut comprendre.*—*Thiersch*, vol. i., p. 132.

so directly opposed to truth, respecting the official acts of Greece, that the nation was unable to ascertain whether it had been betrayed by the English minister or by his government. The Protocol is as follows:—

“The Plenipotentiaries of France, Great Britain, and Russia, having met together in Conference, direct their attention to the information which has reached them from Greece, up to the 21st of March last, and determine upon the following resolutions:—

“The Conference of London has seen *with real satisfaction, that the first act of the Provisional Government of Greece, after* having received the assurances of support which the Residents of the three Courts were directed by the Protocol of the 7th of January, 1832, to give to it, *was the proclamation of a general amnesty for political offences.*

“*This act proves that the Provisional Government of Greece has fully comprehended the motives which induced the Conference of London to grant to it the support of the Alliance.*

“It did not, in fact, enter into the intentions of the Conference to favour the triumph of party, nor to bring personal vengeance and re-action into the heart of Greece.

“The Conference did not intend to grant its moral or military support to the establishment of tribunals of exception, nor to the adoption of measures on either side, which would be at variance with the ordinary and regular course of the laws.

“The object of the Conference was, to avert in Greece

the impending calamity of a civil war, and to save her from falling into a state of anarchy.

“The Conference has now reason to hope, that in a short time Greece will witness the arrival and establishment of an administration organised in the name of its new Sovereign; and the Residents are accordingly authorised to declare once more, *that the Provisional Government will receive in this interval all possible aid from the three Powers*, under the express condition that no desire of personal vengeance shall be listened to; that there shall be neither tribunals of exception nor extra-judicial commissions; and finally, that no sale of national domains shall be effected, nor any measure adopted, which can tend to give rise, in the new Greek state, to any financial embarrassments.”

Thus did the British government express its delight at the composition of a fraudulent amnesty, which, under the mask of “mildness and humanity,” had excluded from mercy all those whom it was proclaimed merely for the purpose of protecting, and allowed the Russian faction to believe that, in giving to such a diabolical act the fraudulent title of a “*general amnesty*,” it had fully comprehended the motives which induced the Conference to grant it the support of the Alliance.

Colocotroni, on hearing of this Protocol, immediately marched to upset the Provisional

Government and the National Assembly, and issued a proclamation against them. This proclamation was answered by a protest on the part of the Deputies and the Primates of the Peloponnesus, and these two documents* exactly represent the conflicting interests of the Russian faction and the national party, as I have hitherto traced them from the year 1822. The grand object of the faction was to preserve the municipal, fiscal, judicial, and military authorities appointed by Capodistrias, and continued by the Senate until the arrival of Prince Otho. They counted upon the subsequent support of the King of Bavaria, whom the Senate had addressed on the 13th of April, as a body representing the national will; and they received a reply from his Majesty, enjoining them *to surround the Regency on their arrival with their counsels!*"

In the mean time, the National Assembly, whose convocation had been required by the laws of Greece, and decreed by the Provisional Government, prepared to open its session. Dreading that they might be again exposed at

* See Appendix.

Argos to the hostility of the Klephts, they proposed to meet at the capital. This was refused by the Residents, and they were consequently obliged to assemble at Pronia, an open suburb within half a mile of Nauplia. Their first measure was the proclamation of a real act of amnesty, burying in oblivion all the crimes of those who had excluded them from mercy. Their next measure marked the honesty of the national character, and their ancient attachment to England. It was as follows:—

“The deputies will also occupy themselves with the same solicitude in finding the most suitable mode of distributing the national lands, *conformably to the interests of the nation, and to the guaranteeing of all the foreign and internal debts.*”

No sooner had this announcement appeared than the Residents opposed the Assembly, and addressed a collective note to the Greek government, stating that its intentions were contrary to the views of the Alliance, and threatening them with vengeance.

I have shown on former occasions how the Residents had, on the one hand, misled the

Greeks as to the views of the Alliance, and on the other the Alliance as to the events in Greece.

Their letter to M. Tricoupi on the present occasion is the most important of all their extraordinary acts. After explaining that the Assembly had met in opposition to their wishes, their advice, and their threats, they state —

“Under these circumstances we learnt the new acts of the Conference of London, by which the Allied Powers had just realized the wishes of the Greek nation in choosing for it a Sovereign, and decreeing, in order to secure the accomplishment of its destinies, the following measures:—

“1. That the Provisional Government, such as it existed, should be maintained in all its integrity until the arrival of the Royal Regency.

“2. That, in the mean time, no sale of the national lands should take place, nor should any measure be adopted which might tend to give rise in the new state to financial embarrassments.

“3. That the discussion or the establishment of a definitive constitution, or of fundamental laws, could not take place without the concurrence of the royal authority, since such an attempt would be in direct opposition to the act by which the nation had entrusted to the three Courts the right of choosing a sovereign.

In referring to the instructions of the Residents, presented with the Protocols to Parlia-

ment, we find them ordered to give "all possible publicity" to a declaration on the part of the three Courts, which terminates with the following appeal:—

"The three Courts are persuaded that they would mistake the character of the Greek nation, if they could doubt the sentiments which the nation will, with one voice, proclaim on this event.

"Greeks, indulge these feelings with confidence!—Encircle your new Sovereign with gratitude and affection. Faithful subjects! rally round his throne. Aid him with true devotedness *in giving to the state a definitive constitution*, and of securing to it the double blessing of peace abroad, of tranquillity, of the observance of the laws, and of order, at home.

(Signed) "TALLEYRAND.
"PALMERSTON.

"LIEVEN. MATUSZEWIC."

Now, what could have been the intention of Prince Talleyrand and Viscount Palmerston in addressing this appeal to Greece, before the arrival of King Otho, after whose accession to the crown they of course could have had no right to address his subjects? Was it not that the nation itself should hasten, before the arrival of the king, to prepare its constitution, and to frame its fundamental laws for the royal

assent, which they alone had the right to frame? Did not the express words of the Convention of May the 7th stipulate that "the Sovereign of Greece *and the Greek state* should be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest of the Allied Loan the first revenues;" thereby recognizing the Greek state, in other words, the National Assembly, as a coequal party with the Sovereign?

Did not these very words of the Treaty imply that no financial measures could be arranged without the participation of the Greek state?

How then could the Residents assert that the meeting and the measures of the Assembly were in opposition to the Alliance?

Nay, they say, "We hastened, *even before receiving the patent acts of the Conference*, to announce their principal arrangements to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in order that he might make the use of them most appropriated to the circumstances."

The Residents thus again committed the Conference against the Greek Nation, whilst the English Minister united with a French and Russian colleague in affirming that the attempt

of a National Assembly to provide for a debt to England of £2,800,000 was "a measure tending to give rise in the *new* state to financial embarrassments, and as equally contrary to the acts by which the Allied Powers have fixed *the future destinies* of Greece, as they are fatal to the *true interests* of the Greek people."

Thus was the bond of union between Greece and England dissolved, and the national credit of Greece was equally ruined with the inalienable rights of the British capitalists, which were sacrificed to the views of the Alliance.

The amazement with which one looks upon this sacrifice by an English Minister of the interests of his country, is increased when we consider that the Residents were empowered to support the Provisional Government instead of to counteract it. The pretended danger lest the Assembly should definitively establish a constitution, is a fallacy too contemptible to be dwelt upon. How could any acts of the Greek Nation, after their recognition of King Otho, become definitively binding until they received the King's assent? According to the reasoning of the Residents, the Parliament of England

and the French Chambers would be acting contrary to the interests of England and France, if they were to prepare bills for the royal approval without the concurrence of the Sovereign in their deliberations.

The Residents in this one transaction extinguished, in the name of the Alliance, the "Greek State," which has never since been heard of, whilst they attributed to King Otho the power of governing Greece, independently of the participation or control of its constitutional representatives; thus carrying into effect, to the very letter, the views of Count Boulgari and Count Capodistrias.

The National Assembly, indignant at this conduct, drew up an official reply, which they sent to M. Tricoupi for transmission to the Residents. M. Tricoupi evaded the performance of this duty, so that this interesting State paper has probably never found its way to England.

The assumption by the Residents of Sovereign authority in the country placed the government at their disposal, and Tricoupi, Mavrocordato, Zographo, and some other of the

most conspicuous functionaries, seceded at their instigation from the Assembly, denouncing its views as "incompatible with monarchical principles." Thus a schism was introduced in the ranks of the Constitutionalists; and those primates who had been most opposed to Russian influence, finding that the English Minister did not scruple to sacrifice the rights of his countrymen, submitted with him to the influence of the Russian Envoy. The reply of the National Assembly to the dissensient deputies exposes the real state of the question.*

As the Senate, however, was again allowed by the Residents to interfere in the conduct of the government, the National Assembly pronounced its legal extinction, upon which the threats of the Residents were put into execution by the faction whom they supported.

A band of ruffians were let loose upon the deputies, whom they dispersed with the most brutal outrages, carrying off into the mountains their venerable President Notara, under whose auspices the loans of 1824 and 1825 had been negotiated.

* See Appendix.

The particulars of this transaction are recorded in the declaration of sixty-two deputies, in which, whilst deploring the cruelties to which their country had been exposed, they terminate their appeal in the following words :*

“ At the very moment when they prorogued their session for a period, after having already taken, in favour of the general interests, all the measures in their power, it is impossible for them not to protest before the nation — before the King of Greece, and in the presence of the civilized world—against the authors of so many misfortunes, against those who have made this unhappy country the prey of passions. Impartial history, in unmasking the names of these men, will one day brand their acts more openly than is permitted now. Perhaps, also, the laws, in obtaining that vigour which belongs to them, will one day avenge crimes which have hitherto remained unpunished.†

(Signed) “ THE PRESIDENT,
“ P. NOTARAS,
“ THE PRINCE OF MAINA.”
And sixty-two Signatures.

“Nauplia, 22d August, 1832.”

The Senate, re-invested with vitality by the

* See Appendix.

† “ The Residents, seeing to what their conduct had led, were confounded; and one of them, who, on many former occasions, had given proofs of frankness, accused himself and his colleagues of having caused the ruin of this unfortunate country.”—*Thiersch*, vol. i., p. 179.

Residents, now proceeded to elect the Russian Admiral President of Greece ; but his Excellency finding that he could not succeed in obtaining the suffrages of all the senators, notwithstanding his lavish expenditure, to supply which, every resource was so completely exhausted, that even the pay of his officers was stopped, contented himself with obtaining a certificate of good conduct for his services to the nation, and the Senate directly afterwards named an administrative commission, consisting of Zaïmi, Metaxa, and Colocotroni.

After this, hearing that King Otho was on his way to Greece, they named a military government, composed of Colocotroni, Zavellas, and five other capitani, who assembled their forces with the view of imposing laws on the Regency and the new monarch, and acquiring the supreme direction of the two first instalments of the loan, to be guaranteed by the Alliance.

Greece now witnessed the last act of atrocity committed by the Russian faction. In order to do honour to King Otho on his arrival, the Provisional Government had solicited that a regi-

ment of the French brigade should cross the Morea, to occupy Argos.

Upon this, Colocotroni and his associates, perceiving that their project of surrounding the Regency would be foiled, determined to cut off the French troops on their march through the mountains; but, whilst they were occupied in disputing with respect to the passes where they should attack them, the French reached Argos without having known of their danger. On the following morning, during the absence of their commander at Nauplia, and whilst the soldiers were dispersed in the town, they were attacked by the Palikars. An action immediately commenced, which ended in the destruction of several hundred of the bandits; whilst the French troops, exasperated at the series of insults and perfidy which they had met with from the Russian party, since the death of Capodistrias, sacked the town.

Before the faction could rally from this defeat, the King, accompanied by the Royal Regency, and 3,500 Bavarian troops, appeared in the bay, escorted by three frigates of the Allied Powers, and surrounded by the squadrons of England, France, and Russia.

CHAPTER V.

Institution of the Independent Monarchy of Greece. Appointment and constitution of the Royal Regency. Administration of the Regency from February, 1833, until the subversion of their independence on the 31st of July, 1834, through Foreign support given to the Russian Faction.

Extracts from the Quadruple Convention of May the 7th, 1832, and the accompanying Protocols.

ART. IV.

"GREECE, under the sovereignty of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, and under the guarantee of the three Courts, shall form a monarchical and independent state, according to the terms of the Protocol signed between the said Courts on the 3rd of February, 1830, and accepted both by Greece and by the Ottoman Porte."

Extract of ART. VIII.

"In no case shall the Crown of Greece and the Crown of Bavaria be united upon the same head."

ART. IX.

"The majority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, is fixed at the period when he shall have completed his twentieth year, that is to say, on the 1st of June, 1835."

ART. X.

"During the minority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece, his rights of sovereignty shall be exercised in their full extent by a Regency composed of three councillors, who shall be appointed by His Majesty the King of Bavaria."

ART. XV.

"His Majesty the King of Bavaria shall also assist the Prince Otho in obtaining the services of a certain number of Bavarian officers, who shall organize a national military force in Greece."

ART. XVI.

"As soon as possible, after the signature of the present Convention, the three councillors who are to be associated with His Royal Highness the Prince Otho by His Majesty the King of Bavaria, in order to compose the Regency of Greece, shall repair to Greece, shall enter upon the exercise of the functions of the said Regency, and shall prepare all the measures necessary for the reception of the sovereign, who, on his part, will repair to Greece with as little delay as possible."

ART. XVII.

"The three Courts shall announce to the Greek nation, by a joint declaration, the choice which they have made of His Royal Highness the Prince Otho of Bavaria as King of Greece, and shall afford the Regency all the support in their power."

Previously to the signing of the Treaty, the Bavarian Plenipotentiary in London commu-

nicated to the Conference of London a memoir on—

“The points to be settled between the Bavarian Plenipotentiary and the Plenipotentiaries of the three Courts, relative to the election of His Royal Highness the Prince Otho of Bavaria to the Crown of Greece.”

It is inserted as Annex A. to the Protocol 24, of the 26th of April, 1832, in the following words:

“*Council of Regency.*”

“The Prince Otho, being elected sovereign of Greece, during his minority, it is indispensable during that period that wise and enlightened individuals should be selected to compose the council of Regency. His Majesty is gratified to find that the Powers rely with confidence on the decision which His Majesty may take on this subject. In fact, no one is more interested than himself in the prosperous course of the administration of Greece, or in the attainment by that country of a state of prosperity which may ensure to his son and to his descendants a long series of years of happiness. His Majesty perfectly concurs in the opinion, that the individuals to be called upon to exercise those high duties should be chosen from among the number of those who profess *moderate, but constitutional, opinions*. It is His Majesty's intention to nominate to those offices individuals chosen from among the high functionaries of his kingdom, and to continue to them, during the period of their employment in Greece, until his beloved son has attained his majority, the allowances which they now receive,

granting to them a fixed leave of absence, with the privilege of returning to their present duties.

“It appears to His Majesty that, in order to establish a Council of Regency in such a manner that each member of it may take his particular share in public affairs, and may proceed to the organization and government of Greece according to regular forms, it should be composed of three persons, one of whom should take the Department of the Interior and of Finance; another, the Department of Justice and of Public Instruction; and the third, the Department of Foreign Affairs, of War, and of the Navy. All state affairs should be decided upon by the majority of votes in the Council of Regency thus constituted. It would be essential that the organization of the Council should be settled beforehand, and His Majesty thinks it would be advantageous to regulate it by a separate Protocol.

“The choice of these councillors, which will deprive the King of the services of wise and eminent men, will furnish the most incontestable proof of the sincere interest which His Majesty takes in the prosperity of Greece, and of his desire to anticipate the wishes of the Powers.”

Extract from a confidential Communication from the Plenipotentiaries of the three Courts to the Bavarian Plenipotentiary in reply.

Annex F to the Protocol No. 44 of the Conference of the 26th of April, 1832.

“Council of Regency and Suite of the Prince.

“The Conference adopts, without reserve, all the views expressed upon those two points in the communications of the

Bavarian Plenipotentiaries. Similar stipulations are to be found in Articles X. and XV. of the Project of Treaty. A separate Protocol relative to the division of the duties of administration among the members of the Regency would be superfluous, and would even exceed the limits of the powers of the three Courts. From the moment when it is settled that, during the minority of the King, the sovereign Power shall be fully exercised by the Council of Regency, it is, of course, understood *that that council shall divide the administrative duties in the way that it shall judge most useful and desirable.* It is with great satisfaction that the Conference has learnt, by the verbal and confidential communications of the Bavarian Plenipotentiary, that it is the intention of His Majesty the King of Bavaria, that the Council of Regency should be composed of *Count d'Armanse-berg, of the Councillor of State Maurer, and of Colonel Heydecker.* *The knowledge of this judicious choice has had not a little influence upon the counter-propositions which the Conference this day addresses to the Baron de Cetto."*

Extract of the Instructions from the Conference of London to the Residents of the three Courts in Greece.

From Annex C. to the Protocol No. 44 of the Conference of the 26th of April, 1832.

"When the Regency shall arrive in Greece, you will give to it *all the support* which your weight and influence may enable you to afford. According to the terms of the 14th Article of the above-mentioned convention, the troops of the Alliance now in Greece will be entirely at the disposal of the Royal Regency, and it is, *of course, understood that the*

proceedings of the naval forces of the three Courts must be in perfect conformity with the engagements which those Courts have now contracted with the King of Bavaria and the King of Greece."

Extract of Instruction from the Conference to the Commanders of the Naval Forces of the three Courts in the Archipelago.

Annex E to Protocol No. 44 of the Conference, of the 26th of April, 1832.

"As the *Regency* is the immediate representative of the King of Greece, it should be treated with all the honours due to royalty."

In order to throw still more light on the inviolability of the engagement thus entered into, I add, from the work of M. Maurer, the following extracts.

"It only remained, after the ratification of these engagements, for the King of Bavaria to grant full powers to the members of the Regency, which he did by a royal rescript, an extract of which is as follows:—

"After having this day named our Councillor of State and Councillor of the Empire von Maurer as Extraordinary Commissioner and member of the Council of Regency in Greece during the minority of our well-beloved son, His Majesty the King of Greece, we relieve him from the special

duties of our service for the period of his participating in the Regency of Greece, and transfer him for the above-named period with the duties attached to him to our well-beloved son and to the Greek state, to which he will have to devote his services.

“Bad Brückenau, the 21st of August, 1832.”

It is nowhere stated that any one of the members of the Regency should enjoy higher rights than the others, and for this very reason three members of the Regency were chosen. It is true that the King of Bavaria, after a long delay, granted to Count Armansperg, who had set an especial value on it, the title of President of the Regency. But how little importance it was the intention of His Majesty to attach to this fact, is proved by its being first noticed in the official gazette of Bavaria amongst the errors of the press.

Moreover, in order to prove that the King of Bavaria had not the most remote intention of attaching any higher rights to this presidency contrary to the London Convention, I cite the instructions drawn up by His Majesty for the march of business on the 23rd of July, 1832.

“§ 5.

“The Council of the Regency will draw up its resolu-

tions in all the affairs of Government *according to the majority of votes*, and will issue its decrees with the signature of all the members.

“For the event of one of the members going away we shall provide by eventual substitution.

“§ 6.

“To the member of the Council of the Regency invested by us with the presidency will belong the guidance of the deliberations and the keeping of the Seal of State, as well as the undersigning of the resolutions of the Regency, which are to be deliberated upon by minutes.

“The presiding member of the Regency has also to represent the Regency in its relations with the Ambassadors and other agents of Foreign Courts, and to carry on the verbal communications with the same—with the reserve, however, expressly secured to the collective Council of the Regency, by § 5, of the right of forming its resolutions thereupon.

“In the event of the impediment or death of the President, the next succeeding member of the Regency in the order settled by us in the decree of nomination will take his place.”

“§ 272.

“In order to carry on the administration with efficiency and activity, and to lighten its labours as much as possible, it had already been agreed upon at Munich, that the Privy Councillor of Legation, von Abel, who had been named by the King of Bavaria as the supplemental Member of the Regency, as well as M. von Greiner, the Director of the Finances, should be allowed to attend the sittings of the Regency, and to have a consultative voice in the same. The

business itself was distributed in such a manner, that M. von Greiner had to arrange the finances ; von Abel the internal administration and foreign affairs ; General von Heydeck the war and marine department ; I myself [M. von Maurer] the department of justice, religion, and instruction. The President, in fine, took charge of the so-called representation, and of the entertainments of the Court. When, however, M. von Greiner had quitted Greece, the Count took charge also of the finances.

“ Each of us, in our separate departments, had to receive the requisite information, and to prepare what was necessary, especially the drafts for the decrees and laws. But the final decision always remained with the majority. In this manner it happened that the collective resolutions and laws which relate to the finances are to be referred to M. von Greiner ; the internal administration and foreign relations, and some part of naval affairs, to M. von Abel ; the remaining business of the marine and war department to General Heydeck ; to me the books of law, and every thing appertaining to justice, the church, and the schools ; and, finally, Count Armandsparg was the author of all that took place latterly with regard to the measures of finance.”

Such were the laws which formed the constitution of the Greek monarchy ; and, on the arrival of King Otho and the Regency in Greece, in February, 1833, these were the laws which the whole Greek nation themselves took the oath to observe, in return for the pledge of their monarch to protect their liberty and independence.

It is hardly necessary to add that treason to the Regency on the part of a Greek subject was treason to the King, and that any attempt on the part of a foreign power to subvert that Regency, no matter for what cause, would be an international crime of the deepest dye, since it must have destroyed the tie which bound the Greek nation to their own sovereign, and have been the subversion of the independence of Greece, and consequently the dissolution of all national law, by substituting in its stead the law of a foreign state.

But the definition of the spirit of these engagements has been given by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State. I quote his own words, extracted from a letter to Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated April 18, 1836. Alluding to the object of the Treaty, Lord Palmerston states:

"Was it in order to hold in their hands the means of exercising directly a dictatorial interference in the internal affairs of that Greece which they had solemnly declared to be a free and independent state? Was it in order to render their guarantee of the successive instalments contingent upon the consent of the Greek Government to adopt *particular measures of administration*, or to employ *particular men in posts of trust and power*? Surely not."

All things having been arranged at Munich, the King and the Regency, the Bavarian troops, and the civil functionaries, were conveyed to Greece, under an escort of three frigates of the Allied Powers. The whole of this expedition was placed under the superintendence of Captain Lyons, who commanded the "Madagascar," and to whose admirable management, activity, and talent, throughout this period of excitement and intrigue, Greece was indebted for the early and safe arrival of its monarch, and the successful realization of the wishes of the Alliance.

At the period of King Otho's landing on the shores of Greece, the greater part of the Morea, in consequence of the support given by the Residents to the Senate, was still subject to the rule of the Russian party. The Klephtic Chiefs, emboldened by the encouragement given by the Residents to the revolt of Zavelas against the Provisional Government, had seized the strongholds of the interior, and the local authorities appointed by Capodistrias had preserved their power, appropriated the revenues, pillaged the provinces, and reduced the

wretched inhabitants to despair. Against these evils the people had no appeal. All the municipal authorities, the justices of the peace, and the epistates, belonged to the Russian faction; and Colocotroni had, in reality, been less incensed at the establishment of a new government at Nauplia, than at the prospect of the subversion of that personal influence over the interior of the Morea, which made him so powerful a partizan. Throughout Arcadia, Messenia, and in a part of Maina, at Mistra and Calamata, his name infused terror amongst the peasantry, whom he alternately fleeced by his brigands, or compromised, by inciting them to pillage their neighbours.

To restore tranquillity and order—to create for the new government confidence and esteem—was the first duty of the Regency.

On their landing, a proclamation, breathing these sentiments, was addressed to the nation, and a general amnesty was proclaimed for all political crimes. The nation hastened to testify its confidence in the Regency; and, in exchange for the pledge of their sovereign to defend the liberties and independence of Greece, they took the oath of allegiance to King Otho and the laws.

Amongst these laws were the Protocols that defined the attributes of the sovereignty, as well as the constitution of the Regency, established with the consent of the four powers, and which was to exist inviolate until the majority of the young Prince. Severe measures were provisionally taken to preserve the peace, and three courts were instituted in Nauplia, Missolonghi, and Thebes, and their sentences were carried into execution with a promptitude hitherto unknown in that country. The use of fire-arms was restricted; a corps of gendarmerie was instituted; an administration, an army, and a marine, were created; commissions were appointed to inquire into the state of the church, and of public instruction.

During several months all was harmony and tranquillity at Nauplia, throughout the whole continent, and all the islands of Greece.

At the house of Count Armandsperg, the King and his uncle, the Prince of Saxe-Altenburg, together with the diplomatic corps, the military and naval officers of England, France, and Russia, Bavarian gentlemen and travellers from various countries, formed a nucleus of society,

in which all the leading Greeks had an opportunity of becoming acquainted with their prince, whose exemplary and engaging conduct gained every heart; and the Primates and Capitani, whose passions had been so lately excited with deadly animosity, met hand in hand in rivalry of good feeling and loyalty to their king. The splendour of their arms, the variety of their costumes, their exploits in the war of independence, the legends of their civil feuds, became the theme of curiosity and deep interest to the king and the Bavarians. From far and wide the Hellenists repaired to Nauplia, to witness the spectacle of European society, and the whole country resounded with benedictions on the Alliance, as having fulfilled all that their utmost hopes could have aspired to.

The pretensions of the factions of the past were all impartially discountenanced: the Senate of Capodistrias was allowed to expire without mention even of its name; whilst the Regency endeavoured to extinguish, in the minds of all parties, the memory of the anarchy of the past, and directed them to look to the future with confidence and hope.

The Regency at once decided on disarming the Palikars, and on withstanding the extravagant demands of the Capitani. They wisely judged that indecision in this matter would open the door to the monstrous claims which almost every family in Greece had advanced in expectation that the loans of the Allied Powers were intended to defray their past services. This idea had been infused into their minds by Capodistrias, who had alarmed Prince Leopold by advocating these ridiculous pretensions, while he ingratiated himself with those whose avidity he appeared to sanction.

The disarming of the Palikars, and the coldness of the Regency towards the military chiefs, were extremely unpalatable to General Church, who became the organ of his former comrades in arms. He remonstrated with Count Armansperg against the decree of the Regency, upon which the latter insinuated that it was the work of his colleagues—that it did not meet with his own approbation—and that it should be altered.

Most unfortunately for the tranquillity of Greece, this was communicated by General Church to some of the Capitani, and the whole

corps thenceforth looked upon Count Armansperg as their protector; and considered M. de Maurer, General Heydeck, and M. d'Abel, as inimical to their interests.

The first definitive Greek administration formed by the Regency was as follows:—Tricoupi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, President of the Council, and Minister of the King's Household; Mavrocordato, Minister of the Finances; Praïdes, Minister of Justice; Psyllas, Minister of the Interior; Coletti, Minister of the Marine.

The four first, as I have already stated, had, at the National Assembly of Pronia, deserted the constitutional party, at the instigation of the Residents and Admiral Ricord. Coletti was still considered as their leader by the constitutionalists, who now looked upon Tricoupi and Mavrocordato, not indeed as Capodistrians, but as men whose political consistency could not in future be depended upon.

The country was divided into nomarchies, districts, and municipalities, with executive functionaries over each, to be assisted by provincial, district, and municipal councils, to be

elected by the people. The law of election was postponed; nor was it a matter of importance, since freedom of election had existed in the habits of the people from time immemorial; it was sufficient for the establishment of system and regularity that the government should not interfere with existing customs.

The first embarrassments of the Regency arose from the financial arrangements of Mavrocordato: he rendered all the fiscal officers independent of the local or provincial authorities, and responsible only to the Ministry of the Finance. The country was covered with bands of ephors, or tax-gatherers, and thus, by an usurpation of patronage, he created a party dependent on himself. The rapacity of these agents harassed the peasantry to such a degree, that many of them crossed the frontier with their flocks, and abandoned Greece altogether.

The pretext for the introduction of this new system was an alleged saving of thirty per cent., as compared with the system of farming the revenue under Capodistrias, which system, however corrupt, was superior to Mavrocordato's scheme in this, that the peasantry pos-

sessed the faculty of appeal to the provincial governor. By Capodistrias's system, the government was moreover enabled to become thoroughly acquainted with the resources of the country from year to year, and thereby to prevent private speculation, for the farms were disposed of by public auction. Mavrocordato's scheme, although it might appear on paper to save thirty per cent., did not realise in practice that saving; and such a system, without a previous survey, and a fixed assessment, left the people and the revenue at the mercy of the collector. The collectors, on the other hand, were liable to be imposed on. As their numbers were inadequate to these duties, it was arranged that none of the farm produce could be stored until personally inspected by them. Thus the corn was not allowed to be threshed until the collector was on the spot, and the grapes and currants from the same cause were exposed to destruction from the autumnal rains. Any one acquainted with the nature of the country, and the habits of the underlings of government, the deficiencies of communication, &c., must perceive in such a system the fertile

sources of wide spread corruption, of dissensions, irritation, and disaffection. The Regency, new to the country, having their minds necessarily biassed by the administrative practice of their native country, might, with the best intentions, have committed this error: it is impossible to be as indulgent to a Greek, while giving him credit for superior abilities.

But other measures of Mavrocordato were still more obnoxious, and still more opposed to the practice of former times, and to the established principles of right. Adopting the European fiction, that the land is held of the crown under the Sultan, he asserted that, as Greece now entered into her rights as an independent state, the nation claimed all the pasturages, the uncultivated lands, and the woods, which private individuals had enjoyed under the Turks, merely through the supineness of the Turkish government.

There is no point on which a more unfortunate error exists in the minds of Europeans regarding the East, than that which has relation to the tenure of property. Western feudalism has absorbed the land, and made it hereditary.

Eastern feudalism existed on the tenths; their enjoyment has not become, of principle, hereditary; and in Turkey these tenths have been reconquered by the present Sultan, to the service of the state. But these apparent coincidences of forms and terms have confirmed Europeans in their mistake respecting the vestment of landed property in the crown.* The errors committed by our government in India, and now repudiated by the best authorities, were reproduced in Greece; and, at the Assembly of Pronia, the Greeks maintained the Eastern principle, and were opposed by the Residents.

The national force consisted of about 2000 regular troops, who had been kept in a fair state of discipline. The Regency organized a corps of mounted police, into which the Palikars were invited to enlist; but the mountaineers, attached to their picturesque garb, disliked the uniform of a gendarmerie. This body, however, rendered most efficient service, in keeping the police of the towns.

* The reader, curious on this point, may consult the Appendix to "Turkey, and its Resources."

At this period, tranquillity reigned throughout the country; the dissatisfaction of some of the military leaders was not shared by their body, and was compressed by the firmness of the government, and the hopelessness of anarchy. With the exception of the irritation which the financial measures above indicated were commencing to produce, general satisfaction prevailed. Tranquillity was no where disturbed, and a feeling of confidence and hope animated the nation. The press was free, liberty and property secure; the government, powerful, by its position and character, was disconnected from party, and abstained from injudicious activity and interference. The past anarchy was banished from remembrance; and the man who could have foretold a recurrence of the calamities which were soon to overtake them, would have been looked upon as a visionary. The Russian faction remained apparently quiet. Colocotroni had retired to Arcadia; and the greater part of the Capitani, after enjoying the gaieties of the new court, had gone to their homes.

For several months had this state of things

(probably little anticipated at St. Petersburg) been suffered to exist; and when sufficient space of time had elapsed to justify the expectations of a positive improvement in the state of Greece, and to communicate the satisfactory results of the new system, the Augs-
burgh Gazette denounced the Regency as incompetent.

The first measures of the Regency had no sooner become known at St. Petersburg, than the Emperor appointed a Fanariote Greek as envoy extraordinary to Greece, charged with a previous mission to the King of Bavaria, who, as the Sovereign of the members of the Regency, might naturally be expected to have great influence over their acts.

M. Catacazy landed in Greece in the end of May. Armed with the double influence of St. Petersburg and of Munich, he appeared to adopt, as the model of his policy, the conduct of Count Stackelberg at the court of the unfortunate Stanislaus Augustus. His attempts to overawe the Regency, however, failed; and, incensed at his pretension and interference, the Regency at length wrote to St. Petersburg, to

entreat that he might be recalled, as they could not believe that he represented the real wishes of his Sovereign.

A measure was now adopted by the Regency of deep importance. Penetrating the long cherished designs of the Emperor, to be acknowledged, *at the proper time*, Supreme Head of the Greek church, and seeing that, by such an act, the independence of the nation and the monarchy must be overthrown, the Regency, at M. Maurer's suggestion, convoked the high clergy of Greece at Napoli, and, with their deliberate and grateful support, instituted an independent synod, and placed King Otho at the head of the church of his own kingdom. This measure was in imitation of that adopted by Peter the Great, who separated the church of Russia from dependence on the Patriarch of Constantinople; but such was the national spirit of the Greek clergy, that, on an allusion being made to this example, they stated, "Our's is the mother-church, of which the Russian is the daughter; St. Paul preached, not to Russians, but at Athens." M. Cataczy, with his numerous suite, absented himself from the grand cere-

mony on this occasion, to which the diplomatic body was invited.

The flourishing state of the country was daily increasing, when the Regency were suddenly startled by the timely discovery of a ramified conspiracy, an account of which I shall lay before the reader, in M. de Maurer's own words:—

“Nevertheless, the tranquillity of Greece was of short duration. The Regency governed on principles opposed to those, by the adoption of which Capodistrias had at last drawn down his own unhappy fate. This alone sufficed to unite against us an opposition, composed of the remnants of that party which, in the new organization, had either received no appointments, or from other causes had not sincerely associated with the Regency. The Capodistrians, who had been formerly accustomed to the exclusive possession of influential and lucrative posts, found none of their party in the ministry, and, according to their notions, too few of their number had been provided for. They therefore attempted to recover their lost power, first of all by fraud and intrigue, and, when this failed, by force.

“Under the protecting shield of Theodore Colocotroni, the dispersed remnants of the old Capodistrian party were united; and they combined again, as they had done in former times, in a secret society called the Phoenix. Secret sittings succeeded each other, in which they declaimed against the Regency. The disbanded military; the official people removed as incapable; the primates and capitani,

who, in their own opinion, were thrown into the background; those who had either received no appointments, or such as were not suitable to their desires;—in short, the dissatisfied and discontented of every party were drawn together to form a systematic opposition to the Regency. For this end, a paper called the “Chronos” was established with Colocotroni’s money: complaints were made in it of the incapacity of the Fanariote administration; all the measures of the new government were represented in the most odious light; attention was drawn to the earlier custom of a Constitution entertained by this party; and, indeed, their discourse was in the most ultra-liberal sense. They endeavoured, in every way, to excite the mass of the people. Further, according to old custom, which prevailed even under the Turkish rule, robber bands were let loose, the object of which was to make the new government, which had not the ready means of stopping these commotions, appear as weak and powerless to the people, and on the other side to inspire terror into the Regency itself. The audacity of these robber bands went so far that they robbed and murdered travellers in the vicinity of the capital itself. Amongst the adherents of these bands were soon discovered the old friends of Colocotroni and of Coliopulo Plapouta. In order, however, to give a proper consistency to all these secret machinations, they sought in secret to form an armed force, to inveigle the Palikars scattered over Roumelia, to provide them with arms and ammunition, and in this manner to prepare a formal revolt.

“Under these circumstances, when the conspiracy had already advanced considerably, there appeared again in Greece a Count Roma of Zante, well known in former times. He spread a report that he came from Munich, and

had there entered into associations with men of influence, with whom he had a common understanding. It was now resolved to prepare two addresses in an entirely opposite sense, the secret and real object of which anybody may readily comprehend. The address proposed by Dr. Franz * was directed to the King of Bavaria. In it my recall, and that of General Heydeck, were solicited; and the wish was expressed that Count Armansperg should be left as sole Regent. According to the other address, which, however, was directed to the Emperor of Russia, and which was decidedly a more serious one, the whole three members of the Regency were to be removed, the majority of the King proclaimed, and the Capodistriani replaced at the head of affairs. If these addresses were to fail in the end desired, then they were to have recourse to arms, and to eject the Regency by force.

“In order to organize more completely this formidable revolt, to increase the number of the conspirators, and to make them more resolute in the undertaking they had entered upon, Russian assistance and Russian gold were spoken of; and indeed, for the same end, use was made of a letter which at that very moment arrived from *Count Nesselrode to General Colocotroni*.

“§ 446. “The result of all these truly colossal efforts were disturbances in Tinos, and preparations for a general revolt, which was to have taken place simultaneously in all parts of the kingdom, and which was fixed for breaking out on the 16th of September, 1833.

“But by the proclamation of martial law, by a strict

* Count Armansperg's private secretary.

inquiry into grievances, and by a show of a few troops and cannon, the revolt at Tinos was very speedily quelled. By the arrest of Colocotroni, Coliopulo Plapoutas, Kitzos Zavellas, Mamouris, Karatasso, Roukis, Spiromilio, Theodore Grivas, &c., military chiefs, public order was also restored to all the other parts of the kingdom. At the same time, by the manner in which these chiefs were arrested from the very midst of their already armed adherents, by the national troops of Greece, and by the gendarmerie, a double proof was shown that the mass of the people had remained entirely strangers to these matters, and that the new government, in this short period, had already taken deep root.

“Still, in order to render such machinations and excitements difficult, if not impossible, for the future, a new law of the press was issued; the old weak administration of Tricoupi, Psyllas, and Praïdes, was dismissed, and firmer men—such as Constantine Schinas and Theocariss—were respectively made ministers of justice, ecclesiastical affairs, and finance; and, under such circumstances, the important office of minister of the interior was entrusted to the powerful hands of Coletti.

“All these measures, far from exciting disturbance, or even occasioning dissatisfaction, were received with the greatest applause; so that from many parts addresses of thanks appeared, in which the Regency was congratulated on frustrating the conspiracy, and petitions were addressed in favour of the severest punishment of the accused. The firm bearing and energy manifested by the Regency, on this occasion, increased indeed considerably the national confidence in the new government.

“The country sank into the deepest, hitherto indeed

never experienced, tranquillity. The peasantry gave themselves up to agriculture, the merchants to their commerce, artizans to their trades, and every man was reanimated by the most joyful hope of a happier future. The Regency itself had its hands now more free than before, to accomplish its grand object of reorganizing the country, which had thus far made successful progress.

“To this period belong the preparation of four new codes of law: a book of criminal law, the order of procedure in all legal matters; an act establishing national schools; a law instituting scientific collections; as also regulations respecting antiquities, then the municipal law; the organization of a medical department, and an act of registry for the national marine, &c. &c. &c.*

“§ 447.

“Under these favouring circumstances, the Regency continued as before to approximate parties more and more. The most distinguished military primates of all parties received military appointments, orders, and other distinctions: the naval heroes also, and the civil primates. The latter received, according to their capacities, situations of more or less importance, as every page of the Government Gazette of the times indicates. Others received pensions and titles, or both, as the celebrated Mavromichælis, Jakovaky Rizo Neroulos, Andreas Metaxa, Caradja, Psyllas, Praïdes, and many more. The most distinguished of all parties at length received, at the first distribution of orders, those of higher or lower rank. Whilst Coletti, Lazarus Condouriotti,

* Here breaks out the unfortunate spirit of regulation which has been the curse of all Eastern people subject to European governors.

Andreas Miaulis, Peter Mavromichæli, and Alexander Mavrocordato, received the Grand Cross of the Saviour; Hadgee Christo, Nikitas Stamatopulos, Zaïmis, Panoutzo Notaras, the Archbishop Kyrillos of Corinth, and the naval chiefs, Kanaris, Kriezi, and Sachtouri, were rewarded with the Cross of Commander; and amidst the other nominations to distinctions are to be found primates of all parties.

“Theodore Colocotroni, Kitzos Zavellas, and Grivas, were also thought of; but, as their examinations were going on, their decorations were withheld.

“How flourishing the country had, under these circumstances, become, in comparison with its state the year before, those only can certify who had witnessed its former and later condition. Greeks and strangers were unanimous on this point. A public confirmation of this was given on the first anniversary of the landing of the King, on the 6th February, 1834, and a more gratifying spectacle can hardly be imagined. The general exterior of the numerous population assembled on that occasion showed, in comparison with the year before, an immense improvement in well-being and love of order. The Regency had indeed the satisfaction of seeing the military duty for the day exclusively entrusted to national troops and the Greek gendarmerie, who preserved order and celebrated the honours of the day. Such had been, in this short time, the progress in military discipline and aptitude.

“§ 448.

“However gratifying were the effects of the arrest of Colocotroni and his associates, and however loud was the approbation with which it was received, still new embarrassments arose out of the history of this conspiracy. The

grounds of them lay partly in the long duration of the investigations, but in part also in the fact that Count Armansperg and the English Minister were compromised in it.

“During the long process of the examinations, the Russian party, alarmed at the arrests, combined their resources, and derived new hopes from the position taken up in the interval by the President of the Regency (Count Armansperg) and Mr. Dawkins. Right-minded people, indeed, had kept aloof from both, particularly since the breach which had been declared; and the latter felt it the more necessary to attach to themselves the intriguers, viz., the Fanariotes.

“Mavrocordato, in particular, who had originally exerted himself to the utmost to bring on the trial, was now generally accused of putting every thing in motion to pronounce a decision as much as possible in favour of Colocotroni. But times had changed. It was now only a question of preparing difficulties in the way of the majority of the Regency. Colocotroni's counsel, Clonaris, was, besides this, the intimate friend of Mavrocordato. The President of the Court, Polyzoides, who was, at an early stage, zealous for condemnation, remained uncertain, and only resolved upon the unfortunate conduct he pursued during the sitting of the court. To the warning voice of a friend he is said to have replied—‘What displeases to-day, will, six months hence, be agreeable, and will gain for us even now the applause of the English.’ Terzetti, the third judge, who acted in the sense of Polyzoides, was accustomed to give daily lessons to the Armansperg family. The whole conspiracy was made to appear as a fabrication of Coletti. Even in the English papers there appeared articles relative

to the doubtful issue of the trial in favour of the accused, of whose condemnation few, in Nauplia at least, entertained any doubt.

“The sentence of condemnation indeed was passed; and if the sentence was unjust, or was even in the remotest degree not sufficiently justified, why are the condemned not allowed to be set free? Their then favourers and supporters are in possession of power now.

“§ 449. Right-minded people, indeed, had kept aloof from, particularly since the

“In connection with the trial of Colocotroni were the disorders of Maina and the robber-bands of Roumelia. In order to put an end, in Maina, to the still existing ‘Faustrecht’ (right of the strongest), and being solicited to that effect by a part of its inhabitants, the Regency had, about six months before these troubles broke out, taken the resolution to adapt the numerous towers in that country to purposes less threatening to the public peace. In order to carry this resolution into effect, which, however, it was only intended to do by mild means, Mavrocordato, as minister of marine, received instructions to put some of the ships of the royal navy in a state of readiness; but month after month elapsed, and no fleet appeared. Captain Feder had indeed arrived in Maina with money, and was successfully employed in endeavouring to use this opportunity to bring about peace on all sides. At this period, the proceedings against Colocotroni commenced; and the troubles which still existed in Maina were made use of at Nauplia to increase the difficulties attendant on the process. On the other hand, in consequence of the want of a fleet, the necessary force was not at hand at the first moment that it was required: resistance was made by the Mainotes; and,

as great errors were committed by the military, blood was unfortunately shed. The credulous Mainotes had likewise been taught to believe that their religious freedom was in danger. Their children, according to these insinuations, were not in future to be baptized until they had passed their 12th, or completed their 25th, year. They were themselves to be disarmed, and to be subjected to a tribute of the hated charadsh, like the Rayahs in the time of the Turkish dominion. These apprehensions, their attachment for their arms and their towers, and especially for the 'right of the strongest,' are very well described in the song which was then composed and sung by the Mainotes, and of which, for its curiosity, I subjoin a French translation.

"Whilst Maina had been set in commotion by influence from Nauplia, the simultaneous re-appearance of the bands of robbers in Roumelia may be equally ascribed to Nauplian intrigues. For this reason the condemnation of Theodore Colocotroni, and Coliopulos Plapoutas, had a magic effect upon the peace of the nation. They had, amongst other reasons, been condemned as the raisers of the bands of banditti. Maina was now very soon restored to peace. All that was required was the presence of a very prudent and firm commissioner in Valtinos, who was sent by the minister of the interior, and also that of a priest, sent by the holy synod, in order to restore the deluded Mainotes to tranquillity, and to convert the before-mentioned towers into common dwellings. In Roumelia, however, the peasants were armed against the banditti, while at the same time martial law was put in force. The consequence of this mutual aid was, that, within a very short time, brigandage was entirely suppressed.

"At last, Mavrocordato was dismissed, and thus appa-

rently the spirit of faction was deprived of a rallying point. No rival to Coletti remained amongst his colleagues, and thenceforth he was enabled to proceed with more boldness, and the most perfect peace soon prevailed in every quarter. Under these circumstances, the government had the power of assuming a milder aspect. Six or eight of the principal Capitani, viz., Kitzos Zavellas, Theodore Grivas, Mamouris, Karatasso, Roukis, and others, were liberated: a free pardon was promised them as a recompense for their former services to their native land. Steps were also taken in favour of the Palikari and military primates: honorary rewards, and remuneration in land, which were to be accompanied by other favours. Only a few prisoners (amongst others, Gennaios Colocotroni) were still reserved for trial. Pressing calls of business made it impossible that the administration of justice should proceed as rapidly in Nauplia as the Regency earnestly wished; and this delay was to be lamented on other accounts, because by this means, without any fault of the Regency, the organization of justice was likewise delayed. For it was impossible to try the accomplices before other tribunals than those at which the principals were tried, and therefore new tribunals could only be established after their definitive sentence. The consequence was, that the new laws, which ought to have been organized in July, or at latest in August, 1834, have, owing to the change of the Regency, never yet been brought into operation.

“ § 450. A much more important discovery was occasioned by Mr. Dawkins and Count Armanberg being found to be compromised in these matters. It was about this time re-

ported (whether with or without reason I cannot say) that Count Armansperg had knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy, and that, if he did not openly favour it, he at least saw it with no unfavourable eyes. We could not believe this report, for we were old friends of Armansperg, and we saw no grounds in his conduct to justify our opinion. But, one day, Panagiotes Nicolaïdes came to General Heydeck (not to Count Armansperg, as the English newspapers falsely stated), and disclosed to him that Dr. Franz had drawn up two addresses to the King of Bavaria, for the removal of two of the members of the Regency, with a prayer annexed that Count Armansperg might be solely entrusted with the affairs of the Regency. Some days afterwards, Prince Gustavus Wrede came from the country, and declared the same thing. They both spoke of a secret understanding between Count Armansperg and the conspirators.

“Now that distinct allegations were made, we thought that we could no longer consider the matter as a mere intrigue, but that we must take steps in the business. Nicolaïdes received, therefore, (after Heydeck, d’Abel, Greiner, and I, had agreed upon the necessary proceedings) an order to procure the addresses for us: he brought first one, and after a few days the other. Both were in the handwriting of Franz, and written in ancient Greek. There was no longer any reason to doubt of the participation of Dr. Franz in the conspiracy. At the same time, letters from Count Roma were laid before us, in which he was named as the chief of the plot; but we could none of us believe in the participation of our friend and colleague. We determined to treat him with the greatest frankness, and appointed a meeting, in order to consult with him on the mode of proceeding under these circumstances. The meeting took

place. The arrest of Dr. Franz was *unanimously* resolved on; and the instantaneous execution of this decree, as well as the taking possession of his papers, was *unanimously* added to it. Dr. Franz was arrested by M. d'Abel. What he deposed with respect to Armansterg was, from indulgence to the President of the Regency, not officially attached to the protocols of the Council.

"Afterwards, at the trial of Colocotroni, we managed so that Armansterg's name was not once mentioned. However, the confusion of the President at our meeting was great. He made a declaration, in the presence of Heydeck, d'Abel, Greiner, and myself, to the following effect:—

" ' Franz came to him, and spoke to him in undecided general terms of its being advisable that a transfer of the exclusive power of the Regency should be made to him. He (the Count) answered, that it would indeed be much more desirable and more useful, if one sole person had the exclusive direction of the affairs of the Regency, but that, however, either of his colleagues might be as well fitted for it as himself. ' "

"In order to spare the Count and ourselves further embarrassment, it was decreed that Franz should not be brought before the tribunal, but only lectured, and sent out of the country; and that all his papers, which had been seized, should be returned to him unexamined. Also, *at the earnest request of the President*, a considerable sum of money was allowed him for his travelling expenses. While Franz remained in arrest in his own house at Nauplia, he declared to a witness as follows:—

" ' During the time that the composition of this address was proceeding, he (Dr. Franz) went once to Count Armansterg, and gave him to understand what was going

on—that is to say, to procure the recall of his colleagues in the Regency, and the transfer of all the affairs of the Regency to the Count himself. To these notifications the Count answered *diplomatically* (the identical word used by Dr. Franz), that he was perfectly aware that the march of business could be better and more rapidly directed by one individual than by a commission; that, at the same time, he was persuaded that each of his colleagues was as capable and well qualified for it as he was.

“To the question whether Dr. Franz had not said that Count Armansperg had advised him against his project, or had endeavoured to prove to him that it was treasonable, the witness replied, ‘that Franz had not said a syllable of the kind with respect to the Count; on the contrary, *had declared that the Count (as it appeared) was more flattered than indignant at the whole proposal.*’

“From Trieste, Franz, however, wrote to a friend:—‘I reported the exasperation of the Greeks, and their inclination for a change in the Regency, and wherefore?—With the authorization of the Count, *to whom* I gave myself up particularly, from the beginning, as to a wise Mentor;’ and many more very remarkable things besides. At the end of the letter he says, for instance—‘*Au reste ! I have unequivocal proofs of a higher protection, which promises me an amelioration of my situation, though perhaps not an early one.*’ I possess a copy of this examination, and the original letter itself.

“We were charitable enough to think that the affair was thus ended. However, we learnt afterwards, that for some time previously to all this, Armansperg had courted Dr. Franz in a most remarkable manner; and notwithstanding that Nicolaïdes frequently declared that he had previously

been received as a friend in the Count's house, and that since the disclosure he had made, he had been, as it were, driven from it. Since that time, Count Armansperg was more violent in his abuse of Gustavus Wrede than was the case before. Nevertheless, we thought that our old friend would at least now be more prudent. We contradicted, therefore, the report, which was spreading more and more, of the participation of Count Armansperg in Dr. Franz's history, as well as the reports of dissensions in the Regency. It is remarkable that, in the above-mentioned paper, Franz himself already speaks of dissensions, and this at a time when we ourselves had no sort of suspicion of anything of the kind.

“Greiner alone then looked gloomily to the future, and referred, as the cause, to the sad experience *already made by him at Munich*. What he said to Abel and to me, and, if I mistake not, to Heydeck and to Baron d'Asch, can be certified by all of us on oath, and he will remember it himself. Unfortunately, the result proved he was in the right. Soon after followed the return of Greiner to Munich; and that this was not to be ascribed merely to considerations of health, no one can better testify than M. d'Abel, whom he endeavoured to persuade to return to Bavaria, and by whose family he was taken care of during his illness.

“§ 451.

“About the same time that Franz's conspiracy was discovered, and rendered abortive, the report went forth that Mr. Dawkins likewise said that Heydeck and I only impeded the Count, interfered with his wise regulations, and *had too aristocratic principles, whilst Armansperg was the only liberal man in the Regency*; that, to sum up

the whole, a government with three heads could not proceed, &c. &c. I was very far from believing this report, or even from inquiring further into it, knowing well how necessary it is in Greece to guard against intrigues of this description; but an explanation ensued between Mr. Dawkins and me, which he sought and which I wished for. I repeated to him, in compliance with his wishes, every conversation he was said to have held, not only generally, but each individually; but I added the assurance that I could put no faith in them, because I was too well acquainted with the good wishes of his government for the success of Greek affairs. Mr. Dawkins was at first embarrassed; he assured me, however, that all this was not so; he then became friendly and confidential, which for some time previously he had not been in the same degree as formerly; and I and my colleagues rejoiced in so open an explanation, and considered this affair likewise at an end; but men like Mr. Dawkins and Count Armansperg thought otherwise. These two masters, in what amongst people of distinction is expressed by the word intrigue, judged of us according to their own standard. They could not believe that confidence could be restored on our side. They formed, therefore, a more intimate alliance between themselves.

“Mr. Dawkins, from this time forward, presented all English travellers, and the newly-arrived English naval officers, to Count Armansperg alone. From this time we were treated as if we did not even exist. On the other hand, Mr. Dawkins was no longer treated by the Armansperg family as a diplomatist, but as a friend of the family.

* * * * *

He remarked to those who reminded him of his former

conversations, that it was necessary to shut one eye, and, for the sake of the Count, think all right, because he was the *only* one who, after the 1st of June, 1835, could govern Greece.

"I must here remark that, previously, Mr. Dawkins *used to make proposals of this kind to me; and, according to his plan, had selected me to be chancellor of the kingdom on King Otho's accession.* What he, from this time, wrote to his government, no man can know; but from what ensued, it is unfortunately too easy to guess. At least about this time, or rather before, a distinguished English diplomatist wrote to a friend at Nauplia, that, as he learns, Count Armansperg has a deciding voice in our councils, and that he is, in fact, the real Regent.

"In the mean time, Mr. Dawkins, as we heard, began to talk again at Nauplia of Heydeck, d'Abel, and me; *that we were incarnate aristocrats, and that the liberal Count* was only impeded by us; that three heads could not fit one hat; that Armansperg was the only talented man in the Regency; that his popularity was envied, and that therefore his plans were crossed; that the proposal he had already formed for going to Athens, in the autumn of 1833, was only opposed by us because we wished to undermine his health, whilst the Count *must* be preserved for Greece for the period after 1st June, 1835.

"These and similar conversations Mr. Dawkins is said to have held not only once, but always, however, tête-à-tête, (unter vier Augen) whilst the Countess in her saloon expressed herself in a similar manner, and the Count after his fashion joined the trio. Had any thing, for instance, been done by the Regency which had gained the applause of the Greeks, he would declare to his friends that it had been

done by him in spite of the opposition of his colleagues. On the other hand, if any law or regulation (which he had always agreed to) was spoken against in public, Count Armansperg affirmed that the others—the so-named majority—had done it, and had not listened to his remonstrances.

“For some time we endured these and similar speeches, at last it was officially recurred to at one of our sittings; the Count denied every thing and demanded proof; we could not bring forward our proofs, because we had learnt it, in fact, through friends whom we neither could nor would compromise. This kind of talk continued, and at the same time the increase of dissensions amongst the Regency was always more and more exaggerated, *whilst we at least knew nothing of them*; since the Count permitted us with a good grace to admonish him on the subject of his inactivity in financial matters, and gave his assent without any opposition to all regulations and laws proposed by his more active colleagues, without having ever once expressed an opinion against the proposed plan, and without ever confiding to us the grand views of which Mr. Dawkins spoke; views which remain a mystery to us even now. That all this is really as I have stated, the Protocols of the sittings of the Regency will testify, as well as all those who were present at them, namely, Heydeck, d’Abel, and myself; and, as long as Greiner took part in them in his turn, he can also affirm on oath never to have heard a word of these grand views. And has any thing of the kind become known in Greece, during Count Armansperg’s government from the 31st of July, 1834? Or does what has transpired, and has been proposed there up to this time, prove the existence and excellence of these grand views?

"As now according to report the Regency was disunited, and as it was said to impede the *liberal Count* in his eagle flight, we had three or four discussions on the subject during our sittings; for we always treated the President with the greatest frankness, and we had never even mentioned one word of all this to the young monarch, although I had the happiness to see His Majesty almost every day, and although latterly this was equally the case with M. d'Abel.

"But, after all our explanations, things only became rather worse than better, and thus was confirmed the just remark of Greiner, who, from the very commencement, had declared himself opposed to all such explanations.

"§ 452.

"As explanations alone did not assist us, we endeavoured to *steer clear of the evil* in another way. We believed that the intrigues of Mr. Dawkins were the principal cause of all these reports and proceedings, and we resolved therefore to take steps against him. Mr. Dawkins had, in the mean time, used the before-mentioned expressions to M. de Gasser,* the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires, and the latter, seeing the importance of the affair, and foreseeing the consequences that must result from such conduct, had offered himself to bear witness to it. The affair was therefore brought forward at a sitting appointed expressly for that purpose, and M. Gasser was brought in as a witness. It was now *unanimously resolved* to complain to Mr. Dawkins's government

* M. de Gasser was instructed by his Court to follow the policy of the Russian Envoy, but his duty to his Sovereign and to King Otho did not admit of his withholding from the Regency the danger in which they were placed.

of his conduct, and to solicit his recall, as an individual who only laboured to foment dissensions in the Regency, instead of supporting the new government in their difficult position, in a country torn by parties. A special mission was to be sent to London, and all this was to be *officially* made known to King Otho. Armansperg was completely of the same opinion with us in all this; and at the same time he was inexhaustible in the epithets he applied to Mr. Dawkins's conduct. At the same time, he offered to write himself to the Greek Minister, Michael Schinas, in order to make him acquainted also with his personal wish with respect to the pressing necessity of the removal of Mr. Dawkins.

"This letter was written; it was to be delivered by Michael Schinas to Lord Palmerston; but when, on a later occasion, we reverted to this point, the original letter had disappeared from the archives, and, apparently, nobody knew what was become of it. Our audience with the king now took place, and here Count Armansperg, in my presence and in that of Heydeck and d'Abel, painted the conduct of Mr. Dawkins in the blackest colours, and advised his Majesty to regulate his conduct towards this intriguer in such a manner as to show him that the king also fully agreed to these measures.

"Count Armansperg further declared that, with regard to his saloon, as it was open to every body, he regretted that he could not exclude Mr. Dawkins, but that he would behave to him in a more distant manner than hitherto; and as the Count, in a breach with the Russian ambassador at Munich, had already shown, on a suitable occasion, how a man can behave unpolitely with an appearance of politeness, he was now jealous to apply his theory to the case which had now occurred.

“But, how astounded was every one, when the Count, in spite of the dark colouring which he had given to the king, and during our sittings, drew more confidentially and intimately than ever towards the English Minister!—when Mr. Dawkins, from that time forward, received the most accurate knowledge of what now more frequently took place between us with regard to him; when he now came to be the most intimate friend in the Count’s family, and on public occasions never quitted the Countess’s side!—At the same time, however, during the sittings of the council, we alluded to the evidence of our ears and eyes, then the President was wholly innocent, and knew nothing of the matter.

“Mr. Dawkins, on his side, represented to his government that our application for his recall was a mere intrigue—and who would believe it?—as a Russian intrigue. The whole of us, one after the other, were gained over by Russia, and, mark the conclusion, on that account demanded his recall.* From this time forward all English travellers called us Russians.

* “I communicate here, amongst other things, only one despatch of 19th June, 1834, from London, and indeed an extract, without changing even the errors of language, or the choice expressions.

“ ‘ In deploring the discord which has manifested itself lately in the counsels of the Regency, *Lord Palmerston has told Count Jenison, that, according to letters which he had received from Greece,* this discord was only due to the preponderating influence of the Russian Cabinet, as also to the proceedings of M. Catacazy, who has managed, by dint of intrigues, to gain an ascendancy over a portion of the Regency. According to him, M. de Maurer and General Heydeck had become the dupes of the Russian envoy; and M. d’Abel had been the instrument which M. Catacazy had

"The same thing happened with the English Embassy at Constantinople; and Lord Palmerston, without paying attention to the facts and events that were passing, believed this, and even took steps against us at Munich. If, however, Mr. Dawkins or Lord Palmerston believe themselves to be calumniated, I pledge myself to publish the despatches on this subject which are in my possession. *

"§ 453.

"Whilst Mr. Dawkins busied himself in the manner I have described, Count Armansperg did not remain idle; he wrote to Munich letter after letter, sent couriers thither, of all of

made use of in order to accomplish his intrigues; that the English Cabinet, whilst agreeing that there had been reciprocal wrongs in the Regency, was decided in supporting Count Armansperg with all the weight of its power, if necessary, inasmuch as it had always had a high opinion of his qualities and his political views; and that, with the view to neutralize or to equalize the action of the two fractions of the Regency, it had thought to have found the means, in the removal from Greece of M. d'Abel, not because it thought him the author of this deplorable dissension, but because it had, he said, certain knowledge that the Russian agent made use of him as a docile instrument to foment a dissension, which would end in overthrowing the whole edifice which they had with such difficulty constructed. Lord Palmerston particularly insisted that Count Jenison should make the King of Bavaria understand, that, in expressing this wish relative to the removal of M. d'Abel, he was inclined to consider it the most efficacious remedy, and the one most adapted to prevent much mischief.' Hear!! The sparrows on the house-tops of Nauplia might have informed Lord Palmerston of the gross falsehood of all these accusations.

* This work has been two years in print, and no notice has been taken of it by any of the persons accused!

which we knew nothing, and Counsellor Kobell took care of the rest. The Bavarian newspapers were set to write against us, and to these, as every one at Munich knows, the notorious M. Hächer devoted his talents with the promise of employment afterwards in Greece.

"In this state of things came the first intelligence from London at the end of April, 1834, that Mr. Dawkins would not be re-called, and truly, *in expressions, perhaps, never yet seen in diplomatic communications*. A few days afterwards a grand fête took place on board the "Madagascar" frigate, to which Captain Lyons invited nobody but the Armansperg family and the king himself. Every inhabitant of Nauplia understood the meaning of this fête. Every body understood what the invitation to King Otho, at that particular moment, signified; and His Majesty had naturally no suspicion that he was to serve as a support to foreign intrigues.

"We felt that it was high time now to act, partly in order to shield the young monarch from similar intrigues, partly to render our own position towards the Greeks tenable, and lastly, partly to secure ourselves against the gradually discovered and earlier suspected mal-practices of Count Armansperg. We had, for instance, hitherto, never hinted to the king all the intrigues we had discovered, because we always hoped to defeat them by amicable means; and, on the other hand, we were unwilling to return intrigue with intrigue.

"We now, however, announced officially to Count Armansperg, our intention to lay before King Otho all that had passed. We demanded and obtained an audience; and from this time forward this excellent prince saw the Armansperg family no more. Our own position, however,

called for some more open step immediately; because, until now, we had been playing a most singular part. The truth is, as Count Armansperg, both at an early period, and afterwards, assented with the greatest readiness to all that happened in the Regency, we had always persisted in contradicting the reports spread abroad to the contrary. Nobody, however, after all this, could believe our assurances, in consequence of what passed apart from the sittings of the council, and when we were not present; and indeed we gradually acquired the conviction that it was now no longer possible to keep terms with Count Armansperg; and as no assistance came to us from Munich, we were ourselves compelled to render the President incapable of further mischief. His house became deserted, for few people had ever visited him from personal esteem.

“ § 454.

“It was on the 2nd of May that a meeting expressly convened for that purpose: the following resolutions amongst others were adopted. First of all, at my suggestion, all the Secretaries of the Regency, in preparing drafts and papers for signature, without distinction of persons, were to be instantaneously dismissed the service, if such drafts or documents did not designate the name of the Regency in their joint capacity, or the names of the ministers or offices to which they were attached.

“All the secretaries obeyed this order, with the exception of M. Solomé and M. Vellhof; the former, therefore, received his congé, and the latter resigned, excusing himself, however, verbally, on the ground that he had bound himself by a private agreement with Armansperg, to work for him alone. It is unnecessary to say that we had no pre-

vious knowledge of this private contract with an individual paid by the Regent.

“Another resolution adopted at my suggestion contained an order to all ministers and other diplomatic agents of the Regency abroad, as also to all their consuls, that, on pain of immediate dismissal, they should undertake no duties that should not be assigned to them by the Regency conjointly, or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs officially.

“At the further suggestion of General Heydeck, it was resolved to solicit the Bavarian government, to give directions to the General Director of the Posts at Munich, to send no more letters and packets to Greece to the personal address of Count Armansperg, as we found had been done before; but to send all matters belonging to the Regency, collectively, to the address of the Regency conjointly; private letters and packets, however, to the respective addresses of each. I must here further remark, that once, indeed, a letter to King Otho, which had been put into the post, fell into the hands of the Count, and thence found its way to its destination without our knowing how it could have happened.

“It was resolved upon, at the suggestion of General Heydeck, that, as the circumstances under which we had accorded to the President of the Regency out of the Greek chest a considerable sum in order to represent us had changed, this sum should be reduced to 28,800 drachms, and that the representation of the Regency on great occasions should be provided for by the Regency conjointly.

“As, however, the sum of 91,200 drachms abstracted from the President was far from being necessary for this purpose, a further resolution was adopted; that the re-

mainder of this not very large sum should be transferred to the civil list of the king.

“Count Armansperg agreed to all these resolutions, and at once signed them all. With regard, however, to the last point, viz., the money matter, he refused his assent, remarking, that, according to the convention, he laid claim to the higher amount. As, however, we knew nothing of any such contract, and could only consider the decree of the Regency, which had accorded to him, through the arbitration of M. Kobell, this enormous sum, as by no means binding on the Regency, the President remained silent, and asked leave to have the afternoon to consider of it.

“After having thought over the matter, probably consulting with a friend, the President maintained that the Regency was incompetent to such a resolution, referring to the instruction he had received, by which the king of Bavaria had transferred to him the task of Representation. The words of this instruction are as follows:

“The Presiding Member of the Regency has, in his relations with the accredited Ambassadors of Foreign Courts and other foreign agents, to *represent*, and to carry on, the verbal transactions of the Regency, with the reserve, however, of the right expressly secured to the Council of the Regency in its corporate capacity of coming to a decision thereupon.

“We, the remaining Members of the Regency, could not indeed, under such representation, understand either the culinary or festive expenses of the Count's private family. It was further objected, to Count Armansperg, that, if even the instruction alluded to had this meaning, still, however, in every case, the fixing of the sum for representation, as it was to come from the Greek coffers, depended on the

Regency; and for this express purpose we had indeed devoted to him a considerable sum. As, however, by such and similar reasoning, on which a long Protocol was drawn up, Count Armansperg neither could nor would be convinced, we proposed to him to refer the decision of the question to His Majesty the King of Bavaria, and to solicit from him, as the author of the instruction, the authentic interpretation of it.

“This mode of terminating the affair, adopted by us with the best intentions, was eagerly accepted by Count Armansperg. Without our knowing any thing about it, letter after letter was written; report followed report; and the faithful ‘Madagascar’ was despatched with them to Otranto with the utmost expedition.

“It was represented to the king of Bavaria, as I happen to know from a good source, that for a long time an opposition had been formed against the President, and that I had constituted myself chief of it, in order to succeed to the President’s chair. An opposition towards a person who gave his assent to every measure that had been adopted! And this, too, at a Council Board, at which the majority of votes decided! With regard, however, to my own plans of ambition, it is notorious, that I had previously declared to the Bavarian Chargé d’Affaires, that if, as then appeared probable, Count Armansperg should be recalled, I also should offer my resignation. I expressly entreated M. de Gasser to have the goodness to bring this to the knowledge of the Bavarian government. For, apart from consideration that I considered a separation of the Regency impossible, and in every case inexpedient, I did not wish to subject myself even to an appearance of intrigue. It was further remarked, that I also thought of introducing *Republican*

Institutions ; whilst the Count, *a prop of the monarchical principle*, had in vain endeavoured to oppose me !

“Setting aside the vulgar untruth of such an accusation, and the fact that, during the meetings of the Council, we had never discovered even the slightest traces of this, much however, of an opposite tendency ; such an assertion from the lips of Count Armansperg must naturally have struck us as the more important ; as the Count allowed me on the contrary to be stigmatized as an aristocrat, and as it was said, had given rise to the famous paragraph transferred from the ‘Minerva’ to the Allgemeine Zeitung, in which he is represented as the sole liberal Member of the Regency. Now, one only of the two can by possibility be true ; the falsehood must therefore have been disseminated either at Munich or at Nauplia.

“M. d’Abel did not receive a more favourable testimony ; but General Heydeck, in a most insidious manner, was represented as *the beguiled* ; and it was declared that the Count could not again meet me and M. d’Abel under the same roof, &c. &c. &c.

“Further, the step taken against Count Armansperg was represented in an entirely false point of view. Not under the appearance of a pure question of money, whether the Count was to receive 29,000 or 12,000 drachms from the Greek treasury ; but it was maintained and disseminated that the majority of the Regency had impeded the Count in his usefulness ; (hear, him who had impeded us !) that we had pushed him out of his office ; and that he actually ran danger of his life. Even after our return to Munich, we found these and other erroneous views spread abroad even in the highest quarters.

“Kobell was drawn into the interest of the Count—a man

who, at an earlier period, had shown an activity to fix the appointments for representation of Count Armandsparg.

“ Urged on by England, deceived as to the true history of the affair, the royal Bavarian government resolved on the recall of me and M. d’Abel. Kobell was my successor, and declared that day the happiest of his life. Greiner was made the successor of d’Abel.

“ But, before setting out, M. Kobell had taken the precaution to provide for the event of our refusing (by a reference to the Convention of May 7th, constituting the monarchy) to submit to the edict of recall, by securing to himself the power of employing compulsory means, and furnished himself, besides, with similar despatches from the Russian ambassador at Munich to the Russian mission in Nauplia.

“ The world then witnessed the extraordinary spectacle, that the successor of the man who had been denounced to the British government as too warm an adherent of Russia himself arrived at the hotel of the Russian minister in Greece, to eject, if necessary, the man denounced as a Russian, with Russian arms. Count Armandsparg, however, took care at least to see to the execution of the Russian despatches.

“ If M. Kobell (which, however, I do not believe, as I simply relate facts) should be of opinion that his honour is in any degree wounded by my assertion, I am ready to publish the despatch he brought, besides some other documents, by which the history of the Regency may be somewhat further elucidated.

“ On the 31st of July, 1834 (which, as if in bitter mockery of all our toils, happened to be the anniversary of the emancipation of the Greek Church), M. d’Abel and I received our

“ Kobell was drawn into the interest of the Count—a man

letter of recall, after having a few days previously acquired the knowledge of it.

“The blow came like lightning from a serene sky, for of the intrigues in foreign countries people in Nauplia had not known a word; and, with the exception of Count Arman-
sperg, no one had thought of the possibility of breaking up the Regency.

“King Otho was deeply affected when Count Arman-
sperg communicated to him our recall; and the words of the young monarch, in answer to the phrases of the Count, ran from mouth to mouth.

“The firm bearing of the youthful Prince, endowed with the highest qualities of the heart and head, his affectionate behaviour, and his tender farewell to the two members of the Regency who were recalled, were the sweetest recompense for all our labour and troubles—for the deep vexations to which we had been exposed.

“But the Greek people are also not ungrateful. There were some, indeed, who showed their joy at the event; for where is the country in which changes of government are not looked to with pleasure by many, in the hope of gain?

“But, on the other hand, there were expressions of the most honourable and most exalted sympathy for our fate, which were of themselves an indication of the purest and most dignified national character.

“When, as we have stated above, the abusive article inserted against us, at the instigation of Count Arman-
sperg, appeared in the journal, the ‘Minerva,’ the ‘Sauveur’ answered it with manly courage, and the ‘Minerva’ was trampled under foot in every coffee-house and place of public resort at Nauplia.

"When John Coletti, Rizo Neroulos, and other men of character, manifested their firm determination to send in their resignations, they could only be deterred from executing their purpose by our remark that their duty was to serve their king and country, and not private persons.

"When M. Lesuire, the minister of war, had prepared to adopt military measures against M. d'Abel and me, a Greek officer of gend'armes presented himself in order to ask permission, in the name of his corps, to arrest the minister of war himself, who had taken the oath to the Regency.

"And the answer of a noble Philhellene, Edward Masson, well known for his glorious exertions at the trial of Colocotroni, when advised by Count Armandsparg to see me no more, was worthy of a free and independent Briton.

"The consequences of our recall were, indeed, easy to be anticipated—by those, at least, who knew the relations, the country, the people, and our successors.

"Had it come only a few months later, Greece would then have had her tribunals, her schools of learning, her university, her academy of science, and, in general, a firmer foundation for future times.

"May the blessings of Heaven be still showered on Greece and its excellent monarch!"

The reader will have perceived, in the foregoing manifesto of M. de Maurer, for the accuracy of which he appeals to the testimony of his colleagues, that the Regency had, in November, 1833, sent a Chargé d'Affaires on a special

mission to England, to solicit the recal of the English Minister, on the grounds of his having fermented dissensions in their body. They subsequently entrusted this application to M. Tricoupi, informing him, that, if he was unsuccessful, he would himself be recalled; and, in consequence of the failure of M. Tricoupi, a third Envoy, Prince Caradja, was despatched to England to reiterate their appeal. By the Quadruple Convention, England had pledged herself to give the Regency all the support in her power, and that support they claimed from England against its own Representative.

The substance of the Manifesto amounts to this: that the English Minister had excited the disaffection of the Greeks against M. de Maurer and General Heydeck, for impeding the administration of Count Armansperg, whom Mr. Dawkins had exclusively supported.

The reply of Viscount Palmerston is the approval of Mr. Dawkins's conduct, and a "determination on the part of the Cabinet of England to support Count Armansperg with all the weight of its power, if necessary, inasmuch as it had always had a high opinion of his qualities

and his political views," and "that the other members of the Regency had been the dupes of the Russian Envoy."

Now, this very answer of Lord Palmerston at once explains the schism in the Regency. Setting aside any question of the views of the different members of the council, the exclusive support by England of a minority in a Regency of three members, the ruling power being vested in the majority, could lead to no other result than dissension in the council and anarchy in the country. It was an infringement of the Treaty, of the Protocols, of all the arrangements of the Alliance, and a violation of the constitution and of the independence of Greece. But what useful object could it effect? The support of England and of all the world to Count Armandsparg could not secure to him more than the one vote which he possessed in the council. If Viscount Palmerston had even specified any particular measures which England wished to see carried in the Regency, or had defended any specific views of Count Armandsparg as beneficial to Greece, his policy might be comprehensible; but blindly to give the entire weight of England's

support to any line of conduct which Count Armandsparg might choose to adopt, without even the cognizance of England, is a transaction without parallel. When has such a power ever yet been placed by the British government in the hands even of a British subject? The grounds of his lordship's departure from all the stipulations by which England was bound, were, that the British Cabinet "had always had a high opinion of the Count's qualities and his political views." Whence could those opinions have been derived? His lordship, on the faith of letters which he had received from Greece, ascribes the dissensions in the Regency to the predominating influence of the Russian Envoy over M. de Maurer, General Heydeck, and M. d'Abel; thus making out these gentlemen to be devoted to Russia.

These three members formed the majority of the Regency. They must, therefore, have impressed upon it its collective character. In that collective character was it, or was it not, favourable to Russia? Its acts had been the non-recognition of the Senate; the formation, in the first instance, of a ministry composed of

those individuals whom they imagined to be most favourably looked upon by England; and, in the second instance, of individuals who had been the ever-consistent opponents of Russian influence. They had emancipated the Greek Church from the supremacy of the Emperor, under whom it had been placed by Capodistrias. They had appealed for the recall of the Russian Envoy, for intriguing against them. They had promulgated the municipal law. But what need these acts? Was not the Russian faction under arrest, and was not their arrest in consequence of their hostility to the Regency? Had not the Act of Accusation, drawn up by the King's attorney-general, already appeared in the public papers? The spirit of the Regency cannot be questionable. These considerations were not secret. They were the public events which agitated the public mind, which had called forth address of thanks and congratulation from all parts of the country. What, then, was the character of the correspondent of Lord Palmerston? Was he a man ignorant of the most common events? Was he a man whose judgment or information entitled his opinion to any weight?

In order that the reader may understand the profound character of these intrigues, I subjoin the Act of Accusation against Colocotroni and Count Roma, which appeared in Greece early in April, and which might have enabled the stone-blind in England to judge of the policy of the Regency.

Act of Accusation.

In the year 1833, in the months of May, June, July, August, and in the beginning of September, a conspiracy was organized in Greece, having for its object to disturb public tranquillity, to overturn the internal security of the state, and to injure the independence of the nation.

The principal leaders of this conspiracy were D. Plapouta, surnamed Coliopulos, aged forty-five, and Theodore Colocotroni, aged sixty-four, both residing in the province of Caritena. The said leaders of the conspiracy made use of all possible machinations, fraudulent plottings, and intrigues; they had recourse to persuasion, to promises, to falsehood, in order to ensure success in their criminal projects, and in their schemes of high treason; to excite the subjects of His Majesty against the supreme authority of the state, to procure and bring about civil war, and to change the form of the existing government.

Towards the month of July, August, and in the beginning of September, the said D. Plapouta and Theodore Colocotroni, with the end of paralyzing the royal authority and of exciting civil war, engaged several chiefs of brigands to begin plundering—those brigands having formerly belonged to their service, such as

especially George Condovounissio and P. Balcana—by aiding and abetting them in their infamous practices by counsel and protection, and by furnishing them with ammunition and other necessities for the purpose. Those brigand chiefs, therefore, at the instigation of the above-named promoters, commenced plundering and marauding through various provinces of the state. At the same time, the aforesaid D. Plapouta and Theodore Colocotroni laboured for the said purpose, as well by themselves in person, as by the agency of their friends and others of their adherents well known throughout the Morea, and by different emissaries despatched into continental Greece, and especially by their organ, by name Constantine Dimitricopulos of Alonistena, their faithful envoy in Livadia, one of their followers and long attached to their service; and all their efforts tended to bring about civil war among the subjects of His Majesty, and in effect the intrigue had succeeded, and civil war was on the point of breaking out.

Towards the end of the month of July in the same year, the aforesaid D. Plapouta and Theodore Colocotroni, being traitors to the independence of the nation, signed, and engaged several of His Majesty's subjects to sign, at Tripolizza and in other places, a petition to a foreign power for the purpose of upsetting the high Regency—that is to say, the actual constitution of the state.

In the month of August of the same year, the Sieur Roma of Zante set out from Nauplia, and traversed Argos, Tripolizza, &c., and convoked in each of those towns assemblies of people, having for their object to upset the members of the Regency—that is to say, the changing of the forms of the actual government by means of a petition addressed to His Majesty the King of Bavaria.

The said Roma communicated his criminal project to D. Plapouta and T. Colocotroni—to the first at Argos, to the second at Tripolizza—and they not only did not give information thereof to the authorities, as it was their duty so to do, but to the utmost of their power gave them co-operation, in order to increase the number of persons necessary for the realization of this scheme.

Wherefore, the Attorney General accuses the said D. Plapouta and T. Colocotroni of having organized and directed a conspiracy, in the months of May, June, July, August, and in the beginning of September, last year, tending to disturb public tranquillity, and to excite the subjects of His Majesty to commit plunder, and to change the forms of the existing government. He accuses them, therefore, of having committed crimes declared, in the second article of paragraphs one * and three † of the collection of penal laws, sanctioned by the Assembly of Astros, and at this day in full vigour, and also declared in the second article of the Royal Ordinance, dated February 9th, 1833.

The Attorney General demands, therefore, that the aforesaid D. Plapouta and T. Colocotroni be condemned, conformably to the articles of the above-mentioned laws.

(Signed) E. Masson,
Attorney General.

SENTENCE.

Kingdom of Greece. Tribunal of Nauplia.

Judges—A. POLYZOIDES, President.

G. TERZETTI,

D. SOUTZO,

F. FRANGOULIS,

A. BOULGARIS.

PRONOUNCES,

1. Demetrius Plapouta and Theodore Colocotroni are con-

* § 1. "Whoever shall have maintained an understanding with Foreign Powers, in order to engage them to undertake war against our country, or shall have done any thing tending to destroy the national independence, and the form of the Government."

† § 3. "The principal chiefs of those who shall have taken up arms, or who shall have excited others to take up arms, with the view of producing civil war, or of carrying massacre, fire, brigandage, pillage, or devastation, into any of the provinces or communes, or who shall have formed conspiracies or factions, for the purpose of disturbing the public peace, shall be punished with death, as guilty of high treason."

demned in the penalty of death, as culpable of high treason, or of crimes provided against by the second article of paragraphs A and C of the collection of criminal laws, and by article two of the royal ordinance of February 9, (21,) 1833.

According to the same articles, they are also condemned in the expenses of the judges and witnesses, amounting to 1,047 drachms.

2. The present sentence shall be executed on the place of the Fortress of Nauplia.

3. The condemned are judged worthy of the royal clemency, which the tribunal reserves itself to implore from his Majesty the King.

4. The execution of the present sentence is reprieved until the result of the application for mercy is known.

5. The Attorney General will take care to see this sentence carried into effect.

6. A copy of this sentence is to be communicated to the Attorney General.

Made and published at Nauplia, on the 26th of May, 1834.

The President,

A. Bulgari,

D. K. Soutzo,

F. Frangoulis,

Zoto Reguipi, Registrar.

In order to throw more light on this conspiracy, I should observe, that, on the arrival in the bay of Nauplia of King Otho and the Regency on board his Majesty's ship "Madagascar," Colocotroni and the Senate assembled on board the flag-ship of the Russian admiral, and demanded

to be presented to the King. The reply of the Regency to their request was a non-recognition of the existence of the Senate, and an intimation to Colocotroni and his partizans, that the King would be happy to receive them in their turn, together with their fellow subjects. Upon this, Colocotroni immediately wrote a letter to Count Nesselrode, dated the 3d of February, and consequently even before the landing of the King, expressing his alarm at the consequences of the line of conduct adopted by the Regency, and appealing to the Emperor for support. It was not until the end of July that he received an answer, which determined him to the course which he should pursue. This remarkable document is as follows:—

subject are the more sincere, as, united to the Greek nation by the ties of a common religion, the Emperor will

(No. 1558.)

always devote to it his deepest solicitude.

“St. Petersburg, July 11, 1833.”

“Monsieur le Général,

“I have received with much pleasure the letter which you addressed to me, dated the 3d of February, and I hastened to lay it before the Emperor.

“His Imperial Majesty has deigned to regard with satisfaction the profound gratitude which you express to me, as well in your own name as in that of your countrymen, for the protection and support which Admiral Ricord and

Baron Ruckman (the Russian Resident) *have constantly afforded, according to his orders, to all the peaceful and good inhabitants of Greece, whilst opposing the progress of anarchy, to which your country was very nearly becoming a victim.*

“The Emperor had been painfully affected at the time by those disastrous events which he could not have anticipated, *after the continual and generous sacrifices* which, in concert with his Allies, he had lavished, in order to secure the independence and happiness of Greece. He flatters himself with the hope, that the *future* will entirely efface the sad impressions of the past, and that, instructed by the recent calamities, the Greeks of all classes and of all parties will have hastened to rally, with love and submission, round the throne of their young Sovereign.

“Called by Divine Providence to repair their evils, and to protect the development of the happiness of their country, *King Otho*, we feel certain, will know how to accomplish this noble vocation.

“*The wishes which his Imperial Majesty forms* on this subject are the more sincere, as, *united to the Greek nation by the ties of a common religious creed*, the Emperor will always devote to it his deepest solicitude.

“May the Greeks never forget, that their submission to the government which rules over them, *and their fidelity to the dogmas of their religion, that precious deposit which their ancestors have left them entire*, are altogether the condition and the guarantee of their national prosperity.

“As to what concerns yourself personally, *Monsieur le Général*, the Emperor *knows and appreciates your patriotism, as well as the loyalty of your character*; and he doubts not that you will find in the favour of *King Otho*, and in

the esteem of your countrymen, the recompense of your signal services.

"In offering to you this testimony of the sentiments which his Imperial Majesty is pleased to cherish towards you, as well as towards your nation, I cannot conclude, Monsieur le Général, without assuring you, that taking personally a lively interest in the happy issue of a combination which has for its object the independence and welfare of Greece, I shall rejoice in being able, on every occasion, and in conformity with the exalted wishes of the Emperor, my master, to concur in realizing his benevolent intentions with regard to your country.

"Be pleased to accept with this assurance that of my very distinguished consideration.

(Signed)

"NESSELRODE."

"A Son Excellence

"Monsieur le Général de Colocotroni,

"&c. &c. &c."

The existence of this letter was not known until several months after the imprisonment of Colocotroni, when, becoming alarmed for his life, he promised to give it up on the day of his trial. Yet it can hardly be imagined, that even with such encouragement as this the conspirators would have actually proceeded to extremities if they had not been joined by Count Roma, who informed them that Count Armanseperg himself was with them, and was desirous to procure the removal of his colleagues; and

that, furthermore, the Count was supported by the English Minister, the naval officer commanding on the station, and Lieutenant-general Sir Richard Church.

The necessary inference to them must have been, that England acted under the influence of Russia, even if suggestions to that effect had not been made with every appearance of truth, and indeed this representation to that effect was substantially true.

The embarrassment of the Regency on discovering the participation of Count Armansperg in this conspiracy, may easily be conceived. To have taken cognizance of it would have been to render the trial of Colocotroni impracticable, for how could Greeks be condemned for crimes in which the President of the Regency had himself participated!

Their position was equally difficult, whilst appealing for the recall of its agent, for sowing dissensions in their body, from the circumstance that Count Armansperg, siding with the English minister, in order to save himself, prevented their appeal from being unanimous, and therefore effective.

But they would probably have declined in the outset the honour of being the counsellors of King Otho, if they could have supposed it possible that a British statesman could have proclaimed that the best mode of supporting the throne of Greece was "*to equalize the action of two fractions of the Regency,*" by supporting *one member against two.*

The following passages from M. de Maurer's work will serve to illustrate the conduct of Count Armanberg from the first hour of his appointment:—

" § 273.

"Now, notwithstanding the clearness with which the position of each of us had been separately defined, the President either could not, or would not, understand his own.

"His pretensions in Greece became alarming, for, whilst he allowed us to administer public affairs, he repeatedly, in order to found his presidential authority, referred, in Greece, and in a Greek Regency, to the order of the Privy Council established in Bavaria! And he began, without any decree of the Regency, even partly to act against our decrees. It was on the proposal of granting a sum of money to the Archimandrite Arsenius, that I found myself obliged, on the 23rd of April, 1833, a short time after our arrival, to address to him the following letter:—

"Your Excellency transmitted to me yesterday, by M.

Stademan, the minute ; from which I am sorry to perceive that my proposal of the 4th instant has hitherto been left standing, or rather, to speak more clearly, has been communicated off-hand to M. Christides, as is proved by the report, dated the 11th instant, which says nothing about it. As I do not understand this mode of business, and as it is the more mortifying to the other Members of the Regency, since your Excellency has even thought fit to cut out my proposal, and to substitute another, and to send all this to me by M. Stademan, I have taken the liberty, as I consider our rights to be equal, to cut out your proposal ; and, out of respect towards you, not to send it to you through M. Stademan. But I must now insist the more on my earlier proposal, since I have myself already frequently returned an answer to M. Arsenius rejecting his claim, and resting my rejection on the decree of the Regency.

“ I take this opportunity of further observing, that the mutual relations of the Members of the Regency towards each other are by no means clear, and that there appear to prevail serious misunderstandings on this point. From a great deal that has passed on this occasion, and also previously, it would appear that your Excellency believes that you have the exclusive right of administering the money matters of the Regency, both verbally and in writing ; and it would appear, from your correspondence with foreign countries, that you imagine you alone are to represent the Sovereign. But as paragraph 6 of the instruction of the 22nd of July, 1832, accurately defines the rights of the Presiding Member, and only confers on him the right of verbal communications with the Diplomatic Body ; and as it was, and could be, as little the intention of his Bavarian Majesty as of the

Regency—as is proved by its decree in the first Protocol—to confer on you higher rights, I must request that you will have the goodness to make this a subject of conference at our first meeting.’ &c. &c. &c.

“In the sitting which followed this letter, the correspondence was by a decree of the Regency formally withdrawn from the President, and it was determined that all official orders should be transmitted, with the signature of the three Members of the Regency, to the different Ministers; and that they, as is usual in other monarchical states, should look to their execution. Nevertheless, as I have already remarked, ‘*the secret correspondence of the President did not cease.*’

“Previous to leaving Munich, Count Armansperg had persuaded us to allow him to carry on the correspondence with Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors in his own name, because it was inconvenient that all the Members of the Regency should sign such simple letters. It was, of course, understood, however, that a decree of the collective Regency was to precede every communication. We members of the Regency, who only looked to the fact and not to the name, suspecting nothing wrong in the proposals, consented, and even we ourselves gave a form for such letters.

“Count Armansperg, on the contrary, made use of this form, partly in order to make the world believe that he did every thing—that he, in reality, was the Regent; but, on the other hand, in order to write several letters, even from Munich, of which the other members of the Regency had no knowledge whatever; and, finally, in order that he might receive to his own personal address all the letters and packets for the Regency, and even the private correspondence of King Otho and our own private letters.

"On discovering this irregularity at Nauplia, we endeavoured to obviate it. The whole of the official correspondence and negotiations with the diplomatic body was handed to the respective departments, and the necessary orders were given to the latter by all the Members of the Regency collectively. Still the correspondence of Count Armandsparg *secretly* continued, but, as he himself explained to us at a subsequent sitting, it was carried on under the title of a *private correspondence*.

"§ 257. Without entering into all the details of the Count's conduct, I shall only cite three instances, in order to characterize his mode of acting.

"The Regency conceived it to be its duty to complain to the Russian Court of the Imperial Russian Envoy, M. de Catacazy, in consequence of his conduct on the occasion of the trial of Theodore Grivas, and on the emancipation of the Greek Church. Count Armandsparg was the individual who most eagerly of all urged the complaints, when one day M. Catacazy communicated to us the copy which had been transmitted to him of a letter addressed, at the very time, by Count Armandsparg to Count Nesselrode, which was entirely in favour of M. Catacazy, and of which, naturally enough, we had not the slightest knowledge. It was only some time after this incident became known in Nauplia, that Count Armandsparg confided his letter confidentially to M. von Abel, alone. General Heydeck and myself, however, have never since been able to receive it from his hands.

"When, in the year 1833, the removal of the French auxiliary troops from the Messenian fortresses was demanded by Foreign Powers, it was Count Armandsparg especially who

hurred the drawing up and sending off the well-known memoir so speedily that General Heydeck and I could only obtain a hasty glance of it. But scarcely had the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. de Gasser, reached Nauplia, when Count Armansperg imparted to him confidentially his lively regret with regard to it, and assured him that it had been composed entirely against his views.

"The great Philhellene, the Chevalier Eynard, in fine, had a claim on the Greek Government for an advance of two hundred thousand francs, made in 1831, on account of the guaranteed loan. He, therefore, addressed several petitions to the President of the Regency, and, when no decision ensued thereupon, he addressed himself to the King of Bavaria, who, upon this, recommended the affair of Eynard to Count Armansperg, in an autograph letter, in the most urgent manner.*

"Without acquainting the other Members of the Regency with any of these proceedings, and especially with the King of Bavaria's letter, the Count at length, on the 14th of May, 1834, circulated a paper, by which a representation of M. Eynard was recommended for a favourable answer to the Ministry of the Interior; at the same time, however, he sent a letter, dated the 17th of May, to M. Eynard, in which he endeavoured to throw the blame of the slight attention hitherto paid to his petition, in a certain degree, on the majority of the Regency, by assuring him that he was well

* The Chevalier Eynard, for whom these two hundred thousand francs were applied, was the instrument whom Capodistrias employed to dupe the Liberals of Europe to support him in overthrowing the Primates, or the English party in Greece.

this letter."

disposed towards him, but that the decision did not depend on him, but on the majority.*

* "With the exception of that communication to the Ministry of Finance, and a letter from Soutzo, of July, 1833, in favour of Eynard, I have seen nothing in Greece on this subject. With regard to the remarkable conduct of the Count above alluded to, I have, however, the written proofs in my hand, and I am ready to commit them to the press should M. Eynard have no objection. I have only to remark here, that the only petition of Eynard which was laid before us was dated the 18th of October, 1833 — that is to say, after the same must have already been six months in his hands, and twelve days after our public rupture with Count Armandsparg, on the 2nd of May; at a time, therefore, when, on account of the measures which we had adopted, we had no longer any desire to begin a new subject of disagreement with the President, since we were expecting the decision from Munich. It is further to be remarked that, a few days afterwards, on the 17th of May, Count Armandsparg wrote that remarkable letter to Eynard, in which he sought, in a certain degree, to throw the blame on his colleagues, and ended it with the following words. 'I ought, however, to observe to you, that, if I am President of the Regency, this character does not give me more power than is possessed by any other member of the Regency, and that the decisions are made collectively and according to the majority of votes.' Now, some months beforehand, on the 14th of March, 1834, he had written to Eynard as follows:—'I have received, through the kindness of the King of Bavaria, my august sovereign, your letter of the 10th, and I regret not to be able to write to you any thing positive with regard to its contents. I should have had the advantage of writing to you, if the position of affairs had changed, and if I had not hoped with certainty to see a speedy removal of those obstacles which have hitherto prevented the Regency from taking any definitive resolution with regard to your claim,' &c. We were all this time as ignorant of these alleged impediments and difficulties as we were, indeed, of this letter."

its protectors to the Morea and the Cyclades ; then extended to the gulfs of Volo and Arta ; its destiny presided over by a conclave of foreign ambassadors, seated in London, to be regulated by their agents in Greece ; then elevated into a monarchy under a German Prince, to be bound by a treaty of defensive alliance, with an inland state in the centre of the Germanic

Events in Greece, from the Change in the Regency till the Accession of King Otho, on the 1st of June, 1835. Falsification of the History of Greece.

It is singular to see, within a few years, this little country connecting itself with so many and such distinct interests, and passing through such a number of phases :—from being the most prosperous and most favoured province of Turkey, raised by foreign excitement and its own achievements into an independent and beligerent state ; transferred as a pashalik to the Viceroy of Egypt, to become an object of European interference ; rescued from the brink of destruction by foreign fleets, to fall under the tyranny of a Russian Satrap. Its frontiers, which in war extended to Macedonia, and embraced Scio, Samos, and Crete, restricted by

its protectors to the Morea and the Cyclades ; then extended to the gulfs of Volo and Arta ; its destiny presided over by a conclave of foreign ambassadors, seated in London, to be regulated by their agents in Greece ; then elevated into a monarchy under a German Prince, to be bound by a treaty, offensive and defensive, with an inland state in the centre of the Germanic Confederation.

One of the most extraordinary circumstances of its fate, is the having transferred this poor and tortured land to the King of Bavaria, to whom power was given to dispose of the Members of a Regency representing the sovereignty itself. The consequences of this transfer to a foreign potentate of the destinies of Greece, was necessarily the overthrow of its independence, and the triumph in Greece of rebellion, treason, and anarchy.

An English minister had contributed to overthrow the supreme power to which he was accredited, which England had pledged herself by treaty to support, and which she had previously exerted all her best energies, devoted her deepest attention, expended her blood, and

wasted her treasure, for the purpose of securing.

The members of the Regency, who had sought to effect, and in many respects had succeeded in effecting, improvements in the system of the government, according to the best estimate they were enabled to form of its interests and its character, had been denounced as Russian, while not one fact was produced to substantiate so grave an accusation; and which seemed merely to rest on the fact of the existence of animosity between them and Count Armansperg, who had always represented himself to the English minister, and who was also represented by the agency of Russia as the partizan of England. The whole history of Greece became thenceforward entirely falsified. All the acts of the majority, which deserved commendation, were now attributed to Count Armansperg; whilst all the discord and discontent, which arose from the conduct and the disgrace of the Russian party, was represented by Count Armansperg, and his English supporters, as the result and the evidence of the maladministration of his colleagues.

The voice of the nation, and of every leading individual, was hushed, for what Greek could venture to pronounce the truth, after two members of the Regency had been expelled by Russian bayonets, at the instigation of England, because they had presumed to make a representation to a British secretary of state.

As soon as Count Armandsparg obtained, by the installation of his new colleague, M. Koibell, a majority in the council, he cancelled all the charges which the Regency had brought against the English minister, and a new era commenced, in which the Count directed the affairs of Greece, supported by Russia, Bavaria, and England. Nevertheless, General Heydeck still continued a member of the Regency; and as the sentiments of King Otho, both personal and political, had been in harmony with those of M. de Maurer and M. d'Abel, it was feared that on his attaining his majority, on the 1st of June, 1835, he would avenge the treasonable intrigues by which the independence of his kingdom had been subverted.

One of the accusations brought against the majority was, that they were "republicans and

revolutionists ;” whilst Count Armansperg, “a prop of the monarchical system, had in vain endeavoured to oppose them.” It is a strange thing that Russian partizans should be accused of being republicans. This was the epithet invariably applied by Russia to all her adversaries in Greece. Sir Stratford Canning, and the whole of the Primates of Greece, had been denounced as republicans and revolutionists, because they had advocated municipal and representative rights. Coletti, and the National Assembly of Pronia, had been denounced as republicans and revolutionists, and are so still, because they advocated the claims of the English capitalists, and the rights of the “Greek state” to set apart the national lands, in order to establish the national credit ; and in the whole of the official documents of Russia, and of her party in Greece, may be traced their invariable advocacy of the “monarchical” principle.

Now, what had been the particular measures which Count Armansperg had in vain opposed ? According to the distribution of the labours of the Regency, M. von Maurer was charged with the affairs of the Judiciary, the Church, and the

National education, and M. d'Abel with the internal organization.

It will naturally strike the reader who has paid attention to the municipal organization of Greece under the Turks, that the first step of the Regency ought to have been the restoration of the municipal system, by which the internal police, the collection and assessment of the taxes, the care of the roads, the arbitration of local disputes, would have been entrusted to the people themselves, and that in this manner the expenditure and the labours of the general government would have been confined to the defence of the nation in its external relations, and the formation of its commercial and political ties with the independent nations of the world. But, as I have already mentioned, the military chieftains devoted to Russia, having under their command several thousand followers, held possession of the greater part of the Morea, and several portions of Roumelia and the municipal authorities of Capodistrias had been maintained by the Senate until the King's arrival. It was therefore impossible for the Regency to promulgate the municipal law so

long as the power of the Russian faction was predominant in the Morea, because the terror which Colocotroni and his brigand partizans had created in the villages would have enabled them to obtain the return of municipal functionaries devoted to the Russian interest. Thus, instead of the Regency being enabled to entrust the rural police to the villages themselves, it became necessary to organize a *gens d'armes*, and to defer the promulgation of the municipal law until a "national sense" had been created through the prevalence of order, and the gradual development of a feeling of confidence in the loyalty, patriotism, and independence of the Regency themselves. But, after the imprisonment of Colocotroni and his associates, they ventured to bring out the municipal law. This law, when carried to its fullest execution, would never have been equal to one tenth of the privileges granted by the Turkish system, but even this would have been a boon, and proved that the Regency could not be Russian. The municipal law was published at Nauplia in January, 1834. This was one of the measures of the majority, termed republican, which Count Armand, a

prop of the "monarchical principle," had vainly endeavoured to oppose in 1834.

But the organization of the courts of justice, the appointment of the judges and of the justices of the peace, and the promulgation of the penal code of Greece, had all emanated from M. de Maurer; his measures had been concerted with Coletti, Schinas, and Mr. Masson, the Attorney General, and were amongst those termed "Republican," which Count Armansperg had vainly opposed.

The events in Greece, from the time of M. de Maurer's removal in July, 1834, until the majority of the King on the 1st of June, 1835, may be briefly narrated. Mavrocordato, on finding that Lord Palmerston supported Mr. Dawkins against the Regency, joined Count Armansperg against them, and openly allied himself with the Russian party. He formed a new conspiracy in Messenia, and was sent out of the country on the Regency discovering their danger. This insurrection broke out immediately after M. de Maurer's departure, and placed Count Armansperg in the most embarrassing position. In his despair he appealed to Coletti, who, within

ten days, suppressed it. The Count appointed a commissioner to examine into the affair, instructing him, however, to address his reports, not to the Minister of the Interior, Coletti, but directly to himself. I have already shown that Zaïmi, from being the most devoted friend to the liberties of his country, had been compromised towards the constitutional party, and had been driven to become the most rancorous enemy of England. The result of the trial was the escape of the ringleaders, whilst the peasantry whom they had misled were executed.

As the period of the 1st of June, 1835, approached, when King Otho would attain his majority, the British Secretary of State became alarmed lest Count Armansperg should be disgraced; and, accordingly, every effort was directed to ensure his remaining in Greece. The King of Bavaria was instigated to exert his royal and paternal influence over his son; and the Bavarian Minister in England, Count Jenison, was sent from London, through Munich, to Athens, to convey to the young monarch the united wishes of England and Bavaria, that Count Armansperg should be retained, Cap-

tain Lyons, whose term of naval service had expired, was sent by Lord Palmerston with a letter from the King of England to King Otho, congratulating him on his accession, and expressing the same wishes that were conveyed by Count Jenison.

Whatever opinions and wishes the young monarch may have entertained, it was impossible for him to resist the united importunities of England and Bavaria in favour of Count Armandsparg, countenanced as it was by Russia, Austria, and France. Finding himself compelled to yield to his counsellors, he invested Count Armandsparg with the title and power of Arch-Chancellor of Greece; an office, the attributes of which were framed by Count Armandsparg himself. The power thus acquired by the Count raised him above the royal authority; since the King could not sign any paper which was not countersigned by the arch-chancellor, whilst the latter could sign any paper without the knowledge or participation of the monarch. No sooner was the Count master of his acts, than, in defiance of every sense of shame and of every dread of retribution, with a consciousness the most insulting in the blindness of England,

or the most degrading in the subserviency of her Representative, he granted a free pardon to his associates in guilt. The Primates of Greece, the Representatives of the national feeling, were stigmatized by Russia by the wonted epithets of anarchists and revolutionists; England re-echoing, by the voice of her Representative and the language of her documents, the insidious calumny, while, in the might of her delusion, she designated them—*"Russians."*

After the liberation of Colocotroni and Plapoutas, Coletti was dismissed from office, and sent in exile to Paris. In the organization of the tribunals, the old partizans of Capodistrias were selected, and the offices of the interior were gradually filled with their associates. Sir Edmund Lyons having succeeded in the object of his mission, and having been recommended by the King of Bavaria and King Otho, or, what was the same thing, by Count Armanseperg, to the King of England, as his future Representative at Athens, received from Lord Palmerston the appointment of Minister Plenipotentiary to the New Court, an appointment which contravened an ancient principle of the

Diplomatic Service of England, which is opposed to any similar recommendations emanating from Foreign Powers.

The past history of Greece would probably have never become known to the British public, and Greece herself would have been condemned to suffer in misery and in silence the effects of the systematic representation which has led to the ruin of her freedom and independence, had it not been for the fact that the British Secretary of State found it necessary, last year, to bring forward a Bill in Parliament to enable England to guarantee to Greece a third portion of the third instalment of the allied loan, "without the concurrence of her Allies." The motion was introduced at so late a period of the session, that it excited the distrust of all parties. In order to support his measure, Lord Palmerston laid before Parliament papers respecting Greek affairs; and when these were not deemed sufficient, he produced a fresh set, entitled "Additional Papers." The lateness of the session, and the difficulty of investigating within so short an interval such abstruse negotiations, rendered investigation impossible.

to the Regency, who were at length compelled, on this account, to withdraw from him the charge of the official correspondence. Nevertheless, M. de Maurer adds, "The secret correspondence of the President did not cease," and the Regency found themselves under the necessity, towards the end of 1833, "of handing

CHAPTER VII.

Misrepresentations laid before Parliament by Viscount Palmerston respecting the Financial, Civil, and Municipal Administration of Greece, from the arrival of King Otho in that country. Erroneousness of the Published Reports received from the Ministers of England accredited to Greece. Their coincidence with the statements of Russia. The Russian Party in Greece represented to England as the "National" Party, and supported by England against the Greek Nation.

IN the distribution of the labours of the Regency, the administration of the finances had been undertaken by Count Armandsparg; but it appears from M. de Maurer's work that the Count, notwithstanding the clearness with which the position of each member of the Regency had been defined, had felt himself at liberty to exercise an exclusive control over that department, without the participation of his colleagues, and that he was detected in carrying on a secret correspondence with foreign courts, unknown

to the Regency, who were at length compelled, on this account, to withdraw from him the charge of the official correspondence. Nevertheless, M. de Maurer adds, "The secret correspondence of the President did not cease," and the Regency found themselves under the necessity, towards the end of 1833, "of handing over the whole of the official correspondence, and negotiations with the diplomatic body, to the respective departments."

They at the same time found it necessary to recal the Greek envoy, Prince Soutzo, from Paris, and to appoint him to St. Petersburg; and their motive for this measure was their having discovered that he was the instrument of Count Pozzo di Borgo in deluding the French government. Soutzo was then sent to St. Petersburg, where, since his conduct was now known to the Regency, his presence would be comparatively harmless. He was the only representative whom Capodistrias had appointed to foreign courts, and his devotion to the President was well known in Greece.

The Regency were obliged, before they left Munich, to negotiate the first and second instal-

ments of the Greek loan; and as Paris was a central spot, where most of the foreign loans are contracted, and, moreover, as Prince Soutzo had for several years been favourably known to the British embassy at the French court, the Regency, ignorant of the previous history of Greece, entrusted him with this negotiation, which, according to the terms of the Convention of May the 7th, was a transaction simply requiring the notarial certificate of the Greek plenipotentiary. Nevertheless, Prince Soutzo, in concert with Count Pozzo di Borgo, and supported by the fact of the previous extinction of the rights of the English bondholders, through the declaration of the residents in Greece, (in which appeared the signature of the representative of England,) drew up a contract, to which the three allied powers became parties, by which Greece was made to assign the whole of its national lands, and all the property of the state, "*as an additional security,*" for the capital and interest of the loan; so that Lord Palmerston ratified and guaranteed the previous extinction of the claims of the British capitalists, to whom all

the national lands and the property of Greece were pledged in 1825.

Previously to entering into this extraordinary transaction, I shall present an analysis of the statements submitted last year by Viscount Palmerston to both houses of parliament.

It had been agreed upon by England, France, and Russia, in the Convention of May the 7th, 1832, that the loan was to be raised by instalments of twenty millions each. The first two instalments had already been raised, and the Greek government had repeatedly applied for the guarantee of the three powers to enable it to raise the third. Russia had started difficulties with regard to the mode of its application, insisting that it should be applied to the payment of the interest of the two first instalments. The British Secretary of State, taking another view of the question, brought a bill into parliament to enable England to guarantee her portion of the third instalment "without the concurrence of her allies." The papers presented to Parliament * contain the correspondence which passed on the subject; and the authorities to

* The reader will find these papers in the Appendix.

which His Lordship referred respecting the Greek finances were—

Prince Soutzo, Greek Envoy at Paris,

Mavrocordato, Minister of Finance in Greece,

Mr. Dawkins, British Minister in Greece,

Sir Edmund Lyons, Ditto,

M. Tricoupi, Greek Envoy in London,

Count Armansperg, President of the Regency,

Viscount Palmerston,

Count Pozzo di Borgo.

The first distinct affirmation made in the correspondence is, *that the first two instalments of the loan were consumed in 1833.*

Lord Palmerston, in his letter to Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated April 18, 1836, states,

“The present wants of Greece are not the less real *because certain sums were spent unnecessarily three years ago, or because certain expenditures which then took place have not been clearly explained in accounts recently made up by the Greek government.*”

In reply, Count Pozzo di Borgo writes, on the 21st of June,

“*It was after the Regency had made use of the two other instalments* that Prince Soutzo received, in 1833, the order to ask for the third and last instalment.

“*The three courts having, at that time, taken into con-*

sideration the inconsiderate use which the Greek government had made of *the two other instalments* which had been previously issued, resolved to suspend the issue of the third."

That this statement to the three courts made by Lord Palmerston, Prince Soutzo, and Count Pozzo di Borgo, was a palpable untruth, appears from the Greek budget for 1833 and 1834, sent by Mr. Dawkins to the Duke of Wellington, in which it is stated that the sum disposable in the Greek treasury, on the 1st of January, 1835, was 9,873,969,02 drs. £352,641. (See No. 1 in Appendix, additional papers.)

The second affirmation made by Viscount Palmerston, is, that "the expenditure of the Regency, which, in 1833, was 13,000,000 of drachms, had, in 1834, *under particular circumstances*, risen to 20,000,000 drachms." In answer to the Member for Cambridge, his lordship observed,* "The former lavish expenditure of the means supplied to Greece has been alluded to, but it must be remembered that the expenditure took place under an authority different from that which now governs the destinies of

* See Mirror of Parliament, p. 2590.

Greece. There was then a Regency of two persons; and if, under their government, the expenditure was lavish, it must be remembered that *they are not now any longer in that country.* The ministry which now governs Greece was then *in the minority.*"

His lordship's statement of the expenditure in the year 1834 rests upon the budget sent home by Mr. Dawkins, which is entirely controverted by an official budget subsequently laid before the Greek nation,* in which it appears that the expenditure in 1834 was only 14,987,298 drachms; so that the members of the Regency, whom the British secretary of state seems, with a strange pertinacity, to have misrepresented and persecuted as Russian, had first of all been calumniated for squandering the whole of the first and second instalments in 1833, and had again been stigmatized in 1834 for squandering £184,405, which had never been expended at all.

The next statements are the budget sent home by Sir Edmund Lyons for 1835, and that for the ensuing year, communicated to the conference by M. Tricoupi, on the 21st of November,

* See Appendix.

1835. The former is represented as merely "an approximative statement," although one would imagine that the receipts and expenditure up to that time might have been known. In the memoir respecting the expenditure of Greece and its financial prospects communicated to the Conference of London by the Greek Minister on the 21st of November, 1835 (page 34 of parliamentary papers), it is stated that the revenues of 1835 had *increased*: that, amongst other things, the tithes had increased by 2,245,884 drachms; and the taxes on cattle and pasturage by 1,817,000 drachms, in comparison with the year 1834. Now, if only these two items are added to the revenue for 1834, according to Count Armansperg's own calculation, the revenues for 1835 ought to have been 13,518,294 drachms. But we find, in the budget for 1835, under the head A, for interest and sinking fund, the sum of 2,707,123 drachms; now, as in the budget of 1834, this item was accounted for up to March, 1835, and as it appears from the Protocol of the Conference of London of April 16, 1836, that the Greek government did not pay the interest and

sinking fund after September 1, 1835, we must deduct from the sum of 2,707,123 drachms, which was the annual interest on the loan, one half. Thus we shall have, in addition to the revenue estimated by Count Armansperg, 1,353,561 drachms. This, added to 13,518,294, will give 14,871,855 drachms. But we must add also the 9,873,969 drachms,* which was the sum disposable on the 31st of December, 1834, *and which was not even alluded to in the budget sent home by Sir Edmund Lyons.* Thus we shall have, as the receipts of Greece, together with the sum in the treasury of Greece, in 1835,

	DRACHMS.
	24,745,824
Deduct Expenditure . .	16,851,070
Surplus	7,894,754

So that, so far from there having been, as is stated in Sir Edmund Lyons's budget, a deficit of 6,465,039 drachms, there must have been a *surplus* of more than that amount.

Having thus shown that the budget transmitted by Sir Edmund Lyons is controverted by the budget of Mr. Dawkins, and by the state-

* See fourth head in the Budget.

ments of M. Tricoupi, I come to the examination of the budget for 1836, laid before the conference by M. Tricoupi.

According to the statement presented by him to the Conference (see parliamentary papers), the taxes, and especially the tithes, were augmenting; so that we can hardly admit the revenue of Greece, for 1836, to be less than that assigned for 1835; viz. 14,871,855.

But we will take it, as estimated by M. Tricoupi, at only 11,312,445. He estimates the expenditure at 15,333,955, but in this charge he includes the sum of 4,020,480, as interest and sinking fund at 6 per cent, on loan of 60,000,000 of francs, or 67,008,000 drachms. Now not only had the third instalment not been raised, but, as we have seen above, the Greek government had ceased, in September, 1835, to pay the interest on the two first instalments:

		DRACHMS.
So that from	15,333,955	of expenditure
We must deduct	4,020,480	
	<u>11,313,475</u>	

which will leave, within a fraction, an exact balance between the receipts and expenditure,

a circumstance which is probably unparalleled in financial accounts, exhibiting a degree of proficiency in the financial department of Greece, without example in any country, of ancient or modern times.

M. Tricoupi, however, states that there is a deficit of 4,021,510, and that after asserting the revenue of 1836 to be 3,559,410 below the receipts of the previous year.

What, too, has become of the surplus of 7,894,754 drachms, in the treasury at the beginning of the year? Instead of this surplus, Count Armansperg had demanded and received a portion of the third instalment of the loan, had borrowed from the King of Bavaria 1,000,000 drachms, and he did not pay the interest on the two instalments of the loan after the 1st of September, 1835. What do such contradictions in matters of coin imply? Where is this money?

I have thus shown that the whole of the successive statements presented to parliament by the British Secretary of State of the finances of Greece from the arrival of King Otho, namely, the reports of Prince Soutzo, Mr. Dawkins, Sir Edmund Lyons, M. Tricoupi, and Count Ar-

mansperg, are every one of them contradictory to each other, and that the deduction drawn from them collectively by Viscount Palmerston is the reverse of the real result which, taken one with another, they present. His lordship affirmed that no man in his senses would state that Greece was not in need of succour, that there was a deficit in the treasury of more than 4,000,000 of francs, whilst his own documents showed that instead of a deficit, there was a surplus of more than 6,000,000 of francs. These accounts are in the aggregate a deeply-contrived fraud, the unravelling of which fortunately betrays the web of infamy which its artful combination is intended to conceal, and which it entirely veiled from the British senate. It stands to reason that the Regency in its corporate capacity could not have presented to the Conference of London false statements in 1833 and 1834, criminating themselves. The only presumption, therefore, is that those falsehoods were a part of the "secret correspondence" carried on by Count Armandsperg with Count Nesselrode and other foreign Secretaries of State with a view to defame and ruin his colleagues,

against whom he was simultaneously conspiring with Colocotroni and the Russian faction in Greece. But the singular point in this tissue of fraud is that although the five reports proceed from five different authorities, namely, the only two ministers England has had in Greece, and the only two envoys Greece has had in England and Count Armansperg, the whole of these five gentlemen appear to acquiesce in the correctness of their separate accounts, and, what is equally astounding, these accounts had been laboriously examined by Lord Palmerston and approved of by him as correct. In his letter to Count Pozzo di Borgo, dated June the 13th, 1836, His Lordship states that "the conference had at first doubted of the accuracy of the Greek accounts, but *all doubt upon this point has long since been removed.*"

According to M. de Maurer's work, Prince Soutzo was in reality sent to London to negotiate the third series of the loan, but also to arrange the recognition of the old English loans.

Now, the proceedings of Prince Soutzo in London, relative to this latter affair, were a

complete bar to England's claims.* But when Prince Soutzo came to England on this special mission, M. Tricoupi was secretary of state for foreign affairs in Greece, and his brother-in-law, Mavrocordato, was minister of the finances. Both of them, therefore, must have been acting in concert with Michael Soutzo, and have known of the untruth of the accusations made by him against the majority of the Regency of having squandered the two first instalments in 1833. The reader, on comparing these extraordinary proceedings of Tricoupi, Mavrocordato, and Count Armansperg, with the "fraudful plottings" of the brigand Colocotroni, will at once perceive the connection between the diplomatic and the Klephtic conspirators, and understand the nature

* The bondholders were furious; yet in M. de Maurer's work we find the following extract, which clearly proves the good intentions of the majority of the Regency.

"Negociations were also commenced with regard to the loans contracted in London in the years 1824 and 1825, on the principle that only that state which has paid its debts, however usuriously contracted, deserves credit, and because the constant aim of the first Regency was directed to settle the greatest difficulties which had arisen in earlier times, and to deliver over the country, if possible, free from debt, to its legitimate sovereign, on the 1st of June, 1835."

of the appeal of the Regency for the recal of Mr. Dawkins for supporting their President against them, and the grounds of their breaking up the administration of Tricoupi.

But Count Pozzo di Borgo himself, in his letter to Viscount Palmerston of the 21st of June, 1836, acknowledges that Count Armandsparg was friendly to Russia, and approves of M. de Maurer's dismissal. He states,

"Unhappily, the Regency, instead of coming to an understanding among themselves, presented a picture of internal division and disunion, which deprived the government of the consideration and the power that ought to cause it to be respected.

"In this state of things, His Majesty the King of Bavaria thought proper essentially to alter the composition of the above-mentioned Regency, by removing some of its members, *and by more strongly concentrating the power in those who remained in office.*

"This fact demonstrates a plain truth, namely, that the troubles of Greece arose from irregularities in the exercise of power and from the want of wisdom on the part of those who had to exercise it."

Would this have been Count Pozzo di Borgo's language if M. de Maurer had been the instrument on whom Russia calculated? Would Count Pozzo di Borgo have denounced a partizan

of Russia to the Conference of London, as having squandered the funds of Greece? Is it the habit of Russia to be foiled in this manner, and would M. Maurer in such a case have published his appeal to the world?

I have shown, at a former period, how Tricoupi and Zaïmi had been compromised towards the national representatives by conforming to the insidious invitation of Augustin Capodistrias.* I have further explained that under the influence of the Residents, Mavrocordato, Zographos, Tricoupi, and a minority in the national assembly at Pronia, had been induced to oppose the wishes of the assembly when they attempted to set apart the national lands to pay the debt due to England. The course they then took was the same in its object as that which was pursued by the Russian party under Colocotroni, who were marching in arms to upset the assembly. In the same manner, when Colocotroni and the Russian faction conspired, in the following year, against M. de Maurer, General Heydeck, and M. d'Abel, and addressed petitions to the King

* See M. Thiersch's letter to Sir Stratford Canning, Appendix.

of Bavaria and the Emperor of Russia against them, Count Armansperg, Mavrocordato, Tri-coupi, Zographos, Mr. Dawkins, and Prince Soutzo, had all united in a diplomatic combination to support the "good Christians," under the patronage of the Emperor, by inciting England against the administration of the majority of the Regency. The powerful means they employed for this end I have just exposed. It still remained for the British Secretary of State to represent the Russian party and the administration of Count Armansperg as *national*; and, accordingly, by a sleight-of-hand somewhat ingenious, the Count, after having made England ruin his colleagues for their national measures, by denouncing them as "*revolutionists and republicans*,"—(the epithet which Russia had invariably applied to her foes) actually claims the merit of having been himself the framer of those very measures; not, however, he it remarked, until after he had appointed functionaries, selected from the Russian party, to carry them into effect, thus placing in their hands the exclusive influence and benefits which his colleagues had intended to confer upon the nation.

Thus, after trampling down the fundamental institutions of Greece with the whole power of England, and subverting the government constituted by the treaty of May the 7th, raising at one moment an independent monarchy, then transferring the sovereignty to a foreign potentate, and surrounding the throne of King Otho with traitors, the British secretary of state again imposes on the King of England and the British parliament the belief that he has been all the while supporting a liberal and national administration in Greece.

Let us examine the despatches of the English representative in Greece, Sir Edmund Lyons. (See Appendix.)

No. 5.

Sir Edmund Lyons to Viscount Palmerston—Received

January 30, 1836.

Athens, January 3, 1836.

“Count d’Armanberg has always been the defender of whatever was national in the country, and has endeavoured to blend the elements of nationality with the interests of the crown, and thereby consolidate the throne. These principles are manifested very distinctly in the proclamation issued by the Regency on the king’s arrival in Greece, and more particularly in the municipal law of Greece. This law is founded on very liberal principles ; it places the administra-

tion of the affairs of the municipalities entirely in their own hands ; it establishes the principle of election on the most liberal and extended scale ; unites most happily the elements of democracy with those of aristocracy ; and secures to the throne at the same time that influence which the interests of the nation require. The carrying of this law into execution was delayed during the existence of the Regency, in consequence of the inexperience of the persons who were charged with it, and by many other causes ; but it has been pressed forward with vigour since the king assumed the reins of government."

Sir Edmund Lyons could hardly have been ignorant that no act of the Regency could pass in Greece without the signature of all the three members. To attribute, therefore, the proclamation issued on the landing of the King exclusively to Count Armand, is incorrect. The merit justly attributed by Sir Edmund Lyons to this act belongs to the majority.*

With regard to the municipal law, it is notorious that not only had Count Armand no hand in it, but that it formed the groundwork

* "On the very first day after the entrance of the king into his capital, when I had neither chair, table, pen, nor ink in the house, I wrote, with a pencil on the wall of my future study, the project of the first draft to the ministers, in which the first measures were proposed, and their opinion requested."—M. von Maurer, p. 77, vol. ii.

of his incitement of the King of Bavaria against his colleagues as revolutionists. The "national" principles of the Count may be judged of by this that after the expulsion of M. de Maurer he instituted a journal called the "National," which he supported with a salary of 1000 drachms a month, and in which he opened a campaign against Coletti, his own minister of the interior. The delay in carrying the municipal law into execution during the existence of the Regency arose from the fact that King Otho, General Heydeck, and Coletti, still guarded the constitutional liberties of Greece; but, when an English naval officer, who distinguished himself by the support of Count Armandsparg against his colleagues, had been made a knight of the Guelph for his services, and arrived at Athens with a special mission from England on the eve of King Otho's majority—when the Bavarian envoy at St. James's simultaneously appeared with the influence of England and Bavaria, urging the young prince to abide by the counsels of the President—when the whole of Mr. Dawkins's acts in Greece had been entirely approved of by his

government, and Sir Edmund Lyons was appointed to succeed him in the system he had pursued — when Coletti was dismissed—when Colocotroni, the correspondent of Count Nesselrode and the “friend of the Emperor,” was liberated from imprisonment, and rewarded for his crimes—when Russia’s enemies were sacrificed, her partizans invested with power, supported by the Arch-chancellor, by England, France, and Bavaria, and rewarded with the vast amount of money supplied by the alliance — *then*, as Sir Edmund Lyons justly observes, “the municipal law was pressed forward with vigour.” The result, as regarded the municipal elections, could only be favourable to the wishes of the Emperor, to whom “the internal organisation of Greece *was a vital question!*”

Sir Edmund Lyons states that the law secured to the throne that influence which the interests of the *nation* required.

Here we see the word *nation* again made use of instead of the Russian party. The interests which it required were the influence of the throne to support its partizans. That influence consisted in the power which it reserved to the

crown of nominating the whole of the internal police of the country; "of dissolving the municipal counsels," if they proved refractory; "of nominating the mayors and their assessors of the municipalities of the first and second class; and of conferring that power on the governors of the provinces with regard to the villages." These offices were, of course, distributed by Count Armansperg to the faction. "But," adds Sir Edmund Lyons, "the officers charged with the execution of the law were inexperienced during the time of the Regency." After Coletti's dismissal, they were replaced by the experienced police of Capodistrias.

Sir Edmund Lyons continues—

"Juries have been established in Greece *since the accession of his majesty*; they answer remarkably well, and are properly appreciated by the nation."

Had Sir E. Lyons ever read the Constitution of Træzene, drawn up in 1827, before the arrival of Capodistrias, of which the CXLIV. Art. is as follows?

"The Trial by Jury is adopted—the senate will establish it by a particular law."

Under the patriarchal institutions which the Greeks enjoyed under the Turks, all their differences were arranged amongst themselves, through the arbitration of the Demogerontes and the bishop, whose decisions were founded on the pandects of Justinian, which, singular to say, had always been observed in Greece. The most powerful means which Capodistrias possessed of breaking the independent spirit of the Greeks was the introduction of litigation. After instituting courts of law, he selected his judicial partizans from a faction in the Ionian Islands, which had always been inimical to British influence, and had never forgotten the transfer of those islands to the protectorate of England, from that of Russia. The greater part of these functionaries had rendered themselves so odious to the Greek nation that they had fled the country before the arrival of the king. The organization of the judiciary under the Regency was the work of M. de Maurer, assisted by M. Schinas and by Mr. Masson, a Scotch gentleman, who practised in the courts in modern Greek, and had become endeared to all classes by his eloquent and intrepid defence of George Mavromichæli, before a packed and incompetent

tribunal, as well as by the able manner in which he conducted, as the King's advocate, the prosecution of Colocotroni.

It was the intention of M. de Maurer to have established a legal hierarchy, consisting, as much as possible, of those only who, by their past conduct and actual position, afforded a sufficient guarantee that they loved the independence of their country beyond every other consideration. But the whole organization of the courts and the promulgation of the codes was interrupted by the recall of M. von Maurer; and no sooner had he quitted Greece than Mr. Masson was forced to resign, the counsel for the prisoners were promoted to high functions, and, out of 107 legal appointments, eighty were given to the Russian party. The Capodistrian lawyers returned to Greece; and in the ten tribunals of first instance, the two courts of appeal, and the court of cassation, the king's counsel in each, with only two exceptions, were selected by Count Armansperg from the Russian party.

Sir Edmund Lyons continues:

“The most important step towards the advancement of the nation is certainly the promulgation of the law of endowment

of Greek families, which appeared a very short time after the king assumed the direction of affairs. Up to the present moment there have been *but few landed proprietors in Greece*, with the exception of the Islands of the Archipelago. The object of this law is to secure to every Greek subject a portion of freehold landed property; thus the liberty of the people will be secured on the most solid foundation; private interests will become connected with general interests, and thence will emanate a constant desire for the conservation of good order and tranquillity. This is the surest and safest means of obtaining a *national representation*; it is this which will render it compatible with the maintenance of good order and tranquillity, and the consolidation of the throne."

It is a remarkable fact that almost the only measure of Count Armandsperg's which called forth any opinion from the Russian cabinet was this very law of endowment. Count Nesselrode brought forward, as an indispensable condition to the advance of the third instalment, a proposition of M. Catacazy, the Russian envoy in Greece, "that the three courts should interpose no obstacle to the measures which the Greek government *has already taken, or shall desire to take*, with a view to render the national lands productive, by making certain grants to *those Greek families* who have deserved well of their country."

Here, therefore, we have a most extraordinary

coincidence in the views of the diplomacy of two governments, avowedly pursuing different ends, and working through instruments devoted to one or other government. England's highest commendation is given to a measure which is to secure the tranquillity of Greece. Russia, whose clearness of vision no reasonable man can doubt, no less warmly commends the same measure; nay, this very measure emanated from Russian influence, and Russia declares that she would rather break up the alliance than abandon it. Sir Edmund Lyons continues,

"Another measure which has been adopted *since the majority of the king* is the formation of the council of state, which has all the characteristics of a senate. The council of state is composed entirely of Greeks who have distinguished themselves during the war of independence, and is consequently *strictly national*."

The council of state was instituted long before the majority of the king;* Sir Richard Church, the Prince of Maina, and some other members, having been appointed with salaries as counsellors of state in the time of M. de Maurer. That it had all the characteristics of a senate

* The King attained his majority on the 1st of June, 1835.

does not say much in favour of its independence. In the account of the expenditure sent home by Sir Edmund Lyons in the budget for 1835, the expense of the council is stated to be 52,800 drachms; and in 1836, when it had become strictly "national," after the majority and the accession of Colocotroni, the expense of maintaining it rose to 80,000 drachms.

But, to proceed with Sir Edmund Lyons's report.

"Count Armansperg has always shown particular respect for the nationality of the Greeks. As soon as he regained his influence in the Regency, the first detachment of Greek national troops was formed, and a special mark of confidence was shown them in putting them at the head of the expedition sent into Messenia."

I have already stated that Count Armansperg, in despair at finding that an insurrection, which he had instigated against his colleagues, turned, after their expulsion, inopportunately against himself, placed the whole power of the state in the hands of Coletti, who, by his ability and influence, quelled the insurrection in a week. I have sufficiently shown the artfulness by which the Arch-chancellor ascribed to himself the merit of the measures of others, to enable the reader

to estimate his share in the formation of a national force.

Sir Edmund Lyons continues,

"Pensions to the widows and orphans of those who fell in the revolution have been granted *since the majority*."

Under the head of pensions and aids to invalid widows and orphans we find 96,140 drachms expended in 1833, and 270,881 drachms in 1834, the two years previous to the majority.

"The difficulties in the way of public instruction have been removed *since the majority*."

As the organization of the schools took place under M. de Maurer and Abel, with the assent of Count Armansperg, it is to be supposed that the difficulties which had prevailed before the king's accession had arisen from Count Armansperg.

"The nation, which was before kept in utter ignorance of the expenditure, has had the budgets of 1835 and 1836 laid before it."

What! the Greek nation had, before the majority of King Otho, been kept in ignorance of its expenditure! What can such an assertion mean? The Greeks had been accustomed, from all time, to know every item of the expenditure

of the measures of others, to enable the reader

of their government.* In every village, burgh, town, or province, they audited their own public accounts. During the whole of the revolution, the most elaborate statements were made of every item of the expenditure; and even in the humiliated assembly of Argos, we have seen Capodistrias compelled to account for even the smallest fraction. Had Sir Edmund Lyons never heard of the budget of Capodistrias? Was he not the commanding officer on the Greek station at the time of the assembly?

A man in the slightest degree acquainted with Eastern habits could never have dreamt of a revolution existing in an Eastern country, and the people having arms in their hands without being acquainted with the state of their finances. In those countries, the public finances are reduced almost to a level and equality with domestic affairs, and these habits it is which have prevented any Eastern government from contracting debts. The exception in Greece is of European culture.

* Sir E. Lyons was six years on the station, and very industriously qualifying himself, during that period, for his subsequent diplomatic duties.

With regard to the budgets of 1835 and 1836 having been presented to the Greek nation, if those were the only statements laid before them by Count Armansperg, they must have deceived the Greek nation as much as they did the House of Commons, by concealing the disappearance of 7,894,754 drachms, and misrepresenting the real receipts of the treasury.

“A law has been enacted, after receiving the sanction of the council of state, for the establishment of a national bank. The impatience of the public (who are paying twenty-five and thirty per cent. interest for money) for this law to pass, in order that the bank might come into operation in the spring, was very great; but the council of state did its duty, and discussed it very fully in all its bearings.”

The idea of a national loan bank in Greece originated with Capodistrias. The history of the bank proposed by Count Armansperg is one of the most barefaced attempts at imposition that has ever been devised, and is only so far important as it shows that there is a stage in the progress of Hellenic nationalization under Russian influence, in which the influx of British capital might powerfully assist in controlling Greece and convulsing Turkey.

The despatches of Sir Edmund Lyons embrace his general view of the state of Greece. Here we have a tissue of mis-statements respecting the civil, municipal, and financial administration of the country, and those statements all directed to one evident end—the attributing to Count Armansperg the acts of the Regency which appeared to be popular and beneficial, and which is effected by the simple process of transposing the date of their origin ; whilst the secret is withheld that those measures had been enacted for the benefit of the nation, at a time when the *Russian party was annihilated*, and that their promulgation had been expressly delayed until after the ejection of M. de Maurer and the departure of General Heydeck, when the Russian party was invested with the confidence of Europe, and adopted by the opinion of foreign people and governments, as the *national* representatives of Greece.

These misrepresentations are a continuation of those which had been imposed on the British government by the Resident who preceded Sir Edmund Lyons. Thus the whole of the diplomatic reports from Greece during the last

nine years are a perversion of the true history of that country, the result of which has been the committal of England to overthrow, or convert, to the interest of Russia, "the secret and open adversaries of that power," in other words, those leading Greeks who were devoted to the independence of their country, and every one of those national governments constituted by legal forms which England had promised and pretended to support.

But the mischief is not limited to this. France, whilst seeing her powerful neighbour pertinaciously persisting in this infatuated career, has been impeded by England in every attempt to oppose the antinational progress of the Russian interest. Thus we see, throughout the whole period, elucidated in the works of M. Thiersch and von Maurer, the French Resident continually overborne by Mr. Dawkins, whilst endeavouring to support the Greek nation, and the same course is continued under Sir Edmund Lyons.

The French government had seen through the character of Count Armandsperg, and declared that it would only guarantee the third instalment on the following conditions :

1. The dismissal from Greece of all the Bavarians, civil as well as military.

2. The formation of a national government and a well organized system of finance.

3. The granting of the necessary institutions to the country.

It is therefore evident that the French government did not look on the government as “national”—on the finances as “well organized”—or on the nation as in possession of “necessary institutions.” The representations of the French Resident must therefore have been diametrically opposed to those of the English minister.

Now, in looking to Sir Edmund Lyons’s despatches, we find him contending with a gentleman—of course the French envoy—in the following terms:—

“Athens, 24th March, 1836.

“— dwelt particularly on what he called the impoverished state of the peasantry, and the presence of the Bavarian troops, throwing the whole blame of every thing on Count d’Armansperg, of whom he spoke with great acrimony, and then asked me how I could expect an advance of money to be squandered by the chancellor and to be eaten up by the Bavarians? I observed to him, that the council of state, by the chancellor’s desire, had been for the last

two months scrutinizing the budget, that all the ministers and all the heads of departments had been examined by them, that every avenue of information was open to them, and every facility afforded to them. *I told him* that it was the *first time I had ever heard Count d'Armansperg accused of squandering the money of the state*; that, on the contrary, *his reform of abuses* was one of the great causes of his popularity with the nation at large, and the principal cause of the hatred and opposition of many individuals. *I denied* that the peasantry were impoverished, or that they wore sheepskins. (!) That as to the Bavarian troops, *they were sent here in consequence of an act of the conference*, and that *Count d'Armansperg had not the means of sending them back* if he had wished to do so, and that I should be very happy to discuss with him, whenever he pleased, the propriety of sending them away, *en masse*, at this moment."

It is almost superfluous to offer a comment on such representations as these. The reader has just before seen Count Armansperg described as having "always been the defender of whatever was national;" of what abuses could he then have been the reformer, but of those to which, as a third member of the Regency, he had invariably lent his sanction, and affixed his signature? It seems, from Sir Edmund Lyons's statements, that, notwithstanding the recal of M. de Maurer and the appointment of M. Kobell as a more pliable instrument of Count Armans-

perg, that the Count was still subject to "impediments," that all this time his greatness was "a ripening," and that it was only *since the majority* of King Otho, since the appointment of Sir Edmund Lyons, that his "grand views" had been carried into effect.

The system of instructing Her Majesty's representatives to support any particular statesmen abroad, whether it be at Lisbon, Madrid, or Athens, is an infringement of the prerogative, of which Greece shows the fatal consequences. Both of the representatives of England in Greece, instructed as they have been to support Capodistrias and Armansperg, have accordingly represented what those functionaries have told them as true. Thus they have been the representatives of foreign powers and of foreign interests, instead of the interests of their country. A notary public would answer this purpose at one-tenth of the expence. In the mean time, every act of Count Capodistrias and Count Armansperg, however unpopular, was represented by them to the Greeks as supported and approved of by England; so that England has been made answerable in Greece for the acts of

its oppressors; and, at the same time, has been wholly deluded by its own agents as to the history of Greece.

Having thus exposed the misrepresentations of Viscount Palmerston to the House of Commons, it remains for me to point out the character and the consequences of His Lordship's last act of legislation respecting Greece. His measure bore the stamp of that decision which has characterized the whole of his policy in Greece. The act itself separated England, after ten years' connexion with Russia and France, from further concurrence with her allies; and the reader will naturally imagine that the British government, awakened to a perception of the folly of having so long allied itself with Russia, had at length determined to defend the interests of England alone.

CHAPTER VIII.

Viscount Palmerston sanctions the Extinction of the claims of the British Merchants in Greece to the amount of £2,800,000.

Extinguishes a further Claim of England to £533,333.

Russia asserts her Determination to appropriate to the liquidation of her own debt the National Property of Greece.

THE joint approval by Viscount Palmerston and Count Pozzo di Borgo of the accounts laid before Parliament, from Prince Soutzo, Mr. Dawkins, Sir Edmund Lyons, M. Tricoupi, Mavrocordato, and Count Armansperg, shows the identity of the opinions of England and Russia respecting the affairs of Greece since the year 1832. But the manifesto of the majority of the Regency proves that the interests and the diplomacy of the two countries in Greece had been conflicting; that England had supported Count Armansperg, one member of the Regency, with the whole weight of her power, *against* the majority of the Regency, *because that majority was under the influence of M. Catacazy, the Russian Envoy.*

But the identity of the accusations of the agents of the two powers against the majority of the Regency demonstrates incontrovertibly, either that Russia had all along supported the interests of England, or that England had all along supported the views of Russia. The policy of England must, therefore, have been completely successful, or have been the entire sacrifice of her interests. Either Russia must have tamely acquiesced in the expulsion of her friends, and accepted, without murmur, the consequences of defeat; or England has been mistaken in her protégé, and has not been informed of the true character of his acts, or, if so informed, she has made a different estimate from Russia of their nature and effects. Lord Palmerston thinks he has overreached Russia — a state of mind very desirable to Russia, and which, indeed, must be a main object of her policy—because, unless the English minister was excited in the game, he would not have exerted the energy by which she has profited, nor thrown the stakes which she has won.

An examination of the papers laid before Parliament will enable the reader to satisfy his mind on this question.

The basis of the arrangement proposed by Russia, (as emanating from her Envoy in Greece), for the issue of the third instalment of the Greek loan, is as follows :

COMMUNICATION MADE BY COUNT POZZO DI BORGO TO

THE CONFERENCE ON JUNE 3, 1836.

PROPOSITION OF THE RUSSIAN ENVOY IN GREECE.

Basis of the Arrangement to be proposed for the issue of the Third Instalment of the Greek Loan.

1st. The third instalment of the Loan shall be raised in the manner and according to the conditions hereinafter pointed out.

The funds accruing from the said instalment shall be appropriated *exclusively* to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the Loan during the next five or six years.

For this purpose, the respective Commissioners of the guaranteeing Powers shall be authorized, previously to the half-yearly payments becoming due in March and September, to sign and deposit in the hands of Messrs. Rothschild, at Paris, the number of inscriptions which will be necessary to discharge the interest and sinking fund of the two first instalments already raised, adding thereto successively the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the portions of the third, in proportion to their issue.

The respective Commissioners shall be guided in this respect by the rule established by the Protocol of the 16th April last, relative to the payment of the interest due in the month of March of the present year.

The bankers shall deliver to the Greek Government a discharge for the interest and sinking fund, at the expiration of every six months.

This operation shall be continued for the number of years, of which the period shall be regulated by an accurate calculation as

to when the funds accruing from the third series shall become exhausted.

2d. In return for the facilities given by the guaranteeing Powers to the above arrangement, and in order to afford them *all* the securities which the Convention of the 7th May, 1832, has stipulated in their favour, with a view to *ensure the regular payment of the loan*, the Greek Government formally engages itself, on its part, to consider *the national domains and their revenues* as a general mortgage for the loan of sixty millions, during the *thirty-six years* fixed for the liquidation of that debt; and promises that before the expiration of that term *no other loan shall be contracted upon the mortgage of the same domains, whether with foreign capitalists, or with a loan bank established in the country.*

3rd. The three Courts shall interpose no obstacle to the measures which *the Greek Government has already taken or shall desire to take*, with a view to *render the above-mentioned domains productive*, either by inviting native or foreign colonists, or by making certain grants to *those Greek families who have deserved well of their country.* But it is expressly understood that the revenues which the Government shall secure to itself by all these arrangements, shall be especially appropriated to the *payment of the loan*, dating from the day on which the funds of the third instalment shall be exhausted.

4th. The preceding engagement shall not in any way prejudice the twelfth Article of the Convention of the 7th May, purporting that the first revenues and effective receipts of the Greek Treasury shall always be considered as appropriated, above all things, to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the loan, in case of the receipts proceeding from the national domains being insufficient, or of there being any delay in their collection.

From the third article of this document, it appears that the acts of Count Armansperg up to June, 1836, had been guided by the Russian

Envoy: Count Pozzo di Borgo desires to stipulate "that the three Powers shall interpose no obstacle to the measures which the Greek Government *has already taken or shall desire to take*;" thus proving that Russia was equally confident of her hold on any *future Government*, "with a view to render the above-mentioned domains productive, either by inviting native or foreign colonists, or by making certain grants to those Greek families who have deserved well of their country."

Who could those families be, but the faction whom Russia had all along supported as her exclusive party? * and yet this measure is stated by Sir Edmund Lyons "to have been the most important step towards the advancement of the nation."

In order to appreciate the wonderful influence

* See Count Nesselrode's Letter to His Excellency General de Colocotroni, of July 11, 1833.

"His Imperial Majesty has deigned to view with satisfaction the profound gratitude that you express to me, as well in your name as in that of your countrymen, for the *protection and support* which Admiral Ricord and M. Ruckman have constantly lent, in conformity with his orders, to all the peaceful and good inhabitants of Greece, whilst opposing the progress of anarchy, to which your country had nearly fallen a prey."

which Russia has exercised over the minutest details of this extraordinary drama, I request the reader to look back to the proceedings of the assembly of Argos in 1829, when Capodistrias proposed to raise a loan in Russia, in order to pay off the debt to England, stating *that in forty-two years Greece would thus be delivered from all her debts.* In the second paragraph of M. Catacazy's proposal, which was probably drawn up in 1835, it is stated that *thirty-six years* were fixed for the liquidation of the guaranteed debt; thus both the proposal of Count Capodistrias in 1829, and that of M. Catacazy in 1835, fix on the year 1871 as the period when Greece would be liberated from all her burdens. I am not prepared to offer a solution of this enigma.

To enable the reader to understand the views of Viscount Palmerston and the Russian Cabinet, I subjoin the twelfth article of the Convention of May the 7th, 1832:

ARTICLE XII.

In execution of the stipulations of the Protocol of the 20th of February, 1830, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias engages to guarantee, and their Majesties the King of the French,

and the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, engage to recommend, the former to his Chambers, the latter to his Parliament, to enable their Majesties to guarantee, on the following conditions, a loan to be contracted by the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece.

1°. The principal of the loan to be contracted under the guarantee of the three Powers shall not exceed a total amount of sixty millions of francs.

2°. The said loan shall be raised by instalments of twenty million of francs each.

3°. For the present, the first instalment only shall be raised, and the three Courts shall each become responsible for the payment of one third of the annual amount of the interest and sinking fund of the said instalment.

4°. The second and the third instalments of the said loan may also be raised, according to the necessities of the Greek State, after previous agreement between the three Courts and His Majesty the King of Greece.

5°. In the event of the second and third instalments of the above-mentioned loan being raised in consequence of such an agreement, the three Courts shall each become responsible for the payment of one-third of the annual amount of the interest and sinking fund of these two instalments, as well as of the first.

6°. The Sovereign of Greece and the Greek State shall be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of such instalments of the loan as may have been raised under the guarantee of the three Courts, the first revenues of the State, in such a manner that the actual receipts of the Greek Treasury shall be devoted, *first of all*, to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for any other purpose, until those payments on account of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three Courts, shall have been completely secured for the current year.

The diplomatic Representatives of the three Courts in Greece shall be especially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the last-mentioned stipulation.

The proposition of M. Catacazy is the point on which the British Secretary of State and Count Nesselrode are at length *ostensibly* at issue.

Lord Palmerston states "that the Russian proposal is unexpected, inapplicable to the condition of Greece, inconsistent with the policy hitherto pursued by the three powers, and in diametrical contradiction with the stipulations of the Treaty of 1832."

The Russian Minister, in reply, cites *the terms of the contract of the loan*, the execution of which was guaranteed by Viscount Palmerston, thus proving to his Lordship that he had himself acted in diametrical contradiction with the stipulations of the Treaty of 1832.

This contract of the loan is the document which I have before alluded to as having been drawn up by Prince Soutzo at Paris, and in which Lord Palmerston irretrievably sacrificed the claims of his countrymen to the amount of £2,800,000, by applying an act of Parliament to

a purpose wholly at variance with its provisions.

The bond, commonly called the Anglo-Greek bond, guaranteed by England, is the most remarkable diplomatic document of the age.* It is binding upon England, both in peace and in war. It commences as follows:

"Greek Loan, guaranteed by England, France, and Russia. Series A., under the special guarantee of England. Bond payable to the Bearer. Capital, £40 sterling. Annual interest, £2 sterling.

"The holder of this bond is entitled to the annual interest of two pounds sterling, or fifty-one francs twenty centimes, payable half-yearly, on the 1st of March, and the 1st of September.

"This interest is guaranteed by England, according to the engagement contracted by that power. It is payable at the option of the holder, in London in sterling, or in Paris in francs, at the places named in the Coupons, in conformity with the contract of the loan of 60,000,000 francs, or £2,343,750 sterling, entered into by the Greek Government, and Messrs. de Rothschild, Brothers, on the 12th of January, 1833."

In the body of the bond are inserted the act of Parliament of the 16th of August, 1832, to enable His Majesty to carry into effect the Con-

* See Appendix.

vention of May the 7th, 1832; the French Law of the 14th of June, 1833; and the Ukase to the administrative Senate of Russia, dated St. Petersburg, March the 26th, 1833. Then follows an "extract from the contract of the Loan," in which is the following paragraph:

"Independently of the guarantee given for the present loan, by the three Great Powers, the Greek government assigns, as an additional security, *all the goods and revenues of the state, and especially the entire produce of the taxes.* The Greek government hereby engages to consider the present debt as inviolable, *rejects, from this moment forward, all exceptions and oppositions,* and binds itself never to oppose the claims of any bearers of bonds of the present loan, on account of their being foreigners, or subjects of any Power at war with Greece."

This is succeeded by the certificate of Prince Soutzo as follows:

"By an ordinance of the 16th, (28th) of February, 1833, the Royal Regency of Greece, in the name of H. M. the King of Greece, has duly approved and ratified the contract for a loan, of which the preceding is an extract, and promises to observe, and cause to be exactly observed, the conditions thereof. Paris, March 1, 1833. *

"L'Envoyé Ext. Ministre Plenipotentiaire de S. M. le Roi de Greece à la cour de France.—P. DE SOUTZO."

* Thus the Regency in Greece had ratified the day before a contract signed by Soutzo at Paris the day after.

The last certificate added to the above conditions is as follows:

"The undersigned hereby certifies that the present debenture* appertaining to the loan contracted by the Government of Greece, conformably to the conditions stipulated in the Convention of the 7th of May, 1832, forms a part of the twenty millions of francs, guaranteed by Great Britain, pursuant to the act of Parliament of the 16th of August, 1832, and that in default of payment by the Greek Government the same will be paid by the British Government.

Paris, the 1st of September, 1833.

"The Commissioner specially appointed by His Majesty,
(Signed) A. Aston." †

Here we have a diplomatic commissioner, specially appointed by the king of England to guarantee the execution of a contract on the part of Greece, by which that country is bound

* "You modern wits, should each man bring his claim,
Have desperate debentures on your fame;
And little would be left you, I'm afraid,
If all your debts to Greece and Rome were paid."

Swift.

† The signature of M. Aston to this bond is not the signature of that gentleman as the Secretary of Embassy at Paris, and therefore an act for which he is in the slightest degree responsible, but it is the act of the British Government, to perform which they found it necessary to appoint a special Commissioner, with a warrant from the king.

to assign "all the goods and revenues of the State, and especially the entire produce of the taxes," to the payment of a Greek debt, for which England, Russia, and France are liable in the event of her not paying it, and by which Greece "rejects all exceptions and oppositions," which may be made to such a transaction by any other parties whomsoever.

Now who are the parties injured by this arrangement? They are the English bondholders of the loans of 1824 and 1825, for the payment of whose debentures the Greek Government had eight years before appropriated all the revenues of Greece, and "pledged the whole of the National property."*

* *Greek Loan for Ten Million Spanish Dollars, or £2,000,000.*

The annuities shall be payable both in time of peace and in time of war, and, without distinction, to all Proprietors, whether they belong to a friendly or a hostile nation.

To the payment of the annuities are appropriated all the Revenues of Greece.

The whole of the National Property of Greece is hereby pledged to the holders of all obligations granted in virtue of this Loan, until the whole amount of Capital which such obligations represent shall be discharged, and to effect which a sinking fund will be provided.

This obligation is issued by virtue of the Legislative and Executive Bodies of Greece authorizing the completion of this

These are the claims which Mr. Dawkins opposed at the Congress of Pronia, arraying Tri-coupi, Mavrocordato, Zographo, Zaimi, against Coletti, Condourioti, Panouzzo Notaras, and Petro Bey, thus transferring to the interest of Russia one half of the Greek Primate devoted to the interests of England and of Greece, and

Loan, of which the Decrees, together with the translations, are hereunto annexed.

London, the 15th of February, 1825.

By the Commissioners acting by virtue of the above Powers,

The Signature of Joannes Orlando,

Andreas Luriottis.

The above Signatures are certified to be true,

J. and S. Ricardo.

Second Period. Act 35 of the code of the laws. Provisional Government of Greece.

As the war occasions and requires very heavy disbursements in money, and as the Greek Nation, in seeking its independence, has occasion for other pecuniary means in order to enable her to consolidate her political existence, and as the present rents, together with the quantity of money borrowed, are not sufficient, in comparison with the expenses and the wants of Greece, her Legislative Body has decreed,

First, That there shall be negotiated a loan for the sum of fifteen millions of Spanish dollars.

Second, That the Loan shall be guaranteed by bonds of equal amount on the National Property.

Third, That this Loan shall be solely employed in the present wants of the nation.

Fourth, That the Executive Body be charged with the nego-

preparing them for the part which they subsequently played in conjunction with Prince Soutzo, Count Armansperg, Sir Edmund Lyons, and Count Pozzo di Borgo, in transmitting mis-statements to the British Government.

The reader will perceive that neither England nor Greece can annul this extraordinary treaty

and in ordering the execution of the above articles in the most suitable manner.

Napoli di Romania, the 31st July, 1824.

Signed, Brittenos Theodoritos, Vice-President,

John Scandalides, Chief Secretary.

Approved of by the President of the Executive Body,

George Condouriotti.

The Secretary General ad interim,

P. G. Rodios.

Second Period. Act 3209. Provisional Government of Greece.

The Executive Body to

Messrs. John Orlando,

John Zaïmi, and

Andrew Luriottis,

by virtue of the 5th Article of the code of laws, orders,

First, That full powers are given you to negotiate a loan of fifteen million of Spanish dollars, and to guarantee the same by bonds of equal amount on the real Property.

Second, The same instructions which were given you for the first Loan are to serve for the present one, with the sole addition that you may effect the whole of the Loan at 60 per cent. and not under, and, in the event of a lower rate, you will effect two-thirds of the whole at the rate of 55 per cent; and also in the

of Prince Soutzo, so ingenious has been the process by which Viscount Palmerston has specially engaged the faith of England with that of Russia and France.

The question remains to be decided, whether the English bondholders have not a claim on the justice of their country, since its government has been the barrier to the acknowledgment of their rights in Greece.

I shall now explain the manner in which the Greek government has been absolved by Lord Palmerston from paying the interest and capital of the portion of the first and second instalments of the royal loan, whereby his Lordship has destroyed the security for a debt of £533,333, the previous debt of £2,800,000 being already sacrificed.

like event of your not being able to obtain either 60 or 55 per cent. that you will effect the remaining one-third at 50 per cent. and not under.

In the whole of this negotiation, however, you will always have the interest of the Nation in view.

Napoli di Romania, the 14th August, 1824.

George Condourioti, President.

John Coletti,

Anagnostis Spiliotakis,

Panouzzo Notaras.

The Secretary General ad interim, P. G. Rodios.

In reply to the menace of the Noble Lord, that if Russia did not choose to adopt his Lordship's view of the treaty of May the 7th, 1832, England would act without her concurrence, the Russian cabinet states "its determination to persist, for its part, in the course which it has proposed," and gives the reasons "which do not allow it to accede to that of Lord Palmerston." The Russian chargé d'affaires adds,

"The propositions last brought forward by the Imperial Cabinet have not had, therefore, any other object than to regulate with greater precision a pledged security, of which the Greek government has itself already admitted the principle and recognized the legality; to insist, accordingly, upon the Greek government, in conformity with the obligation which it has contracted, *appropriating* the national lands as a guarantee for the loan.

"In announcing, by order of His Majesty the Emperor, this determination, the undersigned has nevertheless been ordered to declare at the same time, that the Cabinet of Russia, although persisting, for its part, in the intention of applying the produce of the third instalment exclusively to the service of the loan, *readily admits* that this decision can in no wise prejudice the further resolutions of the two other guaranteeing powers; that, far from this being the case, the government of his Britannic Majesty is fully entitled to issue, in whole or in part, the proportion of the last instalment of the loan guaranteed by England, and to grant, accordingly, such an advance upon the third of the twenty

millions which are still to be raised, as it may judge fitting to place at the disposal of the Greek government."

It is clear, therefore, that the resolution of Lord Palmerston to advance the loan without the concurrence of Russia, was exactly the pretext which Russia desired in order to be enabled hereafter to act in the affairs of Greece separately from England, whilst, by appearing to oppose the placing of money in Count Arman-sparg's hands, she, by a stroke of consummate ability, overthrew at once the suspicions which at that time had been awakened in various quarters respecting the character of Arman-sparg, the judiciousness of our policy in Greece, and the danger to be apprehended from concerting our march with Russia.

But Lord Palmerston, in his letter to Count Pozzo di Borgo, of the 14th of June, 1836, defines the Russian proposal and his own view of the Convention of May, 1832, in the following terms:

"The undersigned deems it unnecessary to discuss the details of the proposed scheme (of M. Catacazy). It is enough to state that the essence of the plan is that the produce of the third instalment of the loan should be set

apart to pay the interest of the two first instalments, and that the aggregate interest of the three instalments should afterwards be paid out of the revenue of the national lands, while the treaty of 1832, *on the contrary*, purports that the three instalments shall, if wanted, be applied *to the general service of Greece*; and that the interest and sinking fund shall be defrayed *out of the first produce of the aggregate revenue of that kingdom.*"

Such is the solemn definition given by the British Secretary of State to Russia, France, Bavaria, and Greece, of the Convention of May the 7th, as understood by England. Now, this definition is at variance with the letter of the treaty, which states "that Greece shall be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of such instalments as may have been raised, *the first revenues of the state*, in such a manner that *the actual receipts of the Greek treasury* shall be devoted, *first of all*, to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for any other purpose, until those payments on account of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three courts *shall have been completely secured for the current year*; a stipulation over the fulfilment of which the diplomatic

representatives of the three courts in Greece shall be especially charged to watch."

It would appear that Lord Palmerston had not reasoned to a conclusion, when he states "that the interest should be *defrayed out of the first produce of the aggregate revenue of that Kingdom.*" How could the "first produce of the aggregate revenue" of Greece be devoted first of all to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the loan *for the current year?*" How could the first produce of the aggregate revenue be secured, until the aggregate revenue had come into the treasury—viz., towards the end of the current year? The aggregate revenue could not enter the treasury before its parts. How, then, could the unfortunate representatives of the three courts at Athens watch *at the commencement of the current year* over the setting apart of the first produce of the aggregate revenue of that kingdom, which they could only ascertain at the conclusion of the twelve months? How could they ascertain which was the *first produce* of the aggregate revenue?*

* In Johnson's dictionary we find the following explanation of

see that the revenue should not be employed for any other purpose until the first produce of the *aggregate* revenue had been secured. But it is plainly shown by the context of the Treaty, as it expressly stipulated that the payment of the interest on whatever portion of the loan had been received, was to be considered as the first obligation of Greece, taking precedence of all other claims, and being to be discharged from the first sums entering into the treasury, from whatever source derived—foreign loan, or internal revenue. Such is the practice in all similar cases; so has it been understood by Greece, who puts down the interest as a charge to be reimbursed by her subsidizing allies—although such payments have ceased to be effected by her—a certain consequence of the knowledge of the existence of such opinions, in the mind of the British minister.

But the liberality of the British Secretary of the word *aggregate*,—"framed by the collection of any particular parts, into one mass, body, or system." In illustration, he quotes the following passage, which may throw light on the subject. "They had for a long time together produced many other inept combinations, or *aggregate* forms of particular things, and nonsensical systems of the whole."—*Ray on the Creation*. Johnson.

State goes still further. He states, "The three powers stand solemnly bound by treaty to guarantee for Greece a loan of £60,000,000, if the wants of Greece should render that assistance necessary."

Who ever heard of a state not wanting assistance, when merely to proclaim such wants is to place at its disposal millions of foreign money? when previous loans are annulled, and other powers are bound to discharge even the interest of the new?

"But has Greece," continues his Lordship, "drawn more largely upon this fund *than was originally expected*, and has the annual deficiency of her income *exceeded the calculations of the three powers*, so as to inspire doubts whether the temporary aid will answer its intended purpose, and so as to excite distrust as to the ultimate capacity of Greece to defray the interest and sinking fund out of her own resources? The contrary is the fact."

Such is the encouragement given by the British minister for foreign affairs to Greece, to continue to spend annually one third more than her revenue, and to count upon the prolonged

infatuation of England in supporting her in an extravagance which can only tend to plunge her more speedily into irretrievable ruin.

But on what principle is England called upon to subsidize Greece? Is the political existence of that country endangered by foreign war with a foe of England? Is not the inviolability of her soil from foreign invasion guaranteed by England, France, Russia, Bavaria, and Turkey? What interest has England in subsidizing Greece? Did any national assembly in Greece ever solicit the guarantee of the British government to bolster up its credit? Does Lord Palmerston know what the Greeks themselves think of British subsidies? "This is not gold from London, but chains from St. Petersburg," was the exclamation of a Greeian patriot, on first hearing of the allied loan. To dwell any longer upon the absurdity of such a policy as this, would be to insult the judgment of any sane man.

The financial complications of Greece date from the letter of Mr. Dawkins, protesting against the measures of the National Assembly of Pro-nia; when he sanctioned, in conjunction with the

Residents of Russia and France, the abrogation of the lien held by the capitalists of England over the national lands of Greece.

Russia then proposes a new loan to Greece, for which the national lands thus emancipated from the obligation to England are pledged.

The Greek minister at Paris signs a bond assigning "all the goods and revenues of the state," as a security for the loan guaranteed by England, France, and Russia. This bond is legalized by diplomatic forms, and the execution of it is guaranteed by England.

Russia requires that the third instalment shall go towards the liquidation of the two previous instalments, and commences the system of liquidation.

England, led into the belief of the necessity of the money for the maintenance of an English system in Greece, joins issue with Russia, and declares that without the concurrence of Russia she will advance her single share, and she renounces her separate claim on Greece.

Russia asserts her determination to hold Greece responsible, and, to make the Greek government redeem its obligations, proves that

England had bound herself to admit that view, and, while she proves England bound to admit her view from its coincidence with the treaty itself, she presents no obstacle to the separate action of England. She concurs in England's separate view of abandoning her claims, asserts her own intention of exacting her share, and expresses her expectation "that the views which the Imperial Cabinet has now explained will be received by the government of his Britannic Majesty in a manner consistent with the frankness and confidence by which the present communication has been dictated."

In reply to which Lord Palmerston expresses his delight to hear that Russia expresses her confidence, "that the three courts will continue nevertheless to be equally animated by a sincere desire and by a firm determination to watch over the maintenance and welfare of a state, whose creation has been the result of their united efforts, and whose preservation will always be the object of their mutual solicitude."

Thus, in fact, is the mortgage of the English bondholders transferred away through a series

of diplomatic acts to the Emperor of Russia. This loan, put forward as leading to the joint action of the three powers, becomes itself the motive or pretext of separation, that separation being the self-exclusion of England from the repayment of the money she advanced, or from a share in the control which that creditorship must confer. Russia asserts her intention to break off from the alliance, for the purpose of separate indemnification. Lord Palmerston sanctions her pretension !

Lord Palmerston, moreover, hastens the consummation, by giving Greece to understand, that of whatever extravagance she may be guilty, she may reckon upon more money from England. When the whole of the allied loan has disappeared, there is half a million sterling more hereafter, since the Protocol of 1830, which was the basis of the Convention of May, 1832, did not contemplate the indemnity to the Porte, for the extension of its limits. His Lordship, by appropriating the loan to the general wants of Greece, relieves her from the obligation of paying the particular debt of the loan. Greece, thus subsidized, loses all control over its go-

vernment. Formerly, every peasant proclaimed aloud his grievance, if a fraction was unequally assessed: now the collection of the revenue emanates from functionaries under the discipline of diplomatic secresy; no check or control remains, and the ministers can follow the example of Count Armansperg in presenting wholly opposite statements as different interests may require.*

But, granting that Greece were wholly under British influence, what must be the fatal effects of fostering such excitement as this, which must allay any desire of its government to economize,

* Whilst this sheet is passing through the press, I observe the following passage in the correspondence of the Times, January 29th: — “M. Rudhart had presented his budget for 1838, and induced the King and ministers to sign it, when, having sent it to the Finance Office to have it copied, *one of the clerks* perceived it was all wrong, for that instead of 33,000,000 drachmas, supposing all the taxes collected (which is a problem), the receipts could not amount to more than 28,000,000. This soon got abroad. The Greeks shrugged up their shoulders, and said, ‘These are the men sent to govern us: the three protecting Powers will bear this no longer, surely.’ But the best of the joke is, that when the minister of finance ran to him to show him the mistake, he said he was very sorry, but *he had already communicated it* by the French steamer to the foreign Powers, and could not alter it.”

destroy the only practical check to despotism left them—consent of the people to the amount of revenue placed at the disposal of government, — and thoroughly corrupt the higher classes by the vast capital thrown into the mart of faction for which honour is to be exchanged, and by which subserviency is ensured?

But what must be the consequences, if, as I feel convinced, and as I think I have been enabled to prove, all these prospects have been held out to a faction vibrating in its minutest ramifications to the impulse of Russia, which has hitherto monopolized the whole means placed by the alliance at the disposal of the executive, and through which the national institutions, hopes, and feelings, have been overthrown, and the defenders of these sacrificed or forced to apostatize?

What must be the responsibility incurred by a British minister who, during a series of years, has obstinately resisted all evidence and knowledge of the truth; pertinaciously refused all investigation, inquiry, and discussion; disregarded and approved of the glaring contradictions in the reports of his own agents; and

pursued with relentless persecution every man who has ventured to point out to him the fatal errors which he has cherished?

What must be the effect of this policy on Turkey? what the effect on the Sultan, when Russia points to England as subsidizing Greece, as encouraging her to fresh hostilities and acquisitions, whilst He is at the same time constantly kept in alarm as to the ulterior views of Greece, and the security of his own frontiers.

Russian policy is one comprehensive whole. The parts cannot be separated. The future destinies of Greece are contingent on the position of Russia at Constantinople. That position is now affected by the influences which are brought to bear upon it from the various portions of that vast sphere of which it is the centre; and how is not Greece made to tell on these ulterior results, not merely in the direct character impressed upon her, but as influencing the position of England at Constantinople!

The Russian ambassador may fairly exclaim :
“Look at France, invading your territories, and England announcing her alliance and union of views with France. Can England be ignorant

of the views of France? Can you doubt, whatever she may say, her participation in those views of aggrandizement? Look at her subsidizing Greece. Why should Greece be subsidized? You know that by the former subsidizing of Greece, we were enabled to pass the Balkan; you know that Greece has the means of maintaining herself and remitting a large surplus. You know that at the Conferences of Poros, the ambassadors assigned, as the minimum of its tribute to you, a surplus of a million and a half of piastres. Why should Greece, therefore, be subsidized, if not for the purpose of rendering her dangerous to you? Has not England got the Ionian Islands? Has she not got Malta? Has she not Mussulman subjects in India? Does she not covet possession every where? Has she not been attempting settlements on the Euphrates? Does she not, in fine, proclaim aloud her amity with France, the violator of your provinces? Does she not proclaim her hostility to Russia—hostility never whispered when we were at open war with you; but now that we have become true friends and allies, — now that English vessels are ex-

cluded from the coasts of the Euxine by the influence of the Emperor, — now that her treacherous designs upon Circassia have been frustrated, does England proclaim her hostility to Russia, because foiled in her insidious designs, and attempts to awaken the hostility of Turkey by imputing to Russia the very designs she nourishes herself !”

Such, there can be no question, is the language held in the impenetrable mystery of the chamber of the Reis Effendi. But it may be asked can the Turkish government lend an ear to assertions so preposterous ? Do not, however, the acts and speeches of England enable the common enemy so to misrepresent her intentions ? And has England the means of counteracting—no, of hearing, even, of the arts employed against her ? Is there a single Englishman to mark the progress of these perfidious designs ? May not, as heretofore, her own despicable agency be the principal means employed to confirm misrepresentations on the one hand, and to lull suspicion on the other ? Such, faintly shadowed out, are some of the advantages which Russia has gained by the presumption of Lord

Palmerston in imagining that he has frustrated the designs of his talented opponents, thus showing that "mediocrity" when in "perfection" can be nearly as noxious to the interests of a confiding country as the energy of deluded genius.

CHAPTER IX.

Claims of English bondholders on their country's justice. Their bonds a portion of the collective property of the realm. Financial and political effects of loans on foreign countries and on England. Persecution of the Greek Primates favourable to British claims. Mortgage of Greece to Russia. Contrast between the state of Greece in 1830 and 1838. The finances of Greece contrasted with those of Servia. Diplomatic malversation.

IN the earlier pages of this work, I have shown the hostility of Russia excited against the Greeks by the political principles of the National Assembly of Epidaurus, in 1822. I believe that hostility to have been mainly caused by alarm at the connexion which Greece was proceeding to form with England, by passing a resolution to raise a loan of a million of dollars abroad.

It was not until the years 1824 and 1825, under the administration of Condouriotti and Coletti, that this connexion took place. The

first Greek loan was negotiated at 59, and the second at 55.

It has been customary for public men in England to consider the loans contracted between Foreign governments and British subjects as not entitling the latter to the protection of their own government; and it has been stated, as an objection to the Greek loans in particular, that the independence of Greece was not recognized by England, at the time when they were negotiated.

With regard to the first point, I conceive the question to have been misunderstood.

According to Vattel, who is generally admitted to be the highest authority, not merely on points of international law, but on the obligations by which sovereigns and their subjects are reciprocally bound, it is the duty of the supreme power in the state to protect the interests of private individuals, as a portion of the property of the nation.*

* § 81. Even the property of individuals, in their totality, must be regarded as the property of the nation, in respect to other States. They really belong to it, in a manner, by the rights which it has over the property of its citizens, because they constitute a portion of its entire riches and increase its power. They interest it, by the protection which it owes to its members. In fine, the affair cannot be otherwise, since nations act and treat

But a no less important consideration is involved in the non-protection, or rather non-recognition, of these rights by England, viz.—that by refusing to support the claims of British subjects on Foreign governments, the latter cannot fail to take advantage of our simplicity, and to violate their engagements; thus, not only sacrificing British interests, but injuring their own national credit, and debar-

together in a body, in their quality of political societies, and are regarded as so many moral persons. All those who form a society, a nation, are considered by foreign nations as only constituting one whole — one person alone: all their aggregate goods can only be considered as the goods of this same person; and this is so true that it depends on each political society to establish in itself the community of goods. The others do not inquire what it does in this respect; its domestic regulations change nothing in its rights towards strangers, nor in the mode in which they ought to regard the totality of its goods, in whatever manner possessed.

§ 203. In the same manner, the debts of a nation, or those by which a sovereign has mortgaged any one of his towns or provinces, are not annulled by conquest. The King of Prussia, in acquiring Silesia by conquest, and by the treaty of Breslau, took upon himself the debts for which this province had engaged itself to British merchants. In fact, it could only there acquire the rights of the House of Austria, it could only take Silesia such as it was at the moment of conquest, with its rights and its burdens. To refuse to pay the debts of a country which one has subdued, would be to plunder creditors with whom one is not at war.—

Extract from Vattel's Law of Nations.

ring themselves from the power of entering into any fresh contracts for the purpose of fulfilling former ones. Thus, England, by giving encouragement to international dishonesty, and all the crimes which ensue from it, affecting, as they do, the present and future happiness and civilization of mankind, becomes the patroness of anarchy throughout the world.

We have hitherto looked upon the sinking of the enormous sum of eighteen millions, lent to the various republics and states across the Atlantic, as a loss which British commerce has incurred, as a sacrifice of British capital; but which, on the other hand, has contributed to establish the independence, to consolidate the power, to increase the wealth, and call forth the resources of countries which may become a vast field for the production of raw materials as for the future consumption of English manufactures.

What I have seen of Greece leads me to form different conclusions. I doubt very much that such results have been obtained, and I suspect that the evident political corruption, the constant agitation, the changes and insecurity which the history of those new states exhibits, may, in some

degree, have been produced by the demoralizing effects of the capital which has been obtained under false pretences, which has been squandered for dishonest or for factious ends, and which consequently, as in Greece, has allowed those short-lived governments to run a career of reckless folly, indifferent alike to the support and the feelings of the masses of the people; and therefore destroying, in their moral character, their future hopes, and rendering doubly to be deplored for them, as for us, the capital so heedlessly thrown away, and so woefully misused.

But the circumstance which, more than any other, has aggravated the evil, has been the incomprehensible indifference of England herself to the claims of her subjects. She has ostentatiously put forward in her public prints, in the debates of the House of Commons, in the speeches of her ministers, the non-recognition of the legality of claims which her subjects may have against foreign governments; thus proclaiming that the capital advanced to those governments was neither a gift nor a loan, neither deserving of gratitude for a favour conferred, nor securing the advantages of an obligation entailed. Hence the deterioration of

the character of those countries by their position of debtor, and their irritation against England in consequence of the unjust position which England permits them to assume as regards herself. The advocates of such claims in those governments must be necessarily exposed to the appearance of foreign influence, and become obnoxious to the clamour of democracy, notoriously dishonest in its foreign relations, and consequently to the pretensions of patriotism thus rallied at once against national honour and English influence.

Whoever will take the trouble to follow out the natural effects upon men of such a state of things, must see that a nation ready to grant advances of money in this way, without enforcing payment, and without seeing to the validity of the securities and to the capabilities of the parties who become her creditors, must be looked upon as a dupe; and that character has but to be affixed to a nation as to a man, for it to lose respect and therefore influence. And if these countries do possess the means of repayment, and if they are not in a position to take the benefit of an act of insolvency, then must they look upon the creditor with the feelings which arise from opposition of

interests; and this may assist in solving the enigma of the total want of influence of England over any power, whether great or small.

With regard to the second point, viz., that England is not called upon to support the claims of her capitalists on Greece, because the independence of Greece was not recognized when the Greek loans were contracted; is it for Englishmen to invent arguments for the purpose of sacrificing their own interests, in opposition to the arguments of the Greeks themselves? and how does the argument, if such it can be called, invalidate the obligations of Greece? But the facts are the very reverse. In the interval between the date of the decree of the government of Greece, authorizing the negociation of the loan, and the signature of the contract, the Greek government addressed a diplomatic communication to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and Mr. Canning acknowledged the receipt of that communication, in a letter "to the Secretary of the Greek Government," dated the 1st December, 1824, in which he recognized the *de facto* government of Greece, and the acts and rights of Greece, as a belligerent power; so that, in reality, an official and diplo-

matic intercourse between the governments of the two countries *preceded* the commercial ties between their subjects. If England recognized the right of the Greek Admiralty Courts to condemn British merchant vessels for breaking their blockades, she surely had a right to exact from a government which she thus respected a reciprocal acknowledgment of the rights of her own subjects guaranteed by that government.

If, however, the loss of British influence in foreign countries can be traced to the non-comprehension of her own rights, what must have been the moral effect in Greece of her diplomacy, having been continually directed by Russia, not merely to the extinction of those rights, but to the most cruel, uninterrupted, and successful persecution of the very primates who guaranteed them, and who have braved danger and death to defend them, as the foundation of their country's independence?

It is a remarkable fact, that, throughout the whole of the acts of Greece, the individuals who have been the objects of England's uninterrupted persecution are the very men whose names are affixed to the pecuniary engagements which bound Greece to this country.

The reader will find on reference, in the last chapter, to the Greek Bond of 1824, that it is ratified by Coletti, Condourioti, and Notaras; the first, the most distinguished Representative of Continental Greece; the second, of the islands; and the third, of the Morea.

After the death of Capodistrias, who do we find at the head of the national party, opposing, in arms, the usurpations of the Senate? Who were excluded from the mock amnesty fabricated by Count Augustin Capodistrias and the Residents? Were they not Coletti, Condourioti, and Notaras? What name appears at the head of the signatures of the Moreote Primates, in their protest against the proclamations of Colocotroni? Is it not Notaras? Under whose auspices did the National Representatives at Pronia proclaim "that the guaranteeing of the foreign and internal debt of Greece was the only measure calculated to secure to Greece a political existence?" Were not Coletti and Condourioti leaders of the government which convened that assembly, of which Notaras was the President?

If we look to the foreign diplomatists who advocated the claims of England and Greece, we

find the Ambassadors of England and France, who drew up the Protocols at Poros, at present unemployed.

No doubt distinct and separate grounds may be alleged for the exile of Coletti, for the persecution of Condourioti and Notaras, the non-employment of Sir Stratford Canning and of General Guilleminot.* I merely state the facts, which the reader

* Talleyrand was removed from the Ministry in France, as the condition on which four millions sterling of the indemnity were to be remitted. The Emperor Alexander obtained from his Allies, that the sacrifice should be equally borne between them. Lord Aberdeen was, on the last accession of the Tories to power, excluded from the Foreign Office. His lordship was the only British statesman who protested against the occupation of Africa and the treaty of Adrianople.

The only information before the public, respecting the designs of Russia in Greece, or the means of counteracting them, is included in the following works, drawn up in different languages, at distinct periods, without concert, yet all of them agreeing and mutually confirming and elucidating each other.

“ L'état actuel de la Grèce,” par Frederick Thiersch. 1833.

The “ Greek people,” considered in its social, political, and ecclesiastical relations, by the majority of the Royal Regency. 4 vols. 1835. In German.

“ Turkey and its Resources.” 1833.

And the present volume. The authors of these works have all been proscribed and persecuted by Lord Palmerston; two of them because they were *Russian*! two of them because they were *Anti-Russian*!!

will interpret according to his own intelligence. Somehow or other it always happens that the public men or the diplomatists, who, by their acts, their knowledge, or their capacity, have thwarted Russian views, or have inspired her with dread of their having the capacity to penetrate them, have all been sacrificed by their own governments, or left not employed.

In looking at past circumstances, we are always ready to avow that we have been made the dupes of Russia, but is not the same system of delusion actually in operation? Must we ever incur the cost of experience, without obtaining the fruits of knowledge? and are we always to lag so far in arrear of events, and yet tread so closely on their heels as constantly to perceive that we have been duped, but never reach to the conviction that we are so?

The hostility of Russia to the loan with England was a natural feature in her policy. In the first place, the agricultural prosperity both of Turkey and of Greece is diametrically opposed to the interests of Russia; and the necessity of fostering those interests was one of the most important secondary causes of her instigating the Greek in-

surrection and fomenting anarchy, during ten years, in the Levant. If the corn monopolies of Turkey were done away with, and the internal communications of Greece were improved, the agricultural interests of Russia could not fail to suffer from the competition.

A second important ground of hostility, on the part of Russia, to the loan with England, and to the primates who authorized it, was the dread of the example of a European people in a state of rebellion being upheld by the hope of foreign funds. Russia, composed of an agglomeration of conquered and oppressed states, whose condition affords the most painful contrast to the prosperity which Greece enjoyed under Mussulman institutions, must dread the knowledge amongst the Poles, the Finlanders, the Tatars, the Circassians, the Georgians, and amongst her own subjects, that the Greeks were assisted in their struggle by English capital; and she is still more interested in extinguishing, in the minds of British capitalists, the hope and the belief that loans contracted with Eastern people can ever be repaid.

The third ground of hostility, on the part of Russia, to the Greek loans in England, arises from

the fact that no stronger bond can exist between England and Greece than that of a commercial tie such as this, which, if properly respected, would entirely identify the interests of the two countries.

I have shown, however, that no sooner had Capodistrias been installed in Greece, than Russia herself proposed to subsidize that country.

What was the object of a loan in Greece, after the war was at an end? A loan to a country not in a state of war, not for the purpose of paying off old debts, not overladen with financial embarrassments, or under the obligation of maintaining armies, a marine, or expensive relations with Foreign Powers! The idea is so wholly preposterous — if one might use such a term — so ludicrous, that one is lost in looking for the arguments that are to be answered, or the grounds upon which it could have been supported. But granting money to a state, declared to be prosperous and at peace, is not sufficiently absurd. You must expunge its old obligations at the moment you supply it with new means; and, while you teach it to believe that you have abandoned all check, and that you renounce all claim to future reimbursement, you bind it in a solemn bond, by

which the whole of its public fortune is mortgaged, to the exclusion of the possibility of any new loan being contracted; thus enacting, on a colossal scale, what might appear the nefarious contract of a usurer with a spendthrift, fostering the extravagance, while possessed of the bond that secures the body of the victim.

The object of Russia, in this extraordinary transaction, is clear.

It requires not a drop of ink, or a breath to be expended, to show the complete control that a strong nation must have over the weaker, when the stronger is the creditor of the weaker, and holds a lien over its territory and revenue; but it will be said that Russia does not stand alone, that she is united with her allies, and that, not being able to pursue a policy independent of them, she will be forced to exercise that control only in the same degree as her allies, and for the objects proposed by the Alliance; but it has been already shown that Russia has invariably swayed the Alliance to her ends, and, supposing she were no longer capable of doing so, she can break up the Alliance; nay, we have already seen the Alliance broken, and all control over her, on the part of her allies,

annihilated by the separate line which Lord Palmerston has taken. Then it may be said that, if Russia asserts her claim to indemnity or to possession, her allies will do the same. But her allies have already declared their intention of not doing so, if we can believe Lord Palmerston's assertion respecting France. Therefore, Russia, free to act alone, has the whole property and revenue placed at her disposal, through the renunciation by her allies of their claims. If Russia never proceeds to such extremities, the power of so proceeding must make her future mistress of Greece; and if her allies, finding no other means of counteracting her, did re-assert their claims, they would be only organizing a struggle of mercenary partizans in Greece, or they would repeat the triple compact of 1772 in Poland.* But France and England never

* Extract of a manifesto delivered at the Court of Warsaw, 18th September, 1772.

“ But whilst they (Russia, Prussia, and Austria) take advantage of that mutual friendship and good harmony which happily subsists between them at present, in order to prevent the absolute ruin and arbitrary dissolution of Poland, they cannot but be sensible how little it is in their power to promise themselves, in future periods, the same happy concurrence. *And as they have respectively very considerable claims on the possessions of the Republic, which they cannot permit themselves to expose to the hazard of possible*

could have recourse to such means. It is therefore clear that the field will be wholly resigned to Russia, and that she ultimately must become possessor of "*all the goods and revenues of the state, and especially the entire produce of the taxes.*"

Thus has Russia obtained the renunciation of the claims of England over the lands of Greece. She has effected the extinction of the former debt of Greece to England. She has obtained supplies of money from her allies to support a government in Greece which worked for her. She has secured at the same time the demoralization of the Greek mind and people. She has obtained the precedent of separate action in her allies. She has

contingencies ; they have therefore determined among themselves to assert these their ancient rights and *lawful claims*, which each of them will be ready to justify in time and place by authentic records and solid reasons, but for which the situation of the republic will never leave them hopes of obtaining justice in the ordinary course of proceeding. In consequence hereof, her Majesty the Empress of all the Russias, her Majesty the Empress Dowager, Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, having communicated reciprocally their respective rights and claims, and being mutually convinced of the justice thereof, are determined to secure to themselves a proportionable equivalent, by taking immediate and effectual possession of such parts of the territories of the republic as may serve to fix more natural and sure bounds between her and the Three Powers."

obtained the abandonment of their claims to liquidation. She has established habits of extravagance in the Greek government, which must lead within a short and calculated period to national bankruptcy, while she alone holds a lien over the body of her debtor. And while, by the voice of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, she exclaims to the Greeks—"Be spendthrift and reckless, that you may justify our demands on the British Parliament and people to supply the wants of a state which our care has created, and our honour must maintain:" and thereby encourages the extravagance from which she has so much to expect; she in her own person stands forward as the advocate of economy, which, while bewildering the minds of Greeks and Europeans,* affords the opportunity of calling herself "*national*," in Greece, while establishing the grounds of future confiscation.

* "But let us look to the ground or principle on which the Allied Powers of France, England, and Russia, entered into this treaty, or gave sanction to the loan. That principle, according to the statement of M. Pozzo di Borgo, was to enable Greece to pay off the principal and interest of the debt she had contracted; but it was not meant to trust an infant state with the uncontrolled disposal of so large a sum." — Speech of Mr. Hume: *Mirror of Parliament*, p. 2592; 1836.

But let us seriously inquire what was the financial state of Greece previous to receiving the allied loan.

Greece possesses resources, greater, perhaps, than any country of a similar extent. Her admirable maritime position, accessible at every point — the immense extent of her coasts — the magnificence and abundance of her harbours — the loveliness of her climate — the industry and frugality of her people — all contributed to point her out as destined to attain a high degree of prosperity.

Her revenue under the Turks gave a clear surplus of more than £200,000 a year, after the whole expenses of local government were defrayed, which included contingent expenses for the defence of the empire, during its external and civil wars, and the burdens that consequently lay upon each separate province, and this was again independent of the contribution of sailors to the marine of Turkey ; and it was whilst Greece contributed this sum, that she made that unparalleled progress in population, wealth, commerce, and industry, which had marked the twenty years previous to the revolution. It may be supposed that the ravages of war had annihilated the prosperity of the country, and greatly

reduced its population ; but it has been estimated by the best authorities on this subject, that Greece in 1829 and 1830 had recovered from the effects of the war of independence, and that its population, the only source of national wealth, approached within 30,000 souls to the population of 1820.

But if the revenues of Greece, calculated merely according to the resources of the country as they existed under the Turks, were capable of affording a surplus of £250,000 annually,* what did not become the revenue and the resources of the government, when it became possessed, by the decrees of the Conference of London of the whole of the Turkish private property, which, generally speaking, comprised the best lands, and which amounted in the Morea to 4,000,000 of acres, and to nearly half that amount beyond the Isthmus ! We are accustomed to hear of millions of acres being disposed of in the Western settlements of America for a few shillings an acre, but here was land *occupied by cultivators*, under the finest

* £50,000 was nearly what came into the treasury of the Sultan. The rest was divided among the landed proprietors and the spahis, or, in other words, was appropriated to the standing militia.

climate in the world, in a position the most favourable that can be imagined for intercourse and for commerce ; land producing corn, and wine, and oil, where the silkworm spins, and the cotton-plant affords its precious fleece ; where gums distil from the trees, and the ingredients requisite for every dye grow wild in the mountains ; where the common heather is divided off for the pasturage of swarms of bees, and the currant vine, the most valuable of all crops, skirts the shore, and dips even into the sea. Such was the soil of which four millions of acres were handed over to the government of Greece, where every improvement in agriculture, and every facility in commerce, must have afforded riches incalculable, and where, even under the system that had previously existed, a single acre of irrigable land gave £7 and £8 of gross produce.

But, in addition to these private properties, the government got possession of all the religious endowments of the Mussulmans, while it assumed to itself the right of disposing of the property of the Christian monasteries ; and, as if all these resources were insufficient to supply the necessities of the state, the English government stepped forward to

relieve Greece from the obligations which were entailed upon her by our capitulations with the Turks, of freedom of commercial exchange, and England sanctioned the infraction of the rights of Englishmen, under the idea that taxes upon commerce would afford additional resources to the Greek state.

In looking upon these two pictures — Greece as she was, as she might have been, and Greece as the Alliance has made her — indignation is lost in amazement. Language is wanting to express the contempt which such policy in England deserves, or the commiseration which the fate of too confiding Greece awakens.

But, it will be asked, had the government of England any means of arriving at a knowledge of these circumstances? Is an impossibility of seeing our way a misfortune inseparably connected with all Eastern transactions? Must we not necessarily be led in every step which we take in Eastern affairs by Russia, exclusively possessed of information, alone among the Powers of Europe acting with an object? I have already shown that, upon the only occasion when England endeavoured to acquire information upon

the state of the East, although she adopted means the least likely to arrive at a correct estimate of things (sending Ambassadors to confer with Capodistrias), she did obtain materials sufficient for the prevention of the evils that have ensued—materials which now stand a record of institutions that have been rooted up, and of resources that have been annihilated. But the statement which I have just made respecting the positive resources of the country *was published* five years ago in a work which pointed out that very line which has been adopted in Greece, as necessarily leading to ruin; whilst the policy it did recommend has been carefully avoided by those who had the direction of affairs, even while they expressed their commendation of the principles which that work contained.

“The account I have given,” says Mr. Urquhart, “of the administrative reforms, which conciliated the affections of the Greeks to the Turkish authority, will of itself explain the measures the new administration has to adopt, which are as follows:—provincial governors; a judiciary establishment adopting the pandects of Justinian already in use; the apportioning the revenue by district, according to a general cadastre, and leaving its assessment and collection entirely to the municipal bodies, as also all local

administration, the making of roads, building of bridges, churches, schools, appointment of priests, schoolmasters. The municipalities are the very rudiments of representation, and the primates of a certain number of communities, or of a certain district, might choose deputies to assemble as a provincial council. The executive will receive the surplus revenue of the provinces after the local expenses are defrayed, without charges or trouble in collecting; its functions will be restricted to maintaining order and general police, the appointing of provincial governors, the organization of troops, and the creation of a little marine, the care of the fortresses, foreign commerce, and foreign relations. It will, indeed, be all powerful for good.

“The expenditure would thus be reduced to a mere trifle. In the naval and military departments some expense would be necessary, not in the number of men to be kept on foot, or vessels afloat, but in elementary schools for officers, and in preparing materials and arsenals. The passes of Marcinoros, of Caracos, of Patragic, Tragovouno, and Œta, require some fortification, as also the point of Anactorium, and the north-west extremity of Negrogont. These and the principal fortresses have to be kept up. The clergy are supported by fees and voluntary contributions. The monasteries possess considerable property. The judiciary establishment may be maintained at a very trifling cost, and the government has no further expenses save *la Maison du Roi*. If it adopts the municipal principle, it embarrasses itself with no custom-house officers or tax-gatherers whatever, and it will be relieved from all concern in local affairs. It has little to do with foreign powers—nothing with foreign commerce, save to leave it to itself; and for its military and

civil, its judiciary and central administration, *a quarter of a million yearly seems amply sufficient.*

“The monarchy of Greece must rest on these three principles—municipal institutions, direct taxation, and perfect freedom of commerce; and yet these are not three but one principle, under a three-fold character; each as a principle leading to the other two as consequences, and indivisible in their utility and their operation.”

The strong conviction which has led to an anticipation of the evils resulting from the non-adoption of those principles, appears from the following remarkable extract from the same work:

“But supposing that by overwhelming military power, and at an enormous expense, Greece could establish custom house cordons, what would be the consequence? 1st. The increase of expenditure; 2d. The decrease of her commerce; 3d. The resistance to government which indirect taxation must produce, but in tenfold force in Greece, where they have been for centuries accustomed to buy the produce of all parts of the world at the lowest price. The indirect system will then not disguise taxation, while it misplaces the burdens and doubles the necessities of the state, and will cause universal irritation, without obtaining the support of interests and prejudices grown up under its influence. 4th. Law will cease to be respected. Opinion has hitherto stood in place of law; and law, to be enforced and respected, must now coincide with opinion. prostitute the law to financial purposes—create new crimes, and visit them with the penalties

scarcely awarded to the worst injuries inflicted on society, and law and opinion will be brought into direct collision. This is a momentous consideration for a prince who goes to govern a people, as it is supposed in Europe, of pirates and bandits, with four thousand German bayonets. In practice and in principle so numerous are the objections to the European commercial system, so great are the temptations to interference, for men carrying thither European notions of administration, who will be at first environed with respect, and kneeled to with submission, that I cannot see how they can escape falling into serious errors ; and so difficult is it for the self-love of such a government to retrace any false step, that, without great faith in prophecy, I will only give Greece five years to find its way back to the Turkish dominion, (i. e. dissolution of government) if the indirect system of taxation is attempted."

Before I detail the progress of financial embarrassments in Greece, it is as well to recall to the reader's mind the fact that Eastern countries possess great facilities of administration, especially as regards finances. Whoever looks at what has been achieved by Servia, may conceive what Greece might have effected by her own unassisted resources had she not become the prey of European diplomacy and of western ideas.

"The Servians allied themselves with the Ottomans in the year 1389. The Greeks called them to take possession of, and defend their coun-

try against the Albanians, in 1453. Subjugated almost at the same time, both of them began their struggle of independence in the same order—the Servians, in 1804, the Greeks, in 1821.

“The germ of the Greek revolution lay without Greece, and was systematically and for a long time carefully and extensively nourished in the great marts of Europe, and the final outbreak took place not even on the soil of Greece, but at a distance of seven hundred miles and to the north of the Balcan and the Danube. It was otherwise in Servia: the revolution broke out in the interior of the country, and without any plan. It was at first nothing but a resolve of each single Servian to maintain his customs, and in them his rights. The idea of independence was an after-thought, developed by circumstances of a foreign character.

“Scarcely had the revolt broken out in Greece, when all Europe, America, and even India, with every imaginable means, with money, arms, ships, men of all descriptions, hastened to assist her, and by opinion, the press and diplomacy supported her rebellion. Thus matters continued until the Porte at last was obliged to acknowledge the in-

dependence of the newly created kingdom. The war was not even carried on by the Greeks alone, but in great part by foreigners, Albanians, Wallachians, and Bulgarians.

“The Servians, in an inland country, much less favoured by position, and open on all sides, fought alone, with their own means—one may almost say unknown to all Europe. They defeated, with infinitely smaller forces, hostile armies of thirty to forty thousand men,* and there was no one to mention their deeds.

“The Greeks have received millions as presents, and have incurred millions of debt, notwithstanding which, up to this hour, every newspaper is full of the unhappy state of their finances.

“The Servians have struggled for thirty years (eleven years of open war and nineteen of negotiations) without instalments or protocols, without countenance, without money, yet they felt neither difficulty nor embarrassment; and at the close of the war, they had a large surplus in their national treasury, said to exceed £500,000.

* On more than one occasion the Turks actually refused to fight, when they learnt that the Municipal Primates were in the field against them. In Greece, on the contrary, all those ties, arising out of Eastern institutions, were at once severed.

“ The Greek government must now, we may say, wage war against its former soldiers, whilst in Servia, the warriors have returned to their ploughs.

“ The Greeks wander from their own liberated kingdom back to Turkey, whilst the Servians not only remain in security and comfort in their homes, but receive emigrants from all sides.” *

The Greek people is, nevertheless, immeasurably superior in knowledge, intelligence, activity, and wealth, to the Servians. But the Servians, up to the consummation of their independence, preserved the institutions which have been withered in Greece, and — they have had no benevolent protectors.†

Greece, while a province of the Turkish empire, gave a surplus of revenue over its expenditure.

The budgets of Greece, as a free state, after

* This comparison is drawn from a MS. by Dr. Vuk, the author of the Servian Anthology.

† Russia has assumed to be the protector of Servia ; but, had she stood alone in Greece as she did in Servia, Greece might now be in the happy position which Servia has achieved, and which is now endangered by Russia's progress in Greece and Turkey ; or, to speak more accurately, in the British cabinet, and in society in London.

having been forced to become a debtor to the Allied Powers for £2,400,000, exhibit—

In 1833	.	a deficit of	.	£235,287
1834	.	.	.	381,971
1835	.	.	.	230,894
1836	}	.	.	142,857
1837		.	.	107,142
1838		*	.	71,428
1839		.	.	35,071

The expenditure of Greece, in 1829, was £241,666 — this was *in war*, and even then it was considered profligate and extravagant.

In 1833	.	it was	.	£422,186
1834	.	.	.	535,260
1835	.	.	.	472,806

This was in peace, and merely for the current service.

* “ The entire deficit during this olympiad would *only* amount to 10,000,000; i. e.—

For 1836	.	.	.	4,000,000
1837	.	.	.	3,000,000
1838	.	.	.	2,000,000
1839	.	.	.	1,000,000.”

See Parliamentary Papers.

In 1820, after paying the internal budget, Greece had an excess of £50,000, while the Greek government has since acquired the proprietorship of the national lands, and of the tithes, which did not come into the imperial treasury. These two items amount to at least £200,000. Thus, under the Turkish government, as compared with the present government, there was an excess of £250,000,* after defraying the local administration.

But the estimates presented to Parliament, by Viscount Palmerston, were for the purpose of showing the favourable prospects of Greece, until the end of next year. How far we are to depend on the truth of any official information

* This sum of £200,000 went in rent to Turkish proprietors; or, in tithe, to the support of the Spahis yeomanry. The Greek state has now obtained the right to the land, and has appropriated to itself the tithe; yet Greece, subsidized into the bargain, is bankrupt. Such is the boon of independence that we have conferred — such the fruits that European seeds of administration have scattered over the eastern and western hemispheres. Every where custom-houses have interfered with men's interests. Financial embarrassments have led to political embarrassment and to faction. Moral degradation has followed — character and independence have been lost — convulsion and war every where await but a signal or a spark.

henceforth derived from his Lordship, the reader will be able to judge from the following statement:—

	Receipts, 1833.	Receipts, 1834.	Expenditure, 1833.	Expenditure, 1834.
	Drachms.	Drachms.	Drachms.	Drachms.
Statement made to Parliament by Lord Palmerston . . . }	7,042,653	9,455,410	13,630,467	20,150,657
Accounts published subsequently, by or- der of King Otho, in Greece . . . }	7,721,370	10,921,787	11,821,234	14,987,298
Difference . .	687,717	1,466,377	1,809,233	5,163,358

Receipts for 1833 and 1834, underrated by Count Armansperg by 2,145,094
 Expenditure for 1833 and 1834, overrated by Count Armans- }
 perg by } 6,972,591

Difference between the accounts presented by Lord Pal- }
 merston and the accounts published in Greece, by } 9,117,685
 order of King Otho, for 1833 and 1834 . . . }

“The former lavish expenditure (1833-1834) took place,” says Lord Palmerston, “under an authority different from that which now governs the destinies of Greece: there was then a Regency of two persons; and if, under their government, the expenditure was lavish, it must be remembered that they are not any longer in that country.”

Here we have defalcation of money, falsification of accounts, defamation of character, whilst the false accusation is made the mask under which the acts imputed to others are committed by the parties themselves. This scheme is concocted between an Archchancellor of Greece and two Members of the Conference of London, for the purpose of degrading and expelling two members of the Royal Regency, and for sacrificing two individuals obnoxious to Russia, under the pretext of their being Russian, and of their having squandered the revenue of Greece; and the fraud, so concocted, is presented by a Minister of the Crown to the House of Commons, in full confidence of the acquiescence of "empty benches."

CHAPTER X.

Affair of Usiglio. Systematic misrepresentation from Greece. England supports "antagonist principles" in Greece by fresh subsidies.

DURING the progress of this work an incident has occurred, which, however contemptible in itself, is unfortunately of importance, by displaying the character of the acts and the actors in this extraordinary drama: I allude to the correspondence between Sir Edmund Lyons and M. Rudhart, respecting the affair of Usiglio, published by the Bavarian government, in defiance of all diplomatic precedent and principle, and with no intelligible object, save that of exhibiting England's dishonour to the world.

Count Armansperg's approaching disgrace was communicated to Lord Palmerston by the embassy at St. Petersburg; upon which his Lordship instructed the English Envoy at Mu-

nich to remonstrate and protest against his removal, and even to menace the King of Bavaria, in the event of his persisting in his intention of displacing the Archchancellor. Baron Gise, the minister for foreign affairs, assured Lord Erskine that no such intention was entertained. This assurance was duly acknowledged, and formally communicated by Lord Erskine to his court. The appointment of the Archchancellor's successor had been several days before officially announced in the government gazette!

The determination of Lord Palmerston to support Count Armansperg, if necessary, with the whole power of England, had been loudly proclaimed both in Bavaria and in Greece; and the arrival of his Majesty's ship *Portland* was looked to with deep interest by the Greeks. What then was their amazement on discovering that it conveyed the new prime minister! The same frigate then transported Count Armansperg and his family from the shores of Greece! Suppose a Minister in league with a foreign and a hostile Power, could he do more than this? Could human ingenuity have devised a

scheme more calculated to show to every person and party in Greece, the hopelessness of trust in England, even if her power were exerted for British ends?

To the Greeks the change from the rule of Count Armansperg to that of M. Rudhart was a matter of perfect indifference. The "vital question" of her organization, "according to the views of the Emperor," had been long since effected. To Russia the disgrace of Count Armansperg was a matter of no moment. The King of Bavaria had probably had his eyes opened by the accounts presented to Parliament by Lord Palmerston.

M. Rudhart accepted the office of prime minister of King Otho, with the avowed intention of retrenchment. The task was no light one. The extravagance and misrepresentations of his predecessor had been sanctioned and approved of by England and Russia, whilst Russia, shifting her ground, had lately stepped forward as the champion of financial reforms. Thus M. Rudhart could have no escape but in an unconditional surrender to Russia. If, to secure bureaucratic support and popularity, he opened his hand, he was at once denounced by

Russia as incapable and corrupt; if, on the other hand, he attempted to bring the expenditure of Greece within its receipts, he (like MM. Maurer and Abel) would be denounced by the English Minister as Russian!

No sooner, therefore, had M. Rudhart commenced reducing the enormous establishments in Greece, than the English Minister, taking advantage of the banishment of an Italian refugee, furnished with an English passport, did attack M. Rudhart, and in language the most extraordinary that has ever appeared in the diplomatic service of this or any other country. I have inserted one of these letters in the Appendix, as a specimen of the diplomatic relations of England with Greece.

The expulsion of Usiglio was an act bearing immediately on the fundamental laws of Greece, drawn up at Epidaurus and Træzene. The Greek Representatives at those Assemblies granted to foreigners immunities, which neither the institutions of England nor the United States, nor any other country, confer. According to these laws,

“ All strangers coming to reside in Greece permanently, or for a time, enjoy *equal civil rights with the Greeks.*”

“The law guarantees the personal liberty of every man. No one can be arrested or imprisoned, excepting according to legal forms.”

Under such guarantees, Greece could not fail to receive, from every country, population, commerce, capital, science, and the arts; and although strangers could not enjoy the benefits of the exclusive jurisdiction of their own magistrates, as under the Mussulman administration, the countervailing advantage of being able to purchase land could not fail to identify them with the interests of their adopted country, and form a counterpoise to the exclusive influence of any foreign power over the destinies of the Hellenic state.

I need not add, that England would necessarily have derived for her commerce and manufactures the principal advantage of these institutions, and hence the invectives of Russia against the Primates, by whom such opinions were entertained, and such laws established.

Russian influence had been undeviatingly exercised to overthrow the fundamental institutions established by the four Congresses anterior to the arrival of Capodistrias. He had

failed in the attempt. The Royal Regency restored them to full vigour.* Armansperg, as Archchancellor, has succeeded in setting them aside.

Sir Edmund Lyons, in his correspondence, charges M. Rudhart with an anti-national line of policy, diametrically opposed to the views of the Alliance, and of his predecessor. Alluding to Count Armansperg, he says —

“ M. Usiglio went twice to you, to explain how pacific were his character and views, and how cruel would be his position, if exiled from Greece, which, under Count Armansperg, *was the refuge of the proscribed.*” †

M. Rudhart replies —

“ It was by a circular letter from my predecessor, M. Rizo, under date of the 17th of July, 1835, *written by order of Count Armansperg*, that his Majesty's Consuls abroad, and the Magistrates of the kingdom, were strictly

* The question arose at the trial of Colocotroni, who was condemned to death for acts “ declared to be crimes in the laws sanctioned by the Assembly of Astros,” which were announced by the Attorney General, Mr. Masson, as “ at this time (May, 1834) in full vigour.”—See p. 272.

† The ejection, at the instigation of Lord Palmerston, of two individuals from Greece, was a precedent for such acts. Those individuals were Members of a Royal Regency, constituted by treaty between independent powers.

prohibited from permitting the introduction into Greece of the same Usiglio."

Thus the act which calls forth the invective of the English Minister against the successor of Count Armansperg turns out to be a measure of the Archchancellor, whose system Sir Edmund Lyons had represented to be so entirely constitutional, and above all things so "national." But, what is the position of an English Minister, who, in imputing to a foreign Secretary of State the odium of an anti-national policy, stands convicted by the accused party of having himself been the partizan of that system, and of having obtained for its consolidation the whole support of England, by representing it to be the very reverse of what he subsequently admits it to be, when continued by another? *

• It is a subject of deep regret to me, that, in exposing the policy that has been pursued in Greece, I have been under the necessity of making mention of a gentleman with whom I have lived on friendly terms, and to whom I am indebted for acts of courtesy and civility. Sir Edmund Lyons will recollect how early and how earnestly I pressed upon his consideration circumstances, which left me no doubt as to the character of Count Armansperg's views and policy.

The reply of M. Rudhart shows, that even the constitutional forms respected by Capodistrias had been done away with.

“M. Usiglio,” says M. Rudhart, “has been expelled, by the express order of the King; and, permit me to observe, that in so doing his Majesty exercised a right for which he is responsible to no one.”

Lord Palmerston's dread of a change in the government of Greece will become intelligible, on a perusal of the following extract of his speech to the House of Commons, in August, 1836 :—

“I can assure the Committee, that nothing can be more contrary to the truth than that the government of Greece is arbitrary and tyrannical, conducted on arbitrary and tyrannical principles, and supported by barbarian troops. The measures of Count Armansperg, during the Regency, have been of a different nature.”

“I assure those Honourable Members who have given us such a dismal picture of Greece, that her government is a national government, and that the efforts of those who are now at the head of it are steadily directed to make it more strictly so.”

It might be expected, that the exposure of this system, through the publication of the correspondence between Sir Edmund Lyons and

the Minister of Greece, would have compelled the British Secretary of State, out of a mere sense of shame, to have recalled an agent who has been so committed, so compromised, and so insulted without reparation or redress, and who, putting every consideration of political standing and diplomatic character aside, must henceforward lose every chance of confidence and influence whatever.

But, in the tortuous policy in which Lord Palmerston was involved, the recall of Sir Edmund Lyons became impossible.

His Lordship could not have recalled him without bringing home a witness against himself; but to take this step, would have been a denunciation of the past policy of England in Greece. It would have aroused against England the very men whom she had supported, by giving influence to their position, and credibility to their testimony.

They would have asserted, and truly asserted, that their party and principles had been supported by England; that their opponents, through the persecution of England, had been exasperated against *them*; that they them-

selves had existed only through the support of England ; and that, by the recall of a Minister representing those principles, the majority of the nation, held in respect before, would now wreak their vengeance upon the faithful clients of the venerated Cabinet of St. James's, upon the admirers of the enlightened Minister who directed its councils.

Accordingly, a million of francs were sent out in a French man of war to support M. Rudhart ; and, in furtherance of Lord Palmerston's policy, of ruling by " antagonistic principles," Sir Edmund Lyons was maintained in his position.

CHAPTER XI.

Final overthrow of the Greek State. Illegality of the entire series of Financial measures.

THE national property of Greece and the revenues of the state are mortgaged for the interest and capital of the loan guaranteed by the three Allies. After the proceeds of this loan are expended, it will be impossible for her to raise more money, seeing she has no further security to offer. Greece is herself mortgaged for this loan. Greece already owes, for the interest and sinking fund of the first and second instalments alone, £240,000; and the system of administration and government established for that country has necessitated an expenditure amounting to a third more than the receipts of her treasury, so that she requires, to sustain existence, a sum not far short of £200,000

a year.* The third instalment amounts to £800,000, of which sum England and France have advanced, judging by the correspondence from Greece, either two or three instalments of £40,000 each. The King of Bavaria has to be reimbursed more than £200,000 ; so that from the £800,000 have to be deducted £240,000 interest and sinking fund already due, and at least £320,000 either advanced already or to be refunded to the King of Bavaria,† making £560,000, so that the remainder of the third instalment will barely suffice to prolong the existence of Greece for this year.

But Russia has avowed her determination to enforce the system of liquidation, to apply this third instalment to that purpose, and to appropriate, if necessary, the national lands and the receipts of the Greek treasury to the payment of the interest and capital of her portion of the guaranteed loan. Russia will not, therefore, advance, or, at all

* The sum paid by Greece as revenue, over and above the local expenditure as tithes to the support of Turkish troops, and as rent for land to Turkish proprietors, exceeded, as above stated, £200,000 per annum.

† The King of Bavaria, indignant at the policy of the British Secretary of State, has taken the unusual step of appealing, in an autograph letter, directly to Queen Victoria.

events, she has the power to withhold, her portion of the third instalment amounting to £333,000, whilst on the 1st of March she had the sum of £80,000 to claim, as interest and sinking fund then due on her share of the two first instalments.

But this sum of £413,000 amounts to nearly the whole sum available to Greece, even in the event of England and France abandoning their claim to the interest and sinking fund for their first advances. Russia, therefore, almost from the present hour, has the power of withholding the supplies from Greece. Bankruptcy stares her in the face—bankruptcy attended with convulsion, and followed by anarchy, with Russia for a creditor holding a lien over her body. It is not my province to inquire what international use Russia may make of this position, whether she will organize Greece with a view of acting through a separate diplomacy on the powers of Europe, and of disorganizing more effectually the Ottoman Empire, by allowing to the Greeks certain calculated prerogatives, *

* In Turkey subjects of the Porte, by swearing allegiance to Russia, become relieved from taxes and local jurisdiction. The fearful means of disorganization thus acquired exhibit the ability with which such engines of power are prepared and used.

while this inestimable nursery of seamen will be prepared for manning the fleets of Sevastopol. I cannot venture to prognosticate whether Russia will use the financial authority which she has thus tranquilly and silently acquired to arrest the machinery of Greek Government at once, whether she will herself, having got it completely under control, support its extravagance by subsidies, or reduce its expenditure within the limits of its resources, or whether she will still continue to delude the governments of England and France into the necessity of supporting its actual corruption by contributions, and maintain it as a national pauper union at their joint expence, in order to exhibit to the eyes of mankind the imbecility of the statesmen who rule the first people upon earth. Russia may do all these things. The position in which she stands in Greece is the most splendid triumph ever achieved by diplomacy. By the very means of her antagonist has she rendered a state, which despised and insulted her, her bondsman. Through that bondsman has she exercised a controlling power over the policy of England, France, and Bavaria, whilst through the position which these have assumed in the East, and the connexion be-

tween Greece and the Ottoman Empire, she has half undermined that empire, and obtained the means of organizing a body of seamen capable of manning the joint fleets of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali when she gets them into her possession.

But, are there no means by which this vast design can be frustrated, and the peaceable existence of that state prolonged, which it has cost us efforts of such an extraordinary character to call into life, in opposition to every national interest of our own? Of course, a minister of superior mind in England, and conversant with the spirit and the interests of the East, could at once change the face of things by a solitary declaration, or by a single speech. But this portion of national education is wanting. Here we have confessedly the most important and absorbing of European complications based upon questions of Eastern institutions, interests, and feelings, while there is not a public man who has thought of making a study of such questions, and, while respecting them, we are, and all along have been, dependent for every idea and every detail on the information of our enemy.

But, looking merely at the circumstances of Greece herself—are there no means by which this

catastrophe can be prevented? Greece can only be saved by tearing the financial bonds which have been imposed upon her by the Alliance, and these bonds are fortunately illegal and invalid. They have been unrecognized by the "Greek State;" they have been carried through by agency destitute of the characters of legality, and they are in direct opposition to stipulations of acts of Parliament.

The National Assembly of Argos, in 1829, entrusted Capodistrias with full powers to negotiate with the Allies, on the condition that the arrangements should not be binding on the nation, unless they received the ratification of a National Assembly.

The only power entrusted to the Allies was authority to elect a sovereign. This power they exercised in the Convention of May; but, so far from considering themselves entitled to legislate in opposition to the National Assembly, they recognized, in that treaty, the "Greek State," as a power distinct from and co-equal with the Royal Authority; and submitted to the Assembly the choice of King Otho for ratification. Strange to say, the other arrangements were withheld from the Assembly, who, in reply to the announcement

of the choice of the Alliance, ratified only the election of the king. They protested against the interference of the Residents in their measures to secure the payment of the claims of the English capitalists, and against any acts of the Alliance which might injure their national credit. As the "Greek State" has never since been called together, the acts connected with financial arrangements have not been legalized by receiving the national assent.

The Greek nation, the moment it has the power of doing so, will protest against the guaranteed loan, because no authority for contracting it was given by the National Assembly, and because the contract has not been ratified by the Greek state. Moreover, the conditions of that contract are in violation of anterior decisions of the Parliament of Greece, because it appropriates as mortgage for this loan, the national lands which had been reserved to meet the engagements contracted thereupon with British capitalists in 1824, 1825. Further, the loan had not even been ratified by the Regency of Greece, when the bonds were issued. The Anglo-Greek, French-Greek, and Russo-Greek, bonds are therefore, as regards any obligation on the "sovereign of Greece and the Greek state," waste paper.

But, if rights and forms have been so culpably neglected in this transaction that Greece can hold herself free from the obligations which we have contracted in her name, these obligations can be no more binding on England than they are binding on Greece ; and the responsibility must fall upon the individuals who were the organs of this policy, or who were charged with the management of these affairs, and the execution of these measures.

But, supposing that these acts had been entirely binding upon Greece, still would they not be binding upon England, unless they are found to be in accordance with the engagements entered into by the sovereign of England and the Parliament ; and, as the Convention of May the 7th is adopted by the act of Parliament as the ground of its enactments, a departure from the stipulations of that Convention becomes a violation of the laws of England.

When Parliament gave its sanction to a loan "to be contracted by the king of Greece," it sanctioned a loan to be legally contracted according to the constitution of the country, and did not pass an act interfering with the internal legislation of Greece. That loan could not have been legal, without the authorization or ratification of the

National Assembly. The first was never given; the latter, up to this time, has not been obtained. The loan is, therefore, informal and illegal.

Section 6 of Article 12 of the Convention stipulates that —

“6°. The Sovereign of Greece and the Greek State shall be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of such instalments of the loan as may have been raised under the guarantee of the three Courts, the first revenues of the State, in such a manner that the actual receipts of the Greek Treasury shall be devoted, *first of all*, to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for any other purpose, until those payments, on account of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three Courts, shall have been completely secured for the current year.”

This condition has not been fulfilled. The same paragraph goes on to enact that —

“The diplomatic Representatives of the three Courts in Greece shall be especially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the last-mentioned stipulation.”

This stipulation has been equally infringed. The Convention stipulated that “the second and third instalments” were to be raised only “according to the necessities of the Greek state.” Lord Palmerston falsely established that necessity, by, in the first

instance, fostering anarchy, by fomenting a schism in the Regency, and then by presenting accounts exhibiting a false deficit, or by sanctioning a real robbery of the Treasury.

The conduct, therefore, of her Majesty's Secretary of State in the financial affairs of Greece has not been "*conformable to the tenor of his Majesty's engagements, as specified in the said Convention.*"

The foundation of this Convention was the joint action of the Allies, and that union was rendered obligatory on each by the stipulations of the Convention. Lord Palmerston having determined on advancing singly money to Greece, introduces a bill into Parliament for the avowed purpose of separating England from her allies, and therefore of abrogating the Convention of May the 7th. I do not stop to point out this monstrous and unheard of violation of international law, which could only have been suffered by the parties to that Treaty, because England was acting against herself; but I merely for the present beg the reader's attention to this point, that the act of England, if maintained, by which she paid separately any portion of the third instalment, became a violation of the Convention of the 7th of May, upon the validity of

which Convention alone rests her claim upon Greece, and the validity of the whole transaction as regarding the loan.

But the act of Parliament under which Lord Palmerston has advanced the third instalment is in contradiction with itself, because, though it enables her Majesty to guarantee the interest and sinking fund of her portion of the third instalment, without concert with her allies, it does not sanction any payment of money, except “conformably to the tenor of her Majesty’s engagements, as specified in the said Convention,”* which Convention is based upon

* The act of Parliament of 1836, (c. xciv. 6 and 7 W. IV.,) enables his Majesty “to guarantee the amount of the interest and sinking fund of such portion or portions of the third and last instalments of the loan to be contracted by the King of Greece, under the provisions of the 12th article of the aforesaid Convention, as, from time to time, may appear advisable to his Majesty, notwithstanding that the King of the French and the Emperor of Russia, or either of them, shall refuse or delay to guarantee the like portion or portions of the said third and last instalment of the loan aforesaid.

“And the Commissioners of the Treasury are empowered, from time to time, out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, to cause to be issued such sums as shall be required for the payment of any interest or sinking fund *agreed to be paid by his Majesty under the said Convention*, and when the same may, from time to time respectively, become payable, and so long as the same should be payable, *conformably to the tenor of his Majesty’s engagements, as specified in the said Convention.*”

the united action of the three Courts, and which expressly stipulates that "the actual receipts shall be devoted first of all to the payment of the interest and sinking fund," which Lord Palmerston has declared to the Russian ambassador that it was not his intention to demand.

The only point upon which we have now to rest is this act of Parliament, which does not authorize the measures for which the Foreign Secretary introduced it, and therefore leaves upon the individual responsibility of the minister the money which he has advanced to Greece.

CHAPTER XII.

Conclusion.

I HAVE now concluded the history of Greece. Henceforward, her story and her destinies are involved in those of Russia. There evidently is no man in England conversant with these interests; and the present Secretary for Foreign Affairs is the only man, at all, master of the details connected with it. He is, therefore, perfectly certain of his game. The simultaneous progress of Russia in Persia and in Greece, the approximation of danger at once for Turkey and for India, will no longer serve to arouse to energy, or to impel to investigation, but to confuse and overwhelm the mind of the inquirer, and to implant amongst us at once the conviction that the nationalities of all Eastern countries have vanished, and that there are no further any means of resisting the power of Russia.

As the case stands at present, we have no diplomacy. We have no man in either House of Parliament acquainted with our Eastern, and, consequently, with our foreign relations. We have no control over the foreign minister. England has no Senate such as that of the United States, no system like that of Russia, no national feeling directed to and guiding the march of foreign policy; and yet she occupies the first station in the universe in the minds of men. She does take an active part in the events of other nations; and consequently, if her action is not directed to national ends, if she is not every where the support of the weak and the ally of the friendless, that influence which she does exercise over men's minds will be used for unhallowed and un-English ends. That power is now placed at the mercy of a single man; while England is not only unprepared to control its exercise, but unconscious of its existence. Nor could a greater political calamity befall the human race than the occupation of the position of Foreign Minister in England, by an individual, who, through incapacity or design, renders England contemptible in the eyes of other nations, at a moment when three great Powers are pursuing

aggressive designs in the four quarters of the globe.

If such has been the result of the most intense and sustained diplomatic action which any period of peace has developed, in which the intensest interest of England has been concentrated, and in furtherance of which diplomatic action, battles have been fought, wars sanctioned, millions expended—does it not stand declared that the diplomatic means of England have been turned against herself? Can any Englishman come to the conviction of this truth without saying: “If our diplomatic system cannot be wholly reconstructed, let it be entirely abolished!”

Here we have in Greece the most complete failure that ever was exhibited to mankind — the most complete triumph on the part of Russia. Every thing was in the hands of England, without our advancing a step to acquire it. Every thing is in the hands of Russia, by the efforts of England to give it to her. To effect this loss, England has sacrificed nearly £5,000,000,* has lost every claim to gratitude, and abandoned every right to remu-

* The salary of a Minister in Greece under the Regency was only £400 a year.

neration. Happy would it be for her if this misfortune could teach her what the power of diplomacy is. Applying the conclusions to which an investigation of the affairs of Greece has led me, to former periods of our history, from the year 1763 to the present hour, I am fully persuaded that the wars in which we have been engaged, and consequently the debt with which we are burthened, have arisen out of the absence of diplomatic intelligence and system. It is a remarkable thing that the Americans, who have so closely imitated their parent state even while they dreaded aristocratic influence, gave to their Senate the control of diplomatic relations and even appointments, showing that they felt the deficiency in this respect of the Constitution of Great Britain, and proving, by the result, how judicious was the change.

There are many men in this country who, never having dreamt of this diplomatic power pervading the world and secretly regulating events, laugh at the idea of danger from Russian aggression, because of the smallness of her revenue, the inefficiency of her army, and the insignificance of her fleet. But what are revenue, fleets, and armies, compared with the power of using England for her ends!—of using

the only counterpoise among the nations of the earth to schemes of dismemberment and projects of aggression, for the purpose of furthering those very projects ! With such a state of things, universal dominion is no longer an airy vision, but a positive and inevitable reality. And what can place in stronger light the power which may be acquired through diplomacy, than the conviction, in the mind of every man who has deeply studied and maturely reflected on our Eastern relations, that an able and patriotic minister in England might at the present moment oppose an insuperable barrier to the progress of Russia, by the consolidation of the nationality of Turkey and of Persia ; and thus prevent a catastrophe which, in a few years, it may cost England a hundred millions to avert, or in attempting to avert which she may finally sink ? As by Diplomacy, England might avert that danger, so by Diplomacy is Russia enabled to compass it—and to Diplomacy, alone, if she does succeed, will she be indebted for success.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE MASSACRE AT ARGOS, AND THE FORMATION OF A MIXED GOVERNMENT.

Letter from M. A. Mavrocordato to M. F. Thiersch.

(Translated from the Greek.)

Lepanto, 25th March, 1832.

SIR,

After the conversations we held together, when I had the pleasure of forming your personal acquaintance at Hydra, you cannot doubt the pleasure with which I have learnt the choice of our Prince. I was not here at the moment when the three naval captains of the Allied Powers came to announce this election to the commandant of the fortress, as well as to the extraordinary delegates sent by our government. They immediately expressed, by a salute of twenty-one guns, the joy caused by an event so propitious for unfortunate Greece; and they communicated it to the army encamped in the neighbourhood, which received it with indescribable delight. General Botzaris accompanied me to this town, where I arrived four days ago; but the three captains of the navy were already gone. We then learnt the communications which they made to us in the name of the Residents and the Admirals. Neither the commissioners of the government, nor the commander of the fortress, could differ in opinion with regard to the answer to be given them: they therefore immediately sent,

to the commission of the government on which they depend, the communications which had reached them, conforming themselves entirely to the orders which they received from that quarter; nevertheless, as individuals, they addressed to those gentlemen some observations which will assuredly be conveyed to the knowledge of the Residents, and which appear to me to merit their attention.

I think that the most appropriate means of pacifying Greece was not to apply the Protocol to the power established at Nauplia; and I hope that the lieutenant of the sovereign may arrive as soon as possible, because in every other case I foresee great calamities. I will not enter into an examination *of the acts of violence which have been committed in the elections*, nor occupy myself with showing *that legal forms have been equally violated in the establishment of the government at Nauplia*. You were present in the country, and you are fully informed on all that has passed; consequently it is superfluous to speak to you on that point; but it is necessary here to bring forward a matter which deserves the greatest attention, and which, by what accident I know not, has escaped the attention of the Residents. Blood has been shed at Argos. The number of those who quitted it to retire to Corinth amounted to 1200 armed men. United with their countrymen and with other allies in Western Greece, they at present form a body of more than 5000 men. The greater part of them are animated by feelings of revenge. All of them look upon Count Augustin Capodistrias as the author of the blood shed at Argos and elsewhere. Is it, then, such an easy matter to persuade them to acknowledge this person, for a single instant, as the chief of the nation, and to submit to his authority? *The Residents, in their communication, speak to us of the responsibility that will weigh on each of those who will not conform to the interpretation which they have given to the Protocol*. This may make an impression on some of the military chiefs; but suppose the latter were to retire, and that 5000 or 6000 armed men remain

without control, and without any other impulse than the desire of vengeance, who then will assume the responsibility of the events which such a state of things must necessarily bring about?

Do not imagine that a particular position of my own leads me to express myself in this manner. Fortunately, I bear no public character. I arrived here fifteen days ago, with MM. Andrea Soutzos, D. Meletopulos, and N. Deliani, to join M. Rouphos; and in the event of the battalions of Western Greece passing into the Peloponnesus, to repair thither at the same time, in order to organize the affairs of the interior. As the troops have not yet set out, we have remained here, without taking any part in affairs. After learning the object of the communications, we wrote to Perachora, whither we should have gone immediately, if the voyage by sea had not become endangered by the arrival of two vessels of the government of Nauplia; consequently, we shall shortly go by land, in order to meet the other members of the Congress. If they approve of the resolution of separating, we also shall return, each to his own country. But what advice shall we give to General Botzaris, as well as to the others, with regard to the conduct they ought to pursue? Which responsibility will weigh heaviest on them in the eyes of the nation, the prince, and their allies—that imposed upon them by the communications of the Residents, or that which will weigh upon them as the result of the pillage, the murders, and other calamities, for which we must be prepared, if the chiefs separate from their corps? I feel the grave nature of this last question the more, as I am able to appreciate the influence which the presence of such chiefs exercises over the soldiers, to soften the evils inseparable from civil war.

I learnt, on arriving here, that all the troops had marched to blockade Missolonghi. I hardly require to mention to you the impression which the bare name of that town produced upon me. I know the sentiments of its inhabitants, and I know how much they have already suffered from the troops which the government

of Nauplia has sent thither — not for the purpose of taking care of the town, but to repress the manifestation of the spirit by which it is animated. It was easy to anticipate what would be the fate of those unfortunates, if they were to be blockaded. I therefore hastened to meet the generals, to engage them to keep their troops at a distance; and I learnt, to my great satisfaction, that, entertaining the same apprehensions, they were already disposed to execute the measure which I was anxious to counsel them to take, whatever was the animosity of their soldiers who were ready to fall upon the town.

I repeat that it is highly desirable that the lieutenant of the prince should arrive as soon as possible. Every one is disposed to recognize and obey him; but, if his arrival should unhappily be deferred, I see no other means than that of uniting without arms, in some spot or other, even were it at Argos, all the deputies, both those who are true deputies, as well as the men of wood.* They would exclusively occupy themselves with naming an administrative council, composed of three or of five members, after which they would separate. This council, destined to govern the country until the arrival of the Regent, ought to be mixed, and to offer the necessary guarantees to all parties. It might immediately decree the choice of other deputies, who, on the arrival of the Regent, would join the Congress.

I know of old how much you are interested in the welfare of Greece. The choice of the Prince unites you still more to its inhabitants, and your journeys in the country must have shown you the opinion of the public respecting this choice. Consequently, you know how easy it is to establish the happiness of the Prince and of his people. Every thing, therefore, is possible, provided the most advisable means be taken to put an end to the calamities which afflict all true patriots. &c. &c.

MAVROCORDATO.

* Names given to the Capodistrian party, elected mostly by force. In most of the electoral colleges, they carried the elections by club law.

First Letter from M. Thiersch to the three Residents.

Corinth, 26th March, 1833. 2

Gentlemen,

I conceive it to be my duty to inform you, day by day, of the events which are passing before my eyes, and of the measures which I might have taken to prevent the calamities which we fear.

I arrived at Argos yesterday evening at half-past ten, and until one o'clock in the morning I held conferences with Prince Ypsilanti on the state of affairs in his neighbourhood, and on the other side of the Isthmus. I again found, in his conversation, the profound knowledge of the affairs of Greece, and the just and impartial judgment which characterize him; and I hope that his counsels, which I shall have the honour of communicating to you on my return, will be of great use to me.

The Roumeliotes have connexions and powerful parties in all the towns of the Morea, who cannot perhaps be disarmed without some change, conformable to the opposite opinion, being effected in the government.

The town of Argos was in great consternation. Men who had arrived in the course of the day from Corinth had declared that the Roumeliotes were on the point of crossing the Isthmus; and that, after the example of Salona, they threatened to sow their grain on the ashes of the towns which should oppose them in arms.

On the morning before my departure, I received a deputation from the citizens, and a large portion of the population followed me along the road. During the journey, I received a courier from the municipality of the district, who begged me to give him information on the spot as to what he had to fear or to hope, in order that the town might take its measures according to circumstances. I shall take this man with me to Perachora, whence he will serve me also as a courier for the communications which

I shall address to you from that spot before passing on to Megara.

All the villages on the road to Corinth are deserted. As in the time of the Turks, the whole population has fled to the mountains and the caves.

The news that we received on the road was so contradictory, that at Argos and Nauplia some was very alarming. A well-dressed man, coming from Corinth, told us that he had seen that very morning, with his own eyes, the town attacked by Hadgi Christo, coming from Megara; that the troops of the government defended themselves in their tambouri, and that the Roumeliotes had sent detachments to turn the position of Corinth. Happily, this news was all an invention, and I only mention it as a proof of the alarming reports which are perhaps designedly spread to keep up the consternation and despair of the people. I arrived at three o'clock at Corinth. The town is entirely deserted: there are only military posts of armed peasants. I there held conferences with the governor, a wise and moderate man, worthy of confidence. He regards, as salutary measures, the two steps which I took before my departure from Nauplia, viz.: 1st, to procure the liberation from prison of the two brothers Mavromichæli, to send them to their country to keep it in check, and to organize it in the interest of good order and their new Prince; second, to engage Zaïmi to go to Patrass, and to act there with his friends in the same sense. In every case, it is essential to be sure of the south and the north of the Peloponnesus, and to restrain the movement of the Roumeliotes (if it takes place) to the smallest space possible. The governor considers it as equally essential to save the Peloponnesus from invasion, to transport, as soon as possible, some French battalions to the Isthmus, which should establish themselves at Hexamilia, because he is persuaded that the Roumeliotes will not advance if they know the Isthmus to be occupied by the French. In order to complete the measure taken by the vessels which are to be stationed at Calamachi, he

considers it necessary to detach at least one of the three vessels from the station at Patrass, to place it near Loutraki, on the side opposite the Isthmus.

The troops of the government are concentrating here. There are two battalions of the Morea in the town, and one at Hexamilia; but the whole do not amount to perhaps more than 600 men. Near the town are the cavalry of Kalergi, amounting to 300 men; and the light cavalry of Koliopulo, amounting to 350; 500 Typeki are coming from Eleusis; but the troops are not paid, and it appears that, excepting Kalergi's people, the government cannot count upon their fidelity. The example of Hadgi Christo speaks for itself.

To-morrow, M. Kalergi intends to take up his position at Loutraki with his cavalry, to show the Roumeliotes that he is ready to receive them. As this is only to be a demonstration, or rather a useless provocation, since he could not keep the position with cavalry, surrounded as it is with mountains, I advised him to defer his projected movement at least for a few days, in order that the Roumeliotes may not think that it is I who send the cavalry in pursuit of them.

On the other hand, all the Roumeliotes are moving to concentrate themselves at Megara. Chrysiottis, with the troops of Lepanto, quitted that position four days ago, to repair to the rendezvous. He will be to-day or to-morrow at Salona, and from Salona he will, in four or five days, reach Megara. It is not probable that any thing will be attempted before his arrival. Time will be gained to come to an understanding, if it be still possible, which is much doubted here. The animosity of the soldiers against the present government, and especially against its chief, joined to the hopes attached to an invasion, must be such that their captains would not dare to restrain them on the other side of the Isthmus. Nevertheless, I must not turn back; but, in the most fortunate contingency, we must have the means of providing for them out of the Morea. I therefore beg, Gentle-

men, and I conjure you to seek to obtain, under the form of a temporary loan, at least the sum of 10,000 dollars, in the supposition and in the event that all may be arranged, and that this could be done by providing for the pressing wants of the troops.

The reports of the strength of the Roumeliotes vary very considerably. It appears, however, that they might unite about 3000 men at Megara; and I look upon this number of determined and hardy troops as more than sufficient to force the passage. It is on this account that the measure which the government had taken to make its soldiers retire, if superior forces were to present themselves, would be, in every sense, the most adapted to stop the useless effusion of blood, and to prevent the exasperation from becoming extreme, the consequence of which would complete the destruction of the Peloponnesus. I beg of you, Gentlemen, as there is still time, to come to an understanding on this point with the government. Every thing must be done to hinder the movement at Megara from taking place; but, when once it has commenced, when superior forces are once on the march, we must yield to necessity, in order not to aggravate, by an obstinacy destitute of a real aim, the evils which already weigh on Greece. I shall have the honour of writing to you to-morrow evening from Perachora. Till then, I can only proceed on suppositions.

No. 3.

Second Letter to the Same.

Perachora, 27th March, 1832.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to address to you this morning my first letter of yesterday by the post from Corinth. I continue my communications by simply relating what I have seen and heard. Early in the morning there was a great disturbance among the soldiers at Corinth, before the governor's house. They brought bread which had been distributed to them, fearing that it had been mixed with chalk and mud. In their excitement, they spoke

of vengeance and desertion. Their officer was himself at the head of this movement, pale with rage. I have heard here that, latterly, a detachment of Roumeliotes had seized a transport with corn, which the commissaries at Corinth had sent to be sold at Ægina. It appears that, in order to cover the deficit, they had mixed with it some bad substance or other, in order to support the discontented troops opposed to the enemy.

I wished to have spoken to M. Kalergi, in order to know his means and his opinions on the present state of affairs. He wrote to us that very night, that he would come, with all his cavalry, to escort me to Loutraki. I waited for him till nine o'clock, when this cavalry, consisting of about 200 men, defiled, in very bad condition, amongst the ruins of the deserted town. There were only a few groups of soldiers, dispersed on the walls and hills, who had come to see them. I saw M. Kalergi. After having observed to him how much inconvenience would result from such an expedition under present circumstances, he replied that it was only one of his ordinary promenades on the Isthmus, and that he did not intend to establish himself at Loutraki. To this I had nothing to say, and I began my journey with him at the head of the cavalry of the government. On the road, he expressed to me the hope of retaining his men under their standards until the approaching arrangement of affairs, although they were ill paid, and badly clothed and fed. A short time afterwards, it was announced to him, that that very evening eight men of his troop had gone over to the Roumeliotes. He only asked whether they had taken their horses with them: they told him no, and he passed on.

On arriving at the outposts of the Roumeliotes, I found some difficulty in being received. As a courier, sent by M. Coletti with despatches and letters for you, Gentlemen, had been stopped by order of the government, and sent back from Argos, they thought themselves here obliged to take similar measures. Nevertheless, my name, and my intention to speak with Coletti about

the arrangement of affairs, sufficed to open the road to me. Having arrived almost at the summit of the barren and rugged mountains which terminate the Isthmus on the side of Megara, and after having passed the rocks to the north, I was much surprised to find the plains and the valleys very fertile and well cultivated, the peasants peaceably occupied in the fields, the villages uninjured, the hills covered with flocks, and all this in the midst of a numerous soldiery, supporting the greatest privations. The contrast was very striking between this security and good order on the one side, and, on the other, the complete devastation which has almost entirely destroyed the reviving cultivation of the beautiful district of Corinth.

The appearance of the cavalry of M. Kalergi in the plain had put the militia in movement. Believing that they came to annoy them, they run from all parts to take up a position, and defend themselves. I had some difficulty in persuading them that the cavalry had only approached so near in order to accompany me. In two hours and a half I arrived opposite to Perachora. The village is situated on the slope of a hill, which terminates a small plain, resplendent with the beauty of an Hellenic spring. The village itself is full of soldiers, capitani, deputies, and men assembled from all parts of Greece. Every one received me with marks of joy and friendly confidence. I had no difficulty in convincing myself, that the satisfaction at the choice of the future sovereign of Greece was equally general and sincere. I was conducted to M. Coletti: he lives in a peasant's hut, rather better than the others. The room was already crammed with soldiers, and other persons, who had come to see and hear me. They maintained the most respectful silence during our conversation respecting Prince Otho, the acceptance of his Majesty the King of Bavaria, in the name of his son, and the hopes of a happy futurity for Greece, which was attached to this important event, destined to terminate the sufferings of this good and unhappy people. After this general conversation, M. Coletti whis-

pered to them to leave us alone, and they immediately retired as quietly as they had listened to us. I then explained to him the object of my mission ; I spoke to him of the general alarm of the Morea ; of the necessity in which he was placed, towards the Alliance, towards Greece, and her new Prince, of remaining in his present position, at least until the approaching arrival of the Regent ; of the danger he ran in attempting a movement into the Morea, which would be covered with ruins, and which would render the establishment of any durable order of things, in conformity with the plans of the Alliance, impossible, &c. &c. M. Coletti entered frankly into the subject ; he did not conceal the grave difficulties raised by the recognition of the government established at Argos, or the dangers of opposing diplomatic decisions already taken. At the same time, he declared to me, that not one of the men who acknowledged his authority found in the government of Count Augustin the character required by the Protocol ; that every one, down to the lowest soldier, was intimately convinced that this government was neither national, nor established according to the laws required by the Powers ; that, on the contrary, it was the government of a faction which had raised itself by fraud, and the first act of which had been the premeditated assassination of the deputies of the nation. He added, that, after the death of the President, the only recognized authority was the Administrative Commission, of which he was a member ; that Count Augustin and Colocotroni having deposed the power which they enjoyed as members of that Commission, the Greek government was concentrated in his person alone, because he had neither been able, nor was it his duty, to lay down his authority in the presence of a mass of deputies, against whose decided illegality he had solemnly protested. Consequently, as on the arrival of the Protocol the hypothesis on which it rested did not exist, and as there was no government yet established according to all legal forms, it was necessary, in the first place, to have laboured to form one, in order to be able to re-

cognize one, by uniting all the deputies chosen for the Assembly of Argos in a free spot, and in insisting on the removal of all armed force, in thus bringing about a legal and tranquil solution. After having attained this sure and easy result, we might have ended where we had begun, since we were called upon to proclaim a government legally constituted, and conformable to the bases settled, by common consent, by the Powers who protected Greece. M. Coletti concluded, that such being the state of the question, they were strictly within the terms of the Protocol, in seeking to give it a legal solution. Consequently, nothing more was demanded than the meeting of all the deputies of Argos, and the establishment of a government capable of being recognized by the Powers, and to receive at their hands the Prince, as a pledge of the future happiness of unfortunate Greece.

In vain, said he, we have exhausted all peaceful means to attain this end. There only remains for us to commence the struggle with the anti-national party established at Nauplia, and to settle for ever the question between Greece and its most persevering enemies. The contest will neither be long nor bloody, and on the result will depend the future happiness of Greece.

I entreat you, Gentlemen, to observe that, whatever may be my own sentiments, I confine myself entirely to the task of a reporter, being intimately persuaded that, before all things, we must know what others wish, in order to come to an understanding with them.

I come to the invasion of the Morea which is preparing, for the purpose of solving the political problem. I shall endeavour to concentrate the explanations of M. Coletti, which will appear in the course of our conversation.

Whatever, said he, may be the importance of the reflections which you present to persuade me to keep at least within our positions, it is impossible to comply with your proposal; we cannot even delay the issue. The country where we are encamped is entirely exhausted; we have been able to prevent pil-

lage and to maintain order, and I shall appeal to your testimony, as regards what you see around us. But neither the peasants, nor the soldiers, nor any one, finds the means of subsistence; the difficulties opposed to our communications by sea still further increase our distress, and compel us to put an end to it.

Besides this physical difficulty, it is morally and politically impossible for us to remain where we are. It is as a public man, and not as an individual, that I find myself placed by the force of events at the head of a movement which I have not created, and which I can only direct towards a salutary end; but, supposing I were to wish to wait and to allow the chief of the government of Nauplia to arrange the affairs of Greece with the Regent who is to arrive, do you suppose that the military chiefs whom he wished to destroy at Argos would listen for a single instant to my voice? For the most part, grown old in battle against the oppressors of their country, they have sworn to live in the mountains with the wild beasts, rather than support the shame of such a government; and you wish them to remain tranquil under a chief who, with the perfidious designs which we know of, would try to surround the Prince whom all these warriors are determined to cherish and defend as the most precious deposit that Providence has confided to Greece? But, suppose even that we should succeed in gaining over the Capitani scattered from Lepanto to Megara, and that, by a sort of enchantment, they would suddenly wait a few weeks, perhaps a few months, tranquilly, and with their arms crossed, do you suppose that the soldiers would follow their example? All of them are animated by the same sentiment, and urged on by the same passion against the chief of the government of Nauplia and his party. There exists amongst them, for the cause of Greece, an enthusiasm stronger and more pure than any thing that I have witnessed in the brightest days of our revolution. I have no money to pay them; they do not ask me for any. I have nothing to give them to eat; they patiently suffer every privation. Destitute of clothing, they tran-

quilly resign themselves to the rigour of the season. All this in the hope of purging the soil of Greece from its last enemies, and of seeing at length the fate of their country and their own existence secured; and can it be supposed that, after having supported themselves for three months by this only hope, they will abandon the enterprise at the moment when its termination approaches? The thing is impossible! The very mention of such a question, the mere suspicion of such a design, would suffice to break every tie of subordination, and even to expose the lives of their chiefs. And what would be the consequences? At present, we can guarantee that order will be maintained, that persons and properties will be respected; twice a week the soldiers assemble to pronounce, with national ceremonies, a solemn anathema against those who should commit disorders in the country. They will march to Argos with the olive branch at the end of their muskets and on their caps, as a sign of peace. Each band will be accompanied by a certain number of deputies as witnesses and guarantees of their good conduct. But, disturbed in their plan and disbanded, they would fall on the Morea as brigands. The Residents have summoned me to make them lay down their arms; they do not know the Greeks. I know what they would have wished; they do not know what they would have done: they would have desired to prevent disorder, and they would have covered the continent with brigands, and the sea with pirates; and such would be the consequences to-day if we were to follow the counsels you address to us. The only thing we ask of the Residents and the Admirals is to allow us to settle our affairs as Greeks, and not to create obstacles and resistance which would only aggravate the position of Greece, already so unhappy. I hope the affair will be terminated before the arrival of the Regent; the soil of our country will be freed from its most cruel oppressors, and the man whom our first benefactor, the king of Bavaria, shall send us as the tutor of his son, will find the nation united, ready to acknowledge his authority with unlimited confidence, and to

arrange with him the form of government called for by the country and the character of the people.

As regards Prince Otho, you knew my opinion six months ago—it is that also of all my friends—it is the general and very decided opinion of all the nation. Prince Otho is he whom we have desired, whom we should have unanimously elected, if his election had not been impossible. It is with us, Sir, on the side which the nation has chosen, and where all that it possesses of virtue and patriotism resides, that he will find a profound and true attachment; that he will see the destiny of Greece peacefully developed, and that he may sleep in full security under the protection of the last Palikar.

Such, Gentlemen, is the substance of my first conference with M. Coletti. As a faithful reporter, I even made use of the expressions which are employed here, to place things in their true light. The state of events being such as I have described them, I beg you will take into mature deliberation the proposal with which I concluded my first letter, and decide whether, in the event of superior force appearing at the Isthmus, it might not be preferable to leave things to develop themselves without obstacles, and without aggravating, by a useless opposition, evils which, notwithstanding the best intentions of the chiefs and the soldiers, are inseparable from an invading army.

As soon as our conference was finished, the door opened, and every body, soldiers, deputies, and capitani, came to see and to speak to me. I continued these interviews until night, and I found a very great uniformity in the manner of seeing and judging the things which passed and were preparing in the sequel. Still, however, there are many points which I do not yet comprehend, and there are still many influential persons whom I must see, to form an opinion on affairs which have been allowed to become so strangely complicated. M. Coletti proposes that I should accompany him to-morrow to Megara, as it is essential, even in the interest of my mission, to see on the spot the things

which are preparing. I have decided on accepting his invitation, and I shall have the honour of addressing to you my third letter from thence. I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

No. 4.

Third Letter to the Same.

Megara, 29th March, 1832.

Gentlemen,

In my second letter, written on the 27th from Perachora, I explained to you the motives which M. Coletti alleged as proving the necessity of making the movement on Argos. As I did not choose to trust to this answer alone, which he gave me as chief of the government of Perachora, I begged him to place me in a position to be able to address my remonstrances directly both to the deputies assembled at Perachora and to the military chiefs united at Megara. In order to comply with my proposal, he convoked the deputies for the following day. The assembly took place in a cottage sufficiently large, and entirely filled with the members of the council. The public assembled in great numbers around, looking on through the doors and windows. The president of the assembly was seated on the ground near the fire, surrounded by a circle of deputies, placed in the same manner; all of them were old men, and still wore the same clothes which they had saved from the catastrophe at Argos. The younger ones listened and stood up behind them. I was invited to take my place at the right hand of the President. Beginning, then, as if in a circle of friends, a conversation on the state of Greece, on Prince Otho, and on the hopes of tranquillity which reposed on his election, I had an opportunity of convincing myself that all of them were satisfied with his election, and disposed to surround his government with the wishes and strength of the nation. Finally, I explained the motive of my mission amidst the silence of this mournful and attentive assembly. After having listened

to me, an old man, a deputy of Missolonghi, who formed one of the circle, rose, then placed himself on his knees, and spoke to me nearly as follows: "We have received with much pleasure the conciliating and benevolent words addressed to us by one of the sincerest friends of our country; but we cannot follow your counsels. We seek to obtain our rights, which men have attempted to smother in our blood and to bury in the ashes of Argos; we fulfil our duty in repairing thither, and we shall ourselves march at the head of the columns of our warriors. You speak to us of the French troops whom we might meet on the road. Our soldiers, if attacked, will not fire upon a nation who is the benefactress of Greece, but they will continue their march. We ourselves, strong only in the purity of our consciences, shall await, with our arms crossed on our breasts, the fate prepared for us, and, in dying under the blows of those arms which we cherish, we shall at least prove to posterity that we deserved a better fate."

I am aware of the impropriety of mixing sentiment with such grave transactions; but there was something so touching in the voice, and the peaceful and modest demeanour of the man who thus spoke, that I felt moved, and some tears escaped me in spite of myself; the emotion spread instantaneously through the assembly. In order not to derogate from my sad character of an impartial observer, I rose, addressing them a few kind words of interest which their position inspired.

Friday, the 30th March, 1832.

The next morning we set off for Megara; at a league from that town, M. Coletti found the military chiefs under a tree, where they were united to receive us. Notwithstanding my protesting that I had only to fulfil a mission which perhaps would not please them, they received me with many marks of interest and kindness, testified their lively joy at the election of their prince, and declared their resolution to cherish and defend

him. In approaching Megara, the first column of the expedition covered one of the two hills below which the town is situated. They had unfurled their standards, and received us with discharges of musketry and the liveliest demonstrations of joy. The demogerontes and the clergy were ranged at the entrance of the town, in the midst of the men; the women, following the Greek fashion, looked on from a distance, being stationed at the west angle of the town.

They had prepared the best house for me at Megara, although it had neither chairs nor tables, and contained nothing but some old carpets which had been extended in the corner.

The soldiers even had ornamented the house with branches of myrtle; the staircase, the court, and even the street, was full of it. These soldiers were not better dressed than the other irregular Greek troops; but they appeared to me more restricted to what was strictly necessary than the troops of the government, and, in truth, they only received half an oke of flour a-day, and nothing more. Still the same order reigned amongst them as at Perachora, and the people of the country assured me that they were never tormented by their demands. It was only the Albanians under Grivas, who, notwithstanding the severity of the discipline, committed from time to time excesses. They were on the point of executing on that very day one of these people for having beaten an unhappy peasant who refused him bread.

In order to enable me to know the sentiments and the intentions of the military chiefs, M. Coletti invited them to visit me, in order to hear my proposals, and to make me a witness of the council of war which was to be forthwith held. The scene was nearly the same as that of Perachora. The only addition was that of superb pipes and coffee, with countenances beaming with heroism and frankness; add to this the rich and picturesque costume of the Roumeliote captains, which gives such relief to their martial gait. After hearing my proposals, General Rassos, whose athletic figure is one of the finest models I ever saw, replied,

that these were matters to be proposed to the government which they recognized, as the only legitimate government in Greece, and whose orders they executed. If this government, in forming the resolution to enter the Morea, had counted upon their assent, it had not deceived itself. There exists, he said, a general excitement against the chief of the authority at Nauplia, and the men who associated together to organize and execute the assassination of the deputies at Argos. Between them and us there can be no truce. You tell us that we ought to address our griefs to the Regent who is about to come, but we desire to be in a position to do so. We take our consciences to witness, that we are far from wishing to force decisions. Let him come, and we shall deposit at his feet these arms which have served us in the battles of Missolonghi and Thermopylæ. Let him command us to go whither he chooses; by day or by night, we will obey his orders; but we wish to bring about a state of things to enable him to give his orders, and that he should not have to form his opinions from sinister counsels. We do not choose that he should become the organ of a faction which thirst for our blood.

There was much to be said on this point. One might hope at least to gain time. But on that very day the news arrived from Corinth that the National Assembly had established Count Augustin Capodistrias as the almost absolute chief of the state, and that he was to remain in power until the arrival of the Prince. They pretended even to know that by spending 40,000 dollars they had induced his deputies to sign an address to the Conference of London, in order to demand Count Augustin Capodistrias as the tutor of the Prince. They wrote word that his government hawked about, in several districts of the Peloponnesus, addresses sent from Nauplia, and written in the same sense, and copies of them were sent. Hereupon all hope of being able to restrain the torrent within bounds was lost. "You see clearly what all this means," they added. "In reality, they wish for no Prince. You know the last word of the faction; if this govern-

ment acquires consistency, Count Augustin will remain chief of the state, and no stranger will govern Greece. In the event, however, of its being necessary to accept the Prince, they will only wish for him as their organ, in order to throw upon him all the blame and the infamy of this detestable government. Hitherto we have fought for our country ; in future, we shall fight also for our Prince. ‘ *The Prince and the Constitution.*’ This is our motto, and we will all of us die rather than see the fate of Greece decided according to the views of the faction.”

The excitement increased ; the chiefs tried to engage me to join their cause, to be a witness of their good conduct. They spoke to me of the salutary influence which my presence might exercise over the troops. I answered them that whatever might be my personal sentiments, which I did not conceal from them, I ought not to lay aside the rôle of a conciliator, from which I had hitherto never departed in Greece ; I added that in marching with them I could no longer be of any use ; but that, in resuming my position beyond the strife, I should always serve their cause ; that, finally, it was necessary to come to an arrangement with the Prince or the Regent, and that I would gladly take charge of any sort of commission which they might give me on this subject. I even allowed them to anticipate the possibility of my finding the government in a state of entire prostration on my return to Nauplia, and of being able to persuade its chief to resign his authority. In that case, one might, with the consent of the Residents, commence that very day the government of the Prince, in order to put an end to the evils of the country. They yielded to these reflections, granting me at least a delay of a few days.

In order to support my reports by the necessary documents, I asked them to give me, in writing, the answers of the government of the assembly of the military chiefs, and I have the honour to subjoin them under Nos. A. B. C.

Such, Gentlemen, have been my proceedings. By my reports

you have had an opportunity of convincing yourselves that I have fulfilled my mission with the same good faith with which I approved of the coercive measures which were judged necessary to support the proposals which I was to make to them. The mission has failed. The Morea, I doubt not, will be overrun.

It is, in fine, the fault of those who, during the time when I ran about, night and day, to settle this deplorable affair, have interposed the greatest obstacles to any possible arrangement, by placing opposite to the Prince, Count Augustin Capodistrias, clothed with arbitrary power, and in carrying on intrigues, to turn the choice of the Prince to their own advantage.

It is then those men in power at Nauplia who have drawn the Roumeliotes on their shoulders, and who will be responsible for all the misfortunes which may result from this new complication in the affairs of Greece. There was still another point to be arranged, which appeared to me of grave importance. I had taken part in the decision which had been taken to place the French troops on the Isthmus. I had done so with the best intentions in the world, in order to preserve the Peloponnesus from pillage, and to keep for the Prince at least one spot where he might freely disembark. Nevertheless, I had compromised his name in the conflict of parties to which it ought to have remained a stranger. This was a position which might become fatal. It was necessary to escape from it. But there were still graver reflections to be made, which personally concerned you, Gentlemen. We had taken the decision on the supposition that the mere appearance of the French on the Isthmus would stop the movement. Such was the predominating opinion expressed in the council. But, contrary to all expectation, they persist in the resolution of marching into the Morea. They do not wish to engage with the French; but they will not retreat, and what is more serious is that the deputies choose to place themselves at the head of the columns, and to resign themselves to the fate which awaits them. In this case, we should have witnessed an

event which would have turned against us not only the public opinion of all Greece, but the whole civilized world. It was, therefore, one of those most unfortunate positions from which it was equally necessary to escape. This is the reason why I left in the hands of M. Coletti an open letter addressed to the French commander, to be presented to him in the event of the troops, having passed the Isthmus, meeting him on his march; I beg him to suspend his march until the arrival of fresh instructions from the Residents, announcing to him that I had already informed you, in my despatch of the 29th of March, of the entire change in the state of things, according to which it had been resolved upon to march the French troops. By this letter, of which I send you a copy, I place my person and the cause of the Prince entirely beyond the circle of the political convulsions, and I return to my natural position, offering to the French commander a helping hand to extricate him from the most unlucky position in which a man of honour can be placed, having to choose between his duty and his feelings.

DOCUMENTS ANNEXED TO THE THIRD LETTER.

A. *Declaration of the Government.*

(Translated from the Greek.)

Sir,

The national government has maturely deliberated on the proposals which you made to it; it has authorized us to repeat them to the National Assembly of Perachora, and to the military chiefs united at Megara. The government mistakes neither the weight of your arguments nor the difficulty of its position; but it also knows the duties which that position imposes. The movement commenced on the Isthmus cannot, and ought not, to be stopped. The National Assembly has decreed the removal of its sitting at Argos, to found there the rights of the nation on a durable basis. The government will execute that

decision. The army will escort thither the Representatives of the people; it will know how to defend them, and to put an end to the machinations of those who have conceived the infernal project of destroying them. The written declarations of the Assembly and the army, as well as the explanations which you heard in those meetings themselves, will show to all the world that the government, the assembly, and the army, march on the same line. We cannot allow this event to pass without testifying to you that the government, sharing the sentiments of the deputies of the army and of all the people, looks upon the choice of His Highness Prince Otho of Bavaria, as the surest means of terminating our misfortunes, and as a pledge of a happier future for Greece.

The nation desires nothing more ardently than to see His Highness in its arms.

The Commission of the Government,

(Signed)

J. COLETTI, the Secretary of State.

D. CHRISTIDES.

Megara, 31st March, 1832.

B. *Declaration of the Deputies.*

Sequel to the acts of the first preliminary sitting of the fourth National Assembly prorogued. No. 33.

In the sitting held this day, the 16th of March, by the Representatives of the nation, M. Frederick Thiersch addressed to them some observations tending to approximate the dissentient parties, and to stop the invasion of the Peloponnesus by the national troops. As an argument affording a formal support to his proposals, he alleged the decision taken by the Residents to march the French troops, in order to prevent their entering the Morea.

The deputies of the nation, after having maturely deliberated on the proposal and the arguments of M. Thiersch, and after weighing the difficulty of the circumstances, unanimously agreed:

That the troops of the nation, commanded and accompanied by the national government, should enter without the least delay.

That the plenipotentiaries, escorted by them, should present themselves at their head, not with hostile intentions, but in order to effect the prompt reconciliation of the nation, to found the laws and the public tranquillity on an immutable basis, and to contribute to prepare the way for the Prince Sovereign of Greece.

That even if the French troops were to oppose their march by firing upon them, the Greeks would not fire a single shot against their generous benefactors, but would continue their march; with regard to the plenipotentiaries, with their arms crossed on their breasts, they will fall victims of this armed intervention, and leave the world to judge whether the Greek nation was not worthy of a happier fate.

Such is the step which the deputies of the nation have taken with common consent, a step conformable in every thing to the decision of the national government and of the troops which are at its disposal.

In giving the requisite publicity to their declarations, they conceive themselves free from all responsibility for the evils of which their country might become the theatre, and which would only be the result of an armed intervention against the regular and systematic march of the troops of the nation.

The President, PANOUZZO NOTARAS,

The Secretary Adjunct, B. CHRYSOBORGIS.

Perachora, the 28th March, 1832.

C. *Declaration of the Capitani.*

Sir,

We have listened to the proposals which you have just addressed to us with the view of preventing the entrance of the national armies into the Peloponnesus. It is with deep pain, with just astonishment, that we have learnt that at the demand of

the authority at Nauplia the intervention of the French troops would take place in case the national troops should pass the Isthmus.

It is to our government, Sir, that we have confided the direction and the fate of our country; it is to it as well as to the representatives of the nation, united at Megara and at Perachora, to take part in such communications. Nevertheless, if we must hazard our individual opinion, we are astonished, Sir, that the entrance into the Peloponnesus, which forms a part of the Greek state, should be interdicted to us. We have not declared war against the Peloponnesians; we shall not enter the Peninsula in order to lay it waste, but to consolidate our laws, and to escort to Argos, the scene of the national congress, our Representatives, and those of several communes of Greece. We remember too well the perils which our deputies encountered at this same Argos on the 9th and 11th of December last, to leave them without an escort exposed to the cruel fate which might await them. We are far, Sir, from believing that in placing our plenipotentiaries under the protection of the national arms, and in covering their march to Argos, we shall find ourselves opposed by the intervention of the French arms. But, if such a misfortune were to arrive, we declare that, without failing in the respect and gratitude due to the protecting powers of Greece, we shall know how to meet death; we have one life to give away; we shall devote it for the safety of our country, with the resignation and the serenity of mind of those who have conscientiously fulfilled their duties. God and the civilized world will judge us.

We cannot terminate this letter, Sir, which is an answer to your communications, without imparting to you the joy we feel at the election of a Sovereign Prince, which fills the measure of the benefits of the Alliance. We also fulfil a duty dear to our hearts in expressing to you, Sir, our lively gratitude for your generous efforts in favour of Greece, efforts which are worthy of the nobleness of your character, and of the elevation of your Phil-Hellenic soul.

Receive, Sir, the homage of the highest consideration with which we have the honour to be,

(Signed) The Capitani,

Grivas, Servas, Chrisiottis,

Begos, Macrianis, and others.

Megara, 29th of March, 1832.

D. Letter addressed to the French Commanders, to the Officers commanding the French Bataillons, who may be marching to occupy the Isthmus of Corinth.

Megara, 30th of March, 1832.

Gentlemen,

In case this letter should be presented to you, you will find yourselves in face of the deputies and the Greek troops passing the Isthmus, or, having passed it, to establish themselves at Argos. Supposing even that you were to commence hostilities, the soldiers would continue their march without striking a single blow against a nation which has been the benefactress of Greece; and their deputies at their head, with their arms crossed on their breasts, will resign themselves to the fate which you prepare for them. Will you fire upon them? The very arms of France would refuse to do so. Having assisted at the councils of the Admirals and the Residents of the three powers at which this intervention was agreed upon, and, having taken part in the deliberation as Counsellor of H. B. Majesty, the father of the elected Sovereign of Greece, I beg you will stop any ulterior proceedings until the arrival of new instructions on the part of the Residents, to whom I have communicated, in my despatch of the 27th of March from Perachora, the entire change of the state of things which had occasioned your march. It is to them alone that belongs the right of deciding a measure which, in the present case, may bring about the total destruction of the Peloponnesus.

(Signed) FR. THIERSCH.

No. 6.

Fourth Letter addressed to the Residents.

Nauplia, 6th of April, 1832.

Gentlemen,

The movement of the Roumeliotes to the Morea has commenced, and Admiral Ricord is disembarking troops at the Mills to drive them away from Argos; thus the state of things is very much changed since the conference at which I was present. It was then a question of how the movement should be prevented, and I acceded to every kind of measure which could effect that object; and now that it is a question how to repulse the invasion which has taken place, I can no longer accede to any. We wished to prevent the evils attached to the invasion of the Peloponnesus, and we have not succeeded. To mingle in the combat would only be to increase them. The forces, which might be placed at the disposal of the government at this crisis, would not suffice to destroy its enemies; in case of defeat, these men will disperse in bands over the Morea; and it is then that the work of destruction will commence. At present, the chiefs at the head of these columns have still some chance of maintaining, at least in general, order and discipline; when once the thaw commences, they will avail nothing; already the recognition of the government established at Nauplia has aggravated the state of Greece; the employment of armed forces to maintain it, would, perhaps, render it desperate.

I have no right to protest against your acts, Gentlemen; I cannot even address to you advice; but my position induces me to give you at least my opinion, and I shall do so with all the frankness which the circumstances demand.

You are blamed, Gentlemen, for having recognized the government of Argos; they say you were not authorized to do so even by the sense of the Protocol. I abstain from pronouncing thereupon; but the affair is not finally decided. At this moment, the government of Argos, which you have recognized, exists no longer; a purely democratic republic has been succeeded by an almost ab-

solite monarchy, which owes its establishment to an illegal act, since no more than forty members have signed it, and, allow me to say, this monarchy got up on the spur of the moment does not appear to me to march in the views of the Alliance. The latter grants to the sovereign the right of naming a Regent to administer Greece. Now, do you suppose that the act which institutes the present government, and leaves Count Augustin at liberty to remain at the head of affairs until the arrival, not of the Regent, but of the Prince himself, preserves this prerogative to him? By no means. The Prince is still young; his august father will, perhaps, find it useful that he should finish his education at Munich; every body believes that it is impossible for him to arrive at present; perhaps they will refuse his setting out in the middle of a civil war; but, with regard to the Regent, he must arrive forthwith. Now, in this case, Count Augustin, President of Greece, according to the laws of the Assembly, cannot yield to him his place; in spite of the Regent, he will remain in power; in spite of the Alliance and the King of Bavaria, he will govern until the arrival of the Prince himself. Such are his intentions, if the words of his decree have common sense, and if he acknowledges any strength in the law by virtue of which he governs. What, then, Gentlemen, will be your position?—you will attach yourselves to the cause of a government arbitrarily instituted, instead of supporting the man whom you have thought yourselves authorized to acknowledge; and, whilst he acts against the decisions of the Alliance, you will lend him the means of attaining his object.

There is still another reflection to be made. It is said that a petition was signed at the close of the Assembly, by forty-two deputies devoted to the government, to demand of the Cabinets the appointment of Count Augustin as the tutor of the Prince; and it is believed that an address to the Emperor of Russia, written in the same sense, has been given to M. de Ricord, who has just left for Constantinople, on his way to St. Petersburg.

Others are preparing on different points of the Peloponnesus drawn up in the same sense ; I am told even that there is one signed by the orphans at Ægina.* These are the first and second parts of the plan which they attempt to realize. Count Augustin will govern Greece until the arrival of the Prince, and will remain afterwards as his tutor. What they intend is clear. The Constitution of Nauplia decrees that the Prince must be twenty-two years old in order to reign. The Prince is but seventeen ; the tutor, therefore, will remain in power five years longer. Supported by the royal authority of his minor, by the loan of sixty millions of francs, and in possession of all the resources of power, what will he do ? He will find the means of strengthening the system of government founded by his brother. He himself declared so on his accession. The burden of his acts and of his laws is the patrimony which he leaves to the future Sovereign of Greece. In order to bring about this result, is it necessary to put in motion the forces of England, France, and Russia ? Is this result so precious that Greece must be covered with blood, ashes, and ruins to attain it ? I abstain from all further reflection ; I consider the question as judged, judged by Greece herself, since it is known that a long time ago the government would have been extinguished without the support of the Alliance.

But I cannot conclude without submitting to you another observation. Since my return here, I am informed of certain very unseemly insinuations which people of a certain party make use of every moment against the Prince himself. These insinuations are of a character that I dare not repeat ; I should not put any faith in them, if there were not an alarming conformity in these reports, and if, amongst those who attest them, there were not foreigners of irreproachable character. A short time before the nomination of the Prince was known, one of the most determined men of the present government, who took me for one of his

* A school instituted by Capodistrias.

own party, said to me : — “ You, sir, see to the bottom of this affair ; if the present government acquires consistency, no foreign prince will establish himself among us ; it is Count Augustin and his family that will govern Greece.” Now, this person I could name, if necessary. His numerous and influential family is at the head of a party of the government in a celebrated island ; he himself has since become governor of another island. Even at Nauplia, they begin to call royalists those who sincerely attach themselves to the cause of the Prince, and people of the government those who defend the party now in power. All this complication is very grave, and what may be done in future to support that party will necessarily contribute to realize its last designs, of which we have just spoken. After that, the salutary plan of the powers, who have been the benefactors of Greece, will be entirely overthrown.

But, I must conclude. As any ulterior intervention can only increase the convulsion of the country, and the succours afforded to the present government in the view of the Alliance and the interests of the sovereign prince, it appears to me that you should henceforward abstain from all armed intervention, either by land or by sea, and leave matters to develop themselves according to their internal strength in the Peloponnesus, contenting yourselves with occupying and keeping in its present state the town and the port of Nauplia.

If, as is said here, the Roumeliotes are only a faction, hostile to the Morea, the latter will repulse them ; if, on the contrary, they form, as they pretend, the national party, this province will join their standards, and then it will be useless, perhaps impossible, and certainly contrary to the wish of the powers, to march directly against the country itself, if its wishes were to be pronounced in such a sense, &c.

No. 7.

Reply of the Residents.

Nauplia, 7th of April, 1832.

Sir,

We have received the four letters which you have thought proper to address to us.

It is essential that we should at present re-establish the facts such as they took place, in order that each of us should thoroughly understand his position and his duties. Allow us, then, Sir, to remind you, that, when you announced to us your intention of going to the insurgents, we thought that your opinion and your remonstrances might have some influence over them, in consequence of the relations which you had previously held with some of their chiefs, and in consequence, also, of your character of a Bavarian functionary. We had, therefore, engaged you to add your advice to the declaration which you had determined to make to them to prevent the invasion of the Morea. Such was the object we had in view, and such, also, was the mission which you had offered to fulfil. The intentions which you then announced to us in presence of the three admirals were entirely in harmony with our manner of viewing the crisis which was preparing. If since then motives which we are ignorant of have made you change your opinions, if, above all, you have thought yourself entitled to take upon yourself to write to General Guehenue in a sense entirely contrary to what had been arranged by common consent between the Greek Government, the Admirals, and the Residents, and to what you had yourself considered as indispensable and salutary, your conduct has been what we do not seek to characterize, but which may bring about the fatal consequences which you present with reason in one of your letters.

We regret, Sir, that you have placed us under the necessity of observing to you that we have instructions from our courts, that we act according to them, and that no one here has the right or the power to demand of us an account of our conduct, and to

menace us with a judgment which, however, we do not look to with apprehension.

In terminating here the relations which circumstances had momentarily established between us, we conceive it our duty to point out two facts which you mention in your last letter, and which we must declare to be incorrect. Admiral Ricord has not landed troops at the mills as you state, and as you may easily convince yourself of; and Colonel Raico, in going to Constantinople, took with him no address whatever. In the mean time, we think we may tranquillize you, and dissipate the restlessness and the fears which appear to trouble you, in assuring you that, when the Regent shall arrive, he will meet with no difficulty in assuming the reins of the government from the hands of those who hold them to-day. The decisions of the Alliance, as well as the wishes of Greece, ought to offer you a pledge of this.

Be pleased to receive, Sir, the assurance of our distinguished consideration.

(Signed)

E. DAWKINS.

BARON ROUEN.

A. RUCKMANN.

No. 8.

Fifth Letter from M. Thiersch to the Residents.

Nauplia, 8th April, 1832.

Gentlemen,

The answer that you have done me the honour to address to me this day appears to be founded on the double supposition that I had changed my opinion with regard to the invasion of the Peloponnesus, and that the letter which I had eventually written to the French commander might have brought about the fatal consequences which will, perhaps, be the result of that act. Allow me, Gentlemen, to rectify one of these suppositions, and to protest against the other. I have never changed my opinion

respecting the invasion of the Morea, which I always consider an evil; and I should still concur to-day in any measures which might contribute to prevent it, if it had not taken place; but having arrived at Perachora, and seen things with my own eyes, I became convinced that when once the movement had commenced, it was impossible to drive it back. If this is called changing my opinion, it is because a measure which I conceived to be practicable at a distance appeared to me the reverse when on the spot. I cannot but regret, Gentlemen, that, distrusting, as you doubtless do, my want of experience in such affairs, you have changed your opinions rather than I; perhaps there was still time to have prevented in another manner the effusion of blood, and the invasion itself, which has turned out as I had predicted.

As regards the letter written to the French commanders, it was dictated by the conviction of which I have just spoken, and it is a necessary consequence of it. Foreseeing a scene of horror, such as the letter indicates, in the event of the meeting taking place, ought I to have done nothing to prevent it, and to preserve yourselves and me, Gentlemen, from repenting having brought it about? Far from regretting the course I took, I must declare that I could not to-day act differently than I did. If there has been any fault, the fault, perhaps, is that I have too much conscience, of which I take to myself the whole responsibility. You inform me that I have alone separated myself from a measure taken by common consent; but, being the only one of the conference in a state to foresee such a calamity, I also had alone the right to take some measures to prevent its occurrence. My duty was to inform you in sufficient time to enable you to stop it. This duty I have fulfilled, and you did nothing. This proves that you have no right to condemn my conduct.

It still remains for me to explain the connexion which you suppose to exist between my letter and the actual fact of the invasion. Now, the invasion was organized before my arrival at Perachora. I wrote to you on the 26th from Corinth that the

movement had commenced. On the 27th, I pointed out to you the influence and the resources at Perachora. I subsequently saw it developed under my own eyes at Megara, and become inevitable before my letter was signed and placed in the hands of M. Coletti, immediately before my departure for Nauplia. There is only, therefore, between my letter and the movement, coincidence of time; the event itself took place independently of any step of the kind. But I may be told that the Roumeliotes were encouraged by it. It is only necessary to have been on the spot to know that they did not require it at all. There were neither fears nor hesitation. Every body was filled with an enthusiasm difficult to describe, for the cause which they had taken up, and every one felt carried onwards against the enemy at Nauplia. My letter did not contribute to it in any manner; it was an accident beyond the internal force of the events; it does not even touch the springs which moved the machine: but must I indicate to you those springs? Well! it was the national indignation carried to excess against the detestable system of the government, which you had recognized, and which was supported by you, Gentlemen. You have followed the path of your instructions. I do not dispute your having done your duty, and I sincerely regret that men whom I esteem should have imputed to me an opinion unworthy of their character; but, on my part, I had some right to demand of them some little confidence with regard to what I advanced as to facts and their causes.

“The Roumeliotes have 4000 men on foot to pass the Isthmus.”
—“You are imposed upon,” was the reply; “they have only a thousand.”—“They will arrive at Loutraki on the 3rd of April.”—
“They will not: these are old stories of Perachora.”—“The troops of the government will be defeated at the Isthmus.”—“You imagine all this.”—“Their enemies will establish themselves at Argos.”—
“They will not arrive there.”—“They are resolved to observe the most exemplary discipline.”—“They will plunder like the others.”
—“Probably the Morea will join their ranks.”—“They would re-

pulse them if they were to dare to advance."—"Well, the Roumeliotes are at Loutraki."—"It is only a reconnaissance, a demonstration; they will retreat."—"They have dispersed the troops of the government at the Isthmus."—"This is all nonsense, these are false alarms."—"They are marching on Argos."—"Impossible!"—"They are only three leagues distant; here are the demogerontes of the town, all of them of the party of the government, demanding your protection against them."

Such, Gentlemen, was our conversation on this affair, after my return from Megara. Now that the events are accomplished, that the Roumeliotes have arrived on the day fixed upon, have repulsed the troops of the government, and entered Argos, are received as liberators without molesting any one, and give a free passage to the furniture of Count Augustin, you acknowledge that I was well informed on the events which would happen, and that I accurately judged the result of the catastrophe.

You cannot, therefore, refuse to conform to my judgment regarding the causes which have brought it about. Set aside my letter, it goes for nothing; and if it be necessary to enter into an explanation of the real reasons, I must expose a series of very many faults and of errors committed on all sides on the affairs of Greece, since the death of the late President. But why these recriminations, at a moment when every one ought to join the side on which the Greek nation stands, in order to put an end for ever to its revolution? You will always find me ready to contribute as much as I can to this happy result, guided by your intelligence and that aptitude in affairs which a long experience ought to have given you. I cannot conclude without thanking you for having rectified certain facts which served as the foundation of my last letter. You will nevertheless agree that they make no material alteration in the matters of which they treat.

Memoir of M. de Thiersch on the state of public affairs in Greece after the definitive composition of the government of Seven Members, addressed to his Excellency Sir Stratford Canning, Ambassador Extraordinary of his Britannic Majesty to the Sublime Porte.

Nauplia, May 1, 1832.

Sir,

I have just read the observations which your Excellency addressed to the Residents of the three powers at Nauplia on the state of Greece in the month of December last, and on the means to be employed in restoring internal peace to this unhappy country. The opinions of an upright man, joined to an accurate knowledge of the affairs of Greece, which I have found in this memoir, induce me to address to you some remarks in detail on what has been passing around me. My position towards Greece and its future sovereign imposes on me the duty of omitting nothing that may contribute to enlighten the judgment and the conscience of those who have any influence over the decision of its definitive fate, and who desire that that fate should be conformable to the benevolent views of the protecting powers of Greece and to the present state of Europe. The step which I have just taken appears to me to be the more necessary, as the Protocol of the 7th of March, which demands the formation of a new government, seems to repose on the information of your Excellency, and the first attempt which has been made to march in this new path has met with essential changes which, if we were to look upon them on one side only, might lead to doubts of the possibility of establishing any thing durable until the arrival of the Prince; an opinion equally erroneous and prejudicial to the future condition of the country. Permit me to commence by a sketch of the events which have brought about the present state of things.

The Roumeliotes had entered Argos when the Protocol of the

7th of March arrived from Constantinople; this will save us, was said on every side, and, as it was perceived that Count Augustin Capodistrias could only count on ten soldiers, he was invited to resign. This step raised the grand obstacle to reconciliation, and, as it was necessary to proceed through the organ of the Senate, it was hoped that a commission selected from this body would meet another appointed by the opposition, to come to an understanding as to the composition of the new government, which ought then to have been adopted by the Senate and recognized by the Residents. Instead of following this natural path, commanded by the spirit of the Protocol of the 7th of March, they proceeded on the false supposition that, after the removal of the family of Capodistrias, any composition of a new government would be accepted by the dissentient party, and that, if further difficulties arose on that side, they might be overcome by threats. According to this mode of seeing things, the government, consisting of five members (Colocotroni, Zaïmi, Boudouri, Metaxa, and Coletti) was proclaimed and instantly recognized by the Residents. This arrangement might, perhaps, have been tenable in the month of January, when the party of the Roumeliotes was thrown back on Roumelia and Megara; it was no longer so to-day, because it was neither conformable to the spirit of the Protocol, nor to the position of the parties brought about by the overthrow of the family of Capodistrias. The Protocol required the formation of a government on a more enlarged basis, capable of giving guarantees to the opposite parties; now what was the number and state of those parties? The Peloponnesus contains three; the military party of Colocotroni and Coliopolos; that of the primates represented by the influential families of Londos, Notaras, Delyanis, Meletopulos, Benizelos Roufos, and formerly Zaïmi, bound up with the others by common interests and the ties of relationship; then again the party of Maina, which is beyond the circle of the two former, opposed to each other in spirit and in interests. Colocotroni, it is true, was the representative of his party; *but Zaïmi,*

after having separated from his former friends, was regarded as a deserter from their cause, and had lost the confidence even of his relations. Placed in the government, he only represented his own person, and, in order not to remain alone, he was forced to seek a place in the confidence of his old enemy, who, according to his own confession, has plundered him as well as others. The same thing must be said of Metaxa; as a politician, he has never been any thing but the associate and confidant of this redoubted chieftain of the Klephtic arms of the Morea. Here then the interest of Colocotroni was represented by three members in a commission of five, and the powerful party of the Primates, as well as the fiery population of Maina, were left out of the combination of this attempt at a government. Beyond the Peloponnesus there was on one side the party of Hydra, on the other the Roumeliotes. Boudouri had never taken any frank and decided position. He had always vacillated between his inclination towards his countrymen and the favours of Capodistrias. It appears even that the first motive of his actions was his aversion to the family of Condouriotti, the centre of the ruling party at Hydra. Far from giving guarantees, as a member of a government, he was rather made to repel the confidence of the party which he ought to represent. Roumelia was divided, not to say torn by the two parties, which had met in the streets of Argos, and which had since fought sanguinary battles at Megara, Eleusis, Livadia, Arachova, Salona, and Naupactum. Of these parties there was only that of Perachora, which in the new government had its guarantee in the person of Coletti; the other, which defended the interests of the government of Capodistrias, was entirely forgotten. Besides this, if we consider the military relations of Greece, it was very strange that the Morea, which never was warlike, contained a General in the commission, whilst the province of Roumelia, essentially warlike as well from the character of its inhabitants as from its position, saw none of its chiefs by the side of the hero of Carytena.

This was the weak side of the government, as regarded the Protocol and the guarantee, which it desired to grant to the opposite parties in Greece; but this composition, defective in itself, became a political impossibility when seen in connexion with the events. The system of Capodistrias crumbled to pieces before the success of the Roumeliotes, and this system reappeared in the commission with the two names the most galling and most odious to the opposition. Besides this, it was supported by the Senate which, with four moderate names, counted nine, which were looked upon as the firmest support of the fallen power. What then was the position of Coletti? By a very strange combination, he found himself alone in the midst of his most determined foes, taken in the rear by the Senate, and not being able to count even upon Zaïmi and Boudouri. Perhaps there is no example in history of what was presented here, where, from political convenience, they gave to this body the remnant of a system which had been destroyed, the right of organizing a power in favour of its adversaries, and of making the victors submit to the fate of the vanquished. And how could they escape this fate, having in the commission of five members only one on whom they could depend? Even if Coletti had wished to enter this government, he could not have done so; as a man he would have been lost; as a political chief he would have been obeyed by no influential member of his party, and the civil war, instead of being extinguished in the ruins of the system destroyed, would have been rekindled fiercer than ever. It was necessary, therefore, either to run the hazard of this war, and thus to lose Greece, or to try to bring about speedily such a modification in the government as would lead to its approximating nearer to the terms of the Protocol and the new and real wants of the country; this was the cause of the movement of the Roumeliotes towards the suburb of Nauplia on the 10th of April. The movement having been effected without the commission of any act of hostility, and being followed by the entrance of Coletti into

Nauplia under the safeguard of the Powers, obtained the desired result. The following day, a Commission of Seven members was decreed under the guarantee of the three Residents. The four names of Condourioti, Ypsilanti, Coletti, and Zographos, gave the majority of one vote to the triumphant party; *but by intrigues, which I dare not venture to mention here, the commission came out from the Senate with the name of Tricoupi. The latter, for the same reasons as Zaïmi, had lost the confidence of his former friends,* and, however respectable a man in other respects, his appearance alone deranged the whole combination destined to tranquillize the public mind, and to put an end to the long-sufferings of Greece. After three days of painful labours, they finally obtained, in place of Zographos and Tricoupi, the Roumeliote name of Athanasios Lidoriki, a man without character and without consideration, proposed, amidst many others, by the Roumeliotes of the Capodistrian party, and accepted as a half result by a sort of despondency on the part of the others. But Lidoriki was absent; and it was soon discovered that the six other members of the government, divided into three votes on each side, reduced its action to nothing, and this at a time of effervescence and of a complete want of means, in face of an army which could not be paid, and to which this stationary government could not furnish the means of existence even for the Easter festival. Thus it was necessary to risk absolutely the consequences of a general dissolution, or to escape from this unfortunate position. It was then that the deputies of the Roumeliote chiefs of Argos proposed the respectable name of Costa Botzaris, in the room of Lidoriki, in a sitting combined between the government and the senate. It was only after a struggle of a fortnight, during which they were three times driven to despair, that they succeeded in remedying the inconveniences of the first composition of the government, and that affairs began to march. Such is the state of things on which I am anxious to address some observations to Your Excellency.

In commencing this subject, I shall make use of the outline of the conversations which I held at the time with a distinguished diplomatist of your acquaintance. We are united in the wish to save Greece, although sometimes judging differently the nature of events and the means to be employed for attaining this end. "We ought," said he, "to act with one accord, *and so as not to wound Russia*; it is on her that depends the fate of the negotiations at Constantinople, and consequently the fate of Greece; it is for this reason that we ought to have been contented with the first commission, notwithstanding the repugnance of some of the Capitani against two of its members. Coletti has overthrown it, and the consequences of this derangement have developed themselves in the sequel. They passed from Tricoupi to Lidoriki; from Lidoriki to Costa Botzaris, since such was the wish of the Capitani; this is no longer a government, *it is the breaking up of social order brought about by violence*, and it would be quite natural to see Petro Bey come to-morrow to demand a member of his choice, and the following day other Capitani protesting against Metaxa and Zaïmi. It must not, therefore, appear strange that, in such a state of decomposition and violence, *one of my colleagues declares* that the affair becomes sometimes too revolting, and that he is disposed to leave his post, at least for a time.* At London the Greek question has become stationary, since it cannot be finished until the settlement of the boundaries. Every form of treaty, of guarantee for the loan, the acceptance even of the Prince, *is founded on this fundamental transaction*; † and, according to what is passing here, and *looking to the manner in which events will be regarded by Russian diplomacy*, we are daily further from our object. The consequence will be, that people will be disgusted with an affair without end, the ambassador will quit

* Then why did not Mr. Dawkins let him go? He would then have had the field of Greece entirely at his disposal, in connexion with the French Minister.

† So far from this being the case, the Convention of May the 7th was signed before the arrangement about the boundary was known.

Constantinople, Greece will be abandoned to its fate, which, according to what is going on, cannot be doubtful. In vain do people flatter themselves with any real succour from Bavaria. As the treaty is not yet signed, the King cannot send his Regent, without risking being abandoned to his own means, if the alliance were to be dissolved, either as a result of new complications in Europe, or by a change in the disposition of one of the three cabinets."

To these observations, which presented themselves successively in the course of our conversation, I replied pretty nearly as follows : — " If Greece is destined to perish, in consequence of the events which have just occurred, the fault will neither be that of the Greeks, nor of the three Powers, but of those men who had wished to impose upon it a government suitable, perhaps, at a distant period, but only capable to-day of kindling civil war, instead of ending it, as well as of those who had overthrown the combination, reposing on the names of Ypsilanti and Zographos; every thing else, far from being the result of an armed force, is rather the result of the internal force of things, and, if you will, of the right to exist and to act, which one cannot refuse to recognize as belonging to the triumphant party, and to a cause palpitating with life and animation. For it, the two conditions of existence and of action were, the majority in the commission of the government, and the convocation of the Assembly, dispersed by the cannon of Argos. This is what they have claimed and obtained, nothing more or less. Instead of mistaking the nature of this change, necessary with regard to a government badly constructed, it will be well to look a little closer, to discover something more than muskets and Roumeliote yataghans. People talk only of armed Capitani, where, perhaps, the entire nation is to be found; the military chiefs, with their clients, form its active part, to which Greece owes, in the first place, its independence. It is in consequence of its merits, and its social position, that the army takes part in the National Assembly; it

is represented in it by ten chiefs, chosen by their brethren in arms. And what have those Capitani deputies done? They have gained by their conduct the consideration of the country and of foreigners; and you yourself, Sir, avow, that the Grivas and the Zervas appear to wish to show, that they know how to conduct themselves as warriors belonging to a civilized nation. The discipline which they have observed is without example amongst irregular troops; and their sentiments, manifested by their actions, do not belie the favourable opinion which you have conceived of them. In the field of battle they have defended the lives of the most odious persons of the opposite party, even to that of Captain Poulos Diamantide, on whom rests the malediction of Poros, who was saved by Hadgi Christo, whom he had persecuted as his bitterest enemy. Thus Spiliotopulo, at the risk of his own life, protected the nephew of his enemy, Spiliades, who fell into the hands of the Roumeliotes. After the victory they took the same care of the property of their enemies: they touched nothing at Argos, either in the house of Count Augustin, or at Pronia, in that of Calergi. I myself was present, when the latter begged them, through his aide-de-camp, to spare the furniture of his house. "We are not thieves," replied Nicholas Zervas, "and we do not wage war against the chairs of M. Calergi; if he chooses, he may come himself, and be seated upon them, in the midst of us." Even in the events which concern the internal policy, instead of accusing them of violence, we must recognize their moderation, in submitting to a name so odious as that of Metaxa, contenting themselves with a majority of one voice in a government which owes its existence to their victory, and proposing, in order to obtain it, a name of acknowledged probity and moderation, although it does not properly belong to them; having besides, as a Souliote, to contend against the prejudices which still exist amongst the Roumeliotes against this Albanian people. It would only be now that we should have the right to accuse the Capitani of usurpation, and the govern-

ment of impotency, if, not contented with having a majority in the commission, the former were to claim further changes, and the government, constituted as it is, were to yield to their demands. Up to this point, the accusations appear misplaced; and, be assured, Sir, that such demands will not take place, and that, in the contrary case, the government and the senate would reject them. Certainly, these two authorities would not have yielded to the last demands, if they had not been convinced that they contained the conditions essential to the march of affairs, and to escape finally from a crisis which already lasted too long for the tranquillity of the country.

But there are still other observations to be made respecting the political arrangements. People will not acknowledge, in the train of the Capitani, with whom they are united in sentiments and in interest, the deputies who emigrated from Argos, reinforced by a considerable number of plenipotentiaries, chosen by the provinces. The movement on the Isthmus was effected, in order to begin the Assembly of Argos. The army ought to be considered only as the safeguard of the deputies, to defend them against the attempts of violence on the part of their adversaries. It was for this that it advanced with branches of olive, and that it was received with enthusiasm up to the walls of Nauplia. These deputies are, for the most part, those of Argos, and they await the proclamation of the government, not to continue the Assembly of Perachora, as it is continually reported, but to give effect to the convocation of the National Assembly, made by the late President, John Capodistrias, and repeated by the commission of the government after his death. In order to submit to the government instituted by the Senate, they had demanded, in concert with the Capitani, that the opinion of the majority of the country should prevail against the men of the fallen system, and that the Assembly of Argos should be renewed without delay. This opinion was so general that there was not a single opponent, and so decided, that no government, however powerfully constituted,

could have resisted it, since it embraced the very object for which they had taken up arms, and run all the chances of a disastrous war. The army had served to overthrow the system of Capodistrias; the Assembly concurred in the re-establishment of the national rights, overthrown by his family. Let us cease then to hear in all this but the voice of some discontented and ambitious Capitani: there is something grander than such clamours; it is the consent of the deputies of the army and the provinces; it is public opinion, united on these two points; and here we have the whole fate of a nation, as much as it depends upon public opinion.

We must confess, that even at present the government is not constituted in a manner to satisfy entirely the wants of the people, and the views of the Alliance; but, at least, it can act and end by forming the National Assembly. It alone will have the right to constitute definitively the commission of the government, which only exists at present by a fiction of right attributed to the Senate, and to give to it the direction in which it must act, until the arrival of the Prince.

But, it will be said, what profitable result to the public good shall we have gained by this abrupt change of an established system? In spite of all the appearances of disorder, and all the real difficulties raised partly by the new position, even these results appear to me henceforward to be very important. I shall not speak of the general desire of the people to be delivered from a power which became every day more odious: I wish only to point out the two most essential advantages of the new order of things, viz., the re-establishment of internal peace, and the union of all the superior and respectable men of the nation round the new government. As long as the fallen power weighed upon the country, reconciliation was impossible; the hatred was too intense, the fears too real, for people to understand and believe each other — all this was changed within a short time. Even before the gates of Nauplia the reconciliation of the Roumeliote parties

took place ; and on every point, where they still fought with fury, hostilities immediately ceased. The Mainotes, ready to fall on the south of the Morea, remained in their country, and Colocotroni renounced his armaments. According even to his enemies, there is no longer any probability of a civil war, as long as the established government shall subsist, since all the real strength of the country is on its side. As regards the distinguished men of Greece, it was very strange that gradually they should have all abandoned the late President. This defection could not be attributed to a temporary cause, since it changed into a general abandonment, which took effect in proportion as his political system was developed ; so that, at the end of his career, he saw himself surrounded only by insignificant men and worthless people, only calculated to ruin him in the opinion of his country.

This system was hardly overthrown and the National Government established in its stead, when these same men, forgetting their former dissensions, came from all sides to aid it with their counsels, or to support it with their talents. Not one of the remarkable persons of the country failed to join the throng, and, if there is any probability of saving Greece by the concentration of light and virtue which it contains within its bosom, this work of safety is about to be accomplished now, when, instead of one or two parties divided by hatred and interest, it is the nation itself which meets together, and recognizes itself in the élite of its citizens.

It is very true that the first steps of this government are beset with real difficulties, aggravated in an alarming manner by the complete want of pecuniary means, since the former government may be said to have exhausted the past and the future ; but this is just the moment when succour must be granted to the new order of things : it is necessary to enable the government to pay, at least in part, the army and the navy, and thus to secure their discipline and their obedience. Such is the urgency of the circumstances,

that this question of subsidies has become almost a question of life and death for the government and the nation ; but, this difficulty once removed, the others will vanish, and there will be no fear either of the exorbitant pretensions of the Capitani, or of the political exigencies of the Assembly, which is soon about to meet. Greece, restored to herself, will be able to await, in a state of peace and reviving order, the decision of its fate.

But, whilst in writing I put a little order into the remarks, by means of which I tried to come to an understanding with the diplomatist, who did me the honour to listen to me, I find that my views pass the limits of a conversation, and become almost a memoir on the present state of Greece. It will, therefore, be more suitable that I should abandon the form adopted, and address myself directly to Your Excellency on the objects in question, which I have not yet dwelt upon.

I come to the negotiations at Constantinople, of which it is easy to recognize the vital importance. Greece must be secured on its frontiers in order to obtain the support destined for it, and to witness the arrival of the prince or his lieutenant. Their arrival alone will terminate for ever this disastrous revolution, and it is then only that Greece, placed beyond the reach of new convulsions, will enter into the sphere of the general peace of Europe. But, whilst the difficulties which the transactions have met with from their commencement at Constantinople appear to be aggravated, owing to the complications and perhaps to the resentments, the inevitable consequence of every political catastrophe, the state of Greece cannot longer support its unexampled distress, and the loosening of all its social bonds which is the result of it. If there is at present any general cause which appeases hatred, disposes excited men to be patient, and reasonable men to behave as well as possible, it is the idea of the prince and of the future which is attached to him ; it is the conviction that the fate of Greece is definitively arranged, that the sufferings of individuals will be terminated, and that their wants and their just

demands will be satisfied. But this confidence will vanish, in the mean time, under the weight of evils almost insupportable, and, when once the hope of being soon liberated from them disappears, it is easy to foresee what will be the consequences. In this painful situation of hope and fear, every one asks what will be the intentions of Russia after these last events, and in what point of view we must place and treat the Greek Question, in order to show it worthy of that great power? Russia supported Count John Capodistrias until the end of his career, because she did not change her opinion with regard to him, being always persuaded, as all Europe was before, that that experienced statesman was the most capable of giving peace to a country torn by factions, and establishing a durable order of things. I myself shared this conviction; I was one of his partizans and one of his public defenders against his enemies and his accusers in Europe. It is only in the midst of Greece that the evidence of facts has forced me to rectify my opinion, in acknowledging that it was by grave faults committed in legislation, administration, and internal policy, that the Government of Greece began to totter; afterwards having found that all that Greece contains of judicious men and real strength had placed themselves beyond the circle of his acts, or in hostile opposition to his power, I was compelled to look upon him as a lost man. He himself confessed to me, a few days before his death, that he found he had exhausted his means and his measures. If the Cabinet of St. Petersburg did not perceive this state of things, which was sooner or later to overthrow the system which he had defended, it is because its political agents on the spot judged differently the questions which attached to it. Assuredly, Russia herself, whilst protecting the government established in that country, has not desired to defend its faults or to share its errors, aggravated in later times by horrors; and it is in consequence of these errors and these horrors that he fell. In the execution of the measures required by the late President, there was on both sides a violent collision of interests, which produced deep

irritation ; but these events are accidental, and the enmities temporary. As soon as the passions excited by sanguinary catastrophes shall be appeased, the Greeks will not delay recognizing again their benefactors, and seeing in Russia one of the most powerful supporters of their independence. It is impossible that Russia should be hostile to Greece, and the only thing which she will demand, and which she has a right to require, is that the new state of the country and of its government shall offer the guarantees necessary for the maintenance of peace and of good order until the arrival of the prince. Even if, according to the opinion of some people, this government were not yet to fulfil these conditions, some consideration is due to its situation and to its indisputably good intentions, and it must be assisted in escaping from a position which it has not itself created. Such is the meaning of the Protocol, and the conduct which it appears to impose on the political organs of the Alliance.

But let us suppose that which does not appear very probable, viz. that some agents of Russia should have made the maintenance of the Capodistrian system the condition of their co-operation. Can one believe that Russia herself is disposed to withdraw it, and to change it into opposition, after what has happened here ? It seems to me not. Under whatever point of view we look at the Greek Question, and whatever interests are attached to it, it always presents to the Alliance the same alternative ; it must save Greece, or lose it in abandoning it to its fate. Greece is the unfortunate being to whom we have lent a helping hand when sinking in the waves, and which we cannot withdraw without seeing her again engulfed in the waters. Save Greece ! This is demanded by the sacrifices already made in her cause by the country itself, her exalted renown, her overwhelming misfortunes, the safety of the seas, the commerce and the peace of Europe. Abandon her ? This cannot be done, because Greece never will be abandoned by all the powers interested in her fate. Why did England and France enter into the Triple Alliance ? to prevent

Russia from alone settling the Greek Question. Why must England and Russia remain bound to it? to prevent France from alone arranging its affairs.

I do not think it proper to enter into the questions which regard His Majesty the King of Bavaria, because, on his side, exalted sentiments and a profound interest are mixed up with questions of deep policy; nor shall I conclude with an appeal to the interest which Your Excellency has always taken in Greece, formerly so illustrious, and at present so unhappy. I only wish to enjoy a future opportunity of being presented to Your Excellency, to testify to you personally the high and sincere esteem with which your virtues and your political character have long inspired me,

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE INSURRECTION
AGAINST THE MIXED GOVERNMENT.

Proclamation of Colocotroni against the Mixed Government, addressed to the Greeks.

(Translated from the Greek.)

Fellow Citizens,

The Peloponnesus was the first, notwithstanding the horrible tyranny which oppressed it, to appreciate the rights which its ancestors had bequeathed to it, which nature had granted it. It rose with arms in its hands against the Turks, its barbarous oppressors. It never had any other object than that of gaining its liberty and independence, and of securing its rights from being unworthily infringed. After a bloody war of several years, after an invincible constancy in the misfortunes which war entailed, our country showed itself worthy of the favour of Heaven. The High Allied Courts supported us with their powerful hand, stopped the torrents of blood, and put an end to the sufferings of our too unhappy country.

The benevolent foresight of our protectors sent us, however, a chief whose greatness of soul and exalted patriotism were the foundation of all the blessings which we have enjoyed for the last three years, during which the honour, the lives, the property of the citizens ran no risk of danger.

The loss of this great man rendered necessary the immediate convocation of the national assembly, whose duty it was to assume the authority which was endangered, and

to hinder some men from trampling, in such circumstances, on the rights of the people. The legal deputies of the people, superior to perverseness and clamour, fulfilled, in March last, the sacred rights which the nation had entrusted to them; they drew up a constitution in harmony with a constitutional monarchy; they hastened the arrival of the prince whom the high alliance had chosen; they issued the most important decrees, and formed a provisional government, until the arrival of our much desired sovereign amongst us. So praiseworthy a conduct on the part of the plenipotentiaries, *and the official recognition of their acts by the Residents, conformably to the Protocol signed at London on the 7th of January*, tranquillized the fears of the nation, and gave it the greatest confidence in this *paternal* and peaceable government. In this hope, I myself returned home, without marching against those, who, driven from Argos by the general will of the nation, established themselves at Megara, where they made use of all sorts of violent and destructive means to usurp the power, notwithstanding the *amnesty which they had obtained for all their acts*.

Taking advantage of these circumstances, favoured by the lies which they spread and by the force of arms, they rushed without restraint into Argos, destroyed its happiness, and unblushingly seized the reins of power, in spite of the wise and salutary provisions of the 7th of March. The impress of the utmost fraud marked the establishment of an administrative commission; on this account the Protocol was not published. The Senate remained mute, on seeing its rights thus trampled under foot, and its deliberations violated by the force of arms.

As the nation only demanded the arrival of the prince, it

supported every thing for a time, hoping that the Protocol would be executed. But, seeing the evil increase from day to day; seeing Corinth, Argos, and Nauplia, pillaged and abandoned, as had happened some time before to Salona, Thebes, and Livadia; seeing Tripolizza and other provinces ruined, the honour, the property, the lives of the citizens persecuted, contrary to the spirit of the Protocols of the 7th of March and the 26th of April; seeing the infamous Albanians, driven from their country, paid by the authority to carry the crescent into the centre of the Morea, the tithes absorbed by some civil and military officers, the army on the point of disbanding from the want of pay and food, the whole of the regular troops disorganized; the citizens felt that their country would already have suffered the most dreadful tyranny had it not been for the *patriotic opposition of some members of the commission*.

It is this contempt, this violation of all the rights of the nation, which forced the garrisons of the fortresses of Patrass, Rhium, and Antirrhium, to place those fortresses under the command of the honourable General Zavellas; the warlike bands of western and southern Greece to defend their country; Spezia, Tinos, and other provinces, to drive away their new governors, as agents of perfidy and illegality.

The Moreotes, on learning lately that the infamous Grivas, the prototype of infamy, had received an order from the government to repair to the provinces of Leondari and of Phanari with the Turks, his odious satellites, and wishing to preserve the indestructible rights which they had acquired by so much bloodshed, to protect their country against the greatest evils, and to save their neighbours who had fled into the caverns to escape from plunder, and who,

with tears in their eyes, implored the succour and protection of their brethren, declared in the name of His Royal Highness the Prince Sovereign, in the face of Heaven and the high alliance which protects Greece, as follows :—

1. They will not suffer the entrance of the infamous Grivas into the provinces ; they are ready to repel him by force.

2. They will not suffer the provinces to be oppressed by the corps of troops, and are resolved to drive from their frontiers the Albanian Turks who pass for constitutionalists.

3. They will employ the same violent means as those ordered by the government of Nauplia.

4. They swear that the honour and lives of their fellow citizens who have been outraged shall be avenged, and that compensation shall be given to those who have suffered from plunder in the different provinces.

5. *They preserve the former local authorities, until the Senate, by a legal and free choice, has created a legitimate government.*

6. They declare themselves united with the sound part of the population of the islands of western Greece, and they loudly proclaim their friendship and sincerity towards their brethren of Roumelia, and of the islands who wish to combat in order to restore the peace of the nation, and to procure the triumph of the national rights, with the patriotic zeal and the courage which characterize them.

7. They officially disavow the men assembled at Argos under the false name of deputies. The greater part of them are not invested with regular, legal, and free returns, from the communes which have the right of suffrage ; the greater number of the plenipotentiaries have been named by spots which do not enjoy electoral rights, like the go-

vernment which is created by itself, which hastens to assemble them whilst sacrificing the rights of the nation.

When the public peace shall be re-established, and violence shall no longer govern the Morea, the people will be able to assemble ; then it may convoke in peace its legitimate plenipotentiaries.

The General-in-chief of the Peloponnesus,
(Signed) TH. COLOCOTRONI.
Carytena, 10th June, 1832.

Proclamation of Colocotroni to the Peloponnesians.
Beloved Countrymen,

We address to you a copy of our proclamation to the Panhellenium, dated the 10th of June. You will therein see the expression of the sentiments which you have been kind enough to evince to us, by writing and verbally, as well as your complaints at the violation of your rights and at the misfortunes which many of you have suffered, and which you run the hazard of being all subjected to, as victims of the perversity of some individuals.

The government of Nauplia, arbitrarily named, and against which you have, by several acts, shown your just discontent, intends to send to Leondari and to Phanari the cowardly and unworthy T. Grivas, accompanied by his infamous satellites and his Turks. You may imagine from this what are the infernal plans that injustice and immorality pretend to put in motion against the lives, the honour, property, and liberty of the Moreotes. In order to succeed in their designs, the government wishes to make them slaves, to stifle in their hearts every noble sentiment, and to destroy their inviolable rights in order not to find in them an obstacle to its tyranny. The too painful example

of the misfortunes of which your brethren the Argives, the Corinthians, and the Nauplians, have been the victims, leaves not the least doubt as to the truth of our assertions, as well as of the measures taken to send different bodies of troops to Tripolizza, which groans under its misfortunes, as well as to Calavrita, Vostizza, and Gastouni.

The propitious moment has arrived ; let us defend our rights as those of the entire nation trampled under foot. I appoint to this end my son, who is your comrade, to march against violence and illegality, under the standard of justice, and in the name of the sovereign prince of Greece.

It is for you to show at present the bravery and patriotism which characterize you. Arm yourselves to destroy tyranny and violence. Be convinced that henceforward there will be only slaves in the Morea, if the Moreotes do not fulfil, under present circumstances, with fidelity and perseverance, their duty to their country. We have for our defender, God, our Lord who protects justice. We have for our support the inalienable justice of the three powers, and for our allies the whole of western Greece, the islands, and many soldiers of the regular corps, who have felt their rights overthrown. You are doubtless informed as to the patriotic character of the members of the commission, and of their efforts against illegality and violence ! Peloponnesians ! remember the trophies of Valdezza and of Lala ; think of the extermination of Dramali, and of the thousand victories you have gained over the enemies of your country, and of your unexampled firmness against the efforts of Ibrahim. Rush, then, to arms without delay, under the guidance of your brave soldiers and of your chiefs, to efface the disgrace with which they try to cover you, and to place in safety your honour, your property, and

your rights. Every thing is easy with the aid of Providence and the ægis of our rights. In marching against usurpation, you will regard, as one of your most sacred duties, the maintenance of order, subordination to your chiefs, and promptitude to succour your suffering neighbours.

In this new career, defenders of honour and justice, you will have as your attentive observers the entire nation and the civilized world. No arguments will be able to justify the indifference which people unworthy of liberty can alone feel.

Whenever you have been willing to lend an ear to my counsels, I have led you in the path of honour, and your undertakings have been crowned with success.

TH. COLOCOTRONI,

General-in-chief of the Peloponnesus.

Carytena, 23d June, 1833.

*Protest of the Deputies and the Primates of the Morea
against the above Proclamations.*

(From the Greek.)

Two documents have come to our knowledge, dated the 10th and 11th of June, 1832, signed and addressed by Theodore Colocotroni, the former to the Greek nation, the latter to the Moreotes.

Peloponnesians ourselves, and charged with high functions of representation as deputies of the Morea, on the eve of the opening of the National Assembly, we owe it to the nation and to ourselves to explain ourselves solemnly, both with regard to the contents of the documents in question, and the character and the views of the man from whom they emanated.

Dictated from beginning to end by a manifest spirit of

malevolence and cunning, these two documents we should have thought unworthy of a serious and categorical answer if all the facts had not been disfigured in them; if the impudent falsehoods of which they are a tissue had not for their direct object the criminal intention of overthrowing the established government and the very bases of public safety.

Without reverting to the historical period of the Greek contest, to demonstrate the causes and effects already well known by the present generation, and consigned to the incorruptible judgment of posterity, we cannot but feel the deepest grief, when calling to mind the deplorable epoch of last December, when the vessel of Hellenic Society was fatally shipwrecked within port; then began that uninterrupted series of troubles and misfortunes, the sad inheritance to which Greece appears to have been condemned by the fallen power.

Those men of falsehood and corruption, blind and base instruments of tyranny, who had beguiled and drawn into a contest, pernicious to Greece and to himself, the President, who had been invited in the hope of our common safety, finally designed to raise on the tomb of liberty and of the rights of the nation the despotic throne of a tyrant. Hearts hardened by vice directed Greek hands to shed the blood of their brethren, and to sign proscriptions, persecutions, and terrible acts of revenge.

Nevertheless, thanks to the sound opinion of the nation, to the wisdom and courage of the majority of the military and political defenders of their country, the infernal attack at Argos was a failure, and its deplorable consequences were but of short duration. Those who outraged for a time the national dignity, those who, by premeditation or by

incapacity, exposed to so many perils the destines and the interests of Greece, were judged towards the end of March, 1832; five days elapsed, they were sought for, they and their works—all had disappeared.

The Senate, the national army, the people of the capital, a great portion of the Representatives, concurred in the formation of the present provisional government; on their side, the people of Greece, by their tranquil and prompt submission, and the Representatives of the High Alliance by their solemn recognition, consecrated the establishment and the existence of this government.

The term of its existence appeared to be the approaching arrival of our much desired Prince, and, before this event, the meeting of the legal and free national assembly, which the men of the abolished authority had forced the nation, at the price of so many ruinous sacrifices, to esteem beyond every thing; never, however, did the government find itself in a more difficult position, however great the patriotism and the capacity of those who composed it.

In its very bosom, a combination of persons whose choice was not dictated by the true nature of affairs; a system which at first was not to last beyond a few weeks; empty magazines; a treasury entirely exhausted by the prodigality of power, and wasted by the favours of moral and political corruption, on which the preceding men and their system had leant; an army unpaid for several months suddenly congregated round the capital after a revolution, in which it had taken part by its patriotism and its perseverance. All these circumstances offered great difficulties, terrible to surmount, of a character to discourage the most devoted patriotism, and consequently it is easy to conceive that the movement of the machinery of go-

vernment must have been at times impeded and even obstructed.

If a small number of Albanians are still to be found under the banners of the nation, they form a part of those whom the preceding government had paid in order to strengthen the satellites of its tyranny ; and the present government, in spite of all its efforts, has not yet found the means of paying them to send them back.

Yes, in the civil contest which lasted until the month of March last, towns and villages suffered losses ; promises were made ; commissions were given without number to the military ; but these inevitable results of the necessity under which the authorities and the deputies of Megara were placed of defending themselves and saving the rights of the nation, even were they considered as afflicting evils, still the whole responsibility of them rests entirely with those men who committed the outrage at Argos in December, and who, marching from illegality to illegality, pushed their folly to the extent of wishing to perpetuate the shameful subjugation of the nation, for which they had so long laboured.

Mention is made in the documents, which we refute, of the dissolution of the cavalry, formed at a great expence, without referring to the exact period at which it took place. It was before the establishment of the present government, at a meeting which took place before the gates of Nauplia, that this cavalry was really dissolved by the incapacity and the faults of its former chief, who had long before prepared its ruin.

All that is said respecting the dissolution of the schools of the Evelpides of Ægina is all false, although it is surprising to see still preserved, in the midst of a complete

dearth of resources, such costly establishments. With regard to the regular infantry, whilst applauding the patience, in the midst of privation, of those who still remain under its banners, we have no difficulty in attributing, what is known to all, the errors of some and the desertion of others, independently of the want of pecuniary means, to the machinations and factious suggestions of those same treacherous or foolish officers, whom Colocotroni adorns with the livery of patriotism and fidelity.

We confess with pain that Corinth, Argolis, and Tripolizza, formerly the scenes of great abuses on the part of the satellites of the fallen power, have been overwhelmed with new losses from April last until the present day; but if these sufferings, the sad and inevitable result of the concentration of a great many troops in those districts, must be exclusively imputed to certain persons, and surely those are not to blame who, from the commencement, proposed and counselled the repartition by small detachments of the army in all the cantons, whilst waiting till it could be paid and organized. All the world knows those who opposed that measure, and the secret aim of that opposition appears to-day in all its hideous nakedness. In accordance with the views of the High Alliance, in accordance with its own principles so often proclaimed, the present government has not ceased a single instant to march in the line of moderation and impartiality which it has traced for itself. A complete and real amnesty, a paternal indulgence, have accompanied the commencement and the sequel of its acts. The most barefaced falsehood cannot impute to it the smallest measure of reaction and persecution, whatever efforts are made to misrepresent some rare manifestations of private indignation, sufficiently justified by the violence

of the past, and which the Government hastened to appease the moment it heard of them. On the contrary, a severe scrutiny of its acts might, perhaps, condemn its indulgence and its system as too lenient towards men whom it ought not so far to have mistaken as to think them capable of acting from principles of liberty, and from regard to the public safety.

The present government, sparing no trouble, no sacrifice, to introduce every where the desired tranquillity, to calm the storm of the passions, and to levy the tithes, to meet the wants of the public service, and, above all, of the army, has not for a moment lost sight of the necessity of hastening the meeting of the national assembly, from which was justly anticipated a complete cure for present evils.

But, in the mean time, the pernicious instruments of the fallen power, those who were a thousand times stigmatized as agents of the anti-national machinations of the most perverse and the most turbulent egotism under the very ægis of the amnesty proclaimed in their favour, and under shelter of the extreme moderation of the government, began, the moment it was installed, to concert its overthrow, and to undermine the foundations of public tranquillity.

Linked together by their former crimes, habituated only to repose on an order of things which left a career open to their intrigues and their misdeeds, encouraged perhaps also by the counsels and instigations of an erroneous policy, they conspired against the government, against the assembly, against the whole nation.

After having nearly beguiled the innocence of some, as soon as they thought themselves sufficiently strong, they attacked the safety of all the strongholds; but hardly had they succeeded in their fatal attempt on Patrass, than, in

order to prolong the sufferings of the army, and to add thereby to the military abuses and to the sufferings of the districts, and thus to provoke new murmurs, discontent, and troubles, they inundated the country with false reports, proclaimed the exemption from taxes, organized at last detachments of brigands, in which several of their friends and relations were found, with a view of preventing, by force, or fraud, the levying of the taxes, the only means by which the government could provide for the wants of the state.

They followed this same line with regard to the national assembly, which they looked upon as a rock on which their anti-national undertakings, and their shameful interests, would for ever be shipwrecked. Having lost the hope of adjourning, hindering, or dissolving the assembly, by indirect means, they quit the path of simple opposition on the eve of its meeting, and present themselves, in all their deformity, in the horrible lists of revolt and of civil war.

And M. Theodore Colocotroni, whom the patriotic support of the Primates of the nation, and fortunate events, by no means proportioned to the sphere of his personal capacity, had formerly placed in a position to render to his country services which it had the misfortune to purchase more than once at the risk of its liberty, and at great loss and pecuniary sacrifices — Colocotroni, who has never offered his submission to the laws and to order but in proportion to the weakness and readiness of preceding governments to favour his cupidity, and to leave his errors and his crimes unpunished — Colocotroni, who has not neglected to convert into shameful sources of personal enrichment the capture of fortresses, recruitings, expeditions under various pretexts, and even this exemption from taxation which he has so often proclaimed; almost always the foremost in

sedition enterprizes against the government, and the foremost again whenever it became a question of a despotic administration—Colocotroni again appears upon the scene, self-styled interpreter of the sentiments of the people, self-installed judge of the measures of the government, with violence in his acts, falsehood and calumny in his words and in his writings; he tries to mislead the people, to excite it to civil convulsion, and, arbitrarily arrogating to himself a character and an authority without legal principle, he finally declares himself in revolt, and marches in arms against the Government, and against the totality of the representation of the nation itself.

Such being the disastrous situation towards which the views and the steps of this desperate man urge on the affairs of his country, without pretending to interfere in the measures which the government may think it its duty to take, in order to guarantee the country and its inhabitants; without putting forward the salutary decisions which it will belong to the national assembly to pronounce, we have thought it our duty to unmask, before the nation, before our Sovereign Prince, whose name the factions have so often unblushingly invoked, and before the whole civilized world, the falsehood, the perverseness of the means employed by the enemies of the public tranquillity, and the fatal projects of the revolt which they have just commenced.

We hasten, moreover, to disavow, by the present document, in the most solemn and explicit manner, all that may be said and done by Colocotroni, by those who surround him, and by those who hear him and act in concert with him. We disapprove, without any restriction, as representatives of the Morea, as Greek citizens, of every word, every action, tending to overthrow that which exists, and to

revolt; protesting, with all our might, against the evils and the injuries which this new civil war, provoked by the insurrection, may bring about; and against the said Colocotroni, and against those who act in concert with him, in enterprizes so prejudicial to the interests of the entire nation.

Panoutzos Notaras, Anagnostis Delyanis, Andreas Londos, Joannis Dasios, Georgios Notaras, Vasilios Couroussopoulos, Emanuel Meletopoulos, Anagnostis Tzortzakis, Nicolaos Corpheotakis, Rigas Palamides, Vasilios Christopoulos, Georgios Dariottis, Andreas Calamogdartis, Spiridion Spiliotopulus, Nicolaos Papalexopoulos, Joannis Nassis, Georgios Bastas, Petros Mavromichæli, &c. &c. &c.

Argos, 18th June, 1832.

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF PRONIA.

[As it is important to hear respecting the Congress, those who, from the commencement, opposed its meeting, as well as those who thought it necessary to separate themselves afterwards from its acts, I insert the documents concerning this affair, and the reply of the Congress to these addresses, subjoining also the public declaration of the Deputies, who remained at Nauplia after the dissolution.]

Proclamation of the Fourth National Assembly, held by Prorogation at Pronia, in July, 1832.

The Deputies of the Hellenick people, re-united in a National Assembly, conceive it to be their duty to proclaim, in the face of the nation, the principal objects of their labours.

Intestine divisions have torn, and still in part disturb, the nation. Having for their object the general pacification, the Deputies will commence their deliberations and their decisions, by decreeing a full and entire oblivion of the past.

The Greek nation has also manifested, in other circumstances, its profound gratitude towards the three Monarchs, its august benefactors; but it is on this day, above all, that it must declare it aloud, at a moment when, conforming themselves to the unanimous wishes of the Greeks, they have affixed their seal to the great work of their persevering anxiety for us, in raising to the throne of Greece his Royal Highness, Prince Otho, second son of the King of Bavaria. In declaring, then, the adherence of the entire nation to this choice, we shall invoke the prompt arrival of the new authority among us.

One of our principal labours will also be the revision of the constitutional laws, a revision decreed by the Assembly of Argos; and the drawing up of a new Constitution, adapted to the monarchical forms which shall guarantee the rights of the throne and the people.

The Deputies will also occupy themselves with the same solicitude, in finding the most convenient mode of distributing the national lands, *conformably to the interests of the nation, and to the guaranteeing of all the foreign and internal debts.*

They will also think of the just recompence due to those who have fought by land and by sea, to the relief of those who have suffered, as well as of the widows and orphans of citizens who have died for their country.

Finally, they will occupy themselves with the Provisional Government, which is to administer the country, until the arrival of the new authority.

Assisted by Divine support, and the co-operation of the nation, strong in the purity of their intentions, the Deputies hope to be able to arrive happily at the term of their labours, according to the wishes of the Hellenic people, their Sovereign, and the High Alliance.

The President, PANOUTZO NOTARAS.

The Vice-President, MAVROCORDATO.*

The Secretaries, A. POLIZOIDES.

D. CHRISTIDES.

Pronia, this 20th July, 1832.

*Collective Letter of the Three Residents, to M. Tricoupi,
Secretary for Foreign Affairs.*

Nauplia, 10th August, 1832.

SIR,

From the moment when the resolution was taken to convoke a national congress, we neglected no effort to represent, as well separately as collectively, to the Members of the Administrative Commission, on whom depended this meeting, the unhappy consequences that must necessarily result from the convocation of an assembly at the moment when passions were raging, and were excited to the highest degree by the events which had happened; and when, on the one hand, the powers represented at the Conference of London, in concert with the Court of Bavaria, were occupied in fulfilling the wishes which the Greek nation had so often manifested to the Courts, to which Greece already owed her emancipation, and all the means of consolidating her political existence.

Nevertheless, our councils and our warnings were not appreciated; the Government urged, on the contrary, the

* Mavrocordato subsequently withdrew his name.

meeting of the Assembly, and it met under the most fatal auspices. Civil war and anarchy desolated all Greece. The action of the executive power did not extend beyond the places occupied by the troops of the Alliance, and numerous protestations had invalidated the legality of the Assembly.

Under these circumstances, we obtained a knowledge of the new acts of the Conference of London, by which the allied powers had realized the wishes of the Greek nation, in choosing for it a Sovereign, and in adopting, in order the better to secure the accomplishment of her destinies, the following arrangements:—

1st. That the Provisional Government, such as it exists, must be maintained in all its integrity until the arrival of the Royal Regency.

2nd. That, in the mean time, no sale of national domains should be effected, nor *any measure adopted, which can tend to give rise in the new state to financial embarrassments.*

3rd. That the discussion, or establishment of a definitive constitution, or of fundamental laws, could no longer take place without the concurrence of the Royal power, because such an attempt would be in direct opposition to the act by which the nation had confided to the three Courts the right of choosing for it a Sovereign.

We have hastened, before even having received the patent acts of the Conference, to communicate their principal arrangements to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in order that he might make of it the use most appropriate to the circumstances.

We have not, therefore, been able to witness, without the most profound regret, that the deputies now united at Pronia have just decreed measures which are as contrary *to the acts by which the allied powers have fixed the future*

destiny of Greece, as they are fatal to the true interests of the Greek people. This Assembly, usurping a constituent power which the nation disputes, and which can now no longer exist but with the concurrence of the royal power, has not only declared its determination to lay the foundations of a definitive constitution of the state, and to proceed to the distribution of the national lands; but it has just given the measure of its intentions, and of its ulterior projects, in pronouncing the dissolution of the senate, of a body which makes an integral part of the Provisional Government, and whose existence, sanctioned by time, is to-day more than ever necessary to arrest the outbreak of passions, and to bring about the consolidation and the fusion of parties, before the arrival of the Royal Regency.

This act, illegal and arbitrary in its principle, impolitic in its effects, must necessarily lead to others equally incompatible with the transactions concluded for the future fate of Greece.

We invite you, Sir, to communicate to whom it concerns the contents of the present; and to declare that we claim the rigorous observance of it, and that we shall support the inviolability of these resolutions by the means which are in our power; that we consequently protest against any *infraction that has been made against them*, or that may hereafter be attempted against them; and, finally, that we can only recognize as a Provisional Government that which was constituted before the convocation of the Assembly of Pronia, with such modifications as imperious and urgent circumstances may oblige *the Senate* to attach to it in the spirit of the Protocol of March the 7th, and whilst waiting the arrival of the Royal Regency.

(Signed)

G. DAWKINS.

BARON ROUEN.

BARON RUCKMAN.

Reply of the National Assembly to the Collective Letter that the Residents of the Alliance addressed to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, dated August 10, 1832.

FROM THE GAZETTE OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT.

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION OF GREECE.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Nation, having taken into consideration the communication of the Residents of the Alliance, dated 29th July, 1832, have observed in it with pain that the convocation of the Assembly, as well as the intentions by which it is animated, have been interpreted in a manner contrary to their desire. They hasten, therefore, to reply to this communication with the sole view of re-establishing the truth of the facts, persuaded, as they are, that it will be justly appreciated.

It did not depend upon the Government to impede or to adjourn the re-union of the National Assembly which the law itself had convoked. The third article of the second decree of the fourth Assembly, which, in case of the decease of the President of Greece, gave birth to an administrative commission, required also explicitly the meeting of the National Assembly. This law established on the one side the provisional government, and, on the other, convoked the Assembly. The existence of the former was bound up of right with the convocation of the latter.

But, whatever may be the conflict of passions, it is certain that it has not been brought about by the meeting of the Assembly, which, on the contrary, is seriously occupied in appeasing them. Besides, with reference to the estrangement that has lately taken place, what relation is there between the results of personal dispositions or of provisional interests, and the acts of the Assembly, which have

for their principal aim legislation, which is alone capable of forwarding the happiness both of the conflicting parties and of generations to come.

It is certain that the elections have been made according to the free will of the people, and that in no province has the government or any subaltern authority either forced them, or even exercised the slightest influence over them.

The provinces have all been invited to send their deputies, and they have had all the material time necessary for this purpose. Nevertheless, even if to-day there should arrive deputies of the six or seven provinces which have remained silent, or which have protested against the deputies already sent, the Assembly, conducting itself with perfect impartiality, would admit those who had legal mandates; certainly the absence of a small number could not invalidate the legality of the deputies now present, who surpass, by a great many, the number required by the law.

The Assembly has marched hitherto, and will continue to march, in the path of the general pacification. This is proved by the decree of amnesty, and by the continual efforts of the plenipotentiaries to attain this grand object.

In declaring that it will occupy itself with the constitution, the Assembly has not wished to say that it would put it definitively in execution, without the concurrence of our king or of the Regency. But it has thought it to be its duty to prepare this grand work,* so necessary for the happiness of the governing and the governed.

The distribution of national lands is not an alienation, as it has been tried to be represented. The Assembly has never

* They were called upon to do so by the Protocol.

thought of alienating the national domains, but, having under its eyes the first decree of the Assembly of Trezene, as well as other decisions of this nature, it has only proposed to lay down the bases and the principles according to which the immutable authority that we expect must make the distribution of the national lands to Greek citizens, according to the unanimous wish of the people, which has always reserved to itself that right.

On this occasion it would not, perhaps, be superfluous to observe that the distribution of national lands was not prejudicial to the nation ; that, on the contrary, it was a measure which contributed to the real happiness of the people and to the advantage of the finances, facilitated the extinction of the national debt, and favoured public credit.

As to the Senate, it is the law itself that has caused its cessation.

The second decree of the Assembly of Argos, which institutes the Senate, is a simple complement of the act of the legislative body, dated the 18th January, 1832, an act which the said decree explicitly confirms. This complementary decree states that every act that it does not modify remains regulated according to the above-mentioned act of the legislative body. Thus, as the decree in question does not speak of the duration of the functions of the Senate, and as the act of the 18th of January does not prolong the legal existence of this council of the government beyond the meeting of the Assembly, it is evident that, according to the law, the Senate had legally ceased on the 14th of last month, the day on which the Assembly had commenced its labours. Capodistrias himself, in opening the Assembly of Argos, the 11th of July, 1829, declared in his speech

that all the authorities that it should have instituted would only last till the opening of the present session.

Besides, the Assembly has had in view to replace this council by a body more favourable to the general interests and to the union of the nation. Would it be necessary, perhaps, to add that public opinion has pronounced itself with sufficient decision on this point, and has justified the explicit meaning of the law?

With regard to the constituent right of the Assembly, how could the slightest doubt exist on the subject? The rights of the nation and all the antecedents of Greece secure to it entirely this right. The President himself had recognised the sovereign power of the National Congress. It is certain that, since the accession of the king, this power is modified as regards the fundamental laws, for the validity of which the concurrence of the royal authority is indispensable, when this authority shall have arrived in Greece.

But it is just, and it is the duty of the Assembly to think also of the provisional state of affairs, until the arrival of the king or of his representative.

The Senate has never had a constituent power. Although its name appears to give it a legislative authority, nevertheless, the second decree of the Assembly of Argos only grants to it a consultative voice, and, according to this decree, the Government could adopt or reject its opinion at pleasure. The functions that the law has assigned to it prove, evidently, that it is a simple council of state. If a painful necessity has, for an instant, made it assume, contrary to law, and on an extraordinary occasion, an authority which did not belong to it, this necessity no longer exists, and the Assembly, re-united, has assumed the constituent power which belongs to it.

The Plenipotentiaries of the nation feel profoundly all that they owe to the decisions of the Holy Alliance and to the councils of its representatives. Their acts prove how much they respect the one and appreciate the other. But they do not the less feel the grave nature of the duties of the trust which the people have confided to them, and they dare not render themselves responsible for not fulfilling these duties.

Pronia, 17th August, 1832.

Letter of four Ministers, relative to the two preceding Documents, addressed to the Administrative Commission of Greece.

(Translated from the Greek.)

The communication of the Residents of the three allies to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, dated the 10th of August, and the letter which the President of the Assembly addressed to the government on the 17th of August, in reply to that communication, have engaged the attention of the Under-signed, who feel the burden that would weigh upon them as responsible ministers, if they were not to hasten to place under the eyes of the government the dangers which await the country on the eve of its establishment, and the means by which the public affairs might be improved, or at least not become worse, before the approaching arrival of the authority which is to govern the country in the name of his Majesty the King of Greece.

As regards the convocation of the Assembly, we think that the reasons put forward in the letter of the President of the Assembly are indisputable. The law is clear, and the govern-

ment could not refuse to execute it. Besides, the very attributes which the Senate had given to the administrative commission, when it formed it, imposed upon it, as one of its first duties, the convocation of the Assembly: the members of the government were obliged to conform to it. There is reason to believe that the difficulties encountered by the Assembly, before commencing its labours, have given rise to certain unfortunate feelings, and have produced mistrust with regard to the direction which it ought to have followed. However this may be, the answer which the deputies, united in a preliminary sitting made on the 9th of last month, led us to believe that the Assembly, in continuing the march which it had promised to follow, would doubtless attain the object of approximating the contending parties, and dispose the nation to a worthy reception of its king. Unluckily, this has not been the case.

The discussion which took place on the subject of the declaration of the Assembly spread the first germs of misunderstanding. The project of this declaration had been drawn up by a commission, to which some of the Undersigned belonged. This commission took care to embrace only the objects which it thought useful to the labours to which the Assembly ought to confine itself until the arrival of the Regency. The necessity of the concurrence of the royal authority in the reform of our fundamental laws was therein expressed; but the distrust, pushed already to the extent of misinterpreting the intentions expressed in this declaration, led to their insisting on the alteration of this act: our efforts to support it were vain. We had avoided making, in this declaration, any mention of the division of the national lands; still they obstinately persisted in discussing this subject, and they ended, after long debates, in

confining themselves to find the means of effecting this division.

We felt the difficulties entailed upon us as regards the future, by the engagement which the Assembly made in its declaration, and how grave was the responsibility which would weigh upon us with regard to the king, if we were not to support, with all our power, the principal bases of the monarchical government, which is henceforward to govern our country. We have done all that was in our power to remove the causes of the mistrust which pervaded the public mind. We recognized, above all, the necessity of allowing every act of the Assembly to be preceded by that of the approximation and the accordance of the contending parties. The government has approved of this measure, and entered into preliminaries with the commissions whose nomination it had urged in the bosom of the Assembly.

We should be glad to be able to state that the task of all the deputies to attain the great work of the re-establishment of harmony was in reality conformable to the intentions which they had just expressed in their last reply. But respect for the truth obliges us to declare, that, after the decree relative to the oblivion of the past, far from continuing in these views, the Assembly departed from them, and adopted a retrograde march; for, when it became a question of common agreement between the parties, and that for this end they had just suspended every important act of the Assembly after the decree concerning the recognition of the king, the same day on which it was necessary to draw up the decree for which the Residents themselves had been invited by the President of the Assembly to assist at the sitting, the deputies unexpectedly promulgated that concerning the Senate. This act, which was very rapidly discussed, and at

which those of the Undersigned who take part in the deliberations were not present, gave rise to difficulties relative to the overtures in favour of the projected arrangements, increased the distrust, gave rise to the last communication to the Residents, and placed the Assembly, in reality, in a position very unsatisfactory as regards the Alliance.

The reply of the President of the Assembly does not appear to us suitable, and cannot tranquillize the Residents of the Allied Courts, who must conform to the express instructions which they have received. The government, in transmitting it, cannot approve of the whole of its contents, without incurring a grave responsibility towards the king. The reason is obvious. Immediately after the recognition of the king, the state is understood to be monarchical; and the present government, whatever it be, must support the royal prerogative. One of these prerogatives is its concurrence in what concerns the putting the constitution into execution. With regard to the division of the lands, they desired to reserve to themselves the sole right of deciding, and of leaving to the royal power only the execution.

This resolution is perfectly incompatible with monarchical principles; is opposed, in every respect, to the state of things which at present governs the country, and becomes impracticable, from the want of necessary information, for a decree concerning the division of the national lands.

In one of the last paragraphs of this reply, the question of the concurrence due to the royal authority with respect to the legislative power is again touched upon, and this right is limited to the sole sanction of the sovereign, which is only accorded to the fundamental laws, whilst the concurrence ought to extend also to the initiative, and to the sanction of all the laws without exception: and, since, in

every case, the division of the lands cannot be regulated except by a law, can the Assembly refuse to the sovereign a concurrence in drawing it up?

No doubt, this object alone would suffice to confirm the Residents in the suspicions which they conceived relative to the views of the Assembly, and to oblige them to protest and even to have recourse to other measures, because it is opposed to their instructions.

With regard to the question of a reform of the government, the views of the Assembly may, in fact, give rise to a conflict; but we hope that they may easily be reconciled, by taking into consideration the intentions of the Alliance and those of the Assembly, without being restricted by the letter of the instructions.

The Alliance has only in view the cessation of the troubles of the country, and the re-establishment of harmony; it has thought that the means of attaining this end would be to make all parties concur in the composition of the government. The intentions of the Assembly, if one could for a moment suppose them contrary to the views of the Alliance, would contravene the declaration which it made, and the engagements which it has taken. At the same time, it would in vain seek more efficacious means of attaining the object which it has proposed.

All the discussions which have taken place, as well between the members of the council as in the sectional meetings of the deputies, have proved that every undertaking would be vain, if we did not commence by an arrangement of the contending parties, and that any government which might be formed would not present a national character. We have seen above the reasons why the work of re-establishing harmony has retrograded: if the Assembly, after the act

concerning the Senate, proceeded to another relative to the government, before effecting an arrangement between the parties, not only can no satisfactory result be hoped for, but we can only foresee new dissensions, and an increase of the evils which already convulse the country.

Here we feel the difficult position of the members of the government: they must take into consideration their own cause; and every proposition that each of them might make individually may be misinterpreted. On the other side, however, the present state of things gives too many motives for bad interpretations of another character. Besides, it is impossible to prolong any further this position of things, without bringing about the ruin of the country.

The secretaries of the government, before daring to touch this point, have taken into consideration the grave responsibility which would weigh upon them, if they did not make known to the administrative commission what it owes to the king, to the nation, and to itself.

It would be desirable that a single individual, offering guarantees to all parties, should assume the reins of the provisional government until the arrival of the Regency. But this subject having been discussed, presented insurmountable difficulties; and seeing that, if it did not succeed entirely, the responsibility would be the greater, we dare not again bring it forward.

A second proposal would be to choose three men known for their impartiality, to confide to them the supreme authority, after the resignation of all the members of the present government, with the resolution, on their part, to endeavour to support the new government. But the difficulties which this measure would still offer would not be less, since it is a question of a government composed of several members;

it would be impossible that its composition should not be confided to the departmental sections. In this case, each of the three members would not inspire entire confidence in all the parties of each section. Besides, before taking this step, we must provide for the general concurrence; otherwise, we should risk irritating still more the antipathies which exist.

A third measure would then be to be considered. Since, after the death of one of its members, the government presents only an unequal number, one of the six members might resign, and, in this case, the government reduced to five members would act with an absolute majority.

This measure would agree with the instructions of the Residents; and it is the only one which can avoid the new troubles which threaten us. As regards the Senate, neither the preservation of all its members, nor their entire removal, could fulfil the views of the pacification. We therefore think it necessary to re-organize this body with the changes which the actual state of things prescribes for the persons composing it. Whatever may be the instructions of the Residents for the preservation of the integrity of the existing authorities, we hope that they will themselves feel the necessity of conforming to the spirit of those instructions which would not be incompatible with these measures.

If the government thinks, like the Undersigned, that by these measures we may attain the object of the arrangement without our departing from the communications of the representatives of the Alliance, it remains for us to consider how they may be carried into execution. The Undersigned think that it would be proper to dispose the Assembly to admit them, and to arrive at a common agreement between the deputies and the government. In this

case, they are ready to contribute, in as far as depends upon them, to the desirable success of these measures.

Secy. of State for Finances,	A. MAVROCORDATO.
. Foreign Affairs,	S. TRICOUPI.
. War, . . .	C. ZOGRAPHOS.
. Justice, . .	C. CLONARIS.

Nauplia, August 19, 1832.

Letter of Nineteen Deputies, who abstained from frequenting the sittings of the National Assembly, addressed to the latter.

For several days many of the Undersigned cease to take part in the sittings of the Assembly. They are aware that this conduct is misinterpreted by some of their colleagues; they must explain themselves, and they seize with pleasure this opportunity of doing so.

Before commencing the ordinary sittings of the Assembly, the deputies had assembled, on the 9th of July, in an extraordinary sitting, in the town of Nauplia, and had decided that before any other proceeding, they should occupy themselves with the means necessary to re-establish peace and harmony in the country. We communicated this resolution to the government, in order that it should be transmitted to the Residents. In this document we engaged that, in the declaration which the Assembly was to make, we would give incontestable proof of our sincere efforts to efface every trace of division or antipathy, and to remain faithful to the duties which had been imposed upon us by our pledges, grateful towards the protecting powers of the Greek nation, and worthy of the benevolence of our sovereign.

The debates of the sitting at which the declaration of the

Assembly had been discussed gave occasion to the Undersigned to remark with pain that the Assembly departed from its arrangements. The phrase relative to the concurrence which the sovereign ought to share in the reform of our fundamental laws was effaced, which created suspicions that nothing less was intended than to refuse to the crown one of its incontestable rights. The paragraph which was added in favour of the distribution of the national lands was, in fact, partly amended after long debates, but it betrayed sentiments entirely incompatible both with the arrangements of the High Alliance, expressed in one of its last Protocols, and with the true interests of the nation.

Notwithstanding all this, we did not suffer ourselves to be discouraged ; our regards were constantly fixed on the grand work of the re-establishment of harmony, an object which necessarily occupied the Assembly beyond every thing else. The decree relative to the oblivion of the past was to precede this business. This decree, in fact, passed ; but how could it be executed ? They wished to form commissions of all the sections, in order that they might come to an understanding, and co-operate with the government in effecting this salutary work. The principal bases were fixed for discussing them anew in the sectional committees. It was above all recognized that, to attain this object, the Assembly ought not within a given period to deliberate on any important act, pending the result of the negotiations in favour of the arrangement between the contending parties. From this negotiation were only excepted the decree which was to be issued for the recognition of the king, and the documents relating to it. But, on the very day fixed for the discussion of this last decree, for which the President of the Assembly had made an official communication to the representatives

of the Allied Courts, the debate was suddenly opened respecting the Senate ; and the same day they summarily discussed, settled, and signed the third decree.

This act, in whatever point of view it is considered, with regard to its substance, infallibly tended, by the forms which accompanied it, not only to complete the mistrust of the contending parties, but to frustrate all their efforts in favour of the pacification. What still more aggravated these feelings was, that it gave a motive to the Residents to suspect the intentions of the Assembly, respecting which they had already entertained grave doubts since its declaration, and to protest by their communication of the 10th of August.

The answer of the President of the Assembly to the government, dated the 22nd of August, relative to the demands in that letter, far from dissipating the suspicions of the Residents, will entirely confirm them, and place the Assembly in a disagreeable position with reference to the Alliance.

Although the Assembly admits, in this reply, the concurrence of the king in the constitution, it limits it to its definitive execution. In one of the last paragraphs of its reply, in touching again on the question of the concurrence which the sovereign ought to have in the legislative power, it limits it to the sanction of the fundamental laws.

With regard to the division of the national lands, the Assembly attributes to itself exclusively and in a clear manner, the right to decide upon it, and only grants to the royal authority the execution of it.

With regard to the provisional government, it expresses no opinion. What must be the impression produced on the Residents by the arrangements relative to the concurrence of the sovereign and the division of the national lands,

when the former shock the incontestable principles of all monarchical government, and the latter are in manifest opposition to their instructions? Can they by their silence charge themselves with so grave a responsibility towards their courts and the king of Greece? They will therefore be obliged not only to protest, but to oppose, by every means, what the Assembly may decide. And what will be the consequence of this conflict, especially in the present position of our internal affairs? A division in the nation which would oppose any arrangement; new intestine troubles, much graver than the former, and the dissolution of the Assembly.

How can we remedy these inconveniences, or at least prevent the evils which threaten us, and maintain the Assembly? It would be desirable that, before all, the Assembly should suspend for some days its labours, in order to occupy itself only with the approximation of parties. Whatever step it may take, either as regards the government, or the Senate, if it were not preceded by the re-establishment of harmony and of the general concurrence of the nation, it would be difficult, in the eyes of the Undersigned, to effect it, and still more difficult to render it availing. If, on the contrary, the Assembly insists on continuing its functions, we shall urge the following advice:—

1. The Assembly will explain itself in a positive manner on the right of the concurrence of the king in the legislative power in general, and in the constitution in particular.

2. It will not arrange in a definitive manner what concerns the division of the national lands, by imposing on the crown its execution; but it will acknowledge the right of the concurrence of the king in what it shall decide relative to this object.

3. It will confirm by a decree the present government, until the arrival of the Regency. As the number of the members is even, since the death of one among them, some of those who compose it shall be charged with public functions having the pacification for their object. This measure shall be combined in such a manner as to leave in the capital only an uneven number of members.

4. It will form the Senate, conformably to the second decree of the Assembly of Argos, with amendments relative to its members, such as the circumstances require, and which might be efficacious for the pacification, and even with an increase of its members, in a manner to have represented in its body the contending parties. It will fix its duration until the arrival of the Regency.

5. It will form special commissions, to which it will confide the drawing up the projects of the constitution, the decree relative to the division of the national lands, and other fundamental laws.

6. It will prorogue itself by a decree until the arrival of the Regency.

In taking this direction, the Assembly may prevent its own dissolution, guarantee the important interests of the nation, execute the engagements which it has taken, and attain the great object of the general pacification.

(Signed) The deputies, S. Tricoupi, A. Londo, A. Mavrocordato, C. Zographo, C. Clonaris, C. Pappapoliti, C. Chalciotti, S. Staico, G. Lelio, C. Vlassi, J. Staico, N. Calogeroupolo, Coneletios, B. Boudouri, T. Manghina, A. Mi-aoulis, E. Xenos, N. Ghicas, G. Tomaras.

Nauplia, 22nd August, 1832.

Read in the Congress, at the commencement of the sitting of August the 22nd.

Declaration of Sixty-two Deputies, who remained at Nauplia after the violent Dispersion of the Congress to the Panhellenium.

The Undersigned representative Plenipotentiaries of the nation, appreciating the sacred duties which have been imposed upon them, and not suffering that unjust blame should attach to the representative character with which they are invested, are forced, in the midst of the most difficult circumstances, and at the moment of the prorogation of their labours, to address themselves to their constituents, to expose to them the faithful picture of all that has passed since the convocation of the present Session, and to justify before them, and in presence of the civilized world, their own conduct and their acts. They will also designate the source of the machinations which, in tormenting Greece, without pity for more than five months, have attained the height of audacity, by the frightful and unheard-of crime committed on the 10th instant, in the very sanctuary of the Assembly.

The confession of the truth, which we owe to the present generation, is still more justly due to posterity.

The 25th of last month had decided, at the Isthmus of Corinth, the fate of the Constitutional armies ; and the 29th of the same month had opened to them the gates of Nauplia.

The place left vacant by the man of violence was occupied, after momentary attempts at a change of persons, by a commission of seven Members, a mixture of heterogeneous or hostile elements, become necessary in consequence of the Protocol of March 7th.

The first steps of the new Government, or rather of that of its two halves, which constituted itself inheritors of the

arbitrary system of the Capodistrias family, have clearly indicated the principal aim to which it was directed.

Systematic opposition to every salutary measure, tending to guarantee the tranquillity, by the re-partition of troops in due proportion among the Provinces of the State; evil-intentioned opposition to the wise proposal of naming in time, and conformably to circumstances and to the spirit of the epoch, subaltern authorities; finally, opposition of all kinds, designedly made, and only capable of serving as a firebrand to a premeditated civil conflagration.

The opposition alone against the convocation of the Assembly has not succeeded. Public opinion was strongly pronounced in its favour. Weighty reasons and pressing wants required it.

National Assembly was the watchword of the whole preceding contest. It is for this that so many sacrifices have been made, so many tombs have been opened.

The Assembly then was officially convoked. The town of Argos was designated as the provisional spot for the union of the Plenipotentiaries. Towards this town the populations, left entirely free, and uninfluenced, have begun to send Plenipotentiaries of their choice.

Only a very few provinces have not sent their deputies, and still fewer provinces have protested against those already sent, and in this they did not express their own wishes, but they followed, of necessity, the political opinions of powerful chiefs.

The law considers as legal the National Assembly, as soon as two-thirds of the whole of the Plenipotentiaries are united, supposing always that the other third has not been excluded by force.

The first preparatory sitting, held on the 11th of June

last, regulated all that concerns the examination of the electoral mandates, in naming a Commission, *ad hoc*. Since then more than a month passed without any other sitting having taken place ; certainly the examination of these mandates might have been sooner terminated ; but those who intrigued against the Assembly, in raising difficulty after difficulty, have retarded its opening as long as they could.

The discussion relating to the spot where the Assembly was to hold its sittings has not caused less delay. The Plenipotentiaries have finally agreed to concentrate themselves at Nauplia, which offered to all, without exception, the requisite guarantees, and facilitated, by this means, the success of the wished-for object of the meeting.

The Representatives of the Greek people never doubted that it was allowable for them to meet at Nauplia, a city eminently Greek ; but, having been informed, contrary to all expectation, that this was forbidden them by the Residents, on account of the presence of the allied troops, (as if the troops could have any other aim than the protection of the Greeks, and as if the Government itself had not its seat in the same town, and in the midst of the same soldiers of the alliance,) the Deputies of the nation, wishing to avoid all possible disagreement, decided that they would assemble at *Pronia*, a suburb of Nauplia, five minutes' walk from that town.

It was at Pronia, then, on the 14th of July, that the regular sittings were commenced. Four-fifths of the Plenipotentiaries were already present. In the discussion relative to the proclamation to the Panhellenium, there soon became manifest, on the part of a small number of the Plenipotentiaries, who, indeed, for the most part, belonged to the class of the public functionaries, the obstinate pretension of wish-

ing to direct the labours of the Assembly, or rather the opinions of the Deputies.

The draft of the proclamation having been presented to the Plenipotentiaries as complicated and as unintelligible as it was grave and concise, inasmuch as it indicated beforehand the most important acts of the Assembly, must, necessarily, by its very nature, as well as by the systematic obstinacy which has been displayed in pretending that it should be adopted without amendment, and in a short space of time, have given rise to legitimate suspicions against the authors of it, and brought about, from the very commencement, anomalies and impediments in the business of the Assembly.

The preliminary acts which followed the proclamation, true expressions of the hearts of the Plenipotentiaries, and unequivocal pledges of the purity of their consciences, have loudly proclaimed the spirit of moderation and equity which animated the Deputies of the nation. Such were especially the complete oblivion of the past, and the measures which it contained, measures capable of effacing all traces of disunion, and of attaining the object of the pacification, if the persons charged with its execution had fulfilled their duties with fidelity and conscientiousness. We cannot, therefore, but consider, as calumniators of the Assembly, those men who dared to say that it has not chosen to reflect on the means of pacifying the country. And what could the Assembly do more to attain this object, than what it really has done? Could it be permitted that a body, destined only to deliberate and to take general decisions, should descend into the arena of actions peculiar to the executive power, and that it should neglect its legislative labours? Would it not thereby depart openly from its duties? And, nevertheless, to deprive its adversaries of all pretext for suspicion, it consented to

cede nine of its Members to co-operate with the Government in the end proposed.

We now ask, what has this Provisional Government done since? If it and its Ministers sincerely desired pacification, ought it not to conform its acts to its words? It ought, above all things, to publish the decree of oblivion of the past, according to Art. V. of the same decree, and yet it still keeps copies piled up in its offices.

The Plenipotentiaries have shown their sincere desire to restore union and tranquillity to the interior, although they did not find the executive power ready to realize their wishes. Abroad, they have not less proved, by their first acts, how much they appreciated the high and salutary decisions of the Triple Alliance, which entirely correspond with the wishes manifested for a long time by the nation, of which they are the faithful Representatives. They have hastened to confirm the election of King Otho, and to invite his Majesty to hasten his arrival in the new State; at the same time, profiting by the circumstance, they have expressed, by private addresses, both their profound gratitude towards their magnanimous benefactors, the Allied Sovereigns, and their gratitude towards the King of Bavaria, the august father of the Sovereign of Greece, for benefits previously received. It is very singular, that we do not yet know the fate of those documents, of which the transmission was confided to the care of the Government.*

To the principal objects of the deliberations of the Assembly belonged also undoubtedly the care of organizing provisionally the internal administration of the State, until the arrival of the Regency, an object the more important as

* M. Tricoupi, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, may answer this question.

the actual state of things does not offer the slightest guarantee for the cessation of existing dissensions, but it contains, on the contrary, all the elements which maintain and perpetuate the desire of anarchy and the conflict of passions.

The Plenipotentiaries have judged fit to commence the reform of the present government by the abolition of the Senate. This council, according to the second decree of the Assembly of Argos, which is but the complement of the act of the legislative body, dated January 18, 1828, was considered abolished of right the moment when the Assembly opened its sittings. But it was necessary to declare this in reality, because it did not hasten of itself to avow what it ought to have acknowledged, namely, that its existence was entirely useless, its power absolutely null in presence of the Sovereign Assembly. Besides the abolition of this council, the Assembly had certainly strong and sufficient reasons to pronounce its condemnation also for its numerous illegal acts and its reactions, but it consented to pass over these illegalities in silence, in order to conform religiously both to the letter and the contents of the decree relative to the oblivion of the past.

All the decisions taken by the Assembly involved upon sacred interests, and were weighed in the balance of justice; and it is evident that the decrees of a body which represents the nation are legal as regards their origin and binding on the State. But, contrary to all expectation, and to the astonishment of all, these decisions have met with opposition from the Residents, in a communication addressed to the Secretary of the Government for Foreign Affairs, dated July 29, and transmitted to the Assembly by these functionaries. The representatives of the Alliance, after having first condemned the convocation made by the Government

of this Assembly prescribed by the law, and demanded loudly by public opinion ; after having imposed limits to the national will of the representatives of the Greek people, have ended by pronouncing that the Assembly had *arrogated* to itself the constitutional power of the nation.

Singular state of things ! The Residents, formerly witnesses of the horrible outrage at Argos, and of the criminal conduct of an usurper of the supreme authority, and having before their eyes the Protocol of January 7, which transmitted to them the express order to recognise the Government which should be established by the National Assembly "*according to all legal forms*," have not hesitated, notwithstanding these data and these instructions, to recognize as legal the acts of the self-styled Fifth National Assembly, which were opposed *to all legal forms*, and to consider as legitimate *the supposed child* of this Assembly, and this at an epoch when a large and powerful party in the state had taken up arms against it, and when almost the entire nation manifested its indignation against arbitrary power. What do they do to-day ? Whilst every thing ought to convince them of the legality of the present Assembly and of the validity of its acts, not only do they appear to question them, but they vote against them.

The most singular fact is, that they grant a constituent power to a body which, even if it legally existed, had only a consultative power, and which represents neither the capacities of Greece, nor the most notable proprietors, nor those who have distinguished themselves by sacrifices, or illustrated themselves by services in the struggle for independence. Thus they expose the fate of the Greeks to all the dangers of an equivocal position, in attributing to this abolished body the power of modifying the Government at will, and in the manner it may think fit.

The undermentioned communication of the three Residents contained, amongst others, three articles, as the last decisions of the Conference.

These articles were :

1. The immutability of the Provisional Government until the arrival of the Regency.
2. The prohibition of drawing up the definitive fundamental laws, without the concurrence of the royal authority.
3. The non-alienation of the national lands. The Assembly has not hesitated to reply to them with all the respect due to the authors of the communication, but also with all the frankness and with the profound consciousness of its sacred duties.

With regard to the first article, taking to witness and alleging in its support, the misery of the present state of things, the Assembly avowed clearly that it was just, and its duty to think of reforming the Government provisionally, until the arrival of the durable authority.

With regard to the fundamental laws, it acknowledged beforehand, what, indeed, it had never intended to deny, namely, the necessity of the concurrence of the royal authority, when it should be present ; but it added also that it had thought it to be its duty to prepare this grand work, equally necessary for the welfare of the administrators, and of the governed.*

Finally, as concerns the *alienation of national lands*, the Assembly has made the just observation that it was not proper to confound this term with that which the Assembly

* See Proclamation of the Conference of London — "Greeks, aid your prince with true devotedness in the work of giving to the State a definitive constitution."

had employed in its proclamation, namely, with the *repartition of the national domains*, a measure decreed already and consecrated by all the preceding assemblies, with which the President Capodistrias himself was seriously occupied, *and which alone was capable of giving to the Greeks a true political existence, and of contributing, at the same time, to the extinction of the public debts, and in general to the establishment of the national credit.* The Assembly has gone still further: it has made the necessary distinction between the mode, that is to say, the principles and the bases, of the repartition of the national lands on the one side, and its execution on the other: and whilst it referred, as a matter of course, the second of these two points to the co-operation of the future authority, it reserves to itself of right the first.

The national territory emancipated from its conquerors at the price of Greek blood could not but revert of right to its ancient possessors. It is therefore common property, a common inheritance, exposed to the view of the Greeks, and relative to which all those who have taken part in the struggle are considered as so many co-heirs and co-proprietors.

Is there in fact any thing more legitimate and more natural than to reserve to the sovereign Assembly, which represents the whole nation, the right to lay down the principles according to which the future repartition of the common property should be made?

It is certain that, since the seventh year of the war of independence, the powers who from that period constituted themselves protectors of Greece, have also essentially contributed to the deliverance of the Greek territory. But we dare not think, and we should commit an unpardonable

fault if we were to imagine, that these powers, by their humane and generous co-operation, had ever meant to appropriate to themselves other rights than those which the nation herself had accorded to them, namely, the right to elect the prince who was to reign hereditarily over Greece.

Thus the Greeks, sole and incontestable masters of the fruits of their victory, do not arrogate to themselves a strange or unbecoming right, when they attribute to themselves the power of disposing of them.

It is in this spirit, and on these principles, that to the grave communication of the Residents an answer not less grave and important was made on the part of the Assembly. The Government to which this answer was addressed, ought to have sent it, without the least delay, to whom it concerned, from respect to the supreme authority whence it emanated : but it is with grief and profound indignation that we announce to the public that the Government did not fulfil these commands ; * that it has even dared, as we see by its conduct, to constitute itself supreme judge of the definitive decisions of an entire Assembly. The observations of certain deputy ministers ought to have been made in a public and official manner, in the sitting itself, and during the discussion. The deputies considered as secretaries of the Government prove thereby that they have strangely misunderstood their duties ; for these functionaries, in their quality of responsible persons, can, it is true, judge of the acts of Government, but by no means of those of a Sovereign Assembly, which is only accountable for them to the nation.

* What does M. Tricoupi say to this ? He was at that time Secretary of State.

Long discussions have taken place respecting the persons and the organization of the Government. The opinion of the majority, recognized according to the manner of voting, adopted in the regulation, decided on the establishment of an administrative commission of seven members, the nomination of the persons who were to compose it until the arrival of the Regency, and the replacement of the Senate by a legislative committee taken from the body of the Plenipotentiaries, whose functions were only to last until the provinces had sent representatives, who should be chosen immediately according to *the law of election*, No. 17.

It was also decided by the majority, that the constitution of Trezene, modified in a proper manner, should be adopted until the happy arrival in Greece of the Royal Regency, the period at which the monarchical and definitive constitution would necessarily be settled. The last discussions of this sitting, prolonged by the arguments and replies designedly spun out from nine o'clock in the morning till five in the afternoon, had for their object the definitive decision of the proposition already so often renewed, and concerning the illegal acts of the self-styled Fifth National Assembly.

The President had closed the sitting, and the Plenipotentiaries were beginning to depart, when a detachment of soldiers, who, having deserted the standard of their chief, General Griziotti, owing to an intrigue, found themselves encamped under the orders of their officers, Theodore Cazani, Jean Condouli, Lambros Coutzos, and some subalterns at Aria, half a league distant from Nauplia, surrounded the hall of the Assembly, armed with guns and sabres, threw themselves tumultuously in the midst of the Plenipotentiaries, and spread amongst them and the spectators a panic terror. Never has a more terrible spectacle met the eyes of

the Greeks — never has so tragical an event afflicted Greek hearts—never has a more criminal action dishonoured the soil of Greece. Like untamed brutes — like furious tigers, these soldiers, having for accomplices some even of the guards of the Assembly, fell upon the Plenipotentiaries, dispersed them, threatened some of them with death, (an outrage which, however, was averted); they contented themselves with pillaging others, and, finally, they carried away some of them to their quarters at Aria, and amongst them the President whom they kept a prisoner for several days.

Soldiers, or rather a mob of soldiers, ignorant of order, are but simple machines, material instruments receiving only their impulse from without. It is, therefore, those who incite to a criminal act, and not those who are led to it, that the weight of punishment must be inflicted. These soldiers had for some days previously demanded of the Government their arrears of salary, which it promised to pay them within a given period. The last day of this term was that in which the horrible scene, of which we have just spoken, took place. A deputation of these same soldiers, sent into the capital to receive their pay, at the very moment when the Plenipotentiaries, seated in the hall of the Assembly, deliberated on the reform of the present state of things, received, according to their own avowal, on the part of some members of the Government, the answer that, not being sure of their maintenance in the administrative commission, they were by no means bound to keep their promise; and that the soldiers had only to address themselves to the Assembly, which had created a new Government, in order to obtain payment.

Such an answer, supposing even that it was not made

with a perfidious and insurrectionary view, was, nevertheless, capable of exciting, and of leading to acts of despair, soldiers whose only expectation of relief for their nakedness and misery was their moderate pay. However, many circumstances, and strong presumptive evidence, which time alone will clear up, lead to the belief that this event was the result of an infernal intrigue, long since hatched, the principal object of which was the dissolution of the National Assembly, which was an eye-sore to those wretched persecutors of a well understood liberty and of legal order, who delight in anarchy, and in the misfortunes of Greece.

Hellenes! you have seen in this simple recital, which we have just laid before you, with what sincerity — with what devotion to the interests of our country — and with what scrupulous conscientiousness—your Representative Plenipotentiaries have fulfilled their duties.—You have seen the opposition that the well-intentioned majority of the Assembly has met with on the part of a capricious minority, incapable of yielding to the victorious arguments of reason.—You have, in fine, seen what intrigues the adversaries have employed, what snares they have laid, to accomplish the failure of the useful and salutary views of the Assembly. The Plenipotentiaries have shown the perseverance of martyrs, and they trust they have sufficiently justified by their conduct the confidence with which you have honoured them.

Nevertheless, at the very moment when they prorogue their session for a period, after having already adopted in favour of the general interests all the measures in their power, it is impossible for them not to protest before the nation—before the King of Greece, and in presence of the civilized world—against the authors of so many misfortunes—against those

who have made this unhappy country the prey of passions. Impartial history, in unmasking the names of these men, will one day brand their acts more openly than is permitted now. Perhaps, also, the laws, in obtaining that vigour which belongs to them, will one day avenge crimes which hitherto have remained unpunished.

(Signed)

The President, P. NOTARAS,
P. MAVROMICHÆLIS, &c. &c.

And sixty-two signatures,

Nauplia, this 22d August, 1832,

PAPERS RELATING TO THE THIRD INSTAL-
MENT OF THE GREEK LOAN.

1835, 1836.

PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS BY COMMAND OF
HIS MAJESTY, JULY, 1836.

No. 1.

*M. Tricoupi, to the Plenipotentiaries of France, Great Britain, and
Russia.*

2, Chester Terrace, June 19, 1835.

The Undersigned, &c. has the honour, by order of his Court, under date of *the 18th of May last*, to communicate to their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of the three august Courts of France, Great Britain, and Russia, that the sum of 8,841,304 francs, 89 centimes, which, according to the explanation of the Greek government, remained at its disposal at the beginning of the year 1835, was already, at the date above-mentioned, so far reduced by the great amount of ordinary and extraordinary disbursements for which it has been necessary to provide, that it would scarcely be sufficient to cover the expenditure of the first months after that date: that the funds of the treasury are not essentially increased since that time, because the greater part of the payments into the treasury were only made at the end of the

year; neither can any such payment be expected before the end of August: that the embarrassments which would infallibly result to the Greek government from the want of the necessary funds to meet the current expences, render it important that the three Great Powers, in their anxiety for the Greek State, should have the goodness to consent to the third instalment of the Loan being raised; that, finally, if the desires of the Greek government should, for the present, remain unsatisfied, the Undersigned is called upon to request that his government may, in the meanwhile, obtain an advance of 3,000,000 of francs, on account of the third instalment, under the common guarantee of the three Great Powers, in order that it may be able to meet the disbursements of the service for the ensuing months.

In communicating to the Conference the recent orders of his Court, the Undersigned has the honour to observe that it would be an extremely serious matter, if His Majesty the King of Greece, having scarcely attained his majority, should find himself in a few weeks in a state of financial embarrassment.

The Undersigned, in the full confidence that he will be able in a few days to announce to his Court a favourable resolution on the part of their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of the three august Courts, has the honour to request them, &c. &c.

Their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of

France, Great Britain, and Russia.

(Signed) S. TRICOUPI.

No. 2.

E. J. Dawkins, Esq., to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received June the 28th, 1835.)

Athens, the 29th of May, 1835.

My Lord,

At the particular request of the Greek government, conveyed to me in the accompanying note from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship

the copy of a Royal Ordinance, addressed on the 6th (18th) instant by the King of Greece to his Envoy in London, directing him to point out, in urgent terms, to the Conference of London, the necessity of their authorizing the immediate realization of the third instalment of the Greek Loan, and, in the event of this measure being likely to meet with any delay, to request them to grant an advance of 3,000,000 francs upon the said instalment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. J. DAWKINS.

The Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

&c. &c. &c.

Enclosure in No. 2.

M. Rizo to Mr. Dawkins.

Athens, May 15th, (27th) 1835.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you, in confidence, a copy of a decree addressed by His Majesty to His Minister in London, on the 6th (18th) of this month, by which he is ordered to solicit the kind consent of the Three Courts, that the third instalment of the loan guaranteed by them may be speedily raised.

The benefits which must result to the country from the accomplishment of the desires of His Majesty are sufficiently great not to escape, in their full extent, the enlightened zeal with which you, Sir, have always acted in every thing that concerns the happiness of Greece; and I do not doubt that you will readily support, by your good offices, with your august Court, the twofold demand which the King's Minister at London has been ordered to address to their Excellencies the Representatives of the three Courts assembled in Conference.

I request you to receive, &c.

(Signed) J. RIZO.

E. J. Dawkins, Esq.

&c. &c. &c.

*Sub-enclosure in No. 2.**Decree of the King of Greece, addressed to his Minister in London.*

Otho, &c.

We have already, under date of the 8th (20th) of February last, ordered our Envoy at the Court of England, M. Tricoupi, to enter into communication with the Plenipotentiaries of the three Courts assembled in Conference at London, in order that the third instalment of the loan may at length be raised. We showed at that time that there still remained at our disposal, at the beginning of the year 1835, a sum of 8,841,304 francs. This sum, however, is already so far reduced by the great amount of ordinary and extraordinary disbursements, for which it has been necessary to provide, that it will scarcely be sufficient to cover the expences of the ensuing months. The funds of the treasury are not essentially increased since that time, because the greater part of the payments into the treasury are only made at the end of the year. Neither can any such payment be expected before the end of August.

The embarrassments which would infallibly result to our Government, from the want of the necessary funds to meet the current expences, render it therefore important that the three Great Powers should as speedily as possible consent to the third instalment of the loan being raised. We, in consequence, enjoin anew our Envoy to employ all his efforts, in the sense of the instructions which we have already given to him, to bring to an issue this question, which is a vital one for the Greek State. And if his exertions for this object should, nevertheless, be for the moment unsuccessful, it is our will that he should employ all his efforts to procure that at least, in the mean while, and in order to enable our Government to meet the disbursements of the service for the ensuing months, a sum of 3,000,000 francs may be received beforehand, on account of the third instalment, under the guarantee of the three Great Powers.

We expect, from the activity of M. Tricoupi, and from his zeal for our service, that he will neglect no means in order to bring about the result which he will have reason to expect.

In the name of the King,

The Regency of Greece.

(Signed) COUNT ARMANSBERG.

DE KOBELL.

DE HEIDECK.

(Countersigned) J. Rizo.

Athens, May 6th, (18th) 1836.

Monsieur Tricoupi,

&c. &c. &c.

No. 3.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Edmund Lyons.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, July 3, 1835.

The Plenipotentiaries of England, France, and Russia assembled a few days ago at this office, in conference, on the affairs of Greece, at the request of Monsieur Tricoupi, who was also present on that occasion.

M. Tricoupi pressed upon the Plenipotentiaries the urgent need of the Greek government for a further advance of money on account of the loan of 60,000,000 of francs, and earnestly requested that the third instalment might be guaranteed, or that, at all events, the three Powers would guarantee an advance of 3,000,000 on account of that instalment.

The Members of the Conference thereupon informed M. Tricoupi, that before they could consent that their respective Courts should guarantee the third instalment, it would be necessary that the Greek government should show what steps it has taken to appropriate, as required by the Treaty, *the first produce of the revenues of the Greek state, to the payment of the interest of*

the loan ; and no further proceedings can be taken in this matter, till such information shall be received from Greece.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.
Sir Edmund Lyons, &c. &c. &c.

No. 4.

M. Tricoupi, to the Plenipotentiaries of France, Great Britain, and Russia.

Manchester Square, Nov. 21, 1835.

The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Greece, has the honour, by order of his Court, to transmit to their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of France, Great Britain, and Russia, assembled in Conference, the copy of a Decree of His Majesty the King of Greece, dated 25th September (7th October) of the present year, as required by the Conference, for the prompt and regular payment of the interest and sinking fund of the loan contracted by the Greek government under the guarantee of the three great mediating Powers.

The Undersigned has also received orders to inform the Plenipotentiaries that original versions of this Decree, which will be published in the Government Gazette, will be transmitted to their Excellencies, or to the Representatives of the three Courts in Greece, as soon as the Greek government shall learn that the Conference has approved of the terms in which it is drawn up.

The Undersigned, at the same time, has received orders to annex to the Decree a tabular sketch of the revenue and expenditure of the State for the ensuing years, which gives reason to suppose that a balance of receipts and disbursements will be established in the space of four years, and that the whole of the deficit during the four years will only amount to about 10,000,000 of drachmas.

After the transmission of the documents which, on the one hand, prove to demonstration the urgent necessity for raising the remainder of the loan, and furnish, on the other, all the guar-

antees required for the prompt and regular payment of the interest and of the sinking fund of the loan, the Undersigned is ordered to solicit once more the consent of the three august guaranteeing Powers to the prompt issue of the last instalment, which alone can place the Government in a position to fulfil its obligations and its duties, and to second with success the magnanimous views of the mediating Powers with respect to Greece.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) S. TRICOUPI.
 Their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of
 France, Great Britain, and Russia.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Otho, by the grace of God, King of Greece.

In order to execute faithfully the stipulation contained in the sixth paragraph of the 12th Article of the Convention, signed in London on the 7th of May, 1832, for the definitive arrangement of the affairs of Greece, we have, by the 3d, 6th, and 11th Articles of the Contract, entered into on the 12th of January, 1833, with the brothers Rothschild, at Paris, with respect to the guaranteed loan of 60,000,000 millions of francs, which contract was ratified by us on the 16th (28th) February of the same year, provided in a proper manner that the interest of 5 per cent., and the sinking fund of 1 per cent., should be paid regularly and fully by half-yearly payments. We have also effected the payment of the interest and of the sinking fund to the extent, up to the 20th August (1st September), 1835, of the sum of 6,110,197 dr., on account of the two first series of the loan, amounting to 40,000,000 of francs, and have besides given orders to our department of finance to include the said interest and the said sinking fund in the monthly, as well as annual budgets, as a fixed and primary disbursement of the state, and to take the greatest care that the payment thereof be made regularly, and in conformity with the agreements.

In order, however, to prove afresh how much we have at heart the exact fulfilment of the engagements which we have contracted by the above-named treaty, we declare and decree as follows :—

1. The interest and sinking fund of the guaranteed loan of 60,000,000, which will be due on the 1st of September, 1835, shall be paid, as has been done with respect to the two first instalments, out of the sums arising from the third instalment of the loan when raised, by the banking-house charged with the issue of it, and which, consequently, shall always reserve, out of the proceeds of that instalment, immediately before the expiration of the periods of payment, the sums which shall be necessary for such payment, and which sums it shall employ exclusively for this purpose.

The said banking-house shall enter into a formal engagement to the above effect, by means of a declaration, of which it shall cause six copies to be made, whereof three shall be delivered to the Plenipotentiaries of France, Great Britain, and Russia, in London; two shall be deposited in the banks of London and Paris; and the sixth shall be deposited in our archives.

2. As soon as the third instalment of the loan shall be entirely raised, we will always provide, before the commencement of the year, for the service of the interest and sinking fund for the whole year, and will cause this measure to be recorded in a suitable manner.

For this purpose we will immediately give a sufficient guarantee at the banking-house charged with the payment of the interest and sinking fund, or we will prove to the Ministers or other Plenipotentiaries of the three Powers present, either the existence of the funds in ready money, or in effects perfectly disposable, which shall be transmitted to the banking-house charged with the payments, with the co-operation of the said Ministers or Plenipotentiaries.

Authentic copies, either of the papers in the form of a memorandum to be drawn up in the first case, or of the declaration to

be given in the second case, shall be issued to the number of six copies, for the purpose pointed out at the end of the first Article.

3. In case the securities mentioned in the 2d Article should not be given at the time appointed, the cashier and the comptroller of our treasury are bound, from the first day of the current year, to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund above-mentioned the effective receipts of the treasury, in the first instance, and without being able to use them for any other purpose, by depositing the amount of the receipts from time to time, and until the whole amount of the sum to be paid for the current year shall be obtained, in a private chest, of which the Ministers or Plenipotentiaries of France, of Great Britain, and of Russia, shall alike have the key; with whose co-operation they shall send, at the proper time, either in money or in bills of exchange, the collected sum to the banking-house charged with the payment of the interest and sinking fund.

The cashier and comptroller shall pledge themselves by special oath to act in conformity with the present arrangements.

4. Special original copies of the present decree, which shall be published in the government paper, shall be forwarded to the Plenipotentiaries of France, of Great Britain, and of Russia, and deposited in the banks of London and Paris, as well as in the banking-house charged with the payment of the interest and of the sinking fund.

Given at our capital and residence of Athens, the 25th September (7th October), 1835.

(Signed)

OTHO.

(Countersigned)

ARMANSPERG.

THEOCARIS.

For copy conformable to the original,

The Secretary of State for the King's House and for Foreign Affairs,

(Signed)

J. RIZO.

Touching the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the new Greek loan.

*Enclosure 2 in No. 4.**Extract of a Tabular Sketch of the Revenues and Expenditure of the Greek State.*

There is reason to suppose that a balance of disbursements and receipts will be established, at least in the space of four years, provided that nothing occurs to call for sacrifices from the treasury, and that the country gradually improves in the manner pointed out above.

The entire deficit during this olympiad would only amount to about 10,000,000; *i. e.*—

For 1836	.	.	.	4,000,000
1837	.	.	.	3,000,000
1838	.	.	.	2,000,000
1839	.	.	.	1,000,000

This supposition rests upon the successive increase of the revenue of the state which may be expected according to the explanations given in this section, as well as upon the experience of the current year, and principally upon the gradual execution of the law for the endowment of Greek families, and upon the improvements introduced into the system of taxation.

No. 5.

Sir Edmund Lyons to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received March 26th, 1836).

(Extract).

Athens, 29th February, 1836.

I will now give your lordship all the information which has reached the government respecting the movement in Acarnania. There are, it appears, two rebellious bands, consisting of about one hundred men each; one is headed by Dimio Tzelios, a captain of Western Greece. He has adopted the Roumeliote motto (Συνταγμα) Constitution.

At the head of the other band is Monsieur Málama, who was formerly aide de camp to Count Augustin Capodistrias. He has displayed the phœnix.

These bands having presented themselves before Mitica and Dragomestie, where the inhabitants refused to admit them, marched to Missolonghi, and demanded a parley with the civil authorities, which being refused, they approached the walls nearer than was thought convenient, and were fired at, upon which they retired with the loss of a few men, not however without having killed a Bavarian officer who exposed himself on the ramparts. As they remained in the neighbourhood too long, the garrison, consisting of only forty men, assisted by the town people, sallied forth, and drove them to the mountains, where they were three days ago, their numbers not increasing. They consist, for the most part, of the lowest caloyers of the suppressed monasteries, and the remains of bands who have lived by robbery all through the revolution.

A considerable body of troops has been passed over from the Morea into Western Greece, and no doubt is entertained of the immediate dispersion of the rebels.

We have reason to hope a severe, if not a death-blow may be given this season to the predatory warfare on the frontier, provided always that the government receives a liberal portion of the third instalment of the loan in ten or twelve weeks. Without this assistance, the government must come to a dead stop, and the troops who are sent to put down the brigands will become lawless themselves. The whole country will be a scene of devastation.

(Signed) EDMUND LYONS.

The Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 6.

*Sir Edmund Lyons to Viscount Palmerston.**(Received April 9th, 1836.)*

Athens, March 7th, 1836.

My Lord,

I think it desirable to inform your lordship by the Ancona post that the last accounts received by the Greek government from Western Greece represent affairs to be in the same state as I had the honour of describing to your lordship in my last despatch of the 29th ultimo. A considerable body of troops passed over from the Morea to Missolonghi on the 5th instant, which it is hoped may be sufficient to restore order and enforce obedience to the laws; but, as the leaders of the insurgents have undoubtedly money at their command, whilst the measures of government are cramped for want of it, immediate relief must be granted. The rebels say, "The government has no money, and can only obtain it by imposing taxes on the Moreots, which will make them discontented, and disposed to join us."

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND LYONS.

The Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 7.

*Sir Edmund Lyons to Viscount Palmerston.**(Received April 9th, 1836.)*

(Extract.)

Athens, March 24, 1836.

Count d'Armanberg, in accordance with the unanimous wish of the nation, has enrolled 2,000 irregular troops (Palikari,) for the purpose of suppressing brigandage in the mountainous frontier of the north, and of restoring order in Acarnania. Nothing can exceed the fine spirit which appears to animate these troops, or the general joy of the nation on seeing them embodied; but, my

Lord, they must be paid, and if the Government should be unable to keep its engagements with them, they will consider themselves at perfect liberty to raise contributions on the peaceable inhabitants, which must end in civil war.

The royal forces are closing in upon the Insurgents in superior numbers, and it is confidently hoped that order will be restored in Acarnania in a few days; the peasantry, and indeed all the inhabitants, have behaved remarkably well, the Chiefs of the Insurgents, and their followers, being for the most part Greeks, from beyond the frontier. The suppression of the brigandage must be a work of more time, and it will be necessary to keep troops on the frontier throughout the summer.

(Signed) EDMUND LYONS.

The Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 8.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

Foreign Office, April 15, 1836.

My Lord,

I have to instruct your Excellency to represent to M. Thiers the urgent necessity of placing, without further delay, some pecuniary resources at the disposal of the Greek Government, in order to avoid the confusion and disorder which must necessarily ensue, if the Greek Government has not the means of paying the army, and of defraying the expenses of the other services of the State; and your Excellency will earnestly entreat M. Thiers to authorize Count Sébastiani to concur in guaranteeing a further advance of 10,000,000 of francs on account of the remaining instalment of the loan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

His Excellency the Earl Granville, G.C.B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 9.

*Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.**(Received April 21, 1836.)*

(Extract.) Paris, April 18, 1836.

M. Thiers yesterday informed me that he had directed General Sébastiani to convoke the Greek Conference in London for the purpose of considering the question of advancing a sum to the Greek Government on account of the third instalment of the Loan, and that he had authorized Count Sébastiani to concur in guaranteeing a further advance of five millions. I at the same time expressed my fears that this sum would be scarcely sufficient to meet the immediate wants of the Greek Government, and this morning having received your Lordship's despatch of the 15th of April, I apprized M. Thiers that I was instructed to entreat him to authorize the French Ambassador to concur in the guarantee of ten millions: I represented to him the possible confusion which might ensue, if, from the inadequacy of the sum he proposed to advance, the Greek Government should not have the means of paying the army, and of defraying other necessary expenses of the Government. (Signed) GRANVILLE.

The Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 10.

Protocol of a Conference held at the Foreign Office, April 16, 1836.

Present:

The Plenipotentiaries

of France;

of Great Britain; and

of Russia.

The Plenipotentiaries of the three Courts being assembled, took into consideration the circumstance that the Government of Greece

not having furnished the house of Rothschild with the sums to be applied to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the two first instalments of the Greek Loan, for the half year which became due the first of March last, they found it necessary to authorise the said house of Rothschild to advance the said interest and sinking fund in order to avoid the inconvenience which would have arisen from the suspension of the said payments, and being desirous of reimbursing to the said house of Rothschild the sums furnished by it, they agreed to authorize the issue, from the present time, of a fresh series of Greek bonds under the guarantee of their respective courts, on account of the third instalment of the Greek loan; it being clearly understood that the amount of the bonds to be issued in virtue of the present Protocol shall not exceed the sum of 1,212,000 francs for the charges of the interest and the sinking fund due on the 1st of March, 1836; adding also thereto the charges which Messrs. Rothschild may bring forward against the Greek government on account of interest for the funds which they have advanced for the service of the half-year, which expired on the 1st of March, 1836.

The plenipotentiaries of the three courts have in consequence agreed to furnish the agents of their courts at Paris with the necessary authority, in order that each of them may invest with the guarantee of his court one third of the bonds to be issued in consequence of the above-mentioned arrangement, observing in other respects the instructions with which they have been severally furnished with regard to the two first instalments of the loan.

In consenting to the above arrangement, the plenipotentiary of Russia has considered it to be his duty to record in the present Protocol the document hereunto annexed,

(Signed) H. SEBASTIANI,
PALMERSTON.
POZZO DI BORGO.

*Enclosure in No. 10.**Annex to Protocol of the 16th of April, 1836.*

The ambassador of Russia, in consenting to the above arrangement, declared at the same time that the Greek government not having remitted to the house of Rothschild within the stipulated time the sum necessary for the service of the interest of the two first instalments, has not fulfilled the engagements and conditions imposed upon it by the clause of the 12th Article of the Convention of the 7th May, in the following terms, namely — That the first revenues of the state are to be applied, before all things, to the payment of the interest of the loan, without being capable of being applied to any other purpose. The ambassador consequently adds, that the provisional measure adopted for the liquidation of the interest of the half year which expired on the 1st of March, ought not to serve as an example for the future, nor invalidate in any way whatsoever the effect of the above-mentioned clause; his government reserving to itself the full and entire right to watch henceforth over its strict and regular execution, in order that the Greek government, by allowing the subsequent half years to elapse without remitting in time the funds necessary for the service of the interest of the loan, may not place the guaranteeing Powers under the necessity of providing themselves for this payment, by further advances on account of the third instalment, which would be contrary to the reciprocal engagements contracted between the governments who signed the above-mentioned Convention of the 7th of May.

(Signed) Pozzo di Borgo.

*No. 11.**Viscount Palmerston to Count Pozzo di Borgo.*

Foreign Office, April 18, 1836.

Monsieur le Comte,

It was with extreme regret and disappointment that I learnt from you, in the conference which the Plenipotentiaries of

the three Powers held on the affairs of Greece on Saturday last, that you are not authorized by your court to concur in guaranteeing any further advance to the Greek government on account of the third instalment of the loan, beyond the sum of 1,212,000 francs, which is requisite to repay to Messrs. Rothschild the amount issued by them in March last for dividends and sinking fund of the two first instalments.

But I must earnestly request you to bring this matter immediately under the consideration of your government, with the view of obtaining, as speedily as possible, the requisite authority.

The subject is not a new one, and the three courts have long been acquainted with all its circumstances.

During the last twelve months, the Greek government has been incessantly representing to the Conference that the third instalment of the loan was necessary in order to supply the means of carrying on the administration of the country; and that if these indispensable means were refused, embarrassments of all kinds would ensue, and the internal tranquillity of Greece would be endangered. The Greek government has repeatedly declared, that without further assistance from the loan, they would be unable to pay the army and the civil establishments; and it is sufficiently obvious, that unless the civil and military servants of a state are paid, the machine of government must soon come to a stand, and confusion and anarchy must inevitably follow.

But, can it be the interest or the wish of any of the three Powers that such a state of things should arise in Greece?

Why was it that France, Great Britain, and Russia, concluded the treaty of July, 1827, and laboured so actively, so perseveringly, and so successfully, to carry that treaty into effect? Their object at that time was to rescue Greece from anarchy, to raise her to independence, and to restore her to tranquillity; surely it cannot now be the wish of any of the three Powers that Greece, which has by their aid become independent and tranquil, should, by their refusal to execute their engagements, fall back into anarchy.

I say, by their refusal to execute their engagements, because a reference to the Protocols and Treaties will show, that what Greece now asks, is what the three Powers have engaged to do.

As long ago as the 3d of February, 1830, the three Powers pledged themselves, by the Protocol of that date, to guarantee a loan to the Greek state; and, by the treaty of 1832, that pledge was renewed in a more formal and specific manner.

The original proposition was, that the whole loan should be raised at once. But the Conference, on discussing the matter, determined to divide the amount into instalments. But why did they do so? Was it in order to reserve to themselves opportunities of escaping from the spirit of their engagement, and of retracting their consent to guarantee the 60,000,000? Certainly not: such an intention would have been inconsistent with the good faith by which all the parties were animated.

Was it in order to hold in their hands the means of exercising, indirectly, a dictatorial interference in the internal affairs of that Greece, which they had solemnly declared to be a free and independent state? Was it in order to be able to render their guarantee of the successive instalments contingent upon the consent of the Greek government to adopt particular measures of administration, or to employ particular men in posts of trust and power? Surely not; such a secret intention would have been at variance with the frankness, sincerity, and disinterestedness, which have marked the conduct of the three Powers throughout the whole of the long and difficult negotiations connected with the establishment of the Greek state.

What then was the motive which induced the Conference so to divide the loan? That motive is recorded in the treaty of 1832. It was to prevent Greece from incurring hastily a debt larger than might ultimately prove to be really necessary; and to save her from that prodigality of expenditure which might take place, if a sum far beyond the wants of any current year were placed, at once, at the disposal of her administration.

It was, therefore, distinctly stipulated that the first instalment should be raised immediately, and that the second and third instalments should be raised afterwards, according to the wants of the Greek state.

Soon after this decision, an arrangement was made with Turkey, by virtue of which 40,000,000 of piastres were to be paid to the Sultan, in exchange for Acarnania, Etolia, and certain other districts, which were added to Greece by the arrangement made at Constantinople in 1832; and the second instalment of the loan was guaranteed, in order to enable the Greek government to make that payment.

Since that time no further portion of the loan has been raised, and the last instalment is still untouched; but Greece declares that she now wants that instalment, and if the three Powers are satisfied that she does want it, they are bound by their solemn engagements to give the guarantee, without starting new conditions, different from those contained in the treaty of 1832. That Greece does want pecuniary assistance, it is surely impossible to deny. The fact is indisputable, whatever may be its cause.

It has been alleged, that during the Regency there was a lavish and heedless expenditure of the public money; and it is asserted, that the budgets which have lately been furnished, are not clearly and satisfactorily framed, and do not distinctly show how all the past expenditures are accounted for; but even if both these assertions are true, still they do not bear upon the question now under consideration.

The present wants of Greece are not the less real, because certain sums were spent unnecessarily three years ago, or because certain expenditures, which then took place, have not been clearly explained, in accounts recently made up by the Greek government; but it is upon the present wants of Greece that, according to the words of the treaty of 1832, the question of a further guarantee is to depend.

If the Greek government had already raised the whole

60,000,000, and, notwithstanding that supply, had still a deficient revenue; and if, under such circumstances, it were now applying to the three Powers for a further guarantee; the three Powers, in such a case, being invited to enter into fresh engagements, would naturally object to do so, and might justly allege that a due attention to economy had not been evinced by the government of Greece. But how stands the fact at present: and has the government of Greece been less economical than the three Powers had a right to expect? It would seem, on the contrary, that the Greek government has been more economical than was expected, or else the revenue of Greece has risen with greater rapidity than was hoped for.

The three Powers reckoned from the beginning that Greece would require a loan of 60,000,000 of francs, to enable her to defray her various expenses till her revenue should equal her expenditure. But of that 60,000,000, Greece has not hitherto had much more than 20,000,000 applicable to the annual charges of her government, because the rest of the 40,000,000 which have been raised was paid to the Porte as compensation for the additional territory; and now the statements furnished by the Greek government tend to show, that if the late inroad of banditti into Western Greece had not happened, it is probable that the whole of the remaining 20,000,000 would not eventually have been wanted.

So far then from the Greek government having spent more money than the Conference expected, that government may contend that it has, on the contrary, confined its pecuniary wants strictly within the limits originally chalked out by the three Powers; and all it asks in return is, that the three Powers shall not shrink from the full performance of the engagement deliberately taken by them.

In order to enable you to bring this matter more distinctly under the consideration of your government, I have prepared the enclosed draft of a Protocol, by which the three Powers would guarantee the issue of a further sum on account of the remaining

portion of the loan; and I would beg to propose, that the sum to be thus guaranteed should not be less than 9,000,000 of francs, in addition to the 1,212,000, guaranteed by the Protocol of the 16th instant.

The recent disturbances which have taken place in Western Greece must necessarily have added many unforeseen charges to the ordinary expences of the Greek state; and all the accounts which his Majesty's government have lately received from Greece, tend to prove the extreme urgency of prompt and liberal pecuniary aid.

The matter then, Monsieur le Comte, appears to stand thus:—

The three Powers have solemnly pledged themselves to assist the Greek state to raise a loan of 60,000,000 of francs, by giving respectively their separate guarantee for a third of that amount. This engagement of the three Powers was subject to the condition, that the whole amount should not be raised if the wants of Greece should not require it.

The Greek government now deliberately declare, that the wants of Greece do require the whole amount to be raised; and it is a fact notorious to all the world, that at all events a large portion of the remaining instalment is immediately and absolutely necessary for the exigencies of the public service in Greece.

In this state of things, it is the opinion of the British government, that at least one-half of the remaining 20,000,000 should be placed, without delay, at the disposal of the Greek government; and we confidently hope that the governments of France and Russia, acting in the spirit of that liberal and enlightened policy which has hitherto guided their conduct on the affairs of Greece, will not refuse to concur in a measure, which is equally called for by the necessities of Greece, and by the engagements which the three Powers have entered into.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

His Excellency Count Pozzo di Borgo,
&c. &c. &c.

*Enclosure in No. 11.**Draft of Protocol.*

The Plenipotentiaries of the three Powers being assembled in Conference, in order to take into consideration the representations which have been made to them, on several occasions, by the Minister of the King of Greece at the Court of London, on the subject of the financial difficulties which temporarily press upon the Greek government ;

The Plenipotentiaries perceived the extreme importance of providing, without loss of time, means for enabling the Greek government to meet the most urgent demands of its internal administration for the year 1836, and of thus preventing the serious consequences which might result from the present state of affairs to the prosperity and happiness of the kingdom of Greece, which the three Powers are so anxious to secure to it ; and the Plenipotentiaries being of opinion, that to attain this end it would be necessary to enable the Greek government to raise a sum of ——— francs, and that the best mode of effecting this object would be to authorize the issue, from this period, of a new series of Greek bonds, under the guarantee of the three Powers, to the amount of the said sum of ——— francs, on account of the third instalment of the Greek loan ; they have agreed to furnish the agents of their Courts at Paris with the necessary authority, in order that each of them may invest, with the guarantee of his Court, one-third of the bonds to be issued for the above-mentioned object, to the amount of the said sum of ——— francs, observing, in other respects, the instructions with which they have been respectively furnished, with regard to the two first instalments of the loan.

*No. 12.**Viscount Palmerston to the Earl of Durham.*

Foreign Office, April 18, 1836.

My Lord,

I enclose for your Excellency's information the copy of a letter which I have addressed to Count Pozzo di Borgo, respect-

ing the advance of a sum of money on account of the third instalment of the Greek loan, for the immediate exigencies of the Greek state, together with the draft of a Protocol on the same subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

His Excellency the Earl of Durham,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 13.

Count Pozzo di Borgo to Viscount Palmerston.

London, April 19, 1836.

My Lord,

I have received the letter which your Excellency did me the honour to write to me under date of yesterday, as well as the draft of the Protocol annexed thereto. I will hasten, my Lord, to transmit both of them to my Court.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) Pozzo di Borgo.

His Excellency Viscount Palmerston,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 14.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received April 28, 1836.)

(Extract.) Paris, April 25, 1836.

The French Ambassador will be authorized to agree to the advance of 6,000,000 of francs, which is 1,000,000 more than had been proposed by the French government.

No. 15.

Sir Edmund Lyons to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received May 2, 1836.)

(Extract.) Athens, April 6, 1836.

I have great satisfaction in stating to your lordship, that the inhabitants of Roumelia, on the approach of the royal irregular

troops, under the command of the Roumeliote chieftains, Grivas, Tzavellas, Vassos, Mamouris, and Tzongas, took up arms against the insurgents and brigands, and obliged them to retire to the Greek villages of Frangistan and Marathia, in the frontier mountains of Agrapha, where their united numbers, assembled from all parts, amounted, on the 31st ultimo, to about five hundred men.

A few days after I had the honour of addressing your lordship, on the 24th ultimo, Nicholas Zervas, a bold but profligate captain, raised the standard of rebellion, and M. Balasca, an officer in the gendarmerie, went over to the rebels, and took a leading part. In this state of things Count d'Armansperg put arms into the hands of two thousand Roumeliotes, and sending for their chiefs, told them to go and show their loyalty and attachment to the King, by restoring order in their country, a call they have nobly answered.

Thus, my Lord, the military as well as the civil inhabitants of Roumelia have shown their attachment to the government, and their desire to be allowed to pursue their different callings in peace and tranquillity. The same spirit has shown itself in the Morea and the islands, where attempts to induce the shepherds to resist the tax on sheep have failed to produce any inconvenience to the government.

This attempt at insurrection, which is the third since the arrival of the King and Regency, has so signally failed, that we may confidently hope the effect will be to strengthen the hands of government, and, provided pecuniary aid be granted, we may indulge very sanguine expectations; but a larger sum will be requisite now, than would have been necessary a few months ago.

No. 16.

The Earl of Durham to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received May 30, 1836.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, May 21, 1836.

A proposition of the Russian Minister in Greece, M. Catachasi, for the advance of the whole of the remaining instal-

ment of the loan guaranteed by the three Powers, will be sent by Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo this day.

His Excellency said, that he had directed it to be submitted to the Conference, in the hope that it might tend to the final settlement of the business.

I was promised a copy of this proposition previous to the departure of the messenger, but it has not yet reached me. Your Lordship however will, no doubt, receive it from the Russian Ambassador.

I have, &c.

(Signed) DURHAM.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 17.

COMMUNICATION MADE BY COUNT POZZO DI BORGIO TO THE CONFERENCE, JUNE 3, 1836.

Basis of the arrangement to be proposed for the issue of the third Instalment of the Greek Loan.

1st. The third instalment of the loan shall be raised in the manner and according to the conditions hereinafter pointed out.

The funds accruing from the said instalment shall be appropriated *exclusively* to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the loan during the next five or six years.

For this purpose, the respective Commissioners of the guaranteeing Powers shall be authorized, previously to the half-yearly payments becoming due in March and September, to sign and deposit in the hands of Messrs. Rothschild, at Paris, the number of inscriptions which will be necessary to discharge the interest and sinking fund of the two first instalments already raised, adding thereto successively the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the portions of the third, in proportion to their issue.

The respective Commissioners shall be guided in this respect

by the rule established by the Protocol of the 16th April last, relative to the payment of the interest due in the month of March of the present year.

The bankers shall deliver to the Greek government a discharge for the interest and sinking fund, at the expiration of every six months.

This operation shall be continued for the number of years, of which the period shall be regulated by an accurate calculation, as to when the funds accruing from the third series shall become exhausted.

2d. In return for the facilities given by the guaranteeing Powers to the above arrangement, and in order to afford them all the securities which the Convention of the 7th May, 1832, has stipulated in their favour, with a view to ensure the regular payment of the loan, the Greek government formally engages itself, on its part, to consider the national domains, and their revenues, as a general mortgage for the loan of 60,000,000, during the thirty-six years fixed for the liquidation of that debt; and promises, that, before the expiration of that term, no other loan shall be contracted upon the mortgage of the same domains, whether with foreign capitalists, or with a loan-bank established in the country.

3d. The three Courts shall interpose no obstacle to the measures which the Greek government has already taken, or shall desire to take, with a view to render the above-mentioned domains productive, either by inviting native or foreign colonists, or by making certain grants to those Greek families who have deserved well of their country. But it is expressly understood, that the revenues which the government shall secure to itself by all these arrangements, shall be especially appropriated to the payment of the loan, dating from the day on which the funds of the third instalment shall be exhausted.

4th. The preceding engagement shall not in any way prejudice the 12th Article of the Convention of the 7th May, purporting

that the first revenues and effective receipts of the Greek treasury shall always be considered as appropriated, above all things, to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the loan, in case of the receipts proceeding from the national domains being insufficient, or of there being any delay in their collection.

No. 18.

Viscount Palmerston to Count Pozzo di Borgo.

Foreign Office, 14th June, 1836.

The Undersigned, &c., has to express to Count Pozzo di Borgo, &c., the extreme regret and disappointment with which his Majesty's government has received the proposition with respect to the third instalment of the Greek loan, contained in the paper of which Count Pozzo di Borgo delivered copies to the Undersigned, and to Count Sébastiani, at the Conference held at this Office on the affairs of Greece on the 3d instant.

To a proposition so unexpected, so inapplicable to the condition of Greece, so inconsistent with the policy hitherto pursued by the three Powers, and so directly in contradiction with the stipulations of the treaty of 1832, it is scarcely necessary to say that his Majesty's government cannot accede; but the Undersigned, in declaring to Count Pozzo di Borgo the dissent of his Majesty's government from this plan, has at the same time to express their earnest hope, that the Imperial Cabinet will, upon further consideration of the matter, adopt a determination more consistent with the liberal views which have hitherto guided the three Powers in their conduct with respect to the affairs of Greece.

The Undersigned must beg, in the first place, to recall to the recollection of Count Pozzo di Borgo the origin and nature of the engagements which the three Powers have taken on the subject of the Greek loan; and he will then state the reasons for

which his Majesty's government consider the plan of the Russian Cabinet to be inconsistent with the original intentions, and at variance with the positive engagements of the three Powers.

From the commencement of the Greek Revolution, one of the greatest difficulties which the Greek nation had to struggle with was the want of pecuniary resources.

A small country in a state of insurrection, and laid waste by a barbarous and desolating war, could have no public revenue; and the accumulations previously made by private individuals were necessarily soon exhausted. Enthusiasm and patriotism enable men to carry on defensive warfare with means far scantier than those of their assailants; but for the achievement of success even in such a contest, pecuniary supplies, to a certain amount, are necessary.

During the civil war, the Greeks were liberally assisted with money by individuals in other countries, who sympathized with them in their struggle for independence; and by such aid the Greek nation was able to maintain the war up to the period when the three Powers agreed, by the Treaty of London, to establish an armistice between the contending parties.

The civil contest then ended; but not with it the pecuniary difficulties of Greece. The expences of military operations ceased, but those of peaceful administration began; and while, on the one hand, the necessary expenditure of peace was much augmented by the number of persons, whose habits had been unsettled by the war, and who, on its termination, were thrown for a time upon the government for support; on the other hand, the sacrifices made by the Greeks in the cause of their country during the continuance of the struggle, and the devastation committed by the Turkish and Egyptian troops upon property of all kinds that came within their reach, had dried up the sources from whence, in other countries, public revenue is found to spring.

It was therefore obvious to all men, that pecuniary assistance from without would be as necessary to Greece during the first few

years of peace, as it had been during the continuance of the war. For it was evident, that without a considerable annual income, it would be impossible to organize the several branches of internal administration ; to re-establish tranquillity and order ; to afford security to persons and property ; and to give to agriculture and commerce a rapid and full development ; but it was equally evident, that until the several branches of the internal administration were organized ; until tranquillity and order were restored ; until property and persons were secure ; and until agriculture and commerce should revive ; no considerable public revenue could be expected to accrue.

In consonance with this conviction, his Royal Highness the Prince Leopold, when negotiating in February, 1830, with the Plenipotentiaries of the three Powers, demanded that “ the High Powers should deign to assure to the new Greek state, until its own resources shall recover their vigour, pecuniary succour proportioned to its wants ; the fact being notorious, that the Provisional Government has been enabled hitherto to exist only by the subsidies granted by the generosity of the High Powers.”

This demand was acceded to by the Conference ; and in the Protocol, No. 17, of the 20th of February, 1830, the Plenipotentiaries declared that the “ three Powers are resolved to assure to the new state pecuniary succours by means of the guarantee of a loan to be raised by the Greek government, and of which the object shall be to provide for the pay and maintenance of the troops which the Prince Sovereign shall have occasion to raise for his service.”

But his Royal Highness the Prince Leopold objected to those words in this Protocol, which seemed to confine the application of the loan to the payment of the troops ; and he required, as a *sine quâ non*, that the amount should be considered applicable to the general wants of the Greek state.

In reply to this, on the 7th of May, the three Plenipotentiaries addressed a note to Prince Leopold, in which they omitted the

restriction which confined the application of the loan to the payment of troops ; and they undertook “ that the amount of the loan to be raised should be 60,000,000 of francs, of which each Power should guarantee a third ; that the whole amount should be immediately contracted for, to be raised at fixed periods : and that the Greek government should be entirely independent of the opinion, which either of the three Powers might entertain, as to the extent and urgency of the wants of the new state.”

It is demonstrable from these passages that, in 1830, it was the opinion of the three Powers, that the Greek government would require a sum of 60,000,000 of francs, in aid of the national revenue, during the next few years ; and that it was the intention of the three Powers that the whole of that sum should be placed at the disposal of the Greek government for the general wants of the state, without any restriction whatever with respect to the opinion to be formed by either of the three Powers, as to the extent of those wants.

But the Prince Leopold resigned the crown of Greece on the 21st of May, 1830, and it was not till the 13th of February, 1832, that Prince Otho of Bavaria was chosen to succeed him. During the interval, no further steps were taken about the loan ; but pecuniary assistance was given to Greece by the three Powers, separately.

In April, 1832, a confidential communication was made by the Plenipotentiaries of the three Powers, to the Plenipotentiary of Bavaria, explaining the conditions, and the nature of the arrangements, according to which the crown of Greece was offered to Prince Otho ; and with respect to the loan, that communication contained the following statement.

That the Conference offered to guarantee for Prince Otho a loan equal to that which had been promised to Prince Leopold : that this loan should be raised according as the wants of Greece might require it ; and that Greece should, out of her own revenue, provide the interest and sinking fund of the loan.

On the 7th of May, 1832, a formal Treaty was concluded between the three Powers and Bavaria, the 12th Article of which contains the stipulations under which the three Powers finally bound themselves to give their guarantee; and by that Article it was among other things declared, that the several instalments of the loan should be raised successively, *according to the wants of Greece*, and that the first produce of the Greek revenue should be set apart for paying the interest and sinking fund of the loan.

The three Powers, therefore, stand solemnly bound by Treaty to guarantee for Greece a loan of 60,000,000, if the wants of Greece should render that assistance necessary.

But has Greece drawn more largely upon this fund than was originally expected, and has the annual deficiency of her income exceeded the calculations of the three Powers, so as to inspire doubts whether the temporary aid will answer its intended purpose, and so as to excite distrust as to the ultimate capacity of Greece to defray the interest and sinking fund out of her own resources?

The contrary is the fact, for, during the four years which have elapsed since the signature of the Treaty with Bavaria, only 40,000,000 out of the 60,000,000 have been raised. Out of those 40,000,000 of francs, 11,220,598 francs have been paid to the Porte as the price of the districts ceded by Turkey to Greece, under the arrangement of Constantinople of July 21, 1832; a charge never contemplated in April, 1830, when the three Powers first agreed to give their guarantee, and fixed the amount of the loan; and other charges unconnected with the current service of Greece have absorbed upwards of 4,000,000, so that, instead of the 60,000,000 which the three Powers originally intended to place at the disposal of the Greek government, only 24,316,996 francs have hitherto been received by that government in aid of the general expences of the state.

For more than twelve months past the Greek government has urgently represented to the Conference the necessity of a further advance, to relieve the pecuniary necessities of Greece.

The Conference, entitled as it is, by the Treaty of May, 1832, to be satisfied that the wants of Greece require additional pecuniary aid, before the three Powers incur any further responsibility, demurred for some time as to the accuracy of the accounts upon which the Greek government founded the allegation of its wants:

But all doubt upon this point has long since been removed; and whether the Greek government is able or not to compile the statements of its annual income and expenditure with that critical accuracy which is not always to be found in the published accounts even of older and better organized states, at all events the existence of a considerable deficiency during the present year is indisputably made out.

Under these circumstances, his Majesty's government proposed that the three Powers should guarantee such a further portion of the third instalment of the loan, as, together with the sum lately issued to cover the dividends advanced by Messieurs Rothschild in March last, would amount to 10,000,000 of francs. The government of France in reply, proposed to limit to 6,000,000 the amount now to be guaranteed; and his Majesty's government declared itself willing to accede to that modified proposal; trusting that a sum of 6,000,000 might for the present provide for the most urgent wants of the Greek government; and not doubting that the Conference would sanction hereafter the issue of such further sum as the necessities of Greece might appear to require.

But when, after repeated appeals to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, his Majesty's government at length expected a favourable reply, great indeed was the surprise which could not fail to be excited by the scheme now proposed.

It was shown, some months ago, that the revenue of Greece for the present year would fall short of the expenditure by a sum of several millions of francs. Since that period, disturbances, into the origin of which it is not necessary here to inquire, have broken out in the northern provinces. The suppression of these disturbances has been necessarily attended with a considerable

expense, not previously reckoned upon, which will much increase the amount of the expected deficiency.

To meet this deficiency, the government of Greece applies to the three Powers ; and, appealing to their recorded engagements, calls upon them to guarantee, if not the whole of the third instalment, at least a considerable portion of it. But what is the reply of the Russian government to this appeal?—Why, that it will consent to guarantee the whole of the third instalment, provided that no part of the amount is applied to the general wants of Greece, though to relieve the general wants of Greece was the specific object for which the loan was distinctly destined ; and provided further that the whole of the third instalment shall be reserved to pay, during the next eight years, the interest and sinking fund of the two first instalments, although the Treaty positively stipulates that such interest and sinking fund should be defrayed out of another source.

The effect of such a plan would be, that the considerable deficiency of the present year, and the smaller deficiency which may be expected next year, would be left without the possibility of being provided for ; and that thus the three Powers would deliberately, purposely, and with a full foreknowledge of the consequences of their act, bring down upon Greece that disorganization, anarchy, and ruin, which a condition of remediless insolvency must speedily produce ; while, on the other hand, if, by any miraculous good fortune, the Greek government were to find the means of averting such a catastrophe, the three Powers would be compelling that government to pay the interest of one loan out of the proceeds of another, a course which, in the case of the dividends due in March last, the Russian government loudly condemned ; and against which one of the paragraphs of the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1832 was specifically intended to guard.

The Undersigned deems it unnecessary to discuss the details of the proposed scheme. It is enough to state that the essence

of the plan is, that the produce of the third instalment of the loan should be set apart to pay the interest of the two first instalments, and that the aggregate interest of the three instalments should afterwards be paid out of the revenue of the national lands; while the Treaty of 1832, on the contrary, purports that the three instalments shall, if wanted, be applied to the general service of Greece; and that the interest and sinking fund shall be defrayed out of the first produce of the aggregate revenue of that kingdom.

His Majesty's government, then, object to this scheme, first, because it is inconsistent with the engagements of the three Powers; secondly, because it would afford no relief, but, on the contrary, produce serious injury to Greece.

The Undersigned, therefore, has to request Count Pozzo di Borgo to bring this subject, with the least possible delay, under the consideration of the cabinet of St. Petersburg; and to state, that his Majesty's government is unwilling to think that Russia can have suddenly altered the views by which she has, for so many years, been guided with respect to the affairs of Greece.

Russia was the first to take up the cause of the Greeks, and to press the other Powers of Europe to interfere, in order to put an end to the contest between that nation and the Turks.

Russia was all along the most anxious to establish a free and independent state in Greece. That object, after ten years' negotiation and solicitude, has at length been accomplished — a free and independent kingdom has been established in Greece. It only remains for the three Powers to render that kingdom prosperous also.

The present moment is critical. If the three Powers fulfil their engagements, and afford to Greece the means of obtaining the supplies she wants, there is every reason to expect that her progress will be certain and rapid: but, if the three Powers recede from the performance of the stipulations they have entered into, and deprive Greece of the means of extricating herself from

her difficulties, they will subject themselves to the reproach of having undone their own work, at the very moment when their labours were about to be crowned with success.

His Majesty's government do not choose to expose themselves to this reproach, but they are anxious to learn, at the earliest possible period, the decision of the Russian Cabinet, in order that they may know how to regulate their own course.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

His Excellency Count Pozzo di Borgo,

&c. &c. &c.

No. 19.

Viscount Palmerston to the Earl of Durham.

(Extract.) Foreign Office, June 14, 1836.

I transmit, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a note which I have addressed to Count Pozzo di Borgo, in reply to M. de Catachasi's proposition on the subject of the third instalment of the Greek loan.

It is to be remarked, that this proposition is the only answer which has yet been given to the letter which I addressed to Count Pozzo di Borgo, on the subject of the loan, on the 18th of April, and of which I transmitted to your Excellency a copy in my despatch of that day.

His Majesty's government is unwilling to believe that the Russian Cabinet has changed its policy with respect to Greece, and now desires to check the progress of that state, and to involve it in anarchy, instead of aiding its re-organisation, and helping it to become prosperous, and to continue independent; but the course which Russia is now pursuing seems more calculated to produce the former than the latter result.

For some months past, the Russian Ambassador at this Court gave out, that his government would guarantee no more of the

loan, until King Otho had renounced his claims to the Crown of Bavaria. We contended that the renunciation was necessary, but that it could not properly be coupled with the loan; that the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1832 specified the conditions on which the guarantee was to be given, and that the renunciation was not one of those conditions.

Count Pozzo di Borgo, however, declared the renunciation to be a *sine quâ non*.

At length the renunciation came, and with it we naturally expected to receive the consent of Russia to a further issue on account of the loan. That consent has been also announced; but the manner in which it is given is so ingeniously devised, that the plan, if adopted, would entirely defeat the purpose for which the loan was intended to be raised.

Time presses—the wants of Greece are urgent—England and France are prepared to relieve them—Russia seems determined not to do so. England and France are unwilling to act in this matter without Russia, as long as a chance exists of persuading Russia to co-operate. But the question must be decided one way or the other without further delay, and your Excellency is instructed to ascertain the final determination of the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 20.

Viscount Palmerston to the Earl of Durham.

Foreign Office, June 14, 1836.

My Lord,

You will have the goodness to explain to Count Nesselrode, that the reason why his Majesty's government are so desirous of having, without delay, the answer of the Russian Cabinet upon the subject of the Greek loan is, that if the Russian government decline to concur in guaranteeing an additional advance of 6,000,000 francs, it is the intention of his Majesty's govern-

ment to propose a Bill to Parliament, to enable his Majesty to guarantee to the full extent of one-third of the 60,000,000, without the concurrence of his Allies.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

His Excellency the Earl of Durham,

&c. &c. &c.

No. 21.

Count Pozzo di Borgo to Viscount Palmerston.

The Undersigned, Ambassador of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, has received the note which his Excellency Lord Palmerston, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, did him the honour to address to him on the 14th instant, relative to the issue of the third instalment of the loan guaranteed by the three Courts of Russia, England, and France, in favour of the government of Greece, in reply to the plan of arrangement upon the same subject communicated by the Undersigned to the Conference.

The Undersigned will make it his duty to transmit to his Court the note of the Principal Secretary of State. He thinks it right, however, at the same time, to make some observations to him, with a view to place the nature of this plan, and the motives which led to it, in their true light.

The Undersigned will not go back to the period when Prince Leopold was destined by the three Courts for the Crown of Greece. He will begin from the Convention of the 7th of May, 1832, which is the formal and fundamental act by which the loan, and the conditions attached to it, were created, and he will recall the circumstances which have occurred, since the Greek government requests and presses that the third instalment may be placed at its disposal.

It was after the Regency had made use of the two other instal-

ments, that Prince Soutzo received, in 1833, the orders to ask for the third and last instalment.

The three Courts, having at that time taken into consideration the inconsiderate use which the Greek government had made of the two other instalments which had been previously issued, resolved to suspend the issue of the third and last instalment, until the government should have adopted a prudent and regular course of administration, and should have provided for the service of the two other instalments placed at its disposal, with reference to the payment of the interest and sinking fund, in conformity with the engagements and stipulations of the Convention of the 7th of May, 1832.

This wise precaution, and the motives which led to it, ought to have recalled the Regency to the fulfilment of its duties; but unhappily the members of whom it was composed, instead of coming to an understanding among themselves, in order to effect so sacred and indispensable an object, presented a picture of internal division and disunion, which deprived the government of the consideration and the power that ought to cause it to be respected.

In this state of things, his Majesty the King of Bavaria thought proper essentially to alter the composition of the above-mentioned Regency, by removing some of its members, and by more strongly concentrating the power in those who remained in office.

This fact demonstrates a plain truth, namely, that the troubles of Greece, and their consequences, did not arise from the want of money and pecuniary resources, since the 40,000,000 of francs, which formed the two-thirds of the loan, were, at that time, at the disposal of the government, but, on the contrary, from irregularities in the exercise of power, and from the want of wisdom and of union on the part of those who had to exercise it.

The principal object of the three Powers in lending their credit and their guarantee to Greece, was to facilitate the financial

arrangements of the country, and to give it the means of gradually establishing, through an economical and wise administration, a just balance between the receipt and expences, and thereby providing for itself the resources necessary for the payment of the interest, and of the sinking fund of its debt, and not to entrust inconsiderately to that government so large a sum, the employment of which might not produce the above-mentioned results.

The three Courts did not intend, by giving their guarantee, to create a Russian, a French, and an English debt, but solely a Greek debt, the burthen of which should fall upon that government, and not upon the guaranteeing Powers.

With this view it was stipulated that the first resources of Greece should be applied in preference *to the payment of the interest and of the sinking fund of the loan*, and should “not be employed for any other purpose until those payments on account of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three Courts should have been completely secured for the following year.”

These expressions, recorded in the Convention, constitute the conditions under which the three Courts intended to lend their guarantee to Greece, and point out with equal precision both the spirit and the nature of the engagements reciprocally contracted between them and the new State.

It now remains to inquire which of the two contracting parties has been behind-hand in the engagements which each of them had to fulfil.

The twelfth article of the Convention, § 1, states the principal of the loan “to be contracted under the guarantee of the three Courts *may* amount to the sum of 60,000,000 of francs.”

The following paragraph points out that the loan shall be raised by instalments of 20,000,000 each.

The third provides, that, *for the present*, the first instalment only shall be raised.

Finally, the fourth stipulates that the second and third instal-

ment shall be raised according to the wants of the Greek State, after previous concert between the three Courts and his Majesty the King of Greece.

The guaranteeing Powers, instead of proceeding progressively to issue one instalment after another, as they had reserved to themselves the power of doing, agreed, from a feeling of confidence and generosity, at the request of the Greek government to raise two instalments at once, with the voluntary intention of facilitating, at the same time, the organisation of the internal administration of the country; and of paying to the Ottoman Porte the indemnity which had been allotted to it in consequence of the extension given to the boundaries of the new State on the northern frontier.

This sacrifice having been made, the Powers resolved to suspend the issue of the third and last instalment, with the view of providing for their own interests, namely, of requiring from the Greek government a clear and precise explanation of the state of its receipts and expences, and of ascertaining in a certain and clear manner whether the said government, in its capacity of principal debtor, had enabled itself to meet its engagements, and to devote *the first resources* of the State, as it was bound to do, to the payment of the interest and of the sinking fund of the guaranteed debt.

The Undersigned adds, that these conditions have never been fulfilled by the Greek government; that the explanation of the state of the finances has been vague, obscure, and incomplete; and that, instead of devoting the first resources of the State to the payment of the interest, Greece failed in paying the interest for the half-year, which expired on the 1st of March last, and the Powers have been under the necessity of taking it up, and of paying it at last out of the funds of the loan itself.

It follows, from this fact, that it is not the three Courts who have failed in their engagements, but the Greek government who has not fulfilled its own, contrary to the letter of the Convention,

and certainly contrary to the conviction and the expectation of the guaranteeing Powers at the time they signed it.

In this state of things, and before relinquishing the sole resource which remains for causing the administration of Greece to take up a regular and exact position with regard to its receipts and expences, and for placing it under the necessity of using more discreetly the means at its disposal, Russia sees no method more efficacious than *that of strictly apportioning to the wants of Greece the assistance which it still depends upon the three Courts to afford.*

It appears from the information which the Greek government has communicated to the Imperial Mission at Athens, that the disproportion between the receipts and the expences will continue for four years longer, namely, until the year 1839 inclusive, and that the presumed sum of the entire deficit will amount, in the course of the above-mentioned time, to ten millions of drachmas. The government adds, that what imposes the greatest restraint upon it, and is the principal cause of this deficit, is *the payment of the interest and of the sinking fund of the loan.*

In order to provide for this service, the Greek government thought fit, in the month of October last, to communicate to the three Courts the draft of a Royal Decree, by virtue of which the proceeds of the third instalment were to be applied in the first instance, and exclusively, to the payment of the interest upon the whole of the loan.

The Court of Russia found this proposal liable to objection, first, because it departs from the terms of the Convention which applies the first revenues of the state, before every thing, to the service of the loan, and because there was no appearance that this payment would be carried into effect after the third instalment should be entirely exhausted, which could not fail to happen without delay, if it was placed at the disposal of Greece.

In the mean time, the half-yearly interest and sinking fund of the two instalments already issued, having become due on the 1st

of March last, the Greek government failed to provide the funds necessary for the discharge of its engagements; so that the three guaranteeing Courts found themselves under the necessity of taking them up out of their own funds, and at length defraying them out of the third instalment which still remains to be issued.

It follows from this fact that Greece has not fulfilled its engagements; that the three Courts have been obliged to have recourse to the funds arising from the loan, in order to provide for the interest; thus adopting, from the force of circumstances, the plan and views which the cabinet of Athens had itself proposed in its draft of Royal Decree in the month of October, and which consisted in applying the proceeds of the third instalment to the payment of the interest of the loan.

The Court of Russia, taking the whole question into consideration, adopts this principle; from which it will follow that the Greek government not being obliged during the above-mentioned period of four years to withdraw from the first revenues of the state the sums necessary for the payment of the interest and sinking fund, will be able to apply all its resources to the other wants of the administration, and contrive, during the four years specified by itself, to re-establish the balance between the receipts and expences, and to place itself, with respect to its finances, in a position at once regular and stable.

The Undersigned adds, that, in thus coming forward to the assistance of Greece, the three Courts ought, both for their own interest and for the interest of Greece itself, to require that government to specify, in a precise, permanent, and satisfactory manner, the nature of the receipts of the Treasury which are to be appropriated systematically and exclusively to the service of the interest and sinking fund of the loan, after the produce of the third instalment shall have been exhausted; and it is with this object that the Undersigned has been instructed by his Court to submit to the Conference the adoption of the basis of the arrangement which he has had the honour to communicate to their Excel-

lencies the Principal Secretary of State and the Count Sébastiani ; declaring that if the provisions therein contained meet with the approbation of the Plenipotentiaries assembled in Conference, His Majesty the Emperor is ready to cause to be issued annually the number of bonds required, in order to pay the proportion of the interest and sinking fund of the portion of the loan guaranteed by Russia, and this grant will continue to be made until the third of the twenty millions which constitutes the third instalment of the loan contracted under the guarantee of the Imperial government shall be exhausted.

These are the principal considerations which have dictated the plan of the Court of Russia. It unites at once the advantage of offering a regular and effective succour to Greece ; of protecting, for some years, the interests of the three Courts ; and of insuring to them for a longer period, and until the complete extinction of the loan, a mortgage capable of relieving them from the obligation of paying out of their own funds a debt which belongs to Greece, and which they guaranteed solely with the view of favouring the new state, of procuring funds for it on more advantageous terms, and of facilitating by this means the organization of its financial system ; a result which unhappily is still to be desired, and which can only be expected to be procured by the discreet employment of the internal resources of the country, and by a strict reduction of the expences to the amount and the value of the receipts.

In addressing these observations to his Excellency the Principal Secretary of State, in reply to his note of the 14th instant, the Undersigned conceives that he has shown that the plan of arrangement presented by this Court contains, at once, the means of rendering real assistance to Greece, and a fair provision for the protection of the interests of the guaranteeing Powers, who may differ as to the mode of complying with the demands of the existing government of Greece, but who all profess to an equal degree the kindest sentiments in favour of King Otho and

of the Greek nation, and who doubtless will never cease to give them the most essential and striking proofs of it.

The Undersigned, &c.
(Signed) Pozzo di Borgo.

London, 21st June, 1836.

No. 22.

The Earl of Durham to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received July 11, 1836.)

St. Petersburg, July 2, 1836.

My Lord,

I have just received from Count Nesselrode the answer to the application which I made, in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, respecting the third instalment of the Greek loan. It is, as I anticipated, in the negative. His Excellency informs me that the official communication will be sent through the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, at London.

I have, &c.

(Signed) DURHAM.

The Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 23.

The Baron de Maltitz to Viscount Palmerston.

The Undersigned, &c. has the honour to communicate to His Excellency Viscount Palmerston, &c. the resolutions which the Imperial Cabinet has thought proper definitively to adopt, after the communications which have lately taken place in London, with respect to the issue of the third instalment of the Greek Loan.

The Imperial Cabinet has considered with earnest attention the note of the 14th of June (new style), by which the principal Secretary of State was pleased to announce to Count Pozzo di Borgo that His Britannic Majesty's government did not agree to

the terms which Russia had proposed as the basis on which the third instalment should be raised ; that it insisted, on the contrary, upon the necessity of granting for the present to the Greek government, upon the proceeds of the loan, an immediate advance of six millions of francs, with liberty to authorise, at a later period, the issue of such fresh sum as might be called for by the wants of Greece.

The answer which the Ambassador of Russia had the honour to address to His Excellency Lord Palmerston, dated the 21st of June, having been drawn up in conformity with the instructions with which His Majesty the Emperor had been pleased to furnish his Ambassador, in consequence of the previous communications of the principal Secretary of State, of the 18th of April, the Imperial Cabinet has entirely approved of the tenor of Count Pozzo di Borgo's reply. At the same time that it refers to the general considerations which that document contains, the Cabinet of His Majesty the Emperor has, however, thought proper to add thereto the following reflections, which an attentive perusal of the note of the 14th of June has suggested to it.

Above all, it cannot refrain from expressing its deep regret at perceiving that the benevolent intentions which suggested the plan which it had framed, far from having been appreciated, as they deserved to be, should have called forth on the part of the British Ministry observations which it would be impossible to leave unanswered.

In refusing to agree to that plan, the principal Secretary of State has observed, that the propositions put forth by the Cabinet of Russia were *unexpected, inapplicable to the situation of Greece, contrary to the policy hitherto pursued by the three Powers, at variance with the stipulations of the Treaty of 1832.*

These objections, if they had had any foundation, would have been very serious. In examining, however, more closely the question now under discussion ; in calling to mind all that formerly passed in the negociation which preceded and followed

the signature of the Convention of the 7th of May, 1832; in taking, in short, an impartial survey of the course pursued by common consent by the three Cabinets during the whole of their previous deliberations, the principal Secretary of State will, it may be hoped, be pleased to appreciate more correctly the plan proposed by the Cabinet of Russia.

In fact, Lord Palmerston will cease to consider that plan as *unexpected*, when he shall recollect that the idea of appropriating the third instalment to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the two first was spontaneously suggested by the government of King Otho, in the month of September, 1835, and that the Cabinet of Athens formally communicated at that period to the three Allied Courts a draft of a Royal Decree destined to carry that plan into execution.

The first article of that Decree was expressed specifically in these words:—"The Interest and Sinking Fund of the guaranteed loan of sixty millions which will be due on the 1st of September, 1835, shall be paid, as has been done with respect to the two first instalments, out of the sums accruing from the third instalment of the loan when raised, by the banking-house charged with the issue of it, which, consequently, shall always reserve out of the proceeds of this instalment, immediately before the expiration of the periods of payment, the sums which shall be necessary for such payment, and which sums it shall employ exclusively for this purpose."

It was also in perfect conformity with this plan, that the principal Secretary of State thought fit to propose, in the month of February last, to provide out of the proceeds of the third instalment the necessary funds to meet the service of the two first instalments for the half-yearly payments in March and September of the current year, for which the Greek government had ceased to provide itself.

According to what has been above stated, it is by no means correct to look upon, as *unexpected*, a proposition of which the

Cabinet of Athens was the first to suggest the idea eight months ago, and which since that time the English Ministry has already begun to carry actually into execution.

If the Imperial Cabinet, after having, from the beginning, pointed out the inconvenience of this mode of payment, now consents to adopt it for want of a more regular system, it is not, surely, Russia that should be reproached with having been the first to act upon a plan, which a Royal Decree, drawn up at Athens, was some time ago designed to sanction.

Neither can it be asserted with justice that the proposition put forth upon this subject by the Imperial Cabinet *was inapplicable to the situation of Greece, or contrary to the policy hitherto pursued by the three Powers.*

The situation of Greece is that of a new country, entrusted to a new administration, whose notions have not been sufficiently matured, and whose first measures have not been rendered stable, by experience and time; an administration uncertain in its course, which has reckoned too much upon the necessity under which the guaranteeing Powers would be placed of coming by compulsion to the assistance of Greece, when her own resources should be exhausted, and which, under this expectation, has not endeavoured, from the beginning, to establish an even balance between the expenses of the State, and the smallness of its means. Accordingly, the policy hitherto pursued by the Powers, has constantly had for its object to restrain the precipitation of the Greek government; to keep it within the limits which are prescribed to it by the true interests of the nation; to make it feel the necessity of a strict economy; in a word, to confine its views to the real wants of the nation, without allowing itself to be led away on the one hand by the intemperate desire of acquiring a certain political importance, and without abandoning itself, on the other hand, to premature plans of improvement, disproportioned to the precarious resources of a State hardly established.

Such has been the generous but provident policy which the

three Powers have always pursued in the whole course of their previous deliberations on the affairs of Greece. Still persevering in the same course, the Cabinet of Russia has proposed to employ the third instalment of the loan for a definite, known, and really useful purpose, instead of exposing the Greek government to the danger of risking this last financial resource of the state by employing it for objects undefined, unknown, and of which the utility should not have been clearly proved beforehand.

For this reason the Imperial Cabinet has desired to appropriate the proceeds of the third instalment exclusively to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the loan. This plan offers in itself a threefold advantage; it secures irrevocably the service of the public debt of Greece for a certain number of years, and thus, during that period, places the credit of the new state beyond the reach of every vicissitude; it relieves the Greek government not only from the burthen of an annual payment of 2,424,000 francs, due on account of the interest and sinking fund of the two instalments already issued, but also from the additional charge of interest which will be added in proportion to the progressive issue of the third; finally, it allows the administration of King Otho to apply to the urgent wants of the country *the first revenues* of the state, which it will have to set apart, according to the strict terms of the Convention of 1832, for the service of the loan, if it is not at liberty to provide in succession, out of the proceeds of the third instalment, the necessary means for meeting the obligations to which it is liable in consequence of the issue of the two first.

Such are the incontestible advantages which are united in the plan proposed by the Cabinet of Russia. It may be allowed to imagine that it was *neither inapplicable to the situation of Greece, nor contrary to the course of policy hitherto pursued by the three Powers.*

It would remain still to prove that neither was it at variance with the *stipulations of the Convention of 1832.*

Two fundamental considerations formed the basis of the 12th Article of that agreement.

The object of the first was to devote to the *wants of the Greek state* the financial resources which the credit of the guaranteeing Powers was designed to afford to it.

The object of the second was to procure for the government of King Otho the means of contracting a loan upon the most favourable terms possible, by the aid of the united credit of Russia, Great Britain, and France, but on condition that this loan should *not become a charge* upon the guaranteeing Powers, and that Greece should regulate her finances in such a manner as to *provide entirely* for the service of the said loan.

With respect to the first point, it cannot be questioned, that the necessity of paying the interest and sinking fund of the loan is one of the most urgent wants of the country. For without an absolute regularity in the payment of the interest of the public debt, there is no hope of Greece acquiring credit: and without credit her future existence and prosperity would be but precarious.

One of the principal designs of the Convention of 1832 would, therefore, be accomplished, by securely providing for the service of the loan for a certain uninterrupted series of years, in the mode of which the principle is contained in the plan proposed by the Imperial Cabinet. This steadiness of system, and the public confidence which would be the necessary consequence of it, would of itself prove the greatest benefit to Greece; for it would establish her financial credit upon a basis much more solid than would be the case if the public saw the service of the debt of the state left to the vicissitudes of an administration, whose skill in matters of finance has not hitherto procured for it unlimited confidence.

The object of the second condition which formed the basis of the 12th Article of the Convention of the 7th of May, was to establish the principle that the loan should not become a charge upon the three guaranteeing Powers.

It will be sufficient for Lord Palmerston to refer to the Annexe F., of the Protocol No. 44, of the 26th of April, 1832, in order to satisfy himself of the truth of this.

This paper, addressed by the Conference of London to the Bavarian Plenipotentiary, is plainly expressed in these terms :
“ If Greece contracts a loan, her first duty must be to provide for the charges which will in consequence fall upon her ; and if the three Powers guarantee that loan, their first duty is to require of Greece, for her own interest, the fulfilment of that obligation. The three Courts could not, in any other manner, give to a Greek loan the guarantee required of them.”

It will further be sufficient for Lord Palmerston to glance at the Annexe A. of the Protocol No. 48, of the 30th of June, 1832, in order to satisfy himself that this truth was well understood, and formerly admitted by the Bavarian Plenipotentiary.

In this paper the Baron de Cetto expresses himself in these terms :

“ The Greek government will doubtless impose upon itself the most rigid economy. Far from wishing to be a burden upon the Powers, it merely requires the guarantee by them of the loan, in order to be able to negotiate it on more advantageous terms. It is even probable, provided that the government should re-establish order, and obtain the public confidence, that it will be able to form engagements without having recourse to the further guarantee of the Powers. Bound by the Convention itself to provide in *the first place* for the discharge of the interest and the sums which shall have been advanced under the protecting guarantee of the three Courts, *it never can, in any case, expose them either to real loss, or to the risk of being called upon for payment.*”

This positive declaration, it is fitting to observe, was made by the Bavarian Plenipotentiary in the name of his Court, the very day on which the ratifications of the Convention of the 7th of May were exchanged at London.

Thus the idea of the three Powers, according to which the 12th

Article of that act was drawn up, namely, that of obliging the Greek government to provide, in the first place, for the service of the loan, was formally admitted by the Plenipotentiary of Bavaria, so as completely to secure the interests and rights of the guaranteeing Courts.

As a direct consequence of the principles above set forth, the sixth paragraph of the 12th Article of the Convention assigned the *first revenues of the state* for the payment of the interest and sinking fund, as Lord Palmerston's note has stated with infinite correctness.

But the Principal Secretary of State will have the goodness further to remember that the foresight of the three Cabinets went still further. With the just desire of guarding against the possibility of their interests being exposed to future prejudice, they took care expressly to stipulate that the first revenues and *effective receipts of the Greek Treasury* shall be applied to the service of the loan. Consequently, the extent and nature of the first revenues of the state having been from the beginning uncertain, it was deemed prudent, as a provision against that uncertainty, to attach the *effective receipts of the treasury*, and accordingly to keep back, from the proceeds of the funds accruing from the loan, the sums necessary to secure the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the two first instalments from the date of their being issued, that is, from the 1st of July, 1833, to the 1st of September, 1835, as the accounts presented by the Greek government in the month of October last clearly prove.

By this foresight, by this reserve of funds out of the *effective receipts* of the treasury, agreeably to the actual terms of the Convention of 1832, the three Cabinets succeeded in securing the service of the loan for two successive years. During this period it was not the first revenues of the state that provided for this service, since those revenues still continue uncertain and indeterminate; but it was, on the contrary, the *funds accruing from the two instalments of the loan* which served to pay the interest

thereof. When this resource was exhausted, the payment of the interest ceased ; and the half year's interest due on the 1st of March, 1836, remained unprovided for, because there was no longer *any effective receipt* to meet the engagements of Greece.

Past experience has thus proved to the three Powers the indispensable necessity of not abandoning to uncertain chance the service of the loan which they have guaranteed, so long as the revenues appropriated thereto shall remain unknown or insufficient to answer their object. In this state of uncertainty and financial instability, the Cabinet of Russia has considered that the only means of placing the credit of Greece upon a more solid basis, was to leave her time to regulate gradually the employment of her revenue, to augment her resources, to consolidate her existence, and, until that was the case, to reserve the funds of the third instalment to be successively employed for the discharge of the interest of her debt.

In proposing this plan, with a view to the well understood interest of Greece, the Imperial Cabinet did no more than extend to the entire issue of this last instalment, a measure which had been already partially adopted at the time that the former instalments were raised ; a measure of foresight which alone had been able to secure, up to the month of March last, the regular discharge of the pecuniary obligations of the new state. The proposition put forward by the Imperial Cabinet, far from being *contrary to the terms of the Convention of 1832*, had therefore positively for its object to keep the Greek government within the limits of that act, by rendering it happily incapable of failing in its engagements ; in one word, the proposition had for its object to secure to Greece for a certain number of years the benefit of the *effective receipts* which she owes to the foresight of the guaranteeing Powers, so long as she shall not owe to the skill of her own administration the more durable resource of well known and regular revenues of the state.

Such are the views which determined the Cabinet of Russia to

propose the basis of the arrangement which the Ambassador Count Pozzo di Borgo had the honour to submit to the examination of the Conference of London on the 3rd of June. Such are also the reasons which now determine the Imperial Cabinet to persist, for its part, in the course which it has proposed, and which do not allow it to accede to that, of which Lord Palmerston has explained the plan in his note of the 14th of June.

In announcing, by order of His Majesty the Emperor, this determination, the Undersigned has nevertheless been ordered to declare, at the same time, that the Cabinet of Russia, although persisting, for its part, in the intention of applying the produce of the third instalment exclusively to the service of the loan, readily admits that this decision can in no wise prejudice the further resolutions of the two other guaranteeing powers: that, far from that being the case, the government of His Britannic Majesty is fully entitled to issue in whole, or in part, the proportion of the last instalment of the loan guaranteed by England, and to grant accordingly such an advance upon the third of the twenty millions which are still to be raised, as it may judge fitting to place at the disposal of the Greek government.

The entire freedom of action reserved in this respect to each of the guaranteeing Powers is a necessary consequence of the stipulations of the 12th Article of the Convention of 1832, as well as of the subsequent acts of the Conference, which have expressly proved that the guarantee of the loan is not a *joint guarantee*, but that the third of each series is guaranteed *separately*, and *in a special manner* by each of the three Courts.

In adducing at the present moment this principle which is laid down by the Acts of London, the Imperial Cabinet congratulates itself at finding therein a proof that the agreement so happily established between the Powers, parties to those acts, will be far from ceasing, although each of the three Courts, using the latitude which they have reserved to themselves, may be disposed to adopt a different course with regard to the manner of raising

separately their proportion of the last instalment, guaranteed by them in a *separate* and *special* manner.

Whatever ulterior measures the three Courts shall judge it necessary to take in this respect, it will not be the less apparent that they will continue to share in common the sincere desire and the firm resolution to watch over the maintenance of the existence and of the well-being of a state, the creation of which is the result of their united efforts, and the preservation of which will always be the object of their mutual solicitude.

But this community of obligations and of rights, which rests upon the execution of the Acts of London, imposes likewise upon the three Powers the duty of considering by common consent the means of providing for the responsibility which they have incurred under the Convention of the 7th of May, by answering for the exactness with which the Greek government will discharge its pecuniary engagements, and by thus exposing themselves to the chance of being called upon some day to fulfil those engagements in its stead, in the event of that government being incapable of satisfying them itself.

The duty of foreseeing the possibility of this chance must be doubly proved to the guaranteeing Powers by the circumstances which occurred at the period when the last dividend became due in March. It cannot therefore escape their notice that it is their real interest to come to an understanding beforehand among themselves as to the means best adapted for providing for their liability, by fixing upon the nature and extent of the securities which they are entitled to require from the Greek government, in order that the Loan may not become a charge upon them, contrary to the spirit and letter of the Convention of 1832.

It is with this view that the Imperial Cabinet has thought it its duty to bring to the knowledge of the Conference of London the propositions contained in the 2d, 3rd, and 4th paragraphs of the scheme which Count Pozzo di Borgo had the honour to deliver to the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, and of France, in the Conference of the 3rd of June last.

The arrangements contained in those paragraphs are designed to define the real securities which should serve as a pledge for the accomplishment of the obligations which the Greek government has contracted towards the guaranteeing Powers: securities which it is the more important to determine upon with a view to the interests of the three Courts of Greece herself, and finally of the creditors of the state, inasmuch as the contract of the loan, the execution of which is placed under the guarantee of Russia, Great Britain, and France, has expressly assigned, "*as a general pledge for the loan, all the "property and revenues of the state, and specifically the entire produce of "the taxes."*

The propositions last brought forward by the Imperial Cabinet have not had therefore any other object than to regulate with greater precision a pledged security, of which the Greek government has itself already admitted the principle and recognized the legality; to insist accordingly upon the Greek government, in conformity with the obligation which it has contracted, appropriating the national land as a guarantee for the loan.

It is to this last part of the plan proposed by Count Pozzo di Borgo, that the Imperial Cabinet consequently considers it its duty again to call the attention of His Britannic Majesty's government at the present time. It reserves to itself the power of making a similar invitation to the Cabinet of the Tuilleries, in the full persuasion that the objects to which it now directs the enlightened solicitude of the two guaranteeing Powers concerns in an equal degree the direct interests of Russia as well as those of England and of France, and deserves to fix forthwith their most serious attention.

The Imperial Cabinet, always animated with the desire that the spirit of conciliation and unanimity which has happily guided the three Courts, parties to the acts of London, through all the changes of so long and so difficult a negociation, should still attend upon the examination of their reciprocal obligations and rights, flatters itself that the views which it has now explained will be received by the government of His Britannic Majesty in a

manner consistent with the frankness and confidence by which the present communication has been dictated.

In bringing this communication to the knowledge of His Excellency Viscount Palmerston, the Undersigned has the honour to offer to him the assurance of his highest consideration.

(Signed) THE BARON DE MALTITZ.
London, July 13, 1836.

No. 24.

Viscount Palmerston to Baron Maltitz.

Foreign Office, July 19, 1836.

The Undersigned, &c. has had the honour of receiving the note which the Baron de Maltitz, &c., addressed to him on the 13th instant, conveying the answer of the Russian government to the note which the Undersigned addressed to Count Pozzo di Borgo on the 14th of June; and, though it is not the intention of the Undersigned to pursue any further the discussion which forms the subject of those notes, he cannot close this correspondence without making one or two explanatory observations upon some passages in the note of the Baron de Maltitz.

The Baron de Maltitz remarks that the Undersigned will cease to consider the proposal of the Russian government as unexpected, when he bears in mind that the idea of applying the third instalment to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the two first instalments was spontaneously suggested by the government of King Otho, as far back as September, 1835, and that the Cabinet of Athens formally communicated at that period to the three Allied Courts a draft of a Royal Ordinance, destined to carry such a plan into execution.

The Undersigned, however, must beg leave to point out to Baron de Maltitz the wide and essential difference between the two plans which the Baron thus appears to consider as identical.

By the scheme of the Russian Cabinet recently proposed to the Conference, the whole of the third instalment would be doled out to the Greek government in successive annual sums of about 2,500,000 francs, to cover the dividends and sinking fund of each

year; and the above-mentioned amount would be the utmost extent of aid which the Greek government would receive from the loan in the present or in any future year, to provide for a temporary deficiency of revenue, and to meet the pressing wants of the public service. Whereas, on the other hand, by the plan contemplated in the Royal Ordinance of September last, the whole of the third instalment would at once be placed at the disposal of the Greek government, to meet the immediate and pressing necessities of the State, and the interest and sinking fund of the first and second instalments would be paid out of that part only of the third instalment, which should not be required to supply the temporary deficiency of the general revenue.

The Undersigned must, therefore, be permitted to say, that upon comparing the two plans, he finds nothing in the plan of the Ordinance of September, 1835, which could have led him to expect the proposition contained in the Russian memorandum, which was communicated to the Conference on the 3rd of June, 1836.

The Baron de Maltitz further observes that the Undersigned himself had thought it necessary, in February last, to propose to take out of the produce of the third instalment the funds necessary for the payments to be made in March and September of the present year, on account of the interest and sinking fund of the two first instalments. This is undoubtedly true; but it does not bear out the inference which the Baron de Maltitz seems to draw from it.

The Greek government has all along declared that in the present year its ordinary income would fall short of its unavoidable expenditure; and upon this very ground it founded its application for a further advance on account of the loan. But, if the Revenue of a State falls short of its expenditure, and if a loan is necessary to make good the deficiency, it is clear that the interest of any former debt, not exceeding the amount of the deficiency, must virtually be paid out of the loan that is raised to cover the deficiency; and it, therefore, made no difference in this point of view whether the Greek government remitted from Greece the funds for the payment of the interest due in March and September,

or whether it paid that interest out of the proceeds of the third instalment. But the latter course was evidently the most convenient, and the least expensive arrangement. The government of Greece was led to believe that a portion, at all events, of the third instalment would be guaranteed by the three Powers, and accordingly it made arrangements for paying the March and September dividends out of that portion. The Undersigned, on the part of His Majesty's government, invariably supported the application of the Greek government for a considerable advance; but he cannot admit that his recommendation to that effect, the result of which would have been to place at the immediate disposal of the Greek government the means of providing for its urgent wants, had "a perfect analogy" with the plan of the Russian government, the necessary result of which would be to leave the government of Greece altogether destitute of those means.

When the Undersigned stated that the Russian proposal was inapplicable to the present condition of Greece, he referred to the fact that in the present year the Greek government requires an advance of six or eight millions to cover the deficiency of its revenue, and that for the present year the Russian proposal would afford the Greek government an aid of only 2,500,000 francs; thus leaving that government without any resource for the difference between the 2,500,000 and the actual amount of the deficiency; while, on the other hand, the Russian plan would give to the Greek government six and seven years hence a loan of 2,500,000 francs, though, according to the expectations of that government, no such loan would, at that time, be required.

The plan, therefore, by giving too little at present, and too much in future, appeared to the Undersigned to be inapplicable to the wants and condition of Greece.

The Baron de Maltitz controverts the opinion expressed by the Undersigned in his note of the 14th of June, that the Russian proposition is at variance with the Treaty of May, 1832. The Undersigned having already explained the grounds of that opinion, does not think it necessary now to restate them; but he feels

himself compelled to say that his opinion on that point has not been altered by the arguments contained in Baron de Maltitz's note; and the concluding passage of the declaration annexed by Count Pozzo di Borgo on the 16th of April last to the Protocol of that day, had led the Undersigned at that time to suppose that the Russian government was also of opinion that it would not be consistent with the reciprocal engagements of the Convention of 1832, that the dividends of the first and second instalments should continue systematically to be paid out of the produce of the third.

The Undersigned will avail himself of some future opportunity to have the honour of discussing with the Baron de Maltitz the suggestion adverted to in the concluding part of the Baron's note, that application should be made to the Greek government to pledge specifically the produce of the National Lands for the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the loan, instead of abiding by the stipulations of the 12th Article of the Convention of May, 1832, which mortgage for that purpose the first produce of the aggregate revenue of the State; but it does not at first sight appear that any advantage would accrue from transferring to a part of the revenue of Greece that security which now attaches to the whole.

In conclusion, the Undersigned has to assure the Baron de Maltitz that His Majesty's government have received with the greatest satisfaction the declaration contained in the Baron's note, that, however, the governments of Russia, Great Britain, and France may differ upon the particular point which has been the subject of the present discussion, the three Courts will continue, nevertheless, to be equally animated by a sincere desire, and by a firm determination to watch over the maintenance and welfare of a State, whose creation has been the result of their united efforts, and whose preservation will always be the object of their mutual solicitude. The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.
The Baron de Maltitz,
&c. &c. &c.

ADDITIONAL PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

THIRD INSTALMENT OF THE GREEK LOAN.

1835, 1836.

PRESENTED TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT BY COMMAND
OF HIS MAJESTY, AUGUST, 1836.

No. 1.

Mr. Dawkins to the Duke of Wellington.

Received March 31, 1835.

(Extract).

Athens, February 27, 1835.

I have received from the Greek government the account of their finances, and I have the honour to transmit herewith these documents to your grace for the information of his Majesty's government.

The account comprises the income and expenditure of this government, calculated in Greek drachmas, for the years 1833 and 1834, and will be shortly followed by a Budget for the present year.

The general result of it is that, of the two first instalments of the loan guaranteed to Greece in 1832 by the Allied Powers, and amounting to 44,672,000 drachmas, (40,000,000 francs) 4,602,413 95 leptà, or about ten per cent., were expended in

negotiating the loan ; 12,912,365 75 leptà in payments to Foreign Powers, (the indemnification granted to Turkey by the Convention of the 21st of July, 1832, and two-thirds of the £20,000 advanced to Count Capodistrias by his Majesty's government) which were stipulated independently of the Regency ; — and 4,392,746 66 leptà on account of interest and sinking fund for the years 1833 and 1834 ; making a total of 21,907,526 36 leptà to be deducted from the available proceeds of the loan, and leaving at the disposal of the Regency the sum of 22,764,473 64 leptà for the administration of this country.

Of this sum it appears that 4,875,627 46 leptà were applied to cover the deficit of 1833, and 8,014,877 16 leptà to cover that of 1834 ; and that a surplus of 9,873,969 2 leptà (8,841,304 francs, 89 cents.) remained in the hands of the Greek government at the close of the latter year.

During the two first years of Count Capodistrias's administration, the public income of Greece amounted to about one-third, and during the two last to about half of the expenditure. In 1828, they were, as nearly as can be ascertained, 2,526,612 and 7,649,1852 drachmas ; in 1829, 4,810,052 and 11,793,492 drachmas ; in 1830, 3,356,808 and 6,816,000 drachmas ; and, in 1831, 4,902,334 and 8,848,260 drachmas.

In 1832, when the general insurrection took place, no public accounts were kept. Due allowance must be made in favour of the Provisional Government of Greece in comparing its revenue with that collected by the Regency, the territory of Greece having been extended in the interval ; but your grace will observe with satisfaction that the public income for 1833 is stated in the enclosed account to have risen to 7,042,653 drachmas and 30 leptà, a sum far exceeding this due allowance ; and that, in 1834, it amounted to 9,455,410 drachmas and 17 leptà, being an increase of above 30 per cent., arising principally from the improving state of agriculture.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Account of the sums accruing from the two first series of the Loan of sixty millions of francs, up to the 31st of December, 1834.

	<i>F.</i>	<i>C.</i>	<i>F.</i>	<i>C.</i>	<i>Dr.</i>	<i>L.</i>
<i>Unproductive portion consisting of the Expenses and losses attendant on the negotiation of the loan.</i>						
The loan being negotiated at 94, occasioned a loss of 6 per cent	2,400,000	00				
Commission to Messrs. Rothschild, 2 per cent	800,000	00				
Ditto on payment of three half years' interest and sinking fund	36,000	00				
Ditto banker's, to Mr. S. d'Eichthal of Munich for the transmission of the money	321,690	78	4,121,072	67	4,602,413	95
Couriers to Paris and St. Petersburg	13,508	60				
Printing and stamps of certificates	36,540	00				
Discount paid to Messrs. Rothschild for prompt payment of the instalments	513,333	29				
Total of unproductive portion	4,121,072	67				
<i>Payments to different Powers in execution of former Treaties.</i>						
To Russia, on account of Turkey, to the amount of 22 millions of piastres	5,984,235	05				
To Turkey, in discharge of indemnity of 40 millions of piastres	5,236,363	63	11,561,932	01	12,912,365	75
To England, on account of £20,000 sterling advanced upon the loan	341,333	33				
Total of payments to the powers	11,561,932	01				
Total of sums of which the Treasury has not had the disposal	-	-	15,683,004	68	17,514,779	70

Account of sums continued.

	<i>Dr.</i>	<i>Lep.</i>	<i>F.</i>	<i>C.</i>	<i>Dr.</i>	<i>Lep.</i>
Brought over	-	-	15,683,004	68	17,514,779	70
<i>Expenditure for the administration of the Kingdom during two years.</i>						
Deficit in the service of 1833, including the payment of interest and sinking Fund to March, 1834	6,588,054	12	15,475,690	43	17,283,251	28
Deficit in the service of 1834, including the above service of the loan to the 31st of March, 1835	10,695,197	16				
Total of expences for the administration of the kingdom	17,283,251	28				
Sum disposable on the 31st of December, 1834	-	-	8,841,304	89	9,873,969	02
Total nominal amount of the two first series of the loan	-	-	40,000,000	00	44,672,000	00

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

SERVICE OF 1833.

Account of Receipts.

	<i>Ordinary.</i>		<i>Extraordinary.</i>		<i>Totals.</i>	
	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>
Taxes on real property:						
Farms, and administration of tithes	3,757,826	22	-	-	4,219,275	75
Tax on cattle	287,915	73				
Tax on pasturage	140,518	89				
Tax on houses	33,014	91				
Indirect taxes:						
Customs and transit duties	2,007,875	07	-	-	2,224,556	22
Duties of health and post-offices	118,843	81				
Ships' papers and passports	50,257	22				
Licences to carry arms	14,158	40				
Taxes upon legal instruments	15,576	63				
Carried over	6,425,986	88	-	-	6,443,831	97

Account of Receipts continued.

	Ordinary.		Extraordinary.		Totals.	
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
Brought over	6,425,986	88	-	-	6,443,831	97
Police tax	3,903	30				
Public cries	652	40				
Different tolls	104	71				
Taxes on weights and mea- sures	13,184	68				
Public domain :						
Salt works	24,430	29				
Mines and quarries	5,906	34				
Ponds and fisheries	102,813	00				
Timber and acorns	48,228	06				
National olive groves	105,125	25				
Kitchen gardens	15,015	64				
Houses, stores, and mills	99,981	39				
Meadow lands	19,531	27				
Vineyards, lands, and rice grounds	10,000	00				
Duties upon certain waters	662	80				
Public establishments :						
Royal printing-press	8,633	18				
Post-office	9,624	06				
Taxes for the support of public establishments	8,680	31				
Different receipts :						
Different miscellaneous re- ceipts	9,864	60				
Extraordinary receipts	-	-	9,370	37		
Donations towards public education	-	-	29,030	00		
Arrears :						
Old farm of tithes	-	-	6,145	81		
Old farm of lands	-	-	7,359	40		
Old debtors of different ac- counts	-	-	78,419	56		
Total of receipts	6,912,328	16	130,325	14	7,042,653	30

SERVICE OF 1833.

Account of Expences.

	Ordinary.		Extraordinary.		Total.	
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
Public debt :						
Interest to the 31st of March, 1834 . . .	1,489,066	66	}	-	1,712,426	66
Sinking fund ditto . . .	223,360	00				
Civil list, from the 1st of October, 1832:						
Royal establishment . . .	924,000	00	}	20,565 11	1,627,186	57
Regency	331,500	00				
General services:						
Ministry for foreign affairs . . .	226,746	71	}	58,231 64		
Ditto Home Department . . .	520,588	14				
Ditto Justice	98,571	40	}	-		
Ditto Religion and Public Instruction . . .	114,836	24				
Ditto War	4,630,750	09	}	1,739,482 18	8,913,349	65
Ditto Marine	790,929	84				
Ditto Finance	76,189	94	}	-		
Audit Office for one quarter . . .	13,160	27				
Late Board of Controul	8,422	70	}	-		
Exchequer and Treasury	26,170	13				
General expence of collection of taxes	606,887	53	}	-		
Public establishments :						
National bank (abolished)	7,483	80	}	-		
Royal printing press	19,747	93				
On account of the machines for the Mint	-	-	}	23,995 08	100,196	40
Model farm at Tyrinthus	14,453	28				
On account of buildings at Syra and Nauplia	-	-	}	22,480 41		
Pensions and aids :						
Pensions and aids to invalids, widows, & orphans	96,140	04	}	-	159,633	77
Pensions, aids, (orders of the King)	63,493	73				
Expences of public domains						
Maintenance of houses and magazines	27,347	63	}	-	36,256	88
Expenses of Directors	2,680	24				
Maintenance of vineyards	4,454	38	}	-		
Ditto of olive groves	1,482	00				
Different disbursements	292	63	}	-		
Carried over	10,317,755	31			2,230,294	62
					12,549,049	93

Account of Expenses continued.

	Ordinary.		Extraordinary.		Totals.	
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
Brought over	10,317,755	31	2,230,294	62	12,549,049	93
Extraordinary disbursements:						
Discounts for advances made by M. d'Eichtal of Munich	-	-	373,899	12		
Melting old copper coin	-	-	257,348	35		
Expence and loss in the new gold and silver coinage, deducting the profits on the copper	-	-	117,094	28		
Portion of the expence of carriage, and insurance of national and foreign coin, (payment of these expences in 1834)	-	-	64,739	87	928,984	36
Loss on value of foreign money imported	-	-	52,830	69		
Interest, loss on exchange, Agio	-	-	24,626	42		
Different miscellaneous disbursements	-	-	11,404	63		
Carriage and insurance of 528 chests of different kinds	-	-	27,041	00		
Arrears:						
Payment of notes, drafts, and bonds	-	-	61,415	96		
Payments on account of old debts	-	-	71,677	92	138,291	13
Arrears of civil allowances	-	-	5,197	25		
Purchases of property:						
Payments on account of purchases of property	-	-	14,142	00	14,142	00
Totals	10,318,755	31	3,311,712	11	13,630,467	42

COMPARISON.	Receipts.		Expenses.		Deficit.	
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
Ordinary service	6,912,328	16	10,318,755	31	3,406,427	15
Extraordinary service	130,325	14	3,311,712	11	3,181,386	97
Totals	7,042,653	30	13,630,467	42	6,587,814	12

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.
SERVICE OF 1834.
Account of Receipts.

	Ordinary.		Extraordinary.		Total.	
	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>
Taxes on real property:						
Produce of tithes	5,188,116	00	}	-	5,650,705	12
Tax on cattle	285,000	00				
Tax on pastures	140,500	00				
Tax on houses	37,089	12				
Indirect taxes:						
Customs and transit duties	2,135,000	00	}	-	2,421,400	00
Duties of health and post offices	130,000	00				
Ships' papers & passports	85,000	00				
Licences to carry arms	15,000	00				
Taxes on weights and measures	6,500	00				
Taxes upon legal instruments	27,000	00				
Police tax	13,500	00				
Public cries	7,800	00				
Different tolls	1,600	00				
Public domain:						
Salt works	345,000	00	}	-	861,147	00
Mines and quarries	8,937	00				
Ponds and fisheries	143,900	00				
Timber and acorns	57,600	00				
National olive grounds	106,760	00				
Kitchen gardens	65,400	00				
House, store, and mill rent	115,500	00				
Meadow lands	12,500	00				
Vineyards, lands, and rice grounds	4,800	00				
Duties upon certain waters	750	00				
Public establishments:						
Royal press	21,839	70	}	-	55,549	72
Post office	22,210	02				
Taxes for public establishments	11,500	00				
Miscellaneous receipts:						
Different miscellaneous receipts	6,500	00				
Unforeseen and extraordinary receipts	-	-	7,300	00	13,800	00
Carried over	8,995,301	84	7,300	00	9,002,601	84

Account of Receipts continued.

	Ordinary.		Extraordinary.		Total.	
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
Brought over	8,995,301	84	7,300	00	9,002,601	84
Arrears:						
Former loans in London	-	-	210,900	00	248,203	79
Old debtors on different accounts	-	-	37,303	79		
Ecclesiastical treasury:						
Produce of various ecclesiastical domains	204,504	44	-	-	204,504	44
Totals	9,199,906	38	255,503	79	9,455,410	07

SERVICE OF 1834.

Account of Expenses.

	Ordinary.		Extraordinary.		Total.	
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
Public debt:						
Interest for two half years to the 31st of March, 1835	2,233,600	00	-	-	2,680,320	00
Sinking fund, ditto	446,720	00	-	-		
Civil list:						
Royal establishment	720,000	00	-	-	1,143,552	64
Regency	300,000	00	123,752	64		
General service:						
Council of state	26,316	36	-	-	15,177,572	22
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	553,856	87	-	-		
Ditto Home Office	935,685	83	351,335	41		
Ditto Justice	201,675	08	46,346	63		
Ditto Religion and Public Instruction	360,521	60	-	-		
Ditto War	7,369,735	71	2,114,200	00		
Ditto Marine	2,189,711	90	39,745	95		
Ditto Finance	79,642	77	-	-		
Audit Office	72,088	78	2,732	00		
Exchequer and Treasury	22,428	05	5,909	20		
Treasury of the Courts	34,307	60	1,967	40		
General expense of collection of taxes	769,365	08	-	-		
Carried over	16,315,655	63	2,685,989	23	19,001,444	86

Account of Expenses continued.

	Ordinary.		Extraordinary.		Totals.	
	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>
Brought over	16,315,655	63	2,685,989	23	19,001,444	86
Public establishments:						
Mint	3,926	73	56,716	63	63,255	86
Royal press, (expenses of this establishment borne this year on account of Ministry of Instruction)	-	-	-	-		
National Bank (abolished)	2,612	50	-	-		
Expenses for public domain:						
Expenses for the Forests	14,670	17	-	-	38,428	82
Ditto for the maintenance of the olive grounds	6,940	00				
Ditto for the vineyards	1,000	00				
Indemnities for buildings	5,500	00				
Model farm at Tyrinthus	6,178	65				
General expenses	4,140	00				
Aids and pensions:						
Pensions to invalids, widows, orphans	270,881	93	-	-	278,198	93
Royal charities	7,317	00				
Extraordinary payments:						
Unforeseen and miscellaneous expenses	67,128	36	-	-	513,480	99
Conveyance and insurance of money imported	77,113	95				
Agios, loss by exchange	8,988	92				
Different buildings	360,249	76				
Arrears:						
Payments on account of old debts	-	-	80,928	56	80,928	56
Purchases of property:						
Miscellaneous payments on account of purchases of property	-	-	174,919	31	174,919	31
Totals	17,132,303	60	2,998,353	73	20,150,657	33

COMPARISON.	Receipts.		Expenses.		Deficit.	
	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>	<i>D.</i>	<i>L.</i>
Ordinary service	9,199,906	28	17,132,303	60	7,932,397	32
Extraordinary service	255,503	79	2,998,353	73	2,742,849	94
Totals	9,455,410	07	20,150,657	33	10,695,247	26

NO. 2.—GREEK BUDGET FOR THE YEAR 1835.

Transmitted to Viscount Palmerston by Sir E. Lyons.

SERVICE OF 1835.

RECEIPTS.	Sums recd up to the end of Aug.		Sums to be received.		Total.	
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
CHAP. I. <i>Direct Taxes.</i>						
§ A. Tax on real and usufructuary property	879,821	14	5,734,396	36	6,614,217	50
„ B. Ditto on pastures	—	—	900,000	00	900,000	00
„ C. Ditto on cattle	—	—	1,200,000	00	1,200,000	00
„ D. Ditto on bees	—	—	35,190	00	35,190	00
	879,821	14	7,869,586	36	8,749,407	50
CHAP. II. <i>Indirect Taxes.</i>						
§ A. Customs	921,424	86	1,205,575	14	2,127,000	00
„ B. Duties and fines						
a. Different duties	123,145	57	147,854	43	271,000	00
b. Fines	955	72	3,544	28	4,500	00
c. Stamps	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1,045,526	15	1,356,973	85	2,402,500	00
CHAP. III. <i>Public Establishments.</i>						
§ A. Mint	—	—	—	—	—	—
„ B. Post-office	15,843	23	7,156	77	23,000	00
„ C. Printing & lithographic press	19,948	15	20,051	85	40,000	00
	35,791	38	27,208	62	63,000	00
CHAP. IV. <i>Property of the State.</i>						
§ A. Duties on forests and game	56,242	35	95,007	65	151,250	00
„ B. Minerals and mines	3,027	36	20,972	64	24,000	00
„ C. Salt works	299,742	19	150,817	81	380,560	00
„ D. Fisheries	4,213	86	127,726	14	131,940	00
„ E. Waters	485	00	300	00	785	00
„ F. Olive grounds	1,559	37	63,216	63	64,776	00
„ G. Vines and currant grounds	296	10	57,972	90	58,269	00
„ H. Beds of reeds and rice grounds	802	00	3,528	00	4,330	00
„ I. Farming establishments	—	—	6,000	00	6,000	00
„ J. Various lands	42,827	87	45,059	13	87,887	00
„ K. Public buildings	2,486	4	1,580	96	4,067	00
„ L. Manufactories and work- shops	32,184	93	64,396	7	96,581	00
„ M. Active funds and interest	24,470	86	10,000	14	34,471	00
„ N. Sales of national property	9,176	57	101,823	43	111,000	00
	407,514	50	748,401	50	1,155,916	00

Account of Receipts continued.

RECEIPTS.	Sums rec ^d up to the end of Aug.		Sums to be received.		Total.	
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
CHAP. V. <i>Miscellaneous Revenues.</i>						
§ A. Local taxes	4,086	41	2,000	59	6,087	00
„ B. Duties on weights and mea- sures	805	79	694	21	1,500	00
„ C. Chance revenues and other produce	5,544	60	—	—	5,544	60
	10,436	80	2,694	80	13,131	60

RECAPITULATION.

SPECIES OF RECEIPT.	Amount of Receipts.		
	Receipts.	To be rec ^d .	Total.
Direct taxes	879,821 14	7,869,586 36	8,749,407 50
Indirect taxes	1,045,526 15	1,356,973 85	2,402,500 00
Public establishments	35,791 38	27,208 62	63,000 00
National property	407,514 50	748,401 50	1,155,916 00
Miscellaneous revenues	10,436 80	2,694 80	13,131 60
Total receipts	2,379,089 97	10,004,865 13	12,383,955 10

Expenses of Collection and Management.	Sums received.		Estimate of Sums to be received.		Total.		Service of 1834. Estimate of payments to be made.	
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
CHAP. I.— <i>General Expenses of the Treasury and its Administration.</i>								
§ A. General Treasury.								
1. Appointments	8,296	66	6,049	98	4,182	68		500
2. General expenses of office and transfer of funds.	3,528	96	26,307	00				
Carry over	11,825	62	32,356	98	44,182	68	500	00

Expenses of Collection and Management continued.

Expenses of Collection and Management.	Sums received.		Estimate of Sums to be received.		Total.		Service of 1834. Estimate of Payments to be made.
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.	D. L.
Brought over .	11,825	62	32,356	98	44,182	68	500 00
„ B. Legal Treasury.							
1. Salaries .	10,292	33	16,707	67	54,453	20	187 50
2. General Service .	9,911	92	17,541	28			1,000 00
„ C. Treasuries of districts							
Tantièmes .	—	—	14,545	00	14,545	00	2,479 02
„ D. Expence of buildings							
1. New Buildings .	—	—	—	—	1,000	00	
2. Maintenance of establishments .	—	—	1,000	00			
Total of Chap. I. .	32,029	87	82,150	93	114,180	80	4,166 52
CHAP. II. — Charges of Collection and Management.							
§ A. Direct Taxes.							
1. Commissioners .	68,896	28	96,343	00	229,882	28	1,650 00
2. Charges of collection of tithes in districts not farmed out .	—	—	15,000	00			1,200 00
3. Valuation and collection of duties on pasturage & cattle .	380	00	44,620	00	9,950	00	20,000 00
4. Gratuities .	843	00	4,000	00			
„ B. Indirect taxes.							
1. Salaries & expence of persons, custom-houses, buildings, and repairs .	127,655	43	432,100	00	564,505	43	1,000 00
2. Expences of different taxes .	250	00	4,500	00			
3. Stamps .	2,950	00	7,000	00	9,950	00	
„ C. Public establishments							
Tit. 1. Mint .	26,773	14	156,270	00	416,077	74	
2. Post-office .	86,514	94	72,250	00			
3. Printing and lithographic press .	48,294	66	25,975	00			
„ D. National domains.							
Tit. 1. Expences of forests	29,187	42	38,500	00			
2. Minerals .	8,982	17	18,000	00			
3. Salt works .	66,813	16	112,500	00			1,250 00
Carry over .	467,540	20	1,027,058	00	1,220,415	45	25,100 00

Expenses of Collection and Management continued.

Expenses of Collection and Management.	Sums received.		Estimate of Sums to be received.		Total.		Service of 1834. Estimate of Payments to be made.	
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
Brought over	467,540	20	1,027,058	00	1,220,415	45	25,100	00
4. Fisheries	-	-	500	00				
5. Waters	-	-	-	-				
6. Olive grounds	160	00	5,000	00			650	00
7. Vines and Vineyards	-	-	150	00				
8. Beds of reeds	-	-	50	00				
9. Farming establishments	8,120	00	4,500	00	299,754	16		
10. Divers lands	-	-	100	00				
11. Public buildings	-	-	50	00				
12. Manufactories & workshops	-	-	120	00				
13. Active funds and interest	-	-	100	00				
14. Sales of national property	-	-	3,000	00			3,500	00
15. Measuring, valuations, &c., &c.	421	41	3,500	00			300	00
„ E. Miscellaneous revenues.								
Tit. 1. Expence of collection of local taxes	-	-	1,500	00				
2. „ of taxes on weights	-	-	1,000	00	3,000	00		
3. „ accidental payments	-	-	500	00				
„ F. Legal and executive measures connected with the collection of the Revenue of the State	-	-	6,000	00	6,000	00	2,500	00
Total of Chap. II.	476,041	61	1,053,128	00	1,529,169	61	32,050	00
CHAP. III.—Pensions and Aids.								
§ A. D. Invalids	-	-	1,000	00			-	-
„ B. Widows and orphans	-	-	1,500	00	3,593	33	-	-
„ C. Endowments and aids	93	33	1,000	00			-	-
Total of Chap. III.	93	33	3,500	00	3,593	33	-	-

RECAPITULATION OF EXPENSES.

Expenses of Collection and Management.	Sums received.		Estimate of Sums to be received.		Total.		Service of 1834. Estimate of Payments to be made.	
	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
CHAP. I. — General expenses of treasuries, &c.	32,029	87	82,150	93	114,180	80	4,166	52
„ II. — Special expenses of Collection	476,041	61	1,053,128	00	1,529,169	61	32,050	00
„ III. — Pensions and aids	93	33	3,500	00	3,593	33	—	—
Total expenses	508,164	81	1,138,778	93	1,646,943	74	36,216	52

N. B. In these expenses are likewise included the Extraordinaries, amounting to - drachm. 457,239 40.

Result of the Receipts as compared with the Expenses.

	D.	L.
Amount of Receipts	12,383,955	10
Ditto of Expenses of Collection and Management	1,646,943	74
Net Receipts	10,737,011	36

SERVICE OF 1835.

General View of the Expenditure of the Kingdom.

SERVICES.	Number of the Account.	Service of 1835.						1834.	
		Amount of Payments.		Estimate of Payments to be made.		General Sums.		Payments to be made by estimate.	
		D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
A. Interest & Sinking Fund	1	1,353,561	60	1,353,561	60	2,707,123	20		
B. Civil List	0	549,999	99	341,111	9	891,111	8		
C. Regency	0	254,560	57	—	—	254,560	57		
D. Council of State	2	28,850	00	23,950	00	52,800	00		
E. Minister for Foreign Affairs	3	547,390	75	268,358	35	815,749	10	24,703	33
Carry over		2,734,362	91	1,986,981	04	4,721,343	95	24,703	33

General View of the Expenditure of the Kingdom continued.

SERVICES.	Number of the Account.	Service of 1835.						1834.	
		Sums received.		Estimate of Payments to be mde.		General Sums.		Payments to be made by estimate.	
		D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.	D.	L.
Brought over .		2,734,362	91	1,986,981	04	4,721,343	95	24,703	33
F. Minister of Justice .	4	359,591	34	326,275	00	685,866	35	12,020	00
G. „ of the Interior .	5	423,774	79	758,269	65	1,182,044	44	82,233	38
H. „ of Religion 577,542 51, deducting the sums derived from Ecclesiastical Revenue, 220,000 .	6	98,421	32	259,121	19	357,542	51		
I. Minister of Finance .	7	103,142	87	90,156	71	193,299	58		
J. „ of War .	8	4,305,042	24	1,989,615	26	6,294,657	50	50,000	00
K. „ of the Marine .	9	1,271,475	67	1,545,601	11	2,817,076	78	3,342	40
L. Pensions & aids before 1833 .	10	41,938	94	557,300		599,238	94	102,539	00
Expenses of collection & management, belonging to 1834 .		—	—	—	—	—	—	36,216	52
Grand Total .		9,337,750	08	7,513,319	96	16,851,070	04	311,054	63

BALANCE.

	D.	L.
Total of the Expenses of the Kingdom .	16,851,070	04
Ditto of Receipts .	10,737,011	36
Deficit .	6,114,058	68
Add the sum belonging to the service of 1834 .	311,054	63
And that to the service of 1833 .	39,926	00
There remains a deficit of .	6,465,039	31

The Secretary of State for the Treasury,

(Signed)

W. G. THEOCHARIS.

Athens, this (2nd) 14th September, 1833.

NO. 3.—GREEK BUDGET FOR 1836,

Communicated to the Conference by the Greek Minister, November 21, 1835.

GROSS RECEIPTS.

A. DIRECT TAXES.

	DRA.
1. Tithes	6,650,000
2. Tax on cattle and pastures	2,100,000
3. Ditto on bees	35,000
4. Ditto on patents	100,000
Total Lit. A.	8,885,000

B. INDIRECT TAXES.

5. Customs	2,127,000
6. Stamps	400,000
7. Licences for carrying arms	51,250
8. Duties on weights and measures	3,500
Total Lit. B.. . . .	2,581,750

C. PUBLIC ESTABLISHMENTS.

9. Mint	" " "
10. Post office	23,000
11. Printing and lithographic presses of the State	40,000
Total Lit. C.	63,000

D. TAXES, ROYALTIES, AND PUBLIC DOMAINS.

12. Forests	200,000
13. Minerals	37,000
14. Salt works	380,560
15. Fisheries	131,940
16. Mineral waters	785
17. Olive grounds	64,776
18. Vineyards and currant grounds	58,269
19. Rice grounds	4,330
20. Property at Tyrinthus	6,000
21. Leases of property, lands, gardens, and meadows	87,887
22. Public buildings	4,067
23. Manufactories and workshops	96,581
24. Annuities on purchase money of public property	200,000
25. Active capital and interest	34,500
Total Lit. D.	1,306,695

E. SEPARATE RECEIPTS.

Eventual receipts	6,000
Total of the receipts of the State	12,842,445

EXPENDITURE.

EXPENSES OF COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT.

	DRA.
1. General fund of the Magistracy	120,000
2. Expenses of collection of direct taxes	240,000
3. Ditto of indirect taxes	600,000
4. Ditto of management of public domains	250,000
5. Ditto royalties and public domains	320,000
Total expence of management	1,530,000

BALANCE.

The gross receipts amount to	12,842,445
Deduct expence of collection and management	1,530,000
Remain net receipts	11,312,445

SECOND EXPENDITURE.

B. ORDINARY EXPENSES OF THE STATE.

A. Interest and sinking fund at 6 per cent. on loan of 60 millions of francs, or 67,008,000	4,020,480
B. Civil list	1,000,000
C. Council of State	80,000
D. King's household and Ministry for Foreign Affairs	559,885
E. Ministry of Justice	604,070
F. Ditto Home Department	1,536,237
G. Ditto Religion and Public Instruction	382,823
H. Ditto Finance	200,603
I. Ditto War	4,849,662
K. Ditto Marine	1,500,000
L. Pensions and aids	600,195

Total of ordinary Expenses of the State . 15,333,955

The net receipts of the State amount to . 11,312,445

Remains a deficit . 4,021,510

For a faithful translation: The Secretary of State in the Finance Department,

(Signed)

H. G. THEOCHARIS.

Athens, (Sep. 26) October 8, 1835.

No. 4.

Statements respecting the Expenditure of Greece, and its financial prospects, communicated to the Conference of London, by the Greek Minister, on the 21st of November, 1835.

Greece was recognized by the powers of Europe as an independent state, and also assumed a position amongst the states of Europe, without having, strictly speaking, passed through any intermediate period. The immediate consequence of this was, the necessity which still continues of giving her by degrees institutions, and a system of organization, if not entirely, at least in form, resembling those of other civilized countries.

Such organization, joined to the establishment of a civil list for the King and the Regency, which nevertheless has not much exceeded £40,000 sterling, and coupled also with the demands of the regular military forces of 3,500 men, naturally increased the expenditure of the state, whilst it was impossible that the revenues, especially during the first years, should cover even the most indispensable expences, in a country where agriculture, commerce, and industry, are, as it were, in a state of lethargy, where a long and destructive war has decimated the population, where landed property, that vital source of national wealth, was still almost to be created, where the security of persons and property was exposed to the greatest risk from the consequences of the civil war, and from the absence of regular tribunals: where every thing, shortly before the arrival of the King and the Regency, was plunged into the most complete anarchy; where there was no regular financial administration; where, notwithstanding that the treasury was entirely empty, all persons claimed to be recompensed for services which they had rendered, or indemnified for sacrifices which they had made. This fact was generally admitted, and the indispensable necessity was perceived of concluding a sufficient loan, which the three great Powers granted with that same solicitude for the welfare of Greece of which they

have so often given unequivocal proof. It is not, therefore, astonishing, that there should have been a deficit in the finances of Greece during the first years of the Royal government; and the only point is, whether that deficit should not, and might not have been reduced, in order to place in the hands of the government the means of acting directly upon the material welfare of that country, which was in a state of complete exhaustion. It is fitting in this place to take a hasty survey of the administration of the Regency, so far as it had any effect upon the finances of the country.

The first occupation of the Regency was to raise a regular force, agreeably to the Treaty respecting the army, as much with the view of relieving the troops of the three Powers and of Bavaria, as with that of consolidating order and the public tranquillity which had been so long disturbed, and of transforming an irregular militia into a regular army, a measure which has been held to be of the first importance for the internal order, and for the defence of a state. It is easy to imagine that this operation occasioned a considerable outlay, because it is much more expensive to raise and maintain troops levied abroad, than troops composed of natives, and because the military administration requires much more expence in a country where the objects even of primary necessity must be imported from abroad, than in a country which produces every thing for itself: but the Regency was compelled to adopt this course by Treaty, and by the force of circumstances. Moreover, this body of regulars has effected much useful service, and has bestowed upon the people of Greece much practical information, which must necessarily have a most beneficial influence upon its existence. The benefit of this body of troops must not consequently be regarded solely with reference to its military results, but also with respect to those of national administration; and financial considerations, compared with this two-fold benefit, will assuredly not outweigh it.

2. The formation of a guard of public safety, or a *gendarmerie*,

which, scattered over all parts of the kingdom, might, as in other countries, secure peace and internal tranquillity, was one of the most urgent necessities, and at the same time also the only means of providing in a fitting manner for a great number of old soldiers, and an intermediate measure towards the formation of regular troops. This measure having been attended with the most important results, the expences occasioned by it are thereby sufficiently justified.

3. With regard to the navy, the Regency was far from being able to do all that was necessary, and even what would have been formerly done for that branch of the service. Nevertheless, the settlement of the individual position of the sailors who had deserved so much of their country during the war of independence, their enrolment, and their payment, as also some other arrangements in the arsenal at Poros, such as the boat-houses, &c., and the sending some young men to Europe, with the view of educating them for the naval service, were measures which could not be delayed, although they necessarily increased the expenditure of the navy. But the principal reforms in this branch of service, which is so important to Greece, are still to be effected.

4. An objection has been advanced that some of the principal chiefs of the irregular troops, who distinguished themselves most during the war of independence, were, during the latter part of the Regency, appointed to ranks corresponding with those of the officers of the regular troops, and received proportionate pay, whereby the expences of the army have been considerably increased. Still the Regency could not but take this course, since it would be unjust to neglect those who particularly distinguished themselves during the war. Nevertheless, the state of the national finances has only allowed provision to be made in this manner for a very small portion of the officers of the late irregular troops; and the greater part of them are still waiting with expectation, although the government have passed a special

decree, and, by the law for the endowment of Greek families, have placed at their disposal national lands, to be enjoyed by them as their own property.

5. One of the most sacred duties which the government had to perform, was to take prompt and effectual measures in behalf of the widows and orphans of those who fell in the cause of independence, and for the invalids of that glorious struggle. A separate commission was appointed to examine and to discuss their claims. The pensions, succours, and endowments proposed and granted up to the present time, amount to 600,000 drachmas, and the commission has not yet completed its task. This expence has also been a burthen upon the public treasury, but, from considerations of justice and humanity, it could not be dispensed with.

6. Many military works, such as the arsenal at Nauplia, the barracks, the hospital, &c., which were rendered necessary in consequence of the recently established military regulations, have indeed contributed to augment the deficit in the finances of the three first years, but they will hereafter be of great advantage to the military administration, and will much diminish the expence of it; and the truth may be here perceived of the principle, that every expenditure of a state must not be looked upon as a loss to the treasury; and that, on the contrary, all disbursements for necessary and beneficial establishments produce more than an equivalent revenue.

7. It has been remarked that the organization of the service, and specifically that of the courts of justice, was too expensive, and but little in harmony with the resources of the country: but if the lesson furnished by history is studied, it cannot but be perceived that in all countries wherein order and public tranquillity have been recently established, the authorities and the courts of justice have been near to and within reach of the inhabitants: and that it is only after the successive establishment of municipal authorities, and after the final restoration of order,

that the sphere of the authorities and of the courts of justice has been extended. These considerations, and the peculiar formation of Greece, traversed as it is by mountains, and separated into islands, the difficulty of communication, by reason of the bad state of the roads, and the scattered distribution of the population, sufficiently explain the necessity for multiplying the civil authorities and the courts of justice. This measure necessarily led to great outlay, for it involved appointments, expences for offices, for other arrangements, and for the construction of public buildings, and expences of proceedings, &c.; but it was not on that account possible to dispense with the organization of the country, that indispensable condition for the consolidation of society in Greece; it is evident that internal order, which is the principal foundation of national administration, and of the improvement of the country, cannot be established so long as the government is without instruments for the execution of its orders, and for the administration of the law. The security of persons and property is the chief safeguard for every organized state: every other consideration is to be sacrificed to that.

To think of reaping the precious fruits of agriculture, of industry, of commerce, of the sciences, and of the arts, those vivifying sources of national wealth, without public security and public instruction, is a visionary notion.

It has been objected that the appointments are too highly paid, that there are more persons employed than there is occasion for, and that there are places which are not necessary for the public service. But if it is considered that the expense of living is in fact very great in Greece, where the greater part of the objects of consumption for the upper classes, of which the public servants are a part, are imported from abroad, and that house-rent, for instance, amounts to from 20 to 30 per cent. of the value of the houses; that competition, which alone can keep prices under, is still wanting in the country; that the remuneration for every service must in Greece be paid in money, in consequence of the

commercial propensities of the people ; that the salaries of the civil servants are, in fact, much less than those in most other states ; that a great number of public servants, such as inferior magistrates, their secretaries, the officers of the courts of justice, and the lawyers, are not paid from the public treasury, and only receive the dues of their office *in partem Salarii* ; that it was impossible to expect from the public servants in Greece that they should from the very outset be equally well acquainted with their duty as those who, in other states, are formed in a school of lengthened experience ; and that, finally, the government has, by appointments to civil offices, recompensed more than one service rendered to the country ; it will be admitted *that it is always more easy to censure than to do better*, especially when this fact, as has often been the case in Greece, is overlooked, that it is impossible to expect, in opposition to all the laws of nature and of experience, that a country where so much is to be created should, in a few years, so far develop its resources as to attain to a degree of perfection which other nations have only reached after the laborious struggles of centuries, and that all political constitutions, which, being the work of man, could not be perfect from their birth, and which are not so even yet, should be above all censure. The expences of the financial administration ought not, according to the generally received principles of political economy, to be included in the expences of the state, properly so called, and are merely the expences of administration and augmentation of the gross produce. They are not considerable with reference to the revenues of the country, and as compared with those of other states.

8. It is alleged in the same manner, that the laws given by the Regency are not only too complicated for the present state of the nation, but that their administration and execution occasions very considerable expence. Without considering in this place the impossibility of judging of laws, with respect to their practical utility and their applicability, until after the lapse of a long

period of experience, it is undeniable that one of the principal duties of a legislator is to confer laws which exalt and ennoble a nation, and which are, as much as possible, exempt from all the errors and defects, which are recognized as such in foreign legislation, and which are so prejudicial to nations when not corrected in time, seeing that they convulse them most violently, either by bringing them to the brink of a precipice, or by the process of self-correction : the legislator must keep in view, at the same time, not only the actual state of a country, but also this very important circumstance, that in all legislation there is one distant point which is to be found in all civilised countries, and that laws, which are not in their nature transitory, must be calculated for a long futurity.

Moreover, former governments had conferred the force of law in Greece, upon certain books of French legislation : and it must be remarked in this place, that the Greek people, who are in no respect inferior in point of intellect to the most civilized people, manifest a marked inclination for public life, and for that species of legislation which has conferred such benefit upon France, from whence it originated. Public and oral proceedings are the production of Greece, and have only been reproduced in other states, when, after the lapse of ages, all their advantages, and all their influence upon nations, have been perceived. It is impossible, therefore, to be astonished at their being again introduced into Modern Greece. It may be said that law should be the offspring only of the public life of the nation on which it is conferred, and unfold itself only in conjunction with it. This assertion may hold good where it is applied merely to the civil and the public right of a people ; but to carry it still farther would be to preclude a people from drawing from the history and experience of other nations, who have already traversed a more ample space in the career of civilization, and from appropriating to itself what it finds therein beneficial ; would be to assume that a nation should allow an interval of ages to exist between

itself and other nations, among which it has lately taken its place. It is only necessary to glance at history, to observe the great revolutions which have been effected among nations upon their acquiring written laws. The civil law of the Greeks consists in the *Hexabible* of Armenopoulos, and in the customary laws, consecrated by the practice of the courts, in the same manner as the civil code of France, and of many other countries, comprises the written (or Roman) law, and *customs*. The Regency sanctioned and invested with the force of law this civil law, until the publication of the civil code, which is at present undergoing revision.

9. It has been frequently said, that the government ought not to have appointed missions, as being unnecessary for a country like Greece, and as overburthening the public treasury. If this was not a usual practice among civilised nations, in the number of which Greece must hereafter reckon herself, and of too great importance in respect to the law of nations; if Greece had not, during the first years of her regeneration, had the most vital interests to represent in foreign states; if diplomacy is not to be considered as furnishing opportunities for forming statesmen, who are of such value to Greece, and who, having collected a great store of knowledge and experience, might return to Greece, and distribute there the information which they had acquired abroad, then indeed would the above-mentioned allegation be well placed.

10. The introduction of a medical commission, the appointment of departmental physicians, of vaccinators, the introduction of a course of instruction for surgeons, apothecaries, and midwives, which will speedily commence at Athens, the appointment of the establishment required at the ports for the purposes of sanitary police, increased indeed the expences of the state; but can it be said that this outlay was without object, or that it was superfluous? It would, in truth, be shameful to neglect medical establishments, which are so necessary for the preservation of

health, in a country where Hippocrates lived and moved; it would be the more shameful to do so, since, even in Turkey, and in Egypt, such establishments are beginning to be held in great estimation, and since Greece must, by its geographical position, serve as a bulwark to other states of Europe, against the plague of the East; and since, on that very account, Greece must contemplate the introduction of a system of quarantine, which cannot be carried into effect without the co-operation of a medical body.

11. The government surely will not be liable to blame, for having instituted schools and seminaries of instruction. On these resources depends the civilization of Greece, as well as of every other nation; and the protectors, as well as the friends of Greece, will contemplate with lively satisfaction the desire for improvement, which manifests itself among that interesting people, gifted as it is with ready wit and clear intelligence.

Considering that the funds of charitable institutions are still inconsiderable in Greece; that the revenue of the secularized monasteries was necessarily applied to the payment of the priesthood and to the expences of religion, which at this moment receive an annual aid of 350,000 drachmas from the public treasury; that the municipalities are not in a state to contribute any thing thereto — it will be easily understood that the charges of the public treasury must be increased by the principal expences of the elementary schools, which have been lately increased in number, as also by the entire expences of the twenty-three Greek schools which have been established, of the four academies, of the military school, of the medical schools, of the normal schools, of the seminary for the education of foundlings, of the allowances granted to students for their improvement in the sciences, arts, and trades, of the journeys of masters and scholars, of the education of young Greeks in foreign navies and in naval architecture, for which object the Regency has already expended more than 70,000 drachmas. Besides, there have been complaints in this respect, that the government has done too little; but those

must needs have ceased, when the government had provided for all that was required.

12. Considerable expence has also been incurred for necessary establishments, such as the royal press, the mint, the warehouses, the road from the Piræus to Athens, from Nauplia to Argos, &c. The expence of buildings, in the accounts of the finance department alone, amount to $459,239\frac{20}{100}$ drachmas. These establishments are, it is true, very costly; but it must be considered, that it was necessary, in the first years, to purchase abroad even the planks and timbers; that the country has not, at present, either iron-mines or forges; that wages have sensibly increased, in consequence of the want of hands. Moreover, by means of these establishments, the expences of subsequent years will be considerably diminished.

In addition to this increase of expenditure, occasioned by extraordinary circumstances, it must not be forgotten, that a considerable portion of the revenues of the state must be struck off the sum total of the receipts, since, in consequence of the defects of the ancient system of finance, which it was impossible to change at once, they could not come into the treasury; that, on account of assignments on arrears, and other passive debts of the state, which date from a period antecedent to the arrival of the King, more than 500,000 drachmas have been expended, without that sum having been recovered, or admitting of being covered by the produce of the arrears of the antecedent period. That, at the time of the arrival of the King, there was in the treasury of the state only a disposable sum of 229 phenixes in paper; that the gross revenue of the state did not, from 1833 to 1835, amount to more than the annual sum of 7,600,000 drachmas.

In summing up the foregoing remark, as well as that made at the beginning of the present treatise, it is impossible to be surprised at the deficit, which, deducting the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the two first series of the loan, only amounts, for the years 1833, 1834, and 1835, to five millions and one-

third of drachmas, and has been met by the remainder of the funds of the loan placed at the disposal of the Greek government.

Besides, it is well worthy of consideration, that the greater part of the current disbursements of the state remained in the country, and that the money which was expended returned again to the Greek nation, which could not fail to have a beneficial influence on the existence of the people. It is only necessary to glance at the present state of the country to be satisfied of this fact. In all parts of the kingdom, at Nauplia, Patras, Argos, Athens, and the Piræus, an activity heretofore unknown is perceptible; the cultivation of the country, and generally its productiveness, have received considerable development; and the towns are rising from their ruins. Could these advantages have been looked for, if the consumption and the wants of the people had not increased; if there was no longer any demand for the produce of the country, no longer any inquiry after houses; if, finally, the country had not begun to feel the benefits of that peace which it had so longed for, and to consolidate itself?

All that has passed in the budget of the state is not lost to the nation. Disbursements, with a view to the general good of the country, may be compared to outlay for the promotion of industry. The task of government, in this respect, must only be to reduce the expenditure within the bounds of the strictest necessity.

If then the existence of a deficit in the budget, during the first years, arises only from extraordinary circumstances, and is not the result of the inevitable wants of the administration of the country, the only question is to ascertain how long this state of things may last; whether the means to be provided by the new loan, namely, the raising of the third instalment, can contribute to it; and what will be the prospect of the financial state of the country, principally as regards the balance of the expences, and the receipts of the state.

Before giving a numerical sketch on this question, it may, perhaps, be necessary to glance at the state of this country, its wants, its financial resources, and its administration.

A. In the first place, Greece only requires rest, which alone can consolidate the country, and hasten its development. The formation of a people can only follow the unerring principles of the universe; it is only by degrees that its material force and intellectual powers can be developed.

The government has given to the country the first institutions and elementary laws; it will perfect them by degrees, and will take care to supply that which is still wanting; but the nation, as we have already stated, has great need of rest: it is then that these institutions, these laws, will be able to consolidate themselves. There are several circumstances which promise us rest. In the first place, the reins of government are confided to a King, who seeks his glory only in justice; secondly, the Turkish rule, and the civil wars, have caused the Greek people to feel the difference between despotism and anarchy, and a Monarch who governs according to the laws, and who, consequently, guarantees a lawful state of things. There is, therefore, no reason for supposing that the people could be tempted to return to that state of chaos in which it formerly was placed. Moreover, the law is every where respected in Greece, which, in fact, proves the tendency of the people to maintain order. The government, moreover, possesses the necessary means of carrying into execution the laws and ordinances. An activity, which cannot be mistaken, is already to be observed among the people through the whole extent of the kingdom; money which, for the most part, was buried under ground, is beginning to be dug up, and to be advantageously employed in agriculture, commerce, &c.

People present themselves from all quarters to introduce new branches of industry into Greece; silk, that precious production, afforded to the country a revenue very much out of proportion

with that of other southern states. The cause must be sought for in the faulty method of spinning. The government has already granted all possible facilities for the introduction of spinning machines, similar to those of Lucca. Opium, that precious production of the East, has already been planted in Greece. The facilities afforded to the growers have had the most successful result, and Greece now produces opium little inferior to that of Egypt and of Mecca. The improvement of the oil-works could not escape the notice of native merchants. The experiments made in this matter have had the best result, and it is to be hoped that this branch of industry, for which sacrifices have been made by the government, will shortly be brought to perfection, and will give new resources and riches to Greece. In short, the enterprising spirit of the Greeks, aided by the measures adopted by the government, afford the best hopes for the development of the arts in Greece.

The government hastened to furnish the Greeks, by legislative enactment, with the means of becoming landed proprietors, for which the nation has at all times been anxious, and which the government does not cease to promote in every manner.

There can, therefore, be no doubt that, under such auspices, the Greek people will make great strides, and that in a short time it will lay the foundation of its substantial prosperity by the acquisition of freehold property, by unshackled industry, by the variety of the occupations of the people resulting from the advantageous position of the country, by the facility of house-keeping, by the moderation of the taxes, and, finally, by the frugal way of living, and by the productive capacity of the country, which is so precious to agriculture.

According to the experience of political economy, the result of the substantial prosperity of the people must be the increase of the population of the country, which is so necessary for Greece, and the increase of the revenues of the state; there can, therefore, be no doubt that the revenues of the state will increase in

Greece from year to year; the revenues of the present year are a proof of this—they have exceeded those of former years by about four millions and a half.

B. The extraordinary expences which overburthened the treasury for the three first years will, for the most part, cease henceforward. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the expences have already arrived at their fixed amount, and that, consequently, any increase of the revenue can only be considered as a diminution of the deficit, and that, besides, this diminution will gradually become greater by the reduction in the expences of some branches of the administration; for instance, in those of the army, according to its recent and more suitable establishment, in those of the public offices, owing to the diminution of the present inordinate rents of houses, by the manufacture of various materials which will henceforward be made in the country, by the successive deaths of pensioners, &c.

C. The administration of finance will not fail on its part to contribute to the diminution of the deficit, and to the successive establishment of the balance, although it is not in a state to be of itself alone sufficient for that purpose, seeing that it can only assist in the necessities of the state, and conform itself to the special circumstances of the country, which cannot be methodised immediately. It is very true that the expence of the administration and of the execution of works will increase instead of diminish during the following years, so soon as a system of taxation as uniform as possible shall have been introduced, the working of the mines commenced, and that of the salt pits brought to perfection, the forest regulations completely organized, and those of the custom house placed on a foundation suitable to the gradual development of the people, and the definitive organization of the administration of finance in the provinces brought to a conclusion:—but that increase of expence in the administration and in the execution of works cannot fail to be followed by an increase in the revenues of the state, provided that the ex-

penditure is regulated with the necessary economy : and this duty the present government has imposed upon itself.

D. Another guarantee will be found in the above-mentioned disposition towards economy of which the present government has given proofs, as well as in the character of the monarch, who only requires what is simple, and who is an enemy to all extravagance ; and in fact no unnecessary expence has been incurred since the 1st of June ; many have been abolished, as, for instance, the enlistment of troops in Bavaria, and generally in foreign countries, and the purchase of draught horses and various materials abroad.

E. The most severe responsibility is already introduced, and will be carried on according to the occasions which may hereafter arise. This cannot fail to produce the most advantageous effect on the public treasury. This measure, and the restriction of expenditure to the narrowest practicable limits, cannot fail to secure the most happy success.

The first step which the administration of finance proposes to take will be to draw up (instead of the monthly Budget hitherto in use) an annual Budget, calculated, with the necessary strictness, upon the estimated revenues of the state. This Budget will not commence till the year 1836,—it was impossible to arrange and publish it for the year 1835, seeing, 1st, that the estimates of some of the main branches of the revenues were wanting—that is to say, of the tithes and taxes on cattle, which would, in all probability, afford a surplus of revenue, (considering the new regulations taken to that effect,) which, in fact, did not fail to be the case ; and, 2ndly, that the Council of Ministers did not submit the Budget to the Regency until the first half year had nearly expired, and that it was necessary that some measures should be previously taken, which might ensure the success of the settlement of the Budget.

The alteration of the present system of tithes to that of a monetary tax has been anticipated by the provisions of the law

respecting the endowment of Greek families ; for the present, and until the complete execution of the law, the decree respecting the tithes of the present year has rendered it more easy for the municipalities to let their tithes, and, in fact, the municipalities have availed themselves this year of the favourable provisions of the law : the result of this has been advantageous to the municipalities and the public treasury, the former have been relieved from the vexation of the farmers, and the revenue has received an increase of $2,245,884\frac{91}{100}$ drs. on the amount of the tithes of the preceding year. The profit of 100 per cent., which the farmers occasionally made under former governments, will consequently hereafter accrue to the public account.

The proceeds of the tax on cattle will increase in the present year to 1,817,000 drs. according to official information ; this increase must be attributed to the augmentation of the tax, calculated in proportion to other taxes on land ; it falls chiefly on the herds which arrive from Turkey to winter on the Greek territory.

The tax on cattle is a resource derived from the wandering state of shepherds, and must cease gradually and slowly in proportion to the increase of agriculture ; but the public treasury will not therefore sustain the slightest diminution. The wandering tribes, on becoming proprietors of landed property, will abandon a state of life disadvantageous to themselves, to public order, and to the cultivation of plains and forests. The land taxes which they will then pay to the treasury will greatly surpass the present revenue of the tax on cattle.

The law for the endowment of Greek families, and the regulations for the sale of national property, as well as the law of naturalization, have prepared all that is necessary for the introduction of a system of colonization which is so valuable to Greece. The funds which will accrue from the sale of the national lands will furnish the government with the pecuniary means for providing for the debts of the state, in so far as the interest and sinking

fund are concerned. In this manner, the government will faithfully fulfil the legal obligations of Treaties, and will do every thing that can reasonably be required of it, but impossibilities must not be expected, as, for example, that the administration of the woods and forests should, as the newspaper, "The Minerva," recently alleged, be organized within a year. The government surely cannot accelerate the productive powers of nature, and make trees grow in a year. Meanwhile, Greece, after a lapse of two years and a half, can now procure from her own forests the necessary ship and other timber, instead of buying it at a great expence abroad. This fact proves the progress of the administration of the woods and forests.

After these remarks, which rest upon indisputable facts, we will proceed to sketch out a specific table of the revenues and expences of the state for the succeeding years, proceeding upon the experience of the years that have passed.

The Budget for the year 1835, as discussed in the Council of Ministers, as well as the estimated balance of the receipts and expences of that year, as explained by the Minister of Finance, furnishes the following result :

1. *Net Receipts.*

A. *Direct Taxes.*

	Drachmas.
a. Tithes	6,650,000
b. Tax on cattle	2,100,000
c. Do. on bees	35,000
d. Do. on patents	100,000
Total Lit. A.	8,885,000

B. *Indirect Taxes.*

e. Customs	2,127,000
f. Stamps	400,000
Carried forward .	2,527,000

N

	Drachmas.
Brought forward	2,527,000.
g. Licenses to carry arms	51,000
h. Weights and measures	3,500
Total Lit. B.	2,581,500

C. *Public Establishments.*

i. Mint	
k. Post office	23,000
l. Royal Printing and Lithographic Press	40,000
Total Lit. C.	63,000

D. *Royalties and Domains.*

m. Forests	200,000
n. Mines	37,000
o. Salt works	380,560
p. Preserves and Fisheries	131,940
q. Mineral springs	785
r. Olive grounds	64,776
s. Vineyards and currant grounds	58,269
t. Rice grounds	4,330
u. Farm at Tirynthus	6,000
v. Lease of lands, gardens, and meadows	87,887
w. Public buildings	4,067
x. Manufactories and workshops	96,581
y. Sales of national property	200,000
z. Active capital and interest	34,500
Total Lit. D.	1,306,695

E. *Special Receipts.*

aa. Chance Revenues	6,000
Total receipts	12,842,195

2. *Expences of Management.*

	Drachmas.
1. Treasuries of Departments and Districts	120,000
2. Expences of Direct Taxes .	240,000
3. Ditto of Indirect Taxes .	600,000
4. Ditto of Public Establishments	250,000
5. Ditto of Royalties and Domains	320,000

Total Expences of management, 1,530,000

Which sum being deducted from the gross receipts, leaves at the disposal of the government for the expences of the state 11,312,195

3. *Expences of the State, properly so called.*

a. Interest and Sinking Fund of the new Loan of 60 millions at 6 per cent.	4,020,000
b. Civil List	1,000,000
c. Council of State	80,000
d. King's Household and Ministry for Foreign Affairs	559,855
e. Ministry of Justice	604,070
f. ——— Home Department	1,536,237
g. ——— of Religion	682,823
h. ——— of Finance	200,603
i. ——— of War (including the expences of the Phalanx)	5,000,000
k. of Marine	1,500,000
l. Pensions and aids	600,195

Total 15,783,783

Net receipts 11,312,195

Deficit for the year 1836 4,471,588

Moreover, it must be considered that the interest and sinking fund of the new loan alone amount to 4,020,000 drachmas, which

sum consequently being deducted from the sum total of the deficit, there remains only a deficit of 400,000 drachmas for the current service; but this deficit even might be struck off by reductions on the Budget of the departments, which, with the exception of those of war and of marine which are already reduced, have not been reduced in the statement above given, where they appear in the same state as the council of ministers brought them forward. It would even be possible by further reductions to cover the increased expenditure occasioned by the increase of the Council of state.

The sum of 500,000 drachmas has been included in the Budget of the War Department, under the denomination of appointments, &c., of veterans who have not been employed, or who have not received relief in consequence of the financial state of the country. The government could not remain insensible to the repeated complaints of these veterans.

There is reason to suppose that a balance of disbursements and receipts will be established at least in the space of four years, provided that nothing occurs to call for sacrifices from the treasury, and that the country gradually improves in the manner pointed out above.

The entire deficit during this olympiad would only amount to about 10,000,000, *i. e.*

For	1836	.	.	.	.	.	4,000,000
	1837	.	.	.	.	.	3,000,000
	1838	.	.	.	.	.	2,000,000
	1839	.	.	.	.	.	1,000,000

This supposition rests upon the successive increase of the revenue of the state which may be expected according to the explanations given in this section, as well as upon the experience of the current year, and principally upon the gradual execution of the law for the endowment of Greek families, and upon the improvements introduced into the system of taxation.

The law of endowment, even supposing it to be only carried into effect to one-fourth part of the extent assigned to it, will furnish the treasury with an annual revenue of 6,000,000 drachmas, supposing 50,000 families to be endowed, who would accordingly pay an annuity of 120 drachmas, that is to say, 6 per cent., upon the credit of 2,000 drachmas, which the law grants to each. This supposition is very probable, for one-fourth of the population is already engaged in the cultivation of national lands, and will willingly acquire property in the lands, according to the provisions of the law. No portion of this revenue of the state, which will come into the treasury in addition to the tithes, is included in the Budget of 1836, because the law can only be partially carried into effect in the course of that year. The estimate of 200,000 drachmas, included in the Budget, indicates merely the revenue computed to accrue from other sales of national property.

Even supposing that, at the commencement of the year 1836, the other revenues of the state do not increase under the influence of the circumstances above-mentioned, the revenue which the enforcement of the law of endowment will confer upon Greece would alone be more than sufficient to cover the deficit of the succeeding years, so that the calculation above made is any thing but fictitious, but is based upon facts; a circumstance which should be fully taken into consideration, in an attentive examination of the question relating to the financial state of Greece.

Such a prospect for the receipts and expences of the state, being any thing but illusory, cannot fail to be satisfactory for a state, whose existence dates only a few years back; it is still more satisfactory in comparison with the financial state of so many other civilized countries.

It is to be hoped, that there will be no longer any delay in raising the third instalment of the loan. The royal decree for the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the new loan of 60,000,000 francs, which has already been communicated to the

Allied Courts, proves that the government has honestly given the guarantee required by the 12th and 6th Articles of the Treaty of London. Besides, the raising of the third instalment does not, according to the subsequent treaties, depend upon any other condition; and it must be presumed that the High Powers, who have given so many proofs of the lively interest which they take in the welfare of the Greek nation, will not refuse to the country that pecuniary aid which they have voluntarily guaranteed to it by treaty, and which is absolutely necessary for the restoration and consolidation of this reviving state.

No. 5.

Sir Edmund Lyons to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received January 30, 1836.)

(Extract.)

Athens, January 3, 1836.

Count d'Armansperg has always been the defender of whatever was national in the country, and has endeavoured to blend the elements of nationality with the interests of the crown, and thereby consolidate the throne. These principles are manifested very distinctly in the proclamation issued by the Regency on the King's arrival in Greece, and more particularly in the municipal law of Greece. This law is founded on very liberal principles; it places the administration of the affairs of the municipalities entirely in their own hands; it establishes the principle of election on the most liberal and extended scale, unites most happily the elements of democracy with those of aristocracy, and secures to the throne, at the same time, that influence which the interests of the nation require. The carrying of this law into execution was delayed during the existence of the Regency, in consequence of the inexperience of the persons who were charged with it, and by many other causes; but it has been pressed forward with vigour since the King assumed the reins of government. At the

present moment all the municipalities in Greece are organized, with the exception of those in two districts of Etolia, and the elections have taken place, in almost all of them, to the great satisfaction of the people. Each municipality is already earnestly occupied in the administration of its own affairs, and a new life appears to animate them. In a few months the municipalities will be completely organized, and, I believe, upon as good a footing as any in Europe. Some allowance must, of course, be made for the inexperience of the Greeks in administrative affairs, and for the poverty of some of the municipalities.

Juries have been established in Greece since the accession of his Majesty ; they answer remarkably well, and are properly appreciated by the nation.

The most important step towards the advancement of the nation is certainly the promulgation of the law of endowment of Greek families, which appeared a very short time after the King assumed the direction of affairs. Up to the present moment, there have been but few landed proprietors in Greece, with the exception of the islands of the Archipelago. The object of this law is to secure to every Greek subject a portion of freehold landed property ; thus the liberty of the people will be secured on the most solid foundation, private interests will become connected with general interests, and thence will emanate a constant desire for the conservation of good order and tranquillity. This is the surest and safest means of obtaining a national representation ; it is this which will render it compatible with the maintenance of good order and tranquillity, and the consolidation of the throne.

Another measure, which has been adopted since the majority of the King, is the formation of the Council of State, which has all the characteristics of a senate. The Council of State is composed entirely of Greeks, who have distinguished themselves during the war of independence, and is, consequently, strictly national.

Count d'Armansperg has always shown particular respect for

the nationality of the Greeks. As soon as he regained his influence in the Regency, the first detachment of Greek national troops was formed, and a special mark of confidence was shown them, in putting them at the head of the expedition sent into Messenia. Many Greeks, who had served their country well, received military rank; the disturbances in Maina, instead of being suppressed by force of arms, by means of troops enrolled in foreign countries, were pacified by conciliatory measures; a battalion of troops was raised in the very province where the disturbances had broken out; *the enlistment of troops in Germany was discontinued*; two fresh battalions of national troops were raised in Roumelia and in the Peloponnesus; and, finally, on the King's assuming the reins of government, that great act of justice, the formation of the Phalanx, was consummated; a provision was thereby secured to the warriors who had fought so heroically for the independence of their country, and the satisfaction which it diffused through all classes is an additional guarantee for the maintenance of the tranquillity of the state. By means of this act, and that of the formation of the Council of State, and moreover by means of the regular payment of the expences of the state, reduced since the King's majority to what is strictly necessary, the tranquillity of the country, which alone can ensure the development, the independence, and the liberty of the Greek people, has been secured.

I have great pleasure in stating to your lordship, that not one Bavarian has landed in Greece to fill a place under government since the King's majority. Contracts for public works, which were formerly given exclusively to Bavarians, are now publicly disposed of to the lowest bidder, a measure which has caused general satisfaction.

Pensions to the widows and orphans of those who fell in the revolution have been granted since the majority.

The difficulties in the way of public instruction have been removed since the majority.

The nation, which was before kept in utter ignorance of the expenditure, has had the Budgets of 1835 and 1836 laid before it.

A law has been enacted, after receiving the sanction of the Council of State, for the establishment of a national bank. The impatience of the public (who are paying 25 and 30 per cent. interest for money) for this law to pass, in order that the bank might come into operation in the spring, was very great; but the Council of State did its duty, and discussed it very fully in all its details.

In conclusion, I have the satisfaction of assuring your lordship, that, with the exception of occasional depredations on the frontier, the whole of King Otho's dominions are perfectly tranquil; and I may fairly state, that there is not a country in the world where the people are so well fed, well paid, well clothed, and so well contented—no country where a man is more sure of reaping the fruits of his capital and his labour: so far from there being any misery, there is scarcely a family in the whole kingdom which does not make weekly savings, or increase its stock of sheep or goats; houses are being built even in the winter season, land is taken into cultivation, and the people are occupied in attending to their own affairs.

No. 6.

Sir Edmund Lyons to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received March 26, 1836.)

(Extract.)

Athens, February 24, 1836.

I had the honour of submitting to your lordship, in my despatch of the 3rd of January, detailed accounts of the measures already adopted by Count d'Armanberg, and of those actually in progress for the political advancement of this country, as well as for its internal prosperity.

The almost exclusive attention of the Council of State, ever

since its installation, has been directed to the accomplishment of financial reforms and retrenchments, and the local knowledge which many of the members of this body bring to bear on the questions, and the unremitting assiduity of them all, give every reason to hope for favourable results.

The communes have the entire direction of their own affairs; the press is unshackled; the tribunals are completely independent; private property is scrupulously respected; the personal and religious liberty of the subject is inviolable.

No. 7.

Sir Edmund Lyons to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received April 9, 1836.)

(Extract.)

Athens, 24th March, 1836.

——— dwelt particularly on what he called the impoverished state of the peasantry, and the presence of the Bavarian troops, throwing the whole blame of every thing on Count d'Armansperg, of whom he spoke with great acrimony, and then asked me how I could expect an advance of money to be squandered by the Chancellor and to be eaten up by the Bavarians? I observed to him, that the Council of State, by the Chancellor's desire, had been for the last two months scrutinizing the budget, that all the Ministers and all the Heads of Departments had been examined by them, that every avenue of information was open to them, and every facility afforded to them. I told him that it was the first time I had ever heard Count d'Armansperg accused of squandering the money of the State; that, on the contrary, his reform of abuses was one of the great causes of his popularity with the nation at large, and the principal cause of the hatred and opposition of many individuals. I denied that the peasantry were impoverished, or that they wore sheepskins. That as to the Bavarian troops, they were sent here in consequence of an act of the

Conference, and that Count d'Armansperg had not the means of sending them back if he had wished to do so, and that I should be very happy to discuss with him, whenever he pleased, the propriety of sending them away, *en masse*, at this moment.

No. 8.

Sir Edmund Lyons to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received May 30, 1836.)

(Extract.)

Athens, 10th May, 1836.

Count d'Armansperg has requested Mons. Lagrené and me to express the thanks of King Otho and his government for the promise of pecuniary aid, which relieves Greece from great and immediate embarrassment; but his Excellency, at the same time, requested us to observe to our respective governments that he had earnestly pressed for this assistance before the disturbances, which have naturally caused an increased expence, took place, and that a further advance on the loan is absolutely necessary to enable him to carry into effect his contemplated measures, all of which are indispensable to the tranquillity of the country, and the development of its resources, so as to enable the revenue to cover the expences.

No. 9.

Sir Edmund Lyons to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received June 30, 1836.)

(Extract.)

Athens, May 30, 1836.

No inroads have been made on the frontier since the end of April, and tranquillity has prevailed throughout this country.

General Church is still in Western Greece, and his reports of the loyal feelings of the inhabitants are extremely satisfactory.

Mr. Griffith, of this mission, who has known Greece for many

years, has lately made an excursion in the Morea and Continental Greece, and I have great satisfaction in stating, that he found the progress of improvement to be far beyond his most sanguine expectations.

No. 10.

Sir Edmund Lyons to Viscount Palmerston.

(Received July 27, 1836.)

(Extract.)

Athens, June 28, 1836.

The people throughout the kingdom are occupied in collecting an average harvest in peace, tranquillity, and confidence.

The Council of State, after a short holyday, has resumed its useful labours; the Ottoman and Greek Mixed Commission is actively employed in arranging the sale of Turkish private property in Greece. More activity than I have ever before witnessed here prevails in all the departments of the government, and more fruits are consequently observable.

General Sir R. Church is just returned from inspecting Western Greece, and reports very favourably of the loyal and peaceable spirit of the people.

So far, my Lord, all is satisfactory and cheering; and I have no doubt whatever of the most sanguine expectations of England and France being realized respecting the independence and prosperity of this country, if timely pecuniary aid be guaranteed in the spirit of the Treaty of 7th May, 1832, by which it was called into existence as a kingdom by the three Allied Powers, and upon the faith of which its sovereignty was accepted by the King of Bavaria on the behalf of his son Otho, who, since his majority, has ratified his august father's Act, and sealed the compact with his subjects by solemnly renouncing all eventual claim to the throne of Bavaria.

No. 11.

Statement of the Amount of Trade between England and Greece, in each of the last Five Years, so far as the same can be made out from the returns of His Majesty's Consuls at Patras and Syra.

PATRAS.

Invoice Value of Cargoes.

		Ships.	Tonnage.	Imports.	Exports.
1831	—	8	1,105	£ 535	£ 33,484
1832	—	20	3,081	2,335	45,039
1833	—	23	3,620	2,939	38,949
1834	—	28	4,047	11,596	73,113
1835	—	31	4,542	30,077	117,555

SYRA.

No Returns previously to 1833.

1833	—	17	2,479	Nil.	Nil.
(from August 13)					
1834	—	55	7,763	147,555	Nil.
1835	—	58	8,392	126,977	Nil.

N.B.—It should be observed, with respect to the invoice value of the cargoes herein stated to be conveyed in British ships to Syra, that a considerable portion, probably two-thirds of the cargoes, are carried on from thence to other ports in the Levant.

This Return contains only a statement of the trade carried on in British vessels.

STATEMENT OF THE FINANCES OF GREECE
FOR 1833, 1834, AND 1835.

PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE KING OF GREECE, OCTOBER, 1836.

Having taken under consideration the report of the Finance Ministry, October 13th, (25th) of this year, with the accompanying Budget of the receipts and expenses of the years 1833, 1834, and 1835,

The Finance Secretary will publish the one and the other at full length in the Official Journal of the government, together with this decree. Hereafter will be published officially, in the same journal, the several accounts of each separate Ministry.

In the name, &c. of the King,

The Council of Ministry,

ARMANSPERG.

RISOS.

SMALZ.

MANSOLAS.

CRIESIS.

LASSANI.

Athens, October 28, 1836.

Sire,

In obedience to the Royal Decree, I have the honour to submit to your Majesty the report of the receipts and disbursements during the years 1833, 1834, and 1835, together with the documents on which they are founded.

I am, with the most profound respect, &c. &c. &c.

G. LASSANI, Director of Finance.

RECEIPTS.

	Dr.	Lep.	Dr.	Lep.
<i>Extraordinary Receipts.</i>				
Loan of forty millions of francs . . .	—		44,672,000	00
Balance of the old loan . . .	210,900	0		
Advance by the Bavarian Government	1,128,944	44	1,339,844	44
<i>Ordinary Receipts.</i>				
Revenue . . . 1833 . . .	7,721,370	62		
Ditto . . . 1834 . . .	10,921,787	82		
Ditto . . . 1835 . . .	13,635,930	66		
	32,279,088	80		
Less expenses of collection for 3 years	3,798,184	73		
	28,480,904	7		
Less not yet collected for the 3 years	4,785,397	13		
			23,695,506	94
			69,707,351	38

EXPENSES.

	Dr.	Lep.	Dr.	Lep.
<i>(A.) For the Loan, and for 1833.</i>				
1. Management and dead loan (discount, loss of exchange, interest, commission, coining money, insurance and transport of specie) . . .	—		5,296,070	06
2. Debts and Outfits:—				
1. Indemnity to Turks, for Zeitun	12,531,164	54		
2. Debts due to the Allies . . .	1,125,694	44		
3. Debt and interest to Eynard . . .	131,782	40		
4. Buying up paper money . . .	10,432	00		
5. Sinking fund effective . . .	961,851	16		
6. Expenses previous to 1833 . . .	159,762	45		
			14,920,636	99
3. Interest on the capital of the loan . . .	—		4,842,620	50
4. Calling in the copper coin previous to 1833	—		463,843	87
(A.) Total from the loan, previous to 1833			25,523,221	51
<i>(B.) Current Service, 1833, 1834, 1835.</i>				
1833	11,821,234	27		
1834	14,987,298	87		
1835	13,338,575	04		
	40,147,107	38		
Less yet to be paid	864,866	80		
Balance for the current service, 1833, 1834, 1835	—		39,292,220	38
Total	—		64,805,441	89

RECAPITULATION.

		Total.	
		Dr.	Lep.
Receipts	: : : : : : : : : .	69,707,351	38
Expenses	: : : : : : : : : .	64,805,441	89
Excess of Receipts, viz.		4,901,909	49
In Cash, 31st December, 1835		1,810,834	49
In paper money		123,410	95
In the hands of the bankers of the loan		151,893	79
In different amounts, not included above		184,279	34
The sums received up to the 31st July, 1836, from outstandings 1833, 1834, 1835, deducting expenses of collection		2,631,490	92
		4,901,909	49

N. B. Twenty-eight drachmas form a pound sterling. *

* Morning Herald, December 29, 1836.

COPY OF AN ANGLO-GREEK BOND.**GREEK LOAN GUARANTEED BY ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND
RUSSIA.****SERIES A., UNDER THE SPECIAL GUARANTEE OF ENGLAND.**

Bond payable to the Bearer.

Capital, £40 Sterling.

Annual Interest, £2 Sterling.

The holder of this Bond is entitled to the annual interest of two pounds sterling, or fifty-one francs, twenty centimes, payable half-yearly, on the 1st of March and the 1st of September.

This interest is guaranteed by England, according to the engagement contracted by that Power. It is payable, at the option of the holder, in London in sterling, or in Paris in francs, at the places named in the Coupons, in conformity with the contract of the loan of 60,000,000 francs, or £2,343,750 sterling, entered into by the Greek government and Messrs. de Rothschild, Brothers, on the 12th of January, 1833.

ANNO 2 et 3 Gulielmi IV. Regis. cap. 121. An act to enable his Majesty to carry into effect a Convention made between his Majesty and the King of the French, the Emperor of all the Russias, and the King of Bavaria. (16th Aug., 1832.)

Whereas, by a Convention made and signed at London, on the 7th day of May, 1832, between his Majesty, and the King of the French, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the one part, and the King of Bavaria on the other part, the hereditary sovereignty of Greece was offered by the Courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, to the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria, second son of his Majesty the King of Bavaria, and the same was accepted by his said Majesty the King of Bavaria, acting in the character of guardian of the said Prince Otho during his minority; and whereas an article was agreed upon between the said contracting parties, to the following effect, (See Art. 12. page 337).

And whereas it is expedient that his Majesty should be enabled to carry into effect the said Convention, be it therefore enacted, by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that it shall be lawful for his Majesty, his heirs and successors, and they are hereby authorized to *guarantee the loan* to be contracted by Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, *upon the terms and conditions specified in the said 12th Article of the said Convention*; and that, for the purpose of giving effect to the said guarantee, the Lord High Treasurer, or the Commissioners of the Treasury of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or any three or more of them for the time being, respectively, shall be, and he and they *is and are hereby empowered*, from time to time, out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to cause *to be issued such sums of money as shall be required* for the payment of any interest or sinking fund agreed to be paid by his Majesty under the said Convention, *as and when the same may, from time to time, respectively, become payable*, and so long as the same should be payable, conformably to the tenor of his Majesty's engagements, as specified in the said Convention.

II. And be it further enacted, that the said Lord High Trea-

surer, or Commissioners of the Treasury, for the time being, shall cause to be prepared, and shall lay before both Houses of Parliament, within twenty days after the commencement of every session of Parliament, an account, up to the 31st of December, then next preceding, of the total sums, if any, which shall, from time to time, have been issued and applied, by virtue of this Act, for paying and satisfying any interest on the said part of the said loan, so agreed to be guaranteed by his said Majesty, or towards paying and satisfying any principal thereof.

French Law of the 14th of June, 1833.

(Inserted in the Bulletin des Lois, No. 103.)

The Minister of Finances is authorized to guarantee, in the name of the treasury of France, and under the conditions stipulated in the Convention, signed on the 7th of May, 1832, between France, England, and Russia, on the one part, and his Majesty the King of Bavaria on the other part, the loan to be contracted by the government of Greece.

Ukase to the Administrative Senate of Russia.

Whereas by Art. XII. of the Convention concluded in London the 7th of May, 1832, the government of Greece has been empowered to negotiate, in order to promote the prosperity of that country, a loan, not to exceed the total amount of 60,000,000 of francs, to be guaranteed by the three Powers, viz., Russia, Great Britain, and France, on the conditions stipulated in the said Article; which loan has lately been concluded and divided into three principal series, of 20,000,000 of francs each, at the annual interest of 5 per cent., and with a sinking fund of 1 per cent.

We hereby give our guarantee to the above loan, in such manner that the Imperial Treasury shall be responsible for the payment of the interest and sinking fund of each series, as it may be issued. If, therefore, at any period, the Greek government, from

the pressure of circumstances, should become unable to discharge the whole, or any portion, of the payment due for the one-third part of the said interest and sinking fund, our Minister of Finance, on due notice being given to him, shall, without delay, take the necessary measures for the instant payment, on account of the Imperial Treasury, of such amount as may be chargeable upon it.

The Senate of Administration shall communicate our will on this subject to the Vice Chancellor and to the Minister of Finance, who, each in his particular department, will make the necessary dispositions for the execution of the present Ukase.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

St. Petersburg, 26th March, 1833.

Extract from the Contract of the Greek Loan.

The Greek government, under the guarantee of the three great Powers, England, France, and Russia, sells and negotiates to MM. de Rothschild, brothers, the loan of 60,000,000 of francs capital, guaranteed by the three great Powers. The said sum of 60,000,000 of francs, nominal capital, shall bear an annual interest of 5 per cent., and shall be divided into bonds, payable to bearer, all bearing the said interest.

The annual interest of 5 per cent. on the nominal amount of each bond shall be payable half-yearly, viz., on the 1st of March, and on the 1st of September. This payment shall be made at the option of the bearers, at Paris, in francs, at the house of MM. de Rothschild, brothers, or in London, in sterling, at the fixed exchange of 25 francs and 60 centimes per pound sterling, at the house of MM. Rothschild.

By the present contract, the Greek government ensures to the contracting house, and consequently to the bearers of the bonds, not only the interest at 5 per cent. per annum, but also the creation of an annual sinking fund of 1 per cent. on the nominal capital of the present loan, which must be applied half-yearly to

the successive redemption of the bonds: this sinking fund to operate by compound interest, until the total extinction of the present loan. *The sinking fund, as fixed above, shall neither be increased nor diminished.*

Independently of the guarantee given for the present loan by the three great Powers, the Greek government assigns, as an additional security, all the goods and revenues of the state, and especially the entire produce of the taxes. The Greek government hereby engages to consider the present debt as inviolable, rejects, from this moment forward, all exceptions and oppositions, and binds itself never to oppose the claims of any bearers of bonds of the present loan, on account of their being foreigners, or subjects of any power at war with Greece. The Greek government is, therefore, bound to apply the first revenues of the state to the payment of the interest and sinking fund, so that the actual receipts of the Greek treasury shall be forthwith devoted to such payment, and receive no other destination, until provision for this loan is completely assured for the current year.

The present loan shall be divided into three principal series, of equal amount, or of 20,000,000 of francs capital each.

The sum necessary for the payment of the interest on the bonds of the present loan, as well as of the annual sinking fund, will be placed by the Greek government in the hands of MM. de Rothschild, brothers, in Paris, six months before each half-yearly dividend becomes due. The Greek government engages, therefore, to remit punctually, at the appointed period, the funds for both these objects; but in case it should fail to fulfil this engagement, and whatever may be the cause of the delay that may occur in the above-mentioned remittance, the three great Powers which guarantee the present loan remain bound, each for its respective portion, to transmit to MM. de Rothschild, brothers, funds for the payment of the interest and of the sinking fund of the present loan. Consequently it is agreed, that if at one or any of the periods fixed for the successive remittance of such

funds to Paris by the Greek government, MM. de Rothschild, brothers, have not received a sufficient sum for the payment of the interest and of the sinking fund, they shall immediately notify such deficiency to the Representatives of the three great Powers in Paris or in London, or, in the absence of Representatives of those Powers in Paris or in London, at any other place where they may be represented, or at the seat of government of each power; and in such case, the three great Powers remain bound, each for its respective portion, to enable MM. de Rothschild, brothers, to pay at maturity the above-mentioned interest and sinking fund.

The present loan will be redeemed by means of purchases, made successively, and at the price of the day, on the exchange of Paris, or on that of London, as will be most expedient, by the management of MM. de Rothschild, brothers, and through the agency of a broker. This mode of redemption will only take place when the purchases can be made under par; in the contrary case, the redemption shall be effected publicly, by drawing lots, in the presence of the Representatives of the Greek government at Paris, and of MM. de Rothschild, brothers; the reimbursement of the bonds drawn shall be made at par, at the expiration of six months after the day of their having been drawn; the numbers of those bonds shall be inserted, at three different times, in a Paris and London journal, with an invitation to the bearers to receive the reimbursement in Paris at par, as well as the dividends due at the period fixed for such reimbursement; after which period the said bonds shall cease to bear interest, and the subsequent dividend warrants, becoming from that moment null and void, shall be returned with the bonds. The established sinking fund will always operate equally on the three series of the loan, so that at the end of each half year the same sum will have been employed in the redemption or reimbursement, at par, of the bonds of each of the three series; it being provided, that the reimbursement at par, and by lot, can

only take place on those series, the redemption of which shall not have been effected or completed by purchases made under par, during the half year.

The bonds redeemed by either of the above modes will be cancelled publicly in Paris every half year, in the presence of the Representative of the Greek government and of MM. de Rothschild, brothers, who will sign a declaration, witnessing the transaction. The list of the numbers of the cancelled bonds shall be published in a Paris and London journal."

By an ordinance of the 16th (28th) February, 1833, the Royal Regency of Greece, in the name of his Majesty the King of Greece, has duly approved and ratified the contract for a loan, of which the preceding is an extract, and promises to observe, and cause to be exactly observed, the conditions thereof.

L'Envoyé Extraordinaire, Ministre Plenipotentiaire

de S. M. le Roi de Grèce à la Cour de France,

P. DE SOUTZO.

Paris, 1st March, 1833.

The Undersigned hereby certifies that the present debenture appertaining to the loan contracted by the government of Greece, conformably to the conditions stipulated in the Convention of the 7th of May, 1832, forms a part of the 20,000,000 of francs guaranteed by Great Britain, pursuant to the act of Parliament of 16th of August, 1832; and that in default of payment by the Greek government, the same will be paid by the British government.

The Commissioner specially appointed by his Majesty,

A. ASTON.

Paris, 1st September, 1833.

EXTRACT FROM "TURKEY AND ITS RESOURCES."

PRESENT POPULATION OF THE GREEK STATES.

Islands, &c.	218,000
Eastern Greece	150,000
Western Greece	100,000
Morea	400,000
	868,000

STATEMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE NATIONAL DO- MAINS OF GREECE.

Morea.	Stemmata.	
Pasture and forest	6,000,000 at 3 piastres, per st.	18,000,000
Corn land	6,000,000 at 50	300,000,000
Irrigable land	500,000 at 1,000	500,000,000
Currant land	1,500 at 3,000	4,500,000
Vineyards	6,000 at 1,000	6,000,000
Olive trees	100,000 at 50	5,000,000
Fruit trees	200,000 at 20	400,000
Mills	400 at 5,000	2,000,000
Continental Greece, excepting Eubea and Attica, in which provinces the Turks retain the right of selling their lands.		
Pasture and forest		3,000,000
Arable land	750,000 at 50 piastres, per st.	37,500,000
Vineyards and gardens	3,000 at 1,000	3,000,000
Olive trees	150,000 at 50	7,500,000
Mills		600,000
		887,500,000
		£11,833,333 7s.

REVENUE OF GREECE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION.

1. POLL TAX.

	Piastres.
Eastern Greece	191,500
Western Greece	60,105
Morea	463,000
Islands	200,000
	<u>914,605</u>

2. TITHE.

Eastern Greece	761,000
Western Greece	173,292
Morea	2,500,000
	<u>3,434,292</u>

3. ASSESSED TAXES.

Eastern Greece	1,607,000
Western Greece	12,900
Islands	250,000
	<u>1,869,900</u>

4. CUSTOMS AND EXCISE.

Morea—Excise on Wine	150,000
Export duties on currants, silk, wool, &c.	325,000
Import duties on coffee, &c.	<u>475,000</u>
Paid to the Porte	Total 6,693,797

Raised for Local Purposes, without the sanction of the Porte, but by order of the Local Authorities' approximate Calculation.

For the Morea	10,000,000
For Continental Greece	2,000,000
	<u>12,000,000</u>

Approximate Calculation of the Total Revenue of the Provinces, comprised in independent Greece previous to the Revolution Piastres 18,693,797

At 30 piastres per pound sterling* £623,130

* Mr. Urquhart calculated the piastre at only 15 to the pound sterling; but, although this might have been the rate of exchange before 1815, I have thought it right to take the average exchange for 1820.

LETTER FROM SIR EDMUND LYONS TO THE
CHEVALIER RUDHART.

August, 8, 1837.

Last night, on my return to this capital, I had the honour to receive your letter of the 5th instant, in which I observed with infinite regret that you deem that in wishing to favour personal interests, I have lost sight of my diplomatic character.

This is, Sir, a serious accusation, which I wholly repel, and, in assuring you that you are mistaken, I must also avow that it surprises me; for, whatever unpleasantness and impropriety may arise from this correspondence, it cannot be denied that it has been imposed upon me, because you have been the first to set aside courtesy and diplomatic usages, by omitting to make any communication to this Legation, respecting the arbitrary expulsion from this country of an individual having an English passport, with the *visa* of a Greek consul; secondly, because you have neglected, for twenty-two hours together, to answer the inquiries I made of you: and, lastly, by your refusal, after the communication of the act, which has been accomplished in those twenty-two hours, to afford me any explanation whatever.

When the Prime Minister of a kingdom is a foreigner, and wholly unknown to the country, without any connection of habits and manners, and, apparently, of political sentiments, with the people he governs, his situation is, and must be, an invidious and arduous one. A Foreign Minister, in acknowledging the

undeniable right of the sovereign to choose his Prime Minister, without consulting any Foreign Power, will always act with delicacy, and with a regard for so peculiar a situation. But, if it happen that the Prime Minister be also Minister for Foreign Affairs, the foreign agent is, in my opinion, not to be averted from doing his duty, because his complaints against the government are, in reality, complaints against the *political* direction which it has adopted.

Permit me to assure you, Sir, that, in acting after the principles and impressions I have just stated, I have acted with wisdom and reflection in my diplomatic character, and not in another, in telling you how much I regret that your individual preference for Austrian and Bavarian principles should carry you away so far that you seem no longer to perceive the ties which link the people, of whom you are the head, with the Allied Powers. You wish even to degrade a British passport, to discuss and limit the sphere of British protection, although thousands and tens of thousands of King Otho's subjects and other Greeks are indebted for their lives, liberties, and fortunes, to passports quite similar to that of M. Usiglio.

Really, Sir, it has never entered into my mind that you could be surprized or annoyed at a preference being imputed to you for Austrian and Bavarian policy, or that you have the slightest desire to conceal that preference, since your first acts appeared to be a public avowal of that fact, which all subsequent events have, in my opinion, confirmed, for although, to my great astonishment, you now come forward and profess an entire impartiality towards all the Powers, permit me to tell you, (and I tell it you with deep regret) that I perceive no proof of that impartiality. Does it consist in the generally accredited statement that you have been to seek at Vienna the approbation of the Austrian government, to the memorandum of the plans which you proposed adopting in your administration of Greece? Does that impartiality consist in the care with which you did conceal from the

Allied Powers the memorandum which you have hastened to submit to a government which has always vigorously opposed the emancipation of Greece? Does it consist in devoting your time so wholly to Austria that you have not even found leisure to return a visit of mere politeness to the Representatives of the three Allied Powers, which have raised to the rank of a kingdom the country you rule over—you, Sir, who have been on the eve of embarking on board one of their ships of war?

These facts, Sir, are notorious. It is not for me to say whether they be correct or not, and I cannot be with you of opinion that their object has been to produce upon King Otho's mind and upon foreigners the impression you talk of. I know, on the contrary, that they have generally deemed it an avowal of your determination to give a preference to the Austrian government's principles.

As for your relations with Bavaria, we need but observe the notification of your commission in Greece, in which you are styled "*Bavarian Councillor and State Minister.*" This has not been intended to give your appointment a Greek and independent character so essentially necessary to the welfare, and, I may add, to the tranquillity of Greece. Such gratuitous warning of your intercourse with Bavaria produced, as you may be assured, a most deplorable effect over this ambitious people, followed as it was by the re-enlistment of Bavarian officers, and the rigorous and continual efforts made to re-enlist Bavarian soldiers, notwithstanding the well-known wishes of England and France. All that, coupled with the unfortunate impression (whether founded or not, I cannot say), that was the consequence of the system of public education being put under the superintendence of Professor Brandeis, has excited in the Greeks a spirit of hostility to Bavaria, a feeling of which we have recently had such melancholy evidence. As for myself, as the representative of a Power which has so greatly contributed to the emancipation of Greece, and its erection into a kingdom, by assisting it with loans, and guaran-

teeing its integrity, and which has no other object in view than to consolidate Greece under the dynasty of King Otho, I, Sir, feel it my duty to take all circumstances into consideration, and draw attention upon the too probable and alarming consequences that may attend the recurrence of a proceeding such as the one from which M. Usiglio has suffered.

It is remarkable that, whilst I am writing this letter, I am brought the report of a British agent in Greece, who has no knowledge of M. Usiglio's affair, and who informs me that a rumour is afloat of a Greek debtor, who had escaped to Trieste, having been given up by the Austrian government, and that the circumstance, coupled with the circular order sent from Athens a few months ago concerning some Italian refugees, has made a most serious impression upon the public mind, by increasing the disposition to believe that there exists a secret treaty or understanding between the Austrian, Bavarian, and Greek governments.

When you wrote to me a formal denial of any list of proscribed persons having come from abroad, and of any foreign influence having been exercised in the expulsion of M. Usiglio, I presume, Sir, that the multifariousness of your occupations made you lose sight of facts which have become perfectly well known to this Legation, as well as to the other British Authorities in Greece since the end of April last.

I am sorry, Sir, you have deemed it proper to express regret at my not having confidentially communicated my opinion upon the state of affairs, since I am thereby compelled to remind you that when I took the liberty of acting thus immediately after my arrival, your manners were as discouraging as your recent refusal to grant me any information upon the affair of M. Usiglio.

EDMUND LYONS.

THE END.

LONDON :

P. SHOBERL, JUN., LEICESTER STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE





Parish, Henry Headley

The diplomatic history of the monarchy of Greece from the year 1830,
showing the transfer to Russia of the mortgage held by British capitalists
over its property and revenues

London 1838

H.gr. 905

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